THE ARMED PROPAGANDA
TEAMS OF VIETNAM

It is probably correct to say that almost any nighttime visitation of Viet Cong into a village was preceded by an armed propaganda team that explained the Communist cause and prepared the people to meet the needs of the combat forces. The enemy Armed Propaganda Team could move about within the village and pass as farmers or tradesmen. For instance, David Hunt mentions the APTs in an article entitled Villagers at War: The National Liberation Front In My Tho Province, 1965-1967. Some of his comments are:

Government of Vietnam cadres only came into the hamlets when it was convenient for them to do so, while (Communist) Front cadres who operated openly - that is, who possess legal papers, whose National Liberation Front affiliation is secret - seem to live within the community. The situation in the villages is relatively favorable to the Saigon regime in that the local Front organization cannot function above ground during the day, and Saigon’s “Armed Propaganda Teams" (the idea for such teams, including the name itself, is borrowed directly from the NLF) and regular troops can move around without fear of being hit hard by guerrillas or other NLF units.

The Communist method is mentioned by Colonel William F. Johnston in the article “Neglected Deterrent: Psychological Operation in Liberation Wars,” Military Review, May 1968. Some of his comments are:

Vietnam is not a new type of conflict. Almost every facet of it is simply an adaptation of strategy, tactics and psychological techniques which Mao Tse-tung evolved in China.

In the early stages of the Viet Minh – French conflict, Ho Chi Minh’s guiding principal, according to General Giap, were armed propaganda which would insure that “political activities were more important than military activities,” and “fighting less important than propaganda”; and” not to attempt to overthrow the enemy, but try to win him over and make use of him.”

What the agit-prop cadre said was usually based on a detailed prior investigation by a secret Communist agent in the village. In this way, what they had to say made good sense to the villagers.

Between 1955 and 1960, the US agencies in Vietnam made the same errors that President Diem had made. The real Communist threat of generating power through agitation and armed propaganda based on grievances of the masses was discounted…It was not until 1959…that US priorities turned to psychological warfare as a weapon…but by this time the Viet Cong had five years’ uncontested opportunity to agitate, propagandize, organize, and discipline the masses under an experienced underground Viet Cong military-type chain of command or infrastructure.

My friend U.S. Army Staff Sergeant (Ret.) Sam Eaton told me about an experience his wife Bac had with a Viet Cong propagandist as a 15-year-old teenager in 1968 while living in An Long five miles from the Cambodian border.

The propagandist was named Hoi, a hard-looking communist who demanded the attention of the young girl. She was forced to appear friendly and hospitable as the Viet Cong drank her tea and ate freshly roasted peanuts. He began his lecture:

Tonight we study about honorable Uncle Ho Chi Minh and about life and death. The old people said that dying in glory is better than living in shame. Have you ever heard that before? It is about dignity, courage and honor. We will always put our country and its honor above our lives. I am one of Uncle Ho’s heroes. Look at the courage I display, going from camp to camp, and spreading Uncle Ho’s word. You would do well to mold yourself on my brave model.

Bac said that a few days later when a lone American reconnaissance aircraft flew over the village Hoi opened fire on it with his AK47. The villagers were aghast. Soon afterwards, two fighters appeared. The farmers knew enough to stay very still so as not to invite attack and to wave a Republic of Vietnam flag to show that they were loyal to the government; Hoi once again fired his AK47 from a nearby creek. The aircraft strafed his position with machinegun and rockets.

Hoi suddenly burst from the reeds minus his black pajama shirt and waving a South Vietnamese flag. It was clear that the hero of the revolution had every intention of using the Saigon flag to save his life. Bac watched him hiding among the farmers and recalled the Vietnamese saying, “The coward dies many times before his death.”

APT Handbook

The American and South Vietnamese governments envied the Communist success and decided to counter enemy propaganda by employing their own propaganda troops. One of the problems, of course, is that the Government of Vietnam Armed Propaganda Team would usually be accompanied by armed U.S. troops, which probably led to a lack of credibility on their part. What do we know about the Government of Vietnam Armed Propaganda Teams? There is a wealth of information in the APT Handbook, an undated guide that was issued to the American advisors of the APTs. I have edited some of the data in the handbook for efficiency and to make it more concise:

This handbook was prepared so that advisors and managers of the Chieu Hoi Program, the Intelligence and Psywar communities and other persons who are interested in the means and methods of face-to-face inducement will have a better understanding of the APT and its administration and operation. Armed Propaganda Teams represent the most effective of all returnee media. The results they obtain will vary proportionately to the skill with which they are employed, their training and their motivation. In the past, much of their full potential has been alleviated by the lack of complete understanding of not only what they might possibly accomplish but also of the very basic fundamentals of organization, training, tactics, etc.

Government of Vietnam Armed Propaganda Team

The handbook defines the Armed Propaganda team:

During the summer of 1964, the Ministry of Chieu Hoi conceived the idea to better exploit the experience and knowledge of selected Chieu Hoi returnees (ex-Hoi Chanh) following their release from the Chieu Hoi Center. They decided to use ex-Hoi Chanh to go back into Viet Cong controlled or contested areas to talk to the people, relate their experience on both sides, discuss the policies and aims of the Government of Vietnam and tell the people about the Chieu Hoi Program. This would not only place the Hoi Chanh in a positive position to help the Government of Vietnam but at the same time show the people that those who have seen both sides recognize the Communist cause as unjust and desire to fight against it.

The APT is the primary action arm of the Ministry of Chieu Hoi for face-to-face inducement of enemy military and political personnel to change sides. This para-military force is provided to each province and functions as part of the provincial Chieu Hoi Program. The Armed Propaganda Team has no combat function, only being lightly armed for self-protection while conducting operations in uncertain or contested areas.

The history and organization of the Armed Propaganda Team is discussed:

The first two APT companies were established on 1 October 1964 by the Ministry of Information / Chieu Hoi. These companies, each with a strength of 74 personnel and composed of two 36-man platoons, were initially located in Binh Duong, Long An, and Quang Ngai provinces. The outstanding success  of these companies led to the establishment of an additional 25 companies during 1965 and 1966.The authorized complement of Armed Propaganda Teams was increased to 45 companies in 1967 and 65 companies in 1968.The authorization was increased to 75 companies in 1969.

The annual force structure of the Armed Propaganda Team is determines by the Ministry of Chieu Hoi based on provincial inducement requirements. After coordinating with the United States Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV) the force level is subject to review by the Director General for Budget and Foreign Aid as part of the Ministry budget.

Major factors which are considered in the distribution of the Armed Propaganda Teams are the Province Pacification Precedence List, available targets, and the ability to recruit and manage.

The Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) as of 1 April 1969 is mentioned:

The largest element of the APT is a company. It consists of a company headquarters and three 23-man platoons for a total of 74 personnel. Each platoon consists of a platoon leader, an assistant platoon leader and three seven-man squads. Each squad has a squad leader and two three-man sections. Individual clothing was purchased using the Ministry budget while field equipment was supplied by U.S. Department of Defense funding.

Each Armed Propaganda Company is authorized the following major equipment:

1. 2 trucks
2. 2 trailers
3. 5 38-caliber pistols
4. 57 M2 carbines
5. 3 Browning automatic rifles
6. 6 Thompson submachine guns
7. 3 30-caliber machine guns
8. 4 PRC-10 radio sets
9. 3 public address sets AN/U1H-5
10. 3 recorder-reproducer sets AN-TNH-2
11. 3 portable loudspeakers

Apparently Chieu Hoi officials did not care to give up command of the APTs because the booklet clearly states:

The Ministry expects each Armed Propaganda Company to be self sufficient and not dependent upon Chieu Hoi cadre.   Chieu Hoi chiefs in each province must rely more on the commanders. Commanders must be allowed to command.

Who makes up the ranks of the Armed Propaganda Teams?

Personnel of the APT are selected from ex-Hoi Chanh on the basis of their leadership ability, demonstrated loyalty to the government and ability to communicate effectively with the people. Any ex-Hoi Chanh, man or woman, may be recruited for employment as an APT if they meet the following prerequisites:

1. Must be genuine Hoi Chanh.
2. Must not be guilty of prior criminal acts or military desertion.
3. Must be no younger than 17 nor older than 50 years of age.
4. Must be free from the draft.

If selected, the Chieu Hoi Chief prepares a dossier containing:

1. Application for employment (with biographical data).
2. Health certificate.
3. Relocation certificate.
4. Agreement to be assigned any place where needed.
5. Five photographs.

The temporary employee is entitled to a $2,500VN base salary each month. Once the dossier is screened and checked the temporary employee is appointed as a permanent APT member. He then qualifies for additional subsidies such as a 30% inducement for family, functions and a rice allowance. An additional payment of $525VN is authorized for a wife and $450VN for each child. The maximum payment for a Company Commander can be $5030VN, while a basic member of the APT can make as much as $3450VN. Should he be killed, one year’s salary will be paid to his beneficiary. He will also receive payment for permanent-type injuries. This is based on the percentage of disability and length of service. The family will also receive payment if the APT member is captured or abducted by the Viet Cong while on an operation. APT members may be awarded the Gallantry Cross with Palm, Gold Star, Silver Star or Bronze Star. Surprisingly, the funds to support the Armed Propaganda Teams compose approximately 60% of the Ministry of Chieu Hoi annual budget.

Leaflet SP-2335

Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office Leaflet SP-2335 depicts two Armed Propaganda Team members receiving awards. The text is:

TWO HIGH RANKING HOI CHANH AWARDED PSYWAR MEDALS

In a ceremony at the Prime Minister’s Building on the morning of 12 July 1967, the Republic of Vietnam Prime Minister pinned medals on two former Hoi Chanh, LTC Le Xuan Chuyen and LTC Huynh Cu. LTC Le Xuan Chuyen, who returned last year was appointed the Commander of Central Headquarters of Armed Propaganda Teams. These propaganda teams have the job of explaining the Chieu Hoi Policy to people all over the country. LTC Huynh Cu, ex-leader of the Viet Cong Training Section Zone V, who returned early this year was appointed the Special Assistant to Chieu Hoi Minister with the responsibility of advising the Minister on special Chieu Hoi projects.

The back of the leaflet depicts a newspaper article with the headline:

Prime Minister Loc awards medals to 11 officials and cadres of the Chieu Hoi Ministry.

The booklet discusses Armed Propaganda Team operations:

Maximum benefit should be obtained from frequent utilization of the Armed Propaganda Teams toward assisting in the province pacification effort. It is imperative that these prime inducement agents be utilized on authorized missions and not be used on road clearing operations, as security or reserve forces in a combined operation, or in a role similar to the Army of Viet Nam or the Provincial Reconnaissance Units. The APT have not been selected, equipped or trained to assume an offensive role. If improperly used, then their credibility as PSYOP agents is completely compromised. The APT is not a combat unit. The Armed Propaganda Team should be prepared to assist in the protection of Government of Vietnam citizens and property when under direct attack by the Viet Cong but the APT should be relieved of any tactical assignment as soon as the security situation permits so that it con return to its primary propaganda role.

We should mention here that there is an obvious difference between the way that the North and South regarded their propaganda teams. The North expected the propaganda teams to take part in combat and there is at least one known case where Ho Chi Minh demanded a combat victory by his teams because he thought that would give them more credibility among the people. It is clear that the South did not expect or desire the propaganda teams to take part in combat of any kind

The proper missions and functions of the Armed Propaganda Team are:

1. Disseminate the Chieu Hoi policy among the population.
2. Contact and induce Viet Cong soldiers to return to the Government of Vietnam.
3. Provide security for Chieu Hoi centers.
4. Assist military operations in the recovery of weapons and ammunition.
5. Assist local security forces in discovering underground Viet Cong operations.
6. Organize meetings, talks, culture and drama performances; distribute leaflets, posters and publications.
7. Visit Viet Cong families to induce them to persuade their relatives to return.
8. Assist Viet Cong soldiers in returning to the Government of Vietnam.
9. Send letters to the returnee’s former comrades to persuade them to return.
10. Assist military and security services in the identification of Viet Cong agents.
11. Assist military and security services in the identification of Viet Cong weapons and ammunition caches.

To assist in these operations the booklet discusses proper planning:

1. Identification of a proper PSYOP target.
2. Collection of target intelligence.
3. Determination of objectives.
4. Period of operation.
5. Composition of the force.
6. Support requirement.
7. Approval.

In the section entitled “Utilization” the booklet states:

The Armed Propaganda Team must be regularly committed to PSYOP missions and used in a size force required for the mission. The common practice to deploy these units in elements of two, three and four-man groups is not an effective practice. It places these small groups in positions which do not provide adequate supervision. An excessive number of Armed Propaganda Team members in clerical positions or for guard duty are improper employment procedures. The APT are best employed by platoon, or at the very least by squad. Company sided operations should not be overlooked. Every operation must accomplish specific tasks; an all day “walk in the sun” does not contribute to the pacification effort.

How were the armed propagandists trained? The booklet explains:

The program of instruction for Armed Propaganda Team training provides for four weeks of training in PSYOP and basic military tactics. The APT is given instruction on the use and maintenance of the equipment they will use. He learns the structure and functions of the Government of Vietnam and major policies and programs of national importance.

Some of the courses taught during the four weeks are:

1. Close order drill (daily)
2. Proper bearing and behavior
3. The military successes of the Government of Vietnam
4. Agricultural and land reform policies
5. Techniques of persuasion
6. Techniques of speaking before large groups
7. Radio broadcasting and leaflet distribution
8. Organizing an indoor meeting nor outdoor performance
9. Firing, disassembling and assembling weapons
10. Close combat
11. First aid
12. Signal communication

That concludes our study of the APT Handbook. We shall now study some other references that mention the teams and specific missions that they took part in.

According to Lieutenant General John H. Hay’s Vietnam Studies – Tactical and Materiel innovations, the Vietnamese often sent their APTs along on combat missions with U.S. troops. During operations Vinh Loc and Phu Vang I in September 1968, paramilitary forces were used extensively. Along with police and census units, 30 men organized into Armed Propaganda Teams were with the tactical elements to question and control the population. This arrangement insured that South Vietnamese government representatives were with all units, thus minimizing misunderstandings with detainees and allowing a meaningful initial screening of the people.

Garry D. Brewer says in an Air University Review article entitled, “Chieu Hoi: The Surrender Program in Vietnam:”

The Armed Propaganda Teams (APT’s) represent a means by which selected Hoi Chanh(“returnees”) may engage in direct contact with families and friends of known Viet Cong guerrillas. (The Special Operational Volunteer Forces, composed of surrendered enemy personnel, had much the same purpose and demonstrated decisively the impact of this type of mission.) Organized into some twenty-four platoons with light defensive armament, APT’s are used at the discretion of the province chief in whose area they have been assigned to operate. There have been problems connected with the use of APT’s, largely administrative in character, including problems of training, recruiting, employment, command, etc.; but the potential for access to specific individuals within the insurgent ranks is unmatched. Who should know more about the enemy than ex-guerrillas?

An APT member explains the Chieu Hoi program

The APTs are mentioned again in a 4 November 1968 article entitled “To reach isolated village MEDCAPS go airmobile.” The Viet Cong had attempted to isolate the village of Phu Huu, destroying surrounding roads and bridges. The US military, medical and propaganda teams therefore helicoptered into the village of 1000 people. The mission included three men from the brigade civil affairs section, three members of the 257th Medical Detachment (Dental), five representatives of the 1st Medical Battalion, two ARVN NCOs, an interpreter, and an armed propaganda team of seven Hoi Chanhs. The members of the armed propaganda team circulated through the crowd asking questions concerning enemy activities. Some Vietnamese flags and school supplies were left in the village as well as food and clothing

The APTs were mentioned in the Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United State Senate in February and March of 1970:

A variety of methods are used to encourage the Vietcong to rally. The Vietnamese Ministry of Chieu Hoi, the Ministry of Information, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, and MACV, cooperate in producing radio broadcasts, making tapes of appeals by former Vietcong which are broadcast from aircraft or ground stations, and disseminating printed material. The most effective operations, however, are conducted by the Armed Propaganda Teams, which are made up exclusively of returnees. The primary purpose of the team is to conduct fact-to-face operations in less secure areas to encourage Viet Cong and their supporters to return to the Government of Vietnam. On January 1, 1970, the Ministry of Chieu Hoi authorized an increase from 75 to 90 such teams. The current strength of these armed propaganda teams of 74 men each is 5,200 men.

The armed propaganda team has 74 men in it. A team of 74 former Vietcong who are recruited to work for you. They are paid between 5,000 and 10,000 piasters a month. They are armed usually, with M-2 carbines. They are uniformed, and they operate generally in smaller elements than 74. They generally operate in platoon size or even in squad size. Their function is to go around into the countryside and indicate to the people that they used to be Vietcong and that the government has received them and taken them in and that the Chieu Hoi program does exist as a way of Viet Cong currently on the other side to rally. They contact people like the families of known Viet Cong. They have, for instance, invited and provided the transportation to take such families for a look at the local Chieu Hoi center, to see what it is, and then return them to their homes after that one-half day visit just so the next time they see their relative they can attest to the fact that this program really is what it is. Some of them are also used as guards on the Chieu Hoi hamlets or even the Chieu Hoi centers to help protect them against possible Vietcong attack. They have American advisers, Australian advisers and some Filipino advisers. Each team might not necessarily have an adviser, but there will probably be an adviser in the Province to advise the total program, the reception of new Hoi Chanh and the use of the armed propaganda teams.

Phillip P. Katz mentions the Armed Propaganda Teams in an article entitled “PSYOP and Communication Theory.” He says:

Members of the Armed Propaganda teams (Viet Cong who have rallied to the Government of Vietnam) frequently employ private communications to get the “Chieu Hoi message” to the families of known Viet Cong. The teams speak with the authority of experience; they are convincing; they have the personal answers to questions likely to be asked, and their presence give proof that the Chieu Hoi program delivers its promises. Furthermore, they can sincerely portray their inner feelings about their decision to defect from the ranks of the Viet Cong.

Stanley Sandler mentions the Armed Propaganda teams in “Cease Resistance: It’s Good for You!”: A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations. Some of his comments in part are:

Operation Falling Leaves concentrated on the use of local assets and personnel…including two Armed Propaganda teams composed 100% of surrendered Viet Cong soldiers. Loudspeaker teams penetrated deeply into the forest, while other forayed through its waterways using gigantic, boat mounted loudspeakers, Armed Propaganda teams, a sector Political Warfare company, and personnel from the Vietnamese Information Service made extensive face-to-face contacts with the enemy. The clearing operations in the U-Minh forest garnered no less than 1150 ralliers. In the six weeks before and two weeks afterwards only 211 defectors were taken.

This operation is mentioned again by Colonel Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. USAFR in “US & Vietcong Psychological Operations in Vietnam,” published in Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies , Frank L. Goldstein, Air University Press, 1996.

Two special PSYOP targets were the Vietcong (VC) and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) soldiers in South Vietnam. Two Chieu Hoi operations carried out in the Delta during 1970 and 1971 proved that PSYOP and combat pressure working together could get results. The operations were Operation Roundup in Kien Hoa Province and Project Falling Leaves in Kien Giang Province. Operation Roundup produced hundreds of enemy defectors, according to Colburn Lovett, a USIS foreign service information officer. One PSYOP technique was to take pictures of ralliers/defectors and have them sign a simple message on a leaflet, encouraging their comrades to join the cause. Another technique was to use loudspeaker teams of former VC soldiers who were sent back into the areas of their units to speak to their comrades in the bush. Project Falling Leaves combined Vietnamese and US personnel working in joint PSYOP activities. Armed propaganda teams (100 percent ex-VC) made deep penetrations and extensive face-to-face communications. All possible media were used, including boat-carried loudspeaker teams, leaflet drops, radio tapes, and television appeals by former VC.

Four special PSYOP techniques were employed in Vietnam: distribution of safe conduct passes, money for weapons, focus on returning home to celebrate during the Tet New Year, and Armed Propaganda Teams composed of Hoi Chanh. Many PSYOP professionals believe these teams were effective because of their personal touch to the Chieu Hoi invitations.

Pacific Stars and Stripes mentions the APTs in a January 1968 article entitled “Arms Cache Found.” The article says:

Elements of Americal Division’s 196th Inf. Brigade uncovered one of the largest weapons and ammunition caches ever found in I Corps area recently. A/3/21st Infantry captured 140 weapons and destroyed tons of enemy ammunition in the brigade's largest discovery since it has been in Vietnam. The weapons found by the battalion increased the total number of weapons captured by the “Chargers” to 253 in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa. This discovery came as a result of information from a former 2nd North Vietnamese Army Division noncommissioned officer who turned himself in, using a safe conduct pass he picked up after a leaflet drop by the brigade's Armed Propaganda Team.

The 4th Marines mention the APTs in their Vietnam history:

Armed Propaganda Teams composed of Chieu Hoi were utilized very effectively in the Quang Tri Airstrip area in questioning the local populace regarding VC/NVA movement. The nature of these teams, being ex-Viet Cong, lends to effective interrogation in addition, most of the APT personnel are from the general locality and recognize many of the Viet Cong intra-structure on sight. The use of APT teams to accompany patrols proved extremely effective; however, the patrol’s speed should be governed by the speed which the APT team engages the local Vietnamese in conversation and gathers intelligence.

The Australians in Vietnam also made use of Armed Propaganda teams, although they used a slightly different name:

(They) established Armed Propaganda and Intelligence Teams (APIT)from amongst Montegnard tribesmen in Ban Me Thout, designed to disseminate propaganda, collect information and establish a network of informers, disrupt Viet Cong infiltration and supply routes, conduct small scale raids, ambushes and similar minor operations and to conduct long range patrols into Viet Cong “safe areas,” rescuing captured Montegnards and liberating equipment and ammunition.

MACV Information Pamphlet on the Chieu Hoi program

A number of official military publications were prepared and distributed to the American troops to explain the Chieu Hoi program. In both 1968 and 1970 small booklets entitled Chieu Hoi – The Winning Ticket were published as an MACV Command Information Pamphlet. The pamphlet shows the 7-flag safe conduct pass on the cover. The inner pages contain photos and some of the following text:

When he comes over, he provides valuable information about: enemy units, caches of weapons, ammunition, caches of food. He brings in or locates weapons which otherwise would be used against you. Many serve as ‘Kit Carson’ scouts. They help you locate enemy mines, booby traps, and serve as guides for your unit. Many former Viet Cong join Armed Propaganda Teams, which talk other V.C. into rallying. Finally, the former Viet Cong goes back to farming or some other occupation. What does the program Cost? The cost is approximately $369.00 ($500 by 1970) for each former enemy Viet Cong. This is insignificant when you consider that the estimated cost for killing a Viet Cong runs into many thousands of dollars. How can you help? Let all the would-be defectors (Hoi Chanh) come in safely. Give voluntary defectors Chieu Hoi (not POW) treatment. Segregate Chieu Hoi from POWs. Treat the returnee with respect. Give him a receipt for all weapons that he brings in. Deliver him safely to the unit intelligence officer for prompt debriefing and then promptly to the Government of Vietnam Chieu Hoi service at the nearest district or province headquarters.

Leaflet 3123

On the subject of armed propaganda teams (APTs), JUSPAO leaflet 3123 depicts an entire marching company of Vietnamese APTs, each with a loudspeaker under his right arm. To the right of the photograph are a Chieu Hoi symbol and the text:

Return to alleviate the suffering of the people.

The back is all text:

The Chieu Hoi Cadres of Long An Province.

Deeply encouraged by the success of the Chieu Hoi program, the armed propaganda teams of Long An welcomes the prime Minister and Vietnamese government officials to long An. The even was the opening ceremony of the ‘Spring for the fatherland’ campaign. The aim of the Chieu hoi program is to urge those still on the other side to return to their families and alleviate the sorrows of  separation.

Leaflet 3124

Although not specifically an Armed Propaganda Team leaflet I add leaflet 3124 because it shows members of the Chieu Hoi Entertainment Teams which often accompanied the APTs on their missions. This leaflet was obviously prepared to be used along with 3123 depicted above. The leaflet depicts the singers and dancers entering Long An. The text to the right of the vignette is:

Return to your loved ones

The back is all text:

CHIEU HOI ENTERTAINMENT TEAMS IN LONG AN

The Chieu Hoi entertainment teams enthusiastically welcome the opening of the “Spring for the Fatherland” campaign in Long An. These teams appeal to former friends on the other side, via entertainment, to return to loved ones now enjoying freedom.

Leaflet 2330A - front

JUSPAO leaflet 2330A is longer than usual at 3.4 x 8.5 inches and was prepared for use against the Viet Cong nationwide in December 1967. The leaflet was picked up near Landing Zone Bronco, Dac Pho village, I Corps, by a SP4 of the 23rd (Americal) Infantry Division's 11th Light Infantry Brigade in early 1968. The front is in horizontal format, bears Chieu Hoi emblems at the left and right and the text:

DAI DOAN KET
means

All those who leave the Communist ranks and come back to the National Community will be welcomed as full-fledged citizens and will be protected and helped to rebuild a new life.

Why can't you leave the Communist ranks and return to the National Right Cause to serve the government and the people in building a bright future for our children rather than continue struggling with hardships which lead to a meaningless death?

Leaflet 2330 - back

The back of the leaflet is in a vertical format and depicts a photograph of members of the armed propaganda teams on parade. The text is:

THEY ARE SERVING THE NATIONAL JUST CAUSE

On the National Day 400 members of the Armed Propaganda Teams participated in a parade in Saigon and were applauded by high-ranking officials of the Government of Vietnam and by hundreds of thousands of citizens.

Armed Propaganda Teams are composed of returnees who voluntarily serve the Government of Vietnam. Their most important job is to explain the Chieu Hoi policy of the government to the people. They are furnished uniforms and equipment. They receive a monthly salary to support their families and children.

You are welcome through the Chieu Hoi door into the serving of the country and the people. You can use this leaflet or any other safe conduct pass to come back. You will be welcomed.

Propaganda Poster 2115

Propaganda poster 2115 features five photographs of Armed Propaganda Teams working and talking with the people. The text is:

HOI CHANH IN ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS WORK FOR PEACE.

By helping the people, the Armed Propaganda team is working for peace. Not long ago, members of the team were devoting their energies to war. They taxed and persecuted the people as members of the Viet Cong. Then they rallied to the Government and through the Chieu Hoi Program regained their citizenship rights.

1. Five members of the Armed Propaganda team visit a home to put up posters and explain the importance of participating in elections.
2. Magazines which tell of the Government of Vietnam programs that bring new life to the people of Vietnam are given to families for home study.
3. A new poster explaining Viet Nam’s constitution is discussed by the Armed Propaganda team’s leader and an interested villager.
4. The Armed Propaganda team is shown here in the act of repairing a drainage ditch.
5. Former enemies, now they work together to defeat the Viet Cong and bring peace to the nation. Armed Propaganda team members distribute publications to members of the Vietnamese Special Forces.           

Leaflets that mention the Armed Propaganda teams are fairly rare. In some cases they are mentioned, although not the main theme of the propaganda leaflet. For instance, JUSPAO prepared a set of four leaflets in 1968 coded 2990-2993 which offered rewards for enemy personal and units.

Leaflet 2990 – front

Leaflet 2990 – back

Each leaflet bore the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) symbol on the front. The leaflets are mostly all text and not well illustrated, but the messages cover a wide variety of categories. The leaflet 2990 text is:>

CHIEU HOI NATIONWIDE REWARDS CAMPAIGN

To invite all citizens of Vietnam to participate in a special program for the inducement of Viet Cong / North Vietnam Army ralliers during the period of 1 November 1968 through 31 January 1969, and to give cash to all citizens who successfully persuade enemy military or civilian personnel to rally under the Chieu Hoi program.

Awards will be paid to any Vietnamese citizen who induces a VC/NVA to rally, including members of the RVNAF, National Force, Cadre, Kit Carson Armed Propaganda Teams (APTs), former Hoi Chanh or private citizens.

Rewards are not paid to the rallier himself unless he, in turn, qualifies by inducing another VC/NVA to rally. Any additional information can be obtained from the local Chieu Hoi Province representatives.

The back of the note has a large "$" over a number of categories of personnel with the price paid for each.

The Central Intelligence Agency manual Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare mentions Armed Propaganda Teams although in this case they were talking of building the teams in Central America. However, some comments are still applicable:

Armed Propaganda Teams are formed through a careful selection of persuasive and highly motivated guerrillas who move about within the population, encouraging the people to support the guerrillas and put up resistance against the enemy. It combines a high degree of political awareness and the "armed" propaganda ability of the guerrillas toward a planned, programmed, and controlled effort. The careful selection of the staff, based on their persuasiveness in informal discussions and their ability in combat, is more important than their degree of education or the training program. The tactics of the Armed Propaganda Teams are carried out covertly, and should be parallel to the tactical effort in guerrilla warfare. The knowledge of the psychology of the population is primary for the Armed Propaganda Teams.

The Armed Propaganda Teams provide a several-stage program of persuasive planning in guerrilla warfare in all areas of the country. Also, these teams are the "eyes and ears" of our movement. The Armed Propaganda Teams combine political awareness-building with armed propaganda, which will be carried out by carefully selected guerrillas (preferably with experience in combat), for personal persuasion within the population.

An Armed Propaganda Team includes from 6 to 10 members; this number or a smaller number is ideal, since there is more camaraderie, solidarity and group spirit. The themes to deal with are assimilated more rapidly and the members react more rapidly to unforeseen situations. In addition to the combination as armed propagandist-combatant each member of the team should be well prepared to carry out permanent person-to-person communication, face-to-face.

The target groups for the Armed Propaganda Teams are not the persons with sophisticated political knowledge, but rather those whose opinion are formed from what they see and hear. The cadres should use persuasion to carry out their mission. The combined reports of an Armed Propaganda Team will provide us with exact details on the enemy activities. The intelligence information obtained by the Armed Propaganda Teams should be reported to the chiefs. However, it is necessary to emphasize that the first mission of the Armed Propaganda Teams is to carry out psychological operations, not to obtain data for intelligence. In addition, the Armed Propaganda cadre will report to his superior the reaction of the people to the radio broadcasts, the insurrectional flyers, or any other means of propaganda of ours.

Curiously, with the end of the Vietnam War and the fall of South Vietnam, one might expect that there would be no more use for the Armed Propaganda Teams. However, in early 1978, the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAWN) recruited volunteers for a future Khmer Liberation Army from Khmer refugee camps in southern Vietnam. 300 candidates were taken to Ho Chi Minh City and organized into Armed Propaganda Teams. The plan was to send them into Cambodian provinces along the Vietnamese border to begin the usual organization and mobilization work. They were never deployed. By the end of the year Vietnam lost patience with the Cambodians and invaded the country with a massive force and the expectation of a quick victory. We might say that Vietnam faced its own “Vietnam” during this protracted war. For 10 years it held the villages and main roads while the Cambodian guerrillas continued to bleed their occupiers. Starting about 1986 the Vietnamese began withdrawing from Cambodia and it is believed that by 1990 the occupying troops were all gone.

The United States currently has armed PSYOP troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan. They are not called Armed Propaganda Teams, but instead Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs). However, if you study the mission, you will find that very little has changed since Vietnam. The PSYOP troops still go into the field with radios and leaflets, talk face-to-face with local civilians, create trust to gather intelligence, and are armed for self protection. Nothing much has changed except for the name and the enemy.

As always, the author is very interested in learning more about the use of the Armed Propaganda teams in Vietnam. Interested readers, Vietnamese veterans who were part of such teams, or American veterans who worked with the teams are encouraged to write to him at sgmbert@hotmail.com.