THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM
OF VIETNAM

SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Ret.)

This is a subject that requires an entire book to explore in depth. The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program was the biggest and most expensive psychological operation (PSYOP) campaign of the 10-year Vietnam War. It is impossible to cover every aspect of such an all-encompassing program. We will just look at some general concepts and illustrate leaflets that show the many themes of the operation.

The history the phrase "Chieu Hoi" is not widely known. The Headquarters, USMAC-V Office of the Psychological Operations Directorate Newsletter dated 11 December 1967 says, "In the 14th century, King Le Loi led the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the Minh dynasty of China. Amnesty was offered to certain civil prisoners if they would fight for King Le Loi against the Minh. The amnesty offer included a phrase similar to "Chieu Hoi". The phrase "Chieu Hoi" is a combination of two verbs "to welcome" and "to return." Celebration of Le Loi's victory is on the 22nd day of the 8th lunar month (Gregorian calendar equivalent to late September)."

Midshipman Jason Thomas Chaput of Annapolis adds detail in a 2000 thesis:

Though almost entirely carried out by the Government of South Vietnam, for its duration, the Chieu Hoi Program was clearly a foreign-inspired endeavor. Begun in 1963, the program was primarily the result of the efforts of two foreigners, Sir Robert Thompson and Rufus Phillips. Thompson headed the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam.

[Author’s note: Many years ago when we studied and taught the lessons of the successful military resistance against Communist-inspired rebellions, the three examples referenced in the literature were Malaya, the Philippine Islands, and Greece. Each of these guerrilla defeats was caused by a different circumstance. Readers who are interested should study these government’s victories. Sir Robert Thompson is often credited with bringing the Chieu Hoi concept to President Ngo Dinh Diem. He had taken part in the fight against the Malayan insurrectionists and was considered an expert on the subject].

1968 MACV PSYOP Guide
Note the image depicting two Vietnamese in a restaurant reading Chieu Hoi literature.

Curiously, the Americans also took credit for the origin of the Chieu Hoi program. A government booklet entitled Chieu Hoi and National Reconciliation says, "The Chieu Hoi program originated in the minds of the Agency for International Development (AID) personnel in 1962 who were familiar with the experience of Philippines President Magasaysay and the Armed Forces Economic Corps (EDCOR) program against the HUKs in the early 1950s. They sold the idea to the GVN with support from other members of the country team, and the GVN officially launched the program in 1963." Apparently, when an idea is successful, everyone wants the credit.

Chaput goes on, "Phillips, the head of the Rural Affairs Office for the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM), worked in conjunction with Vietnamese Colonel Hoang Van Lac to sell the idea to Diem's brother. On April 17, 1963, Diem issued a proclamation, which simply called upon the insurgents to stop fighting and rally under the flag of the Government…responsibility and direction for the program fell under the jurisdiction of the Commissariat in the President's office. On the U.S. side, direct responsibility for funding and advising lay in the hands of the Rural Affairs Office…American input and assistance, according to the program's original design, was to be limited to conducting training programs and providing funds and materials to construct the Chieu Hoi Centers where the defectors would rally.

Assistant Director of Rural Affairs Rufus Phillips told me:

I would like to confirm that USAID-USOM Rural Affairs got the Chieu Hoi program off the ground. While it is true that Thompson had recommended such a program to President Diem, when I arrived in June 1962 to do a survey for USAID about how to get the economic aid mission (USOM) involved in counterinsurgency the idea was going nowhere. I talked with Secretary of Defense Nguyen Dinh Thuan about it and offered to bring out retired Lieutenant Colonel C.T.R. Bohannon from the Philippines to work with the Vietnamese government to actually formulate and launch the program. Thuan enthusiastically agreed. I also spoke directly to President Diem about it. (I did not talk to the President's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu about it although I assume he supported it.) I was then asked in Washington to come back and run a new office in USOM called Rural Affairs responsible for counterinsurgency and got agreement that our office would provide support for the program. I got Bohannon (an old Lansdale hand involved in the HUK campaign in the Philippines) put on contract to USOM and brought him to Saigon. Bo had experience with the successful surrender program against the HUKs. He arrived in Saigon in late November 1962 and working together with some Vietnamese designated by Thuan, he and they developed the ideas for the program, drafted the edict issued by President Diem and helped to get the program started. Later during 1963, we brought over some Filipino advisors to work with the Vietnamese on its implementation. 

Jerald W. Berry adds more in his book Psychological Warfare leaflets of the Vietnam War,"self-published and sold on CD, 2001:

The original name of the Chieu Hoi Program was Phong-Trao Chieu-Tap Khang-Chieu Lam Dong, or The Movement to Regroup Misled Members of the Resistance. The Vietnamese eventually abbreviated the name to Chieu Hoi. The Vietnamese word 'Chieu' means' to appeal", and the word 'Hoi' means 'to return". These two words used together translates into "a call to return" to the family of South Vietnam.

Note: It has been stated that Berry misspelled the Vietnamese name of the program and it should be: Phong-Trao Chieu-Tap Khang-Chieu Lam Duong.

Another anecdote about the origin of the translation of Chieu Hoi may be more accurate. According to this source Chieu was usually the first part of a compound word or phrase like chieu-ðai-vien (typically a bar hostess or airline stewardess) or chieu hon (calling back the soul of a dead person). The other part, hoi, was easily understood to imply the return to home or a restoration to life after illness. After considering terms like "welcome back" and "enticed to return," and facing a deadline, a decision was made to adopt "Open Arms."

The Chieu Hoi Symbol

The Chieu Hoi symbol is in the form of a shield and depicts a stylized long-winged white bird at the left flying toward a flame at the right. The words "CHIEU HOI" are above the image.

The theme song of Chieu Hoi started with the lyrics, "tung ca'nh chim ti`m ve" which translates to, "Bird, fly home to your warm nest." The dove was used as an invitation to the VC to come back home with loved ones. The Vietnamese believed that the birds always returned to their nest! Hence, the symbol of the white dove (a universal symbol of peace) flying toward the fire, which to the Vietnamese represents the warmth of family, homecoming and reunion.

It has also been suggested that the flame could represent the difficulty and hardship that the Viet Cong member had to endure during his time in the south and especially during his escape. By acknowledging the danger, the GVN and the Americans implied that they were sympathetic and would respect the returnee. An understanding of the symbols on the Chieu Hoi symbol might help the Viet Cong member to be more confident in the good treatment he would receive when going Hoi Chanh.

1970 Estimate on Approximate Cost per rallier

The Chieu Hoi Program began in 1963. There was little American involvement, yet the number of ralliers was over 11,000. Another 10,000 rallied in 1965 as the first American ground troops began to flow into South Vietnam. As the ground war gained momentum in 1966, Chieu Hoi brought in over 20,000 ralliers. Berry tells us, "American officials had already realized that the Chieu Hoi Program had the most potential as an effective pacification program and had the most favorable cost/benefit ratio of any other existing pacification program. The average cost of processing, retraining, and resettling a returnee was $14 in 1963. This cost rose to $250 in 1967, to $350 in 1969 and to $500 in 1970. Even the increased cost seemed minuscule to the United States, especially when considering the military cost in lives and equipment to eliminate each one of these as enemies.

The cost of getting a Viet Cong to rally was constantly argued in the press. Elliot Harris, author of The un-American Weapon - Psychological Warfare, M. W. Ladd Publishing Company, New York, 1957, says "The average cost expended to cause one Viet Cong guerrilla to defect is $125, vs. the average cost expended to kill one Viet Cong guerilla, $400,000."

A Viet Con Chieu Hoi

William F. Johnston gives some rather staggering dollar numbers in a 1968 article entitled "Some thoughts on Psychological Operations." He says:

To date, the total defections of Viet Cong returning under the program total 75,000. If we take this figure in the commonly accepted ratio of ten government soldiers needed for each insurgent guerilla, the program has saved the GVN-US a troop strength of over 750,000 soldiers. If we do a little arithmetic from the dollar-saved angle, the total cost of the program, using a cost-sited figure of $127 to bring in a Viet Cong defector, would be around nine and a half million dollars. But looking at the cost to kill a Viet Cong, which is estimated at $300,000 each, this number would have cost two and a quarter billion dollars.

About the program, Berry says:

In 1967, the United States took complete control of directing the Chieu Hoi Program and actively stepped up pacification efforts. Despite the lack of trained personnel and language barriers, the program netted more than 27,000 returnees. There were hundreds of American advisors involved in administering the program at this point in the Vietnam War.

Page from Chieu Hoi - The Winning Ticket (1970)

By April 1975, the program had attracted more than 159,000 soldiers and members of the Communist Party underground organizations to rally to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). About 15,000 were from North Vietnam Army (NVA) regular units. The ralliers received vocational training and got help in finding jobs. A large number enlisted in the Government of Vietnam's Army (ARVN) and various paramilitary units. About 700 served American combat platoons as Kit Carson Scouts. Many of the ralliers contributed their skill and their intelligence information as well as their blood to the just cause of the RVN. Thanks to their contribution, the allied forces achieved numerous feats of arms, including destruction of important targets in North Vietnam.

Berry’s numbers are even higher. He says:

By the end of American involvement in the Vietnam War, over 194,000 former VC, NVA, and Communist sympathizers had rallied to the GVN. These numbers alone should represent a measure of success for the Chieu Hoi Program.

Perhaps one of the greater achievements of the small Flag safe conduct passes was the defection of Lieutenant La Thanh Tonc of the North Vietnamese Army on 20 January 1968 to the Marines at Khe Sanh Combat Base. The story is told in the January 2005 issue of Leatherneck by LTC James B. Wilkinson (Ret.). The author explains that Tonc provided the general battle plan of the NVA forces and the order of battle. He pointed out that the plan was to take Hills 861 and 881S. Thereafter, the major attack to seize Khe Sanh would commence. This assault would be supported by heavy artillery, which had been laboriously dug into Co Roc Mountain in Laos. Khe Sanh was to be their most important effort since the United States entered the war, with General Vo Nguyen Giap in command. The Marine’s victory at Khe Sanh can be attributed in part to the information gained from this valuable Chieu Hoi.

A Provincial Chieu Hoi Center

There were three types of Chieu Hoi Centers. They were National, Regional, and Provincial. The National Chieu Hoi Center was located at Thi Nghe in Saigon and was able to accept 4000 returnees a year (in three month increments).

The Regional Centers were originally in Danang, Pleiku, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho. They could accommodate 2,400 returnees a year.

There was one provincial center in each of the 44 provinces in 1967. Some cities had special centers and as a result, there were 47 provincial centers in all.

The new Hoi Chanh took a series of academic discussions at the National and Regional centers as part of clearing his mind of old ideas and introducing new policies and theories. Among them were 20 hours on Chieu Hoi Policy, 32 hours on understanding and evaluating the Communist Systems, 48 hours on the History of the Struggle and Establishing Viewpoints, 10 hours on the Law, and a final 2 hour Conclusion of all they had learned.

A 17 August 1968 letter entitled “Standard Procedures for The Political Education Of Hoi Chanh” stated that the Political education for ralliers had a double objective: To give ralliers a chance of thoroughly knowing the errors of Communism and the facts of life in South Vietnam in order to help them develop strong anti-communist attitudes, and to present the fundamentals of civic and democratic procedures to permit ralliers to adapt themselves easily to the national community.

Some of the Political Education Principles were:

1. Trainees are free to express their views.

2. Political education courses are held in the form of lectures and discussions and not as school classes.

3. Political education for ralliers is a special effort to:

a. Give them a basic knowledge of national life.

b. Clarify their anti-communist beliefs.

4. A political course is not a technical training course. It must be conducted flexibly and delicately for each rallier.

What was the official American concept of the program? Guideline to Chieu Hoi Psychological Operations: The Chieu Hoi Inducement Program, prepared by the Field Development Division of JUSPAO, April 1966 says, "The Chieu Hoi inducement program consists of all activities designed to cause members of the Viet Cong and their supporters to leave the Viet Cong and return to the side of the rightful and legitimate Government of the Republic of Vietnam. The Chieu Hoi inducement program consists of: Psychological operations addressed to Viet Cong military forces, Viet Cong civilian Infrastructure, families of the Viet Cong and the population of Viet Cong-controlled areas.

The Chieu Hoi program was not universally admired among the Vietnamese officials and military. The Command History - 1967 of the United States Military Assistant Command in Vietnam says, "The GVN support of the Chieu Hoi Program lacked 100 percent participation on the part of the GVN officials, for many believed that too much was being done for the Hoi Chanhs. A characteristic remark was ‘They were the enemy once. When they returned they were not sent to prison, but were even allowed to return to their families.’ One American MACV officer said:

Many Province Chiefs are quite simply against Chieu Hoi and will pay lip-service to national policy while dragging their feet at the province level. Other Vietnamese point out the apparent difficulty in maintaining an aggressive attitude in the GVN armed forces against the Viet Cong on one hand, and a lenient police toward returnees on the other.

GI Cigarette Lighter

Other general problems were caused by less than 100% support of the program by American troops. Although the above cigarette lighter is a joke, it gives an idea of an attitude that would not be helpful in convincing Vietnamese farmers and peasants to back the Chieu Hoi Program.

Robert J. Kodosky mentions other problems in Psychological Operations American Style – the Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond: Lexington Books, Lanham, MD, 2007:

United States Information Agency Director Carl Rowan visited Chieu Hoi rehabilitation centers in 1965 and found them “presently without even the most elementary psychological indoctrination programs.” He observed that returnees “languish two or three months in detention with few daily activities beyond interrogation and occasional lectures on the good national cause. As a result of such conditions, “Defectors have become disillusioned anew, returned to the VC fold, and are now warning their colleagues not to fall for the promises of the government’s Chieu Hoi program”

What did it take to get a hard-core Viet Cong or North Vietnamese soldier to defect? In Volume I of the Department of Defense contracted the Final Report Psychological Operations Studies – Vietnam, Human Sciences Research Inc, 1971, Drs. Ernest F. and Edith M. Bairdain say:

Defection is most likely to occur as an immediate response to PSYOP messages when appeals are received in the context of some form of military pressure. Where timely persuasive messages are received, the opportunity exists and defection is feasible to the situation, the potential for inducing defection varies together with the degree of pressure. In the absence of exposure to immediate high external pressure, defection may occur because of the cumulative effects of a series of unrewarding, frustrating, difficult, and intermittently dangerous experience which greatly outweigh and positive features in the total situation.

That seems a very fancy way of saying that when the enemy is under constant pressure and stress, he is more likely to surrender. It hardly seems to be a surprise.

Ralliers were educated and trained in new skills.

What did the Viet Cong think of the Chieu Hoi program? A South Vietnam Liberation Army document dated 20 December 1966 says:

The impact of increased enemy military operations and 'Chieu Hoi' programs has, on the whole, resulted in lowering of morale of some ideologically backward men, who often listen to enemy radio broadcasts, keep in their pockets enemy leaflets, and wait to be issued weapons. This attitude on their part has generated an atmosphere of doubt and mistrust among our military ranks.

PSYOP Loudspeaker Team

Another captured Viet Cong document states:

At present, the enemy is using psychological warfare to attack us on the ideological plane. He has scattered many leaflets from aircraft and has appealed to us through (loudspeaker) broadcasts. The objective of this is to destroy our morale...

These efforts surely influence our troops. If we do not closely control cadre and soldier thoughts, we shall face many difficulties. For this is a dangerous wicked scheme by the enemy. It is related to the general war situation, all aimed at reducing the fighting spirit of our forces and having a great influence on our struggle toward victory in general..."

Carefully indoctrinate troops, cadres and soldiers about the enemy's psychological warfare schemes. Make clear to all people the fact of his corruption and that he pretends to be very strong but cannot hide his failures...

Whenever the enemy uses psychological warfare, cadres should immediately hold indoctrination sessions and closely manage the people's thoughts and actions...When leaflets drop, all people, even the cadres and soldiers, should tear them up without reading them. Only cadre chiefs (team chiefs) are authorized to read and then explain and analyze the contents of the leaflets to the cadres and to soldiers in their units.

The United States Government spent a great amount of time and energy tracking the effectiveness of the Chieu Hoi program. In the report PSYOPS in Vietnam – Indications of Effectiveness. JUSPAO Planning Office, Saigon, Vietnam, May, 1967, there are numerous Communist documents and directives complaining about the Chieu Hoi program. For instance, a report on the Operation and Coordination Committee meeting of the Thu Dau Mot Province Unit Headquarters, Eastern Nam Bo Region of the Liberation Army held on 17 December 1966 says:

The enemy has begun to increase their demagogic propaganda and Chieu Hoi activities, using every insidious strategy to draw our soldiers to their side. At the same time as their attacks on our military and economic fronts, the enemy has begun to increase their psywar operations, aiming at rallying the inhabitants of the disputed area to their side. For the same purpose they created an artificial victory, sent the Americans and South Koreans into strategic hamlets to distribute medicine, candy and cakes to the grownups and children. In an ambush in Binh Nhan when one of our cadre was killed, they came to visit, comfort and offer money and other objects to the family of the deceased.

The enemy used "Dakota" airplanes equipped with megaphones to appeal to our cadre and soldiers to rally to the puppet government under the Chieu Hoi program.

An article entitled "Viet Cong Documents on the War" published in Communist Affairs, January-February 1968, quotes almost two dozen documents where the Viet Cong leadership warns of the Chieu Hoi threat. One of the most interesting finds the commissars offering a carrot, a stick, or a pat on the back:

In case we discover a cadre or fighter who induces some other people to desert our ranks, we are to throughly study the case to see whether that cadre is someone sent by the enemy or just a person who could no longer endure hardships and has resorted to such wrong means.

If the man happens to be a real enemy, then we must deal with him in a proper manner. If he happens to belong to the second case, then we must reeducate and reform him right in the unit.

In case some cadres and fighters receive appeals from their families to return and inform us about such moves, we are to promote their revolutionary spirit and comfort them. We must also make public such a revolutionary spirit and have it studied by other people. Concurrently, we are to consolidate their thought and strive to prevent them being shaken by other appeals that will be launched by their families at other times. Finally, we are to motivate people to write letters to build revolutionary concepts for their families or inform regional authorities to take care of that work.

The Chieu Hoi Program in Vietnam, by Ho Van Cham, The Vietnam Council of Foreign Relations, Saigon, Republic of Vietnam, November 8, 1970, reports an interesting example of one of the successes of the Chieu Hoi program.

Former Viet Cong militia who rallied near Tam Ky. 1

Quang tru province was the scene of one of the most spectacular mass defections in Chieu Hoi history. The commanders of two Viet Cong units garrisoning villages in a coastal wasteland district near Tam ky, a district that had remained outside government control since 1946, came over to the Republic's side with all of their militia troops -- 221 veteran, hard core communists in December 1969. Those troops elected to Chieu Hoi and began fighting communists.

It all started in with Ngo Thoi, a disillusioned VC Officer, whose Viet Cong rank was equivalent to captain. Thoi had a brother who was a sergeant in the government forces at Tam Ky. Through him, Thoi made a proposal to the province chief, Colonel Hoang Dinh Tho. He would defect with his entire militia unit if the province chief re-armed the men with modern weapons, kept them together as a government fighting unit under their own leaders, waived the orientation period, permitted them to stay with their families, and brought prompt material assistance to their war-ravaged village. Colonel Tho accepted the conditions, whereupon another Viet Cong commander from the same district, 27 year old Tran Quyen, petitioned for a similar arrangement. Again Colonel Tho agreed. As Thoi and Quyen assembled their men for the mass defection ceremony, the news flashed through the fishing villages of the district and guerillas from local squads attached themselves to the force of ralliers.

Colonel Tho selected ten volunteers from the new Hoi Chanh group and made them scouts for the province's Regional Forces Reconnaissance Company, which began combing the district for boobytraps, arms caches, bunkers complexes and for other potential Hoi Chanh. Within three weeks more than 200 had rallied to the government's side. Within a month the reconnaissance company, placed into ambush position by their new scouts, intercepted a main force VC Unit. The VC regulars lost 78 dead to the Regional Forces Company and their Hoi Chanh scouts.

As the rest of the Hoi Chanh, newly equipped with combat boots and M-16 rifles, went on patrol in the district, Colonel Tho lived up to his side of the bargain. Relief supplies were shipped to the hamlets. In Quyen's village, arrival of a shipment of lumber and roofing material from provincial headquarters was the signal for the start of a community self-help program, and soon the grass huts were replaced by sturdy dwellings. A tent market was airlifted from Tam Ky, bringing all the small items from the outside world that the villagers had not seen for years -- manufactured soap, cigarettes, finished textiles, shoes. To obtain money with which to buy these items, the Hoi Chanh stepped up their jungle combing activities and uncovered many more Viet Cong arms caches. The reward money for the weapons took the villagers off the barter economy that they had known for two dozen years.

Colonel Tho's gamble paid off and the communist grip on the district was shattered. Said Lietenant Colonel M.G. Stafford, senior U.S. Observer in Quang Tin province:

It's going to be very hard for the Viet Cong main force units or for the North Vietnamese Army Units to do anything in this district from now on. These guys here, these new Hoi Chanh, are some of the finest troops I've seen. They know all the trails and all the tricks that the communist units in this area have used.

Why, after nearly 25 years under communist rule, had these Quang Tin Villagers welcomed government control, and why had professional Commanders like Thoi and Quyen defected with all their troops? The fact that Thoi could talk over the situation with his brother, and the fact that Colonel Tho had the wisdom to bend a little of the conventional Chieu Hoi procedures were factors. But Thoi gives another reason:

The main force communist units in our area had left us on our own, saying that there was too much military pressure from the government for them to stay. They promised to return soon but advised us in the meantime to leave our women and children and hide whenever government troops came near our village. We could not accept this.

Quyen's main reason was more general:

I have lived on promises too long -- promises that the Viet Cong would win and end the war soon.

Quyen's reason -- disillusionment with the communist apparatus and its goals and promises -- is given by a number of ralliers when they are interviewed at Chieu Hoi Centers. They say they had witnessed too many broken promises to retain any confidence in the good intentions of the communists. Sixty-five percent say they were drafted into communist ranks, 35 percent volunteered. But about half say they did not know what they were fighting for and merely obeyed orders. About half say that at first they believed they were fighting for the betterment of the poor, for the welfare of the nation and for the freedom from aggression and imperialism. Loss of these convictions, often coupled with other motives, led them to rally to the government's side.

Leaflet NT3/A/TD9

The above leaflet depicts a Viet Cong guerrilla holding an Allied Chieu Hoi leaflet and surrendering to government forces. The text below the  image is:

The entire people welcome the cadres and soldiers back into the national family.

Former Viet Cong who graduated the Chieu Hoi program
being released at a ceremony held at the Saigon Zoo.
(Photo courtesy of Dave Bowers)

Naturally, there were some arguments about the value of the program. Thomas L. Hughes, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, said in his Memorandum, Statistics on the War Effort in South Vietnam Show Unfavorable Trends, 22 October 1963: In addition to the military defectors, some 13,700 persons "rallied" to the government from April through August 1963 under a national surrender and amnesty campaign. This campaign, known as "Chieu Hoi," was officially inaugurated on April 19. The South Vietnamese government regards the bulk of these as Viet Cong. United States officials, who do not screen these statistics, believe the vast majority to be refugees and persons who, for one reason or another, have left areas controlled or formerly controlled by the Viet Cong. Many of them, however, may well have assisted the Viet Cong in some way voluntarily or under duress. The number of "Chieu Hoi" returnees increased progressively from April 19 to June 1963, when a high of about 3,200 was reached. By August, returnees dropped to a low of about 1,600."

The civilian "Bible" of Vietnam PSYOP is the Robert W. Chandler book War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam, A Westview Special Study, Boulder, CO, 1981. Chandler devotes an entire chapter to the Chieu Hoi program in his book. Although we will use many other official military and government documents in this report, much of our data follows Chandler’s general outline.

He says:

The government's American-inspired and funded amnesty invitation, the Chieu Hoi or "Open Arms" program...was adopted in 1963 as a magnanimous offer of forgiveness and exoneration to those who had been temporarily seduced into following the alien Communist path.

He goes on:

The term 'surrender' was avoided; instead the Viet Cong were implored to atone for their past sins by 'rallying' to the 'just cause' of the Republic." Promises included, "good treatment, medical care, and repatriation after the war. He continues, "Do not fear detention after your capture or surrender. you will be comfortable and well cared for. Wounded prisoners receive the best medical care.

Chieu Hoi Ralliers at the Bien Hoa Chieu Hoi Center received training in automotive repair to help them in their new lives. 2

The American government spent the greatest amount of money and placed the greatest emphasis on the Chieu Hoi program. In conjunction with the Republic of Vietnam they built reception centers at various locations throughout the country. The ralliers (Hoi Chanh) remained in the camp for forty-five to sixty days where they received indoctrination and were then resettled.

In 1966 the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) drew up a plan to work on five conceived weaknesses of the enemy. They were:

1. Fear (of death, injury, American technology, lack of proper burial etc.)

2. Hardships (the terrible march south, jungle diseases, lack of medical supplies, absence from family and loved ones, etc.).

3. Loss of faith in Communist victory (reports of Communist defeats, list of dead VC, overwhelming might of RVN and American forces, the coalition massed against the VC, etc.).

4. Concern for family. (The wife and family at home unprotected without a man in the house, the children growing up without a father's guidance, etc.).

5. Disillusionment. (You were duped by the Communists, the South Vietnamese do not want   to be liberated, you are fighting for your old enemy China, you are killing your own kind, etc.).

Besides the five standard themes, there were four special campaigns.

1. Safe conduct passes dropped in the billions.

2. A reward campaign offering money for weapons, information, individuals and units.

3. A Tet campaign waged each New Year when the soldier would naturally yearn to return home.

4. Recruitment of the Hoi Chanh as part of the propaganda teams.

The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) published a Directive 381-11-1 On 5 August 1968 entitled Military Intelligence Exploitation of Human Sources and Captured Documents.

The document says:

Returnees are particularly fruitful sources of information because, unlike prisoners of war, they have made a personal decision to reject their former allegiance. The psychological barrier of "name, rank, service number, and date and place of birth" does not exist. Interrogation, exploitation, detention, and processing must take into full account the significantly different status of the returnees.

RVN authorities require that the returnee be delivered to a Chieu Hoi agency within 48 hours of the original contact with friendly elements. During this period he may be interrogated for perishable information of immediate tactical value. If, for some reason, he cannot be delivered to the local Chieu Hoi agency within this length of time, immediate notification must be given the Province Chieu Hoi officials of the arrival of the returnee. Interrogation and exploitation should be accomplished as expeditiously as possible.

Returnees reporting to RVN agencies or directly to the Province Chieu Hoi Center will be available at the Chieu Hoi Center for interrogation upon request by the local senior US intelligence officer to local Chieu Hoi officials. GVN Chieu Hoi regulations require that interrogations be conducted in the Chieu Hoi Centers which are located at Province, Region, and National levels. The purpose of these regulations is to prevent hostile interrogation or mistreatment of Hoi Chanh. In special cases, however, returnees may be removed from the Center provided Chieu Hoi officials are aware and are in agreement with proposed action. The local senior US intelligence officer will establish continuing liaison with ARVN and GVN Chieu Hoi officials to insure that returnees who report directly to the Province Chieu Hoi Center are properly interrogated and reported.

Returnees may be asked to volunteer to assist military operations as guides or informants; however, such request must be approved by the local Chieu Hoi officials. Units using returnees in such operations will insure that the individuals are adequately protected, fed, housed, and returned to the Chieu Hoi Center immediately upon completion of the operation. A report will be furnished the local Chieu Hoi officials of the results of the operation in order to properly reward the returnee for his information.

Some of the weapons turned over by ralliers were displayed at the Binh Duong Chieu Hoi Center. 3

Receipt for confiscated weapons, monies, and documents will be issued to the returnee by the receiving unit or agency prior to transfer of the returnee to the Chieu Hoi Center.

Returnees should not be evacuated as prisoners of war, but should be delivered to the nearest Chieu Hoi official or office (there is an office in each district). If for some reason returnees must be evacuated through intelligence channels to higher or adjacent headquarters, the CMIC, or a Corps CIC, the local Chieu Hoi officials must be notified.

Operations using Chieu Hoi Ralliers (Hoi Chanh)

Some of the North Vietnamese officers and soldiers who came over to the “just cause” of the Republic of Vietnam as a Chieu Hoi were not just passive guests. They took part in clandestine actions against their old comrades. From about 1969 to 1971 United States Army Special Forces (MACV-SOG), Central Intelligence Agency handlers and the Vietnamese So Cong Tac (Special Mission Service) sent some of these ralliers back behind the lines as part of a secret operation code-named Earth Angel. Some of these agents were inserted using the high altitude low opening (HALO) parachute method. These operations took place all along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Cambodia and Laos and sometimes in the demilitarized zone. We should note that Cambodian defectors were also used in a second operation code-named Pike Hill. Since these teams were supposed to be local enemy troops they moved along the roads and trails instead of the jungle. As a result, you will also find them identified occasionally as Road Runners.

E4 John P. Martin of the 170th Assault Helicopter Company / Command and Control Central, Kontum, assigned to the Studies and Observation Group (SOG) discussed an Earth Angel mission:

About March 1970 I was asked to report to Forward Operating Base (FOB) II at Kontum. We were told that we would insert a very hard looking older man dressed in a North Vietnamese Colonel’s uniform behind the lines. The officer in charge pointed to a map and although I don’t remember exactly where we were going, I think it was in Cambodia.

We took him in by helicopter and left him in some heavy brush along a tree line. We returned to our base and were taken off standby for three days. The NVA colonel was our only mission. After three days we returned to the tree line and there he was. We had a minute of worry wondering if he had “turned” again and we were about to be ambushed, but there was no movement along the tree line. I watched the colonel carefully to make sure he never pointed his weapon at us as he boarded the craft. We returned to the same FOB II inside helipad as we used to take him out. That pad was rarely used since there was another one outside the FOB that was used on SOG missions. This mission was very secret and we had no cover going in or coming out. We were all alone. That makes for a very nervous disposition. There were just a few of us crewing the bird, none of my people, and as a result I never told anyone in my unit or talked about it until today. We took the colonel in to join a NVA unit, learn as much as he could, quietly depart, and come back to us. I did not try to talk to him. He didn’t have much to say to me either. What was there to talk about?

Major “Wick” Zimmer, the 1970 SOG Airborne Studies Group (OP-36A) Commander admired the dedication of the North Vietnamese Hoi Chanh who took part in Earth Angel:

The Earth Angel agent was a product of northern society. They would hold self-criticism sessions at night, just like they had done in the North Vietnamese Army. They never balked at a mission, never gave any disciplinary problems. They were extremely motivated, almost without parallel.

A more interesting example is a Viet Cong Lieutenant who rallied to the Republic of Vietnam as a Chieu Hoi and became the perimeter security adviser at a secret airfield / combat base in Laos. He was always able to spot areas of likely infiltration and see that they were well covered by weapons and explosives. The story is told by a former Air Commando who served at Laos Site (LS-153) in Mouang Kassy in 1970:

I was met at the shed by the guys I was to be working with and with them was what looked like a civilian local national. He was a bit taller than I was used to and was dressed a bit differently. He was the guy who was responsible for setting up the static perimeter defenses around the airstrip, main compound, and the interior compound where us falangs (foreigners) stayed. He immediately took me on a tour of the defenses. There was a minefield, tanglefoot (single-strand barbed wire strung in a meshwork pattern at about ankle height. A barrier designed to make it difficult to cross the obstructed area by foot. Usually placed around permanent defensive positions), stacked concertina, and more tanglefoot. The bunkers covered each other and were fronted by and flanked by tanglefoot. There were "V" board rocket launchers aimed to hit places of natural cover that couldn't be easily cleared. There were trip flares, set so that they could be seen from inside the bunker line but not from outside. They would be indicators of a probe if they were moved or tampered with but not tripped overnight. There were mortar pits. There were bunkers built up to give the occupants a high vantage point and with a "basement" bunker included to protect from direct fire. Bunker openings designed so that fire from the rear could not freely penetrate the main bunker. The main point of entry to the secure area defended in depth by bunker lines on each side covering the guardhouse. It would take some doing to get inside the compound from outside using force. While the tour went on, the civilian's chest would sort of puff out every time I made a complimentary remark or mentioned that some detail looked better done here than it had been done on other sites I had been to. As the tour wound down and we neared the communication bunker he explained why things were different here. That civilian in charge of the static defenses had once been a Lieutenant Grade cadre in the Viet Cong who had Chieu Hoi'ed and was now working with the Government of Laos forces against the communist Pathet Lao. He had been allowed to bring his family from Viet Nam to live with him and since there were numbers of local Lao fighting on both sides in the war he was trusted because he too was falang to the local tribe.

A Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) sergeant reported that he had a Chieu Hoi that had one major problem. Enemy prisoners left alone with him tended to end up dead. This Hoi Chanh had lost his Grandfather, his father and two brothers to the Viet Cong death squads. He had been conscripted at age 12 by the Viet Cong, but had snuck away at 13 and alerted an Army fire base about a planned sapper attack. Apparently, he had a long memory and it did not include “forgive and forget.”

Things did not always go so smooth with Chieu Hoi defectors. The same LRRP sergeant told of a Chieu Hoi that went out with a team and returned alone with a slight flesh wound to his upper arm. A second team was sent out with this very lucky Hoi Chanh and this time kept a careful watch on him. One of the team was an Apache and when the Chieu Hoi snuck off one night the Apache was hot on his heels. The defector met up with a couple of NVA, talked for a few minutes and headed back to the team's location. The Apache returned before the Chieu Hoi and briefed the team on what he had seen. They immediately departed the location and called for extraction a kilometer away. The Chieu Hoi was mysteriously "killed in action."

PSYOPS POLICY No. 59, dated 20 February 1968 contains a psychological operations policy and guidance. It was prepared by JUSPAO, the military agency that directed U.S. propaganda efforts from Saigon in accordance with US mission directives, and was to be implemented as pertinent by all U.S. Elements in Vietnam. The title is "The North Vietnam Army (NVA) Soldier in South Vietnam as a PSYOP Target." Besides guidance, the policy paper mentions a number of standard leaflets available for immediate reprint should the need arise. SP-1415 "Who Is Your Enemy?," SP-2263 "NVA Poem," SP-2266 "Good Treatment for NVA POWs," SP 2267 "To Soldiers of the NVA" (a Tet greeting), SP-2273 "Soldiers of the NVN People’s Army" (Tet Greeting), SP-2277 "The RVN Invites You," and SP-2236 "NVA POWs Live Peacefully."

U-10 aircraft disbursing leaflets

It is impossible to determine how many Chieu Hoi leaflets were produced during the length of the war. The Leaflet Catalog, 7th PSYOP Battalion, Danang, 1969, lists no less than 65 leaflets in the special category "Chieu Hoi." The first is 7-757-68, "Soldier of North Vietnam," the last is 7-528-69, "The Nguyen Trai Campaign." The latter was a campaign to psychologically attack enemy cadre and soldiers to cause them to rally. These 65 leaflets are just from a single battalion in a bit more than one year of the war.

The catalog also mentions various mixes of Chieu Hoi leaflets that were designed to be dropped together. For instance, mix 4 consists of 7-565-68 "With aching Heart," 7-690-68 "Chieu Hoi Poems," and 7-757-68 "Chieu Hoi is for VC/NVA." Mix 12 consists of JUSPAO leaflets SP3210 "I can't stop weeping," and SP3211 "Rallying helps you return to your friends."

A former VC guerilla receives a cash award after he rallied to the GVN side then led allied troops to a large cache of communist weapons. 4

The reader must remember that there were also various leaflets offering rewards for weapons and information, monetary offers, safe conduct passes, etc., all of which were part of the program but not specifically listed under "Chieu Hoi."

The catalog mentions five Chieu Hoi themes under the heading "Instructions for use of objectives/ appeals indicators." The instructions are, "The Chieu Hoi campaign: The PSYOP objective is to cause the enemy to rally. This is done essentially, with five types of themes or appeals:

1. Rallier exploitation (exploitation of Hoi Chanh).

2. Rally appeals (inducements to rally so as to relieve a condition; i.e. fighting for the wrong cause).

3. Third party inducement (an appeal to a third party to convince a member in the enemy ranks to rally).

4. Advertisement (an advertisement of the benefits a Hoi Chanh derives from rallying).

5. Instructions (how to rally).

Were there additional items produced and distributed besides themed leaflets? Absolutely. We have already stated that this was the biggest and costliest PSYOP program during the Vietnam War. There were hundreds, and perhaps thousands of other objects used to convince the enemy to rally.

 

1970 Chieu Hoi Pocket Calendar

Small pocket calendars and large wall calendars were given to the military and the public. They bore the Chieu Hoi emblem and/or a message.

Robert W. Chandler mentions Chieu Hoi gifts in War of ideas, the U. S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam:

 

Twenty-five thousand Japanese-produced strongly scented bars of soap, each containing seven different Chieu Hoi messages printed on interior layers, were delivered by hand during the 1969 Tet campaign.

 

One infantry division dropped white flags soaked in the Vietnamese fish sauce called Nuoc Mam to hungry enemy soldiers in an effort to persuade them to rally.

 

Marines placed a Chieu Hoi leaflet and a cigarette in plastic bags and floated them up the mouths of rivers during evening tides; similarly, plastic bags containing a washcloth, a half piece of elephant soap, needles and thread, and a leaflet were drifted into Viet Cong areas.

 

 

Chess Game

It was apparently decided in November 1967 during the Vietnam War that if the locals and the Viet Cong could become interested in playing chess, they would be less likely to set up ambushes and bury mines and punji stakes. As a result, this Joint United States Public Affairs Office product coded 2257 was developed. The finder could use the leaflet and cut out the pieces to play Vietnamese chess. It is certainly one of the oddest PSYOP items disseminated in wartime. Notice that the center of the board bears the words “Chieu Hoi” (“Open Arms”), and the Chieu Hoi symbol is at the left and right.

 

Navy Boats Chieu Hoi Poster

Hundreds of different posters were printed and put up on walls and poles wherever the people were likely to congregate. Even the Navy got into the act. Posters were used in the Delta to induce Viet Cong to give themselves up. The United States Navy and the Vietnamese Navy used Patrol Boats, River (PBR), Yabuta junks, River Assault Group (RAG) boats, and Patrol Crafts, Fast (PCF) "swift boats" for missions where they played Chieu Hoi tapes late into the night. Posters were produced showing the various vessels and reminding the Viet Cong:

Rules for the Costal and Water Port Areas.

To those who live in the Delta or Costal Areas:

If you want to return to the Just Cause of the Nation, please follow the following instructions:

Hide your weapons, remember where you hide you weapon so you can retrieve it later for rewards.

Approach South Vietnamese or Allied ships (pictures attached herewith), raise you hands high to show your good will.

Our sailors are instructed to welcome you and to take you to a Chieu Hoi Center.

Please Return to The Just Cause of the Nation so we can build a prosperous nation together.

This poster is a passport for your safe passage.

The vessels often had signs on the port and starboard railings and on the fantail which said,

Every vessel of the Navy of Vietnam and the United States is a Chieu Hoi rallying point for those friendly Viet Cong who want to return to the true government