President Roosevelt |
Elmer Davis |
President Roosevelt established the United States Office of War
Information by his Executive Order 9182 of 13 June 1942. The OWI was charged with
conveying information to the world, and empowered to conduct propaganda to foreign nations
to contribute to an Allied victory. Propaganda in areas of war were subject to the
approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). At lower levels, the Theater commander had
the power of approval. Elmer Davis, OWI’s first Director said that it was “A war
agency, which owes its existence solely to the war, and was established to serve as one of
the instruments by which the war will be won.”
Admiral Nimitz |
Admiral Halsey |
The use of psychological warfare in the Pacific is an
interesting subject and a number of books comment on it. Probably the most concise is You
Can't Fight Tanks with Bayonets, Allison B. Gilmore, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln,
1998. Some of her comments are:
In the war against Japan the theater commanders again defined the form
psywar operations would take and determined what agencies would be involved in its
conduct.
Admiral Chester Nimitz employed the services of OWI in the North and
Central Pacific areas but did not allow the OSS to operate there. He left the decision of
whether these organizations would be permitted to function in the South Pacific to Admiral
William Halsey. In March 1943, Nimitz, his operations staff, and an OWI representative
attended a series of meetings to discuss the creation of an OWI Pacific command team. The
OWI representative later wrote, "There was evidenced a general lack of belief in the
worthwhileness of OWI efforts along propaganda lines and covert doubt as to its general
usefulness." Yet, he stressed, Nimitz himself was, "not unsympathetic to
propaganda warfare . . . and is willing to give us a fair shake in his
theater."Halsey, on the other hand, was described as interested only in,
"fighting, fighting, fighting, and regards psychological warfare as some impractical
plaything of effete civilians." That impression was apparently correct, for in
the end Halsey refused both OWI and OSS clearance to operate under his command.
OWI did not establish a presence in Nimitz's command until March 1944, when
it opened an overseas branch in Honolulu and began full-scale propaganda activities.
Prior to March 1944, OWI’s Honolulu outpost was devoted to information service.
After that date, it began full-scale
propaganda activities against the enemy. It brought in presses for printing leaflets and
news sheets. It originated and relayed radio
messages from its short wave transmitters.
Bradford Smith was the chief of the outpost. He had spent five years as a teacher at
St. Paul’s University in Tokyo. Edward H. MacKay assisted Smith writing leaflets.
MacKay had previously worked in Shanghai and Yokohama. Other staff members were Bessie
McKim, Clarence Davies, Francis Baker and Bess Ellen Backes. The section’s military
members were organized into combat propaganda teams for
a given campaign.
The Overseas Branch of the OWI plans, develops, and executes all phases of
radio, press, publication, and foreign dissemination of propaganda. The Overseas Branch is
divided into Atlantic Operations with headquarters in New York City, and Pacific
Operations, with headquarters in San Francisco. The Overseas Branch directs all of its
media to four types of targets.
1. In enemy countries, its mission is to destroy morale and destroy their war effort.
2. In enemy-occupied countries, its mission is to keep alive the hope of liberation and
stimulate resistance.
3. In neutral countries, its mission is to win the support of the population and
convince them of Allied victory.
4. In Allied countries, its mission is to counter enemy propaganda, to raise morale,
and to foster a better understanding of the United States.
Many of the OWI philosophical concepts are found in the classified confidential
booklet Psychological Warfare, Part One, December 1944. This 44-page booklet has
chapters on Psychological Concepts and Technical Aspects. Other information is found in
the course notes of the Far East Training Program of the Outpost Service Bureau, San
Francisco, 1944. Finally, I used a number of United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Areas
Psychological Warfare booklets and supplements.
Richard S.R. Hubert
All of this reference material is from the personal files of Richard S.R. Hubert,
Chief, Forward Area, U.S. Office of War Information, Central Pacific Operations, based on
Saipan, Marianna Islands.
We know quite a bit about Hubert from the files of his daughter. For instance we
find that on one occasion he was assigned to attend a three-day training course on
psychological operations in Washington DC. His orders state:
The value of this course is in direct proportion to your own alertness. Keep your
eyes and ears open, be quick to ask intelligent questions on matters you want developed.
This course can be a great opportunity for picking up extra knowledge and for developing
important contacts. You will soon be going overseas as a representative of the United
States Government; it is up to you to broaden your background in every way…
Some of the classes taught in this particular course were; Historical Survey of
Asiatic-American Relations, Asia, Introduction to Psywar, Reproduction Training, Radio
Training, and Media of Propaganda. Hubert was being groomed for a major position. This
become clear in a letter from Bradford Smith, Chief of Central Pacific Operations dated 20
February 1945. It says in part:
You are hereby designated Chief, Forward Area, Central Pacific Operations…As
OWI’s chief representative you will be administratively responsible for the radio
station operation on Saigon…You will also be administratively responsible for the
leaflet production program.
We realize that the responsibilities assigned to you are more than properly
belong to one man. We are sure from your past performance, however, that you will
discharge them creditably until such time as it is possible to provide you with needed
assistance.
The assignment on which you are being sent is the most important one we have yet
undertaken. It is given to you in full faith of your ability to carry it out successfully.
The official report on the OWI Saipan operation is found in Richard S. R.
Hubert’s “The OWI Saipan Operation,” Official Report to US
Information Service, Washington, 1946.It explains some of the background on how the Navy
and the civilian propaganda organization came together:
As a result of conversations with Elmer Davis and Secretary of the Navy
Forrestal, Admiral Towers wrote a memo in December, 1944, to Admiral Nimitz recommending
that the O.W.I. should participate in the production of leaflets from facilities to be
provided by O.W.I., and that such a program be instituted in the Pacific Ocean Area.
Origination of copy for leaflets was to take place in Honolulu where JICPOA AND O.W.I.
facilities were available.
“JICPOA” is the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area. It
consisted of Analysts, cryptologists, and 50 U. S. Army Nisei Military Intelligence
Service linguists who helped to translate Japanese documents and sometimes did front-line
duty manning PSYOP loudspeakers.
Either by air or radiophoto, finished copy was to be sent forward for
production. Decision having been made to establish a leaflet production on Saipan, two
Webendorfer high speed presses, specially constructed for this purpose, together with
accessory equipment were forwarded to Honolulu to await permission to ship to Saipan. This
unit together with personnel was set up for a production on the basis of about nine
million leaflets per month. In the event it should have become desirable to originate a
leaflet in the forward area, to fit an emergency need, the JICPOA and O.W.I.
representatives were to confer in order to make sure that no standing policies were
violated.
The assembling of further staff for the Forward Area began with the arrival at Honolulu,
in early December 1944, of the Chief, Forward Area, who was to proceed to Saipan as soon
as arrangements could be completed for theatre clearance.
The following letter from Admiral Nimitz's Chief of Staff authorized the
establishment of a Psychological Warfare Office on Saipan:
“UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS,
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF.
Serial: 05236
Feb. 21, 1945
Confidential
From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific
Ocean Areas.
To: Island Commander, SAIPAN
Via: Commander,
Forward Area, Central Pacific
Subject: Advanced section, Psychological Warfare Office,
Establishment of.
1. It is desired to establish an advanced section of the Psychological Warfare
Office, CINCPAC-CINCPOA, on SAIPAN, and attach its personnel to the Island Command,
Saipan, for administrative purposes.
2. This section will be operationally under the supervision and direction of the
Psychological Warfare Office, CINCPAC-CINCPOA.
3. The Island Commander, Saipan, is requested to provide the necessary office,
working space, and additional facilities which may be required for the operation of the
section.
4. The Officer-in-Charge of the Advanced Section, Lieutenant. R. J. Morris, USNR,
will act as liaison officer with and will be cognizant of all matters pertaining to the
Office of War Information activities and personnel in the Forward Area.
C. H. McMorris
Chief of Staff
This arrangement remained effective, insofar as the liaison angle was concerned,
until August 13, 1945. On which date, apparently because of a dispatch sent by the
Commanding General, U.S. Strategical Air Force (General Spaatz) direct to the O.W.I.,
without going through O.W.I. Liaison, temporarily, at least, responsibility and
authorization for psychological warfare was relinquished by the P. W. Officer and became
vested in USASTAF and O.W.I.
Simultaneously, the Advance Psychological Warfare Section of CINCPAC was directed by
its staff officer to assist USASTAF in every way in the current psychological warfare
campaign. Accordingly, all its facilities were made available both to USASTAF and the
O.W.I. as of the 13th of August, 1945. This arrangement was confirmed by the
Psychological Warfare Officer in his letter dated August 16, 1945. Nothing further
having been heard in this connection, as of August 13, 1945, O.W.I operated in the Forward
Area without liaison.
General Spaatz |
General LeMay |
The United States Army Strategic Air Force Pacific (USASTAF) was authorized on 18
July 1945 under General Spaatz on Guam. Spaatz commanded all B-29 bombers in the Pacific.
General Curtis LeMay of Strategic Air Command fame soon became his Chief of Staff. We
might assume that Washington believed that Spaatz would take the war directly to the
Japanese homeland and thus moved the OWI PSYOP liaison from the Navy to the Army Air
Force.
The following is a synopsis of the OWI’s beliefs and techniques and is not
that of the author. The information is important because with all the modern methods and
machinery of psychological operations today, the psywarrior should know the history of his
specialty, and be able to determine if any valuable knowledge has been lost since the dark
days of WWII.
The OWI believed that the average Japanese soldier had certain characteristics
that could be used against him. For instance, it believed that the Japanese had a desire
to conform to the group rather than to seek individuality. This made it almost impossible
for a Japanese soldier to surrender because he would be stepping outside the bounds of
common ideology. The Japanese who fails can atone for his failure through seppuku (ritual
suicide). The Banzai charge (where a mass of armed and unarmed Japanese soldiers
attack a strong defensive position) therefore is form of seppuku.
The Japanese are preoccupied with fate. He has extremes in emotion. He
will cheer when he is told to, and truly believe the statements of his superiors.
When he realizes that he has been lied to he will sink into a deep despair. However, even
with a low spirit he will continue to fight because he believes that it is his fate. Even
in death, he must act properly and must not disgrace his heritage or his ancestors.
Although the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was banned from the area by both the
Army and the Navy, it is interesting to see that their Morale Operations (MO) Section had
the same beliefs about the Japanese people. The OSS paper entitled “Overall Plan for
the pacific area, 1944” says in part:
The Japanese soldier is an MO target wherever he is located. So is the Japanese
civilian located in Japan proper. Japanese agents, puppets and the collaborationists on
the China coast, in Formosa and the Philippines can also profitably be made the target for
subversive activities based on the Pacific theatres. The peoples located in territories
occupied by the Japanese can also be stimulated into resistance against the Japanese and
are therefore an MO target. ... Psychologically the Japanese people are susceptible to
subversive operations. Even the Japanese soldier is subject to effective psychological
attack whenever he believes his situation is hopeless. These weaknesses in the psychology
of the Japanese should be exploited by subversive operations. Currently there are the
following basic vulnerable points in the Japanese psychological make-up: dissention
between the branches of the armed forces; political differences, especially concerning the
conduct of the war; anxiety over Russia joining the Allies in the Pacific war; fear of
Chinese and Russian communism spreading to the Japanese mainland; failure of the greater
East Asia co-prosperity sphere to secure complete native cooperation; fear of hostility of
the natives of the occupied territory; dissension between Japanese troops of rural and
urban backgrounds; class distinctions on the home front and in the armed forces; anxiety
among the leaders over the effect of the military defeat of Germany; fear of disease; fear
of an air blitz against Japan's principal cities. The hostility toward Japan of certain
groups of the native populations in Formosa and the Philippines provides a good target for
anti-Japanese rumors and for developing cooperation with the American forces by the use of
various subversive methods. These activities could be so directed that they would harass
the Japanese and their puppets and would reduce the flow of aid to Japanese troops.
The OSS, of course, dealt with black operations, sabotage and spying. Military
leaders in the Pacific were suspicious of them and felt that they were uncontrollable. The
OWI, being more civilian in nature, was less liable to go off “half cocked” and
embarrass the theater commanders.
How does one motivate the Japanese soldier to surrender? Use his emotions
against him. Use psychological operations to lower his spirit and bring him to utter
despair, then work on his instinct for self-preservation. Convince him that he has been
mislead, that the war was wrong, that he cannot win, and that it is worth living to
rebuild the new Japan.
General Nogi Training Leaflet
We seldom get to see the training leaflets that the new PSYOP agents prepared
as part of their curriculum. The above leaflet was designed and printed by the outpost
training class in San Francisco in 1944 as they prepared for deployment to the Pacific.
The purpose of the project was to gain experience in studying military conditions for
which leaflets would conceivably be used in the field, and to practice writing and
producing leaflets that would deal with hypothetical situations set up by the class.
The student team was made up of an artist, a military liaison, writers, a
Japanese translator, a Davidson pressman, an advisor-critic and an elected chief of
project. The leaflet above was designed to be used against isolated Japanese troops on New
Guinea.
The front of the leaflet depicts General Nogi and a poem:
The tree, the root and the branches all decaying;
What fragrance the camphor tree still sheds.
The back of the leaflet is all text:
As you all know, General Nogi led his troops to glorious victory at Port
Arthur. His men had superior weapons. They had ample supplies. Their communications were
excellent. This was largely due to the sagacity of general Nogi. Yet General Nogi offered
to commit seppuku when accused of wasting men. He refrained only when the Meiji Tenno
forbade the act.
Compare your situation with the situation at Port Arthur. The Japanese
soldiers there were on the offensive, but you – are you not on the defensive? Are not
your weapons inferior? Are not your supplies dwindling? Have not your communications been
destroyed? Have you not seen your comrades die uselessly?
The Japanese soldiers at Port Arthur died to achieve victory. Yet general
Nogi, even in this hour of greatest victory, wept and sought self-effacement. Is it in
keeping with the wise decision of general Nogi for officers to continually and blindly
subject warriors of Japan to needless slaughter under impossible conditions?
I have not found an OWI leaflet mentioning General Nogi, but it was used by General
MacArthur’s Army psywar unit Australia. An all-text leaflet targeted Japanese troops in the
Philippines but was also suitable for Japanese troops and
civilians anywhere. The text of the leaflet coded 20-J-1 is:
What is the conduct of your present military leaders?" Gen. Nogi wished to
commit suicide for needlessly sacrificing a large number of men yet Gen. Yamashita took no
blame for the glaring blunder committed on Leyte Island, trying instead to shift the blame
onto others. "It would seem that the difference between the splendid spirit of Gen.
Nogi, and the base attitude of the military leaders to today, represented by Yamashita is
like that difference between clouds and mud."
Leaflet 120
It is interesting to note that a very similar leaflet was prepared by the OWI
for use in the field. Black and white leaflet 120 depicts another hero of the
Russo-Japanese War, Admiral Togo. The purpose of the leaflet is to weaken the Japanese
will to fight to the death. Text on the front of the leaflet is:
It is the duty of young people whose future is bright to take care of
themselves and live to serve the nation.
The back is all text:
Wherever the American forces have advanced, the Japan has not
been a match for them. The Americans already control all the South pacific, the Philippines,
and Iwo Jima
In such a situation, what should you do? Is it not better to live for the
future of Japan than to resist and throw away your young lives
foolishly?
Fleet Admiral Togo once said, “You are young and your future is
bright. Therefore, it is your duty to take care of yourselves and to live to serve your
country.”
Cease useless resistance. For what and for whose benefit are you fighting?
Is not the outcome already certain?
Former Premier Koiso said that the productive capacity of Japan was
one-fourth of the United States. Your leaders have been telling you that you cannot
win a war of production.
Moreover, now, the Soviets have denounced the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality
Act. Those who desire peace, those who wish to carry out the injunction of Fleet Admiral Togo, cease
resistance when the American army lands and come over.
General Propaganda
The OWI defined general propaganda as propaganda
not aimed at specific targets like areas to be assaulted or by-passed islands. It is
similar to what we call strategic propaganda today. These leaflets are dropped on the
Japanese wherever they are as they go about their daily business. This type of propaganda
includes newspapers, broadcasts, and leaflets to Japan, occupied China, Korea or Taiwan.
The idea was to continually let the enemy see the propaganda so it would start to wear him
down like the constant dripping of water on a rock. Reading the same Allied propaganda
over and over would eventually lead to independent thought on the part of the finder.
“Repetition connotes truth” says the OWI, so the more leaflets dropped the
better chance that they will be accepted as truthful.
Codes
Part One of the August 1944 United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas
publication Psychological Warfare breaks down the code numbers of the leaflets into
categories and explains their themes. I have greatly edited the explanatory paragraphs. I
also added some examples of the Leaflet titles in each category to show the reader the
general concept of the U.S. propaganda.
a. 100-399. Leaflets bearing these numbers have been prepared for the period of
bombardment of an entire tactical area, preliminary to any further action to be taken in
that area.
100. Where is
your navy?
109. Victory in the
air?
116. Open your eyes.
b. 400-499. Leaflets bearing these numbers are designed for that period of intensive
bombardment, usually by surface ships, just prior to the invasion.
405. To the Japanese
soldier.
410. I raise my two hands to
live for my country.
413. Civilians!
c. 500-699. Leaflets bearing these numbers are designed for that phase when the
actual landings are made and the main engagement begins.
501. To Japanese officers!
503. You can't fight tanks with bayonets!
512. Full strength instead of 10%.
d. 700-799. Leaflets bearing these numbers should be used when the enemy realizes
that our forces will be successful in their attacks.
700. Die for the military caste or live for your home and country.
701. If you commit seppuku.
705. Think it over carefully.
e. 800-999. Leaflets bearing these numbers should be used when resistance has been
broken and only mopping-up remains.
808. Are you so determined to die that you won't listen to reason?
809. What are you fighting for?
810. Life-saving guarantee.
The pamphlets for by-passed garrisons are numbered serially from 1000-1099.
1001. Do you intend to continue to live like a beast in the jungle?
1006. Your island has been isolated and cut off from all aid and supplies.
1009. Instructions for negotiations.
The OWI Saipan Print Shop Operating
Around the Clock, Saipan, August 1945.
A word or two about the printing facilities in general. The printing team originally
consisted of four pressmen, one photographer and one printing production chief. Later, six
Navy pressmen from Honolulu joined the team. An attempt was made to run the presses around
the clock, but the heat and humidity in the print shop without air-conditioning made this
impossible. Japanese prisoners of war joined the group. At first four were trained, later
as many as thirty POWs helped with the printing, rolling of the leaflets, and general
work. The leaflets were usually rolled into leaflet bombs, but sometimes when rushed the
men just stacked them inside the casings. Besides leaflets, Saipan also printed a
newspaper entitled Makoto, (“Truth”).
The installation of Radiophoto equipment allowed transmission from Honolulu to Saipan and
the preparation of Japanese language leaflets and newspaper much more quickly and
efficiently. By 1 June 1945, leaflet text and artwork was being regularly transmitted to Saipan.
The technicians and printers only needed to clean and “touch up” the copy.
OWI leaflet 507
OWI leaflet 507 is a tactical assault leaflet. It is designed to expedite the
surrender of Japanese soldiers during the early stages of an assault. The leaflet depicts
and American officer talking to two Japanese soldiers. The body language is friendly and
the dialogue is intended to make American promises more credible. Text on the back is:
An American officer who speaks Japanese well was talking with two Japanese
soldiers who came over to the American forces on Guam. The two soldiers expressed their
thanks for the excellent treatment they had received.
"Didn't you know that American troops treat Japanese well?' the officer
asked.
The two soldiers shook their heads. "No," they replied. "We
were afraid to come over to you. We thought you would kill us. We only came when there was
no more hope."
Don't wait until our fierce artillery fire and bombs crush you beyond all hope of
recovery. Resistance is futile; come now. You will receive good food, water, and medical
treatment. A hot bath and clean bed await you. Don't throw away your life in vain!
Assault Propaganda
Assault propaganda is closer to what we call tactical propaganda
today. Its purpose was to lower morale of the enemy, decrease his resistance, create
disunity and dissension, and to gain support for Allied causes. It was used for specific
targets and the message was sometimes very specific in nature.
Propaganda for By-passed Garrisons
Bypassed Garrison Leaflet 1044
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During WWII it was the policy of the Navy to bypass well defended islands of no
strategic value and let the Japanese defenders “rot on the vine.” The Navy
dropped OWI leaflet 1044 along with rubber boats on Wake Island to implement
the surender of the trapped troops. Every troop that used the boat to go over to the
Americans was one less armed defender on the island. One side of the leaflet has detailed
instructions on the use of the rubber boat accompanied by simply explanatory sketches:
1. First, orally inflate the boat using the rubber tube. Attach the rubber tube
to the valve on the inside of the boat, turn the valve to the left, and orally inflate
slowly. When the boat is completely inflated, turn the valve to the right and leave it in
that position. You will then have a fine boat! It takes a healthy person about 15 minutes
to inflate the boat orally.
2. When the boat is finished, set out! What about the waves and the wind
conditions? Take off you clothes and make a sail out of them.
3. Put your hands through the straps on the two rubber oars and row with them.
They will also act as a rudder. The small rubber cup is very handy for bailing out the
bilge.
4. When the waves are rough, you can steady the boat by taking hold of the
handles on the top. Work them skillfully so that the boat will not turn over. Even though
there is a heavy swell, keep courage and go on, humming the song “UMI NO TAMI NARA
OTOKO NARA.” You can be sure that the boat will not sink.
5. Directly ahead, you can see lights. That is the rescue ship. If you keep on
course until you reach the ship, all will be well.
Note: The American translation may not be exactly right. According to a
Japanese source, this is an old traditional Japanese fisherman's song and should have
been written UMI NO TAMENARA OTOKO NARA. It does not translate to English well, but means
something like, "A brave man will not be afraid of fishing in rough seas."
A second source, a Japanese TV-producer with interest in naval history said that the
title was “The Pacific March” and that the lyrics were written in a contest
sponsored by a Japanese newspaper with support by the Imperial Navy in 1939. This
propaganda song was a success thanks to a good tune.
We are real sea men, even real males
Once we all desired the Black Japan Current of the Pacific
Now the time has come to go their together bravely
Our blood will be burning with great joy.
Regardless of who is correct, it is clear that the OWI had a good understanding of
Japanese music and culture and chose a tune that challenged the men to bravely take to the
rough seas on the tiny raft.
The other side depicts photographs of rescued Japanese soldiers with
explanatory captions.
a. Life line lowered from American ship.
b. Step by step, up the ladder to hope.
c. Having washed away the mud of battle, they breathe a sigh of relief.
Because the Pacific war was an island war and the American military campaign
called for many strongly defended islands to be bi-passed, the psychological operations
(PSYOP) against the Japanese troops stationed on those islands became a very specialized
art. These men were often out of communication with their officers and political cadre,
sometimes without food or water, often sick or injured and without medical treatment or
drugs. As a result, they were the perfect target for propaganda. Sometimes, these
abandoned Japanese troops were on islands where Americans had landed. They were capable of
putting up a resistance, even if a weak one. American forces could be better used
elsewhere than guarding installations against attack from a few soldiers in the hills. It
was important in both cases to convince the Japanese holdout that his war was over and his
best action was to come over to the American side. Allied propaganda needed to destroy the
Japanese fighting spirit and cause him to quit the fight.
Themes for Japan Proper
Leaflets for the Japanese homeland are generally somewhat different than those
dropped on troops. Because the civilian has been less indoctrinated than the soldier, an
appeal will usually have a greater effect. The civilian has more leisure time to reflect
on the message than the soldier. Propaganda for the civilian should be aimed at three
targets. The first is the “little people,” the farmers, merchants, fisherman,
etc. The second target is the students. The final target is the “official”
class. The students are the most susceptible to anti-militarist statements. The workers
are most susceptible to terrorist themes and citing the lies of their leaders. The
officials should be appealed to with the logic of inevitable defeat and the need to save
the nation by ending the war.
General Themes Which Proved Effective In Japan
1. Citing the lies of Japanese leaders.
OWI leaflet 2023
OWI leaflet 2023 is designed to denounce Japan's leaders as
liars. It refutes the fantastic claims of Japanese sea victories and the loss of American
aircraft carriers. The leaflet depicts a squadron of American dive-bombers flying over a
fleet of U. S. aircraft carriers. Text on the back is:
YOUR LEADERS ARE LIARS!
In a 14 October 1944 broadcast, Japanese commentators quoted naval Captain
Kurihara's statement that Japanese forces inflicted tremendous damage upon the great
American fleet that attacked Formosa, but that America would probably still be able to
bomb Japan.
Knowing that Japanese lies about American losses would not affect the actual
situation, Captain Kurihara sought deliberately to offer an excuse for future powerful
American air raids against Japan.
Those planes are from American aircraft carriers that your leaders said were
sunk near Formosa. Our bombs now tell you that not one carrier was sunk off Formosa during
October.
YOUR LEADERS ARE LIARS!
This leaflet appears to have succeeded. A
wartime Japanese report by the Foreign Section of the Home Ministry says:
People were anxious about losing the war. They had these leaflets saying,
“Your leaders told you a lie, and our planes came from an aircraft carrier that your
leaders claimed was sunk off the coast of Formosa.” Many people became doubtful about
the information from the Japanese Imperial headquarters.
2. Creating dissension and friction
(divide and conquer).
OWI
leaflet 2015
OWI leaflet 2015 is designed to
cause dissension between the people of Japan and their militarist leaders. The text
reminds the people that their leaders cannot protect them from American bombs. The leaflet
depicts a worker trying to hold on to his home while a militarist pulls on his leg with a
rope. The leaflet is printed in brown ink on a blue paper stock. There is a reprint coded
2015A in plain black ink on white paper. Text on the back is:
No one runs away when his home is about to fall. He
will repair the weak spot before it falls.
Japan is
facing a national crisis. The rotten portion of the national structure is the Gumbatsu.
The recent air raids over Japan have proven the fact that the Gumbatsu have deceived you
concerning their strength.
Displace the Gumbatsu. Save yourselves and save the
nation.
The word “Gumbatsu”
appears in numerous American propaganda leaflets. The Gumbatsu was a coalition of military
leaders, elected political leaders, rich industrialists and wealthy landowners who ruled Japan.
They are similar to what President Dwight D. Eisenhower called the
“Military-Industrial complex” in his famous 1961 speech. Perhaps remembering Japan
16 years earlier, he said:
In the councils of government, we must guard against
the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the
military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power
exists and will persist.
3. Citing American industrial might
and recent military victories.
4. Terrorizing and threatening death
and destruction.
Some General Propaganda Themes
1. Appeals to physical needs like rest, food and medical
treatment.
2. Appeals against self-destruction
and for self preservation.
OWI
Leaflet 104
OWI Leaflet 104 meets the theme of
convincing Japanese troops that it is better to live and build the nation rather than die
a useless death. The leaflet depicts a grave marker and the text, “This soldier
helped no one by dying.” There is also a picture of a live soldier and the text,
“This living soldier will help to build a new Japan.”
The back is all text:
EVERY JAPANESE MUST CHOOSE ONE OF TWO
COURSES.
1. Death for the Gumbatsu.
2. Life for a new nation.
Those who die for the Gumbatsu die in vain because the
Gumbatsu is losing the war.
Those who live preserve themselves for the great
responsibility of rebuilding the nation.
There will be no disgrace in living to return to Japan because all who live do so
for the same reason.
3. Give face-saving ways for the
Japanese to cease resistance. Offer excuses. Blame others for his plight.
The
threat of Japanese suicide was very real and the United States produced a great number of
leaflets in an attempt to convince the Japanese soldier to live to return home. The
Japanese warrior code stated that death in battle brought honor both to individual and to
the nation. The preferred method of hara-kiri or seppuku is to stab yourself in the left
abdomen and pull the knife across your stomach, disemboweling yourself. This should be
done without showing any pain or emotion. Many Japanese would have a friend stand by with
a sword and if they wavered their friend would do them the honor of beheading them before
they expressed pain and dishonored themselves.
An Office of Strategic Services Interrogation dated 9 June 1944 mentions a Japanese
officer explaining to his troops the way they should die rather than be captured in a
situation where seppuku was impossible and time was of the essence:
- Point your rifle
under your chin. Place a stick in the trigger guard. Use both feet to force the stick
down.
- Release the
safety pin of a hand grenade and place it close to your body.
- Plunge your
bayonet into your body.
It is very interesting to note that although the American
propagandists tried to keep Japanese enlisted personnel from killing themselves, they had
no reserve about urging Japanese officers to commit seppuku. Eleanor Sparagana says in her
doctorial thesis entitled, The Conduct and Consequences of Psychological Warfare:
American Psychological Warfare Operations in the War against Japan, 1941-1945:
Not all propaganda directed at the military sounded as compassionate as the
anti-suicide appeals. One of the more hard-hearted and devious facets of the campaign
consisted of inciting Japanese officers to perform seppuku when they failed in their
military mission. The Allied reminded Japanese battle-level officers that, while they
committed soldiers to commit hara-kiri instead of surrendering, their senior leaders,
including Tojo, often failed to kill themselves after their failures in battle. One
leaflet depicted a leader preparing to kill himself while kneeling beside a newspaper that
chronicled his failure. Another leaflet pictured the traditional setting for seppuku and
insisted: “It is time that the military leaders admitted their failures and obeyed
the code which they demand that their followers obey. If they do not take that action the
people should demand that they do so.”
Leaflet 2090
Leaflet 2090 is designed to destroy the people's confidence in the militarists. The
front of the leaflet has an illustration of twelve prominent Japanese militarists with a
caption above that reads:
Military leaders of Japan. Can you convince the people that you are able to
defend the soil, the waters, and the skies of Japan?
The back of the leaflet depicts President Harry S. Truman and the following text:
Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, asked these questions in a
message directed to the people of Japan.
"Did you not in the past solemnly declare that you would defend Guam,
Tinian, the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, the last barricade on the way to Tokyo?
Did you not promise in the past, that our planes would not violate the skies of Japan?
Were you able to keep these promises?
Let me assure you again and again that my country is determined to fight this war
to its predestined end and I cannot find any who thinks that our victory will be too hard
and too costly to win.
Your future lies in your own hands. You can choose between a wasteful unclean
death for many of your forces, or a peace with honor."
4. Cite the lies of Japanese
leaders. Point out that the Japanese spirit is not invincible, and that Americans do
possess a fighting spirit.
5. Respect for authority and law.
Where the Americans have conquered they legally rule and the Japanese should obey their
commands.
6. The overwhelming might of
American arms and their recent victories.
Leaflet 100
Leaflet 100 depicts a map of the entire western Pacific to include Japan, Australia,
part of China and Southeast Asia. Two lines appear on the map, one in red, one in blue.
The blue line depicts the furthest advances of the Japanese Empire, while the red line
shows the current status of the war with Allied forces moving closer to the home islands.
The lines visually prove that the Japanese Navy cannot protect the Empire and that Allied
forces are advancing to within striking distance of Japan itself. Some of the demoralizing
text is:
WHERE IS YOUR NAVY?
December 7 1941
November 1943 – Beginning of the American offensive!
The Gilbert Islands conquered by America November 20, 1943!
Saipan, Tinian and Guam conquered by America July 1944!
Is Japan next?
OWI
leaflet 514
OWI leaflet 514 stresses the
American military and industrial might. The leaflet is larger than usual at about 7 x 9
.5 inches and printed in a bright red ink. The leaflet
depicts a sky full of American aircraft and a sea full of American naval vessels all aimed
at Japan. The purpose of the leaflet
is to weaken Japanese morale by stressing American industrial and military might.
References are made to America’s vast forces of men and equipment, and comments of
prisoners of war are quoted generally to support the theme’s contentions. Text
on the back is:
Powerful American forces, supported by innumerable planes,
tanks, and ships, have already landed on your shores. Resistance against such
overwhelming masses of men and equipment can only be futile. We know your valor, but
you can't do the impossible.
As some of your soldiers who, at Tarawa and Saipan,
expressed their thanks to us for fine medical treatment, admitted: "You Americans
keep pouring in men and Materials. What can we do?" Yes, and this time we have even
more than at Tarawa and Saipan.
Leaflet 2008
This leaflet is designed to convince the Japanese that they cannot win the war and
to lower morale and encourage surrender. It reverses the Japanese phrase hakko ichiu (“A world ruled by Japan”)
and shows instead that Japan is being attacked from the eight corners of the world. The 5
x 8-inch leaflet gives the reader the true facts of Allied victories in the Pacific. Some
of the text is:
HAKKO ICHIU TO JAPAN IS HAKKO ICHIU TO THE WHOLE WORLD
The war in Europe is virtually won. The Allied forces from eight corner of the
world will be directed toward Japan’s military clique. From Alaska; from America,
From the Central Pacific; from the South Pacific; from Australia; from India; from Europe
and from the North Atlantic.
Text on the back mentions recent Allied victories. It mentions the invasion of
the Mariana Islands on 11 June 1944, the invasion of the Palau Group on 16 September 1944,
and the regular bombing of Japanese forces on the Philippine Islands.
7. Appeal to non-Japanese inhabitants, calls for sabotage, and warnings to locals to
stay clear of bombing targets.
Cautions
You must be careful to always give
the absolute truth. Any obvious lie or exaggeration will lead to a loss in credibility.
Never use the word surrender (kosan or kofuku) or prisoner of war (horyo or foryo)
in any propaganda. We must help the Japanese to “save face” and make their
surrender palatable. The faces of Japanese prisoners must never be used in propaganda.
They would rather die than have it known that they surrendered. No food, medicine or
tobacco should be dropped on the Japanese without the permission of the Commander in Chief
Pacific.
OWI
Leaflet 810
OWI Leaflets 810 and 811 are both
safe conduct passes that instruct the Japanese how to come over to the American side. As
stated in the preceding paragraph, neither mentions the word surrender. Both are printed
with colorful red, white and blue stripes that make them visible for some distance. It was
important that the passes be clearly marked because suspicious American soldiers were
known to shoot first and ask questions later. Both leaflets have the instructions in
English on one side and in Japanese on the other. They are written in very simple Japanese
that could be understood by all enemy troops. Leaflet 810 is oversized at 8 x 10 inches,
leaflet 811 is more standard at 5 x 8 inches. The text is:
The bearer has ceased all resistance. Treat him in
accordance with international law. Take him to the nearest commanding officer. C-in-C
Allied Forces.
Life Saving Guarantee
1. The American forces will aid all who use this card.
2. Using this, you will receive good treatment.
How to use this card
1. Come slowly toward the American lines with your
hands raised high above your head carrying only this card.
2. Come one by one. Do not come in groups.
3. Men must wear only loincloths. We will provide
clothing.
4. You must not approach American positions at night.
5. This card may be used by anyone - Japanese or
Korean, soldiers or civilians.
6. Those who do not have cards may come to us if they
follow the above instructions.
There was an interesting occurrence in regard to instruction
number 3. Stars and Stripes of 29 June 1945 reports that an Okinawan woman
surrendered to U. S. infantry forces naked, believing that the instructions also applied
to her.
The OWI Propaganda Newspapers
Hawaii Weekly News #2502
The OWI produced many different newspapers for both the Japanese and their allies
and occupied nations. Among other newspapers printed by the OWI on Saipan were the Mariana
News and the Korean-language Chosen Weekly News and Chosen Liberty Weekly.
It believed that there was a distrust of official news in Japan and that an airborne
newspaper, similar in format to Japanese newspapers, would be eagerly read.
The above newspaper was printed as a single sheet, 8 x 11 inches. It depicts The
Marines raising the flag on Mt. Suribachi on Iwo Jima. Note that this is not the famous
Joe Rosenthal photograph. At the time, nobody knew
that the Rosenthal picture of the flag-raising would be known around the world. This
picture depicts the first flag-raising atop Mount Suribachi, February 23, 1945. The
Marines are Hank Hansen (without helmet), Boots Thomas (seated), John Bradley (behind
Thomas) Phil Ward (hand visible grasping pole), Jim Michaels (with carbine) and Chuck
Lindberg (behind Michaels). The photo was taken by Lou Lowery at 1000, 23 February 1945.
Some of the stories in the propaganda newspaper are; Cologne captured by the American
First Army, U.S. Ninth Army racing toward Coblenz, the First Army crosses the Rhine River,
the Battle for Luzon almost over and the British are nearing Mandalay.
The Chosen Liberty Weekly 4500
This Korean-language OWI propaganda newspaper was a slap in the face to the Japanese
who had forbidden the use of the Korean language. The above newspaper was printed as a
single sheet, 8 x 11 inches. The masthead also depicts a map of Korea. The photograph on
the front depicts U.S. Marines landing on Iwo Jima. Other stories are; U.S. carrier-based
aircraft strike Tokyo in a surprise two-day raid, U.S. forces recapture Bataan, U.S.
submarines sink 25 Japanese vessels, and U.S. troops recapture Corregidor.
Makoto (Truth) 2019
The above newspaper was printed as a single sheet, 8 x 11 inches. It depicts two U.S.
Army Air Force B-29 Super Fortresses (Mr. B-San to many Japanese) flying over the
mountains of China. Some of the stories are; American bombing raids on Formosa, the D-Day
invasion of Europe, American aircraft production, and the surrender of Japanese prisoners
on the island of Blak. More interesting, to win the trust of the Japanese there is an
article about Yasuo Kuniyoshi winning the first prize in the annual Carnegie Institute
exhibition of painting.
World’s Weekly News 3501
This Chinese-language newspaper was aimed at people on the mainland, and
particularly the occupied areas like Formosa and Hainan. The newspaper depicts a B-29
Super Fortress on the front. Some of the articles are; the Japanese will make China a
battlefield for the remainder of the war, B-29s bomb Tokyo again, U.S. strikes Luzon twice
in two days and the American Sixth Army just 28 miles from Manila.
Mariana News 2523
This Japanese-language newspaper was printed to give the Japanese homeland true news
of Allied progress on all fronts. It was printed as a single sheet, 8 x 11-inches in size.
This may be the most impressive single copy of the newspaper because it depicts Japanese
ship under attack by carrier aircraft on the front, and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on
the back. Some of the other stories are; Japan’s militarists resist peace terms,
President Truman announces the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, British fleet
attacks Malaya, Kweilin recaptured, and the Japanese routed at Borneo.
The OWI Psychological Warfare textbook explains the need for the newspapers:
For Japanese troops in combat areas and in other places as well as the mainland
proper, such newspapers will not only be interesting because of the reading matter they
provide, but will be effective because they present information which they cannot receive
in any other way. It is a general fact that Japanese troops in many areas previously
attacked by American forces had little information concerning events other than vague
generalizations about “glorious triumphs” passed out to them by their officers.
In the homeland such newspaper should prove effective because, although the Japanese
civilian does read newspapers and listens to the radio, the picture of the war which is
presented to him is far different than the true picture. Thus, this small newspaper is one
of the best means of destroying Japanese faith in Japan’s present leaders, for
substantially lowering morale, and for presenting the truth.
Rakkasan News No. 21
After the war, Masjiro Kawabushi, Chief of the Foreign Affair Bureau of the Home
industry said:
The Mariana News was effective. So was the Rakkasan News [Parachute News,
printed by PWB in Manila, not an OWI product]. Newspapers were better than leaflets in
results achieved.
For the Japanese, the most disheartening issue of the Mariana News was probably
number 2523. This issue featured a large photograph of the Hiroshima atomic bomb explosion
and a series of stories of Japanese defeats in every area. For instance, it explains that
Japan's militarists have rejected Allied peace terms and as a result, President Harry S.
Truman dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Truman says that he only dropped the bomb
after Japan rejected the Potsdam peace terms. Russia has declared war on Japan. Molotov
states that since Japan has rejected the Potsdam terms, peace overtures are meaningless.
The island of Kweilin has been taken by the Americans. The Japanese have been routed in
Borneo. Japanese casualties are mounting in the South Pacific front and the Japanese have
suffered tremendous losses in Burma. It is no wonder that after reading such news the
Japanese were ready to surrender.
Presentation of our Message
The M-15 and M-16 Leaflet Bombs
No bomb has been devised solely for the purpose of distributing propaganda
leaflets. One can modify the M-26 Flare Case into the “bomb, leaflet 100-pound size
T1,” the M-15 Adapter Cluster Case into the “bomb, leaflet 100-pound size
T2,” or the M-16 Adapter Cluster Case into the “bomb, leaflet 500-pound size
T3.” The bombs should burst from 700-1000 feet above enemy occupied areas. The
weight of the M-26 loaded with leaflets is approximately 65 pounds. The leaflets must be
rolled to completely fill the casing. If the leaflets are 5 x 8 inches, the M-26 case (T1
bomb) can hold approximately 10,500 leaflets. The fuse should be set to cause a discharge
at approximately 1,000 feet above and upwind of the target. If the leaflets are 5 x 8
inches, the M-15 case (T2 bomb) can hold approximately 7,500 leaflets and weights
approximately 55 pounds. The M16 case (T3 bomb) filled with leaflets weights approximately
175 pounds and will hold about 30,000 leaflets.
The OWI PV-1 "Polly" Aircraft
A PV-1 aircraft with a special loud speaker system providing audible speech
from 6,000 feet altitude was available for day or night harassment of Japanese troops if
atmospheric condition were right. The loudspeakers were located just aft of
the rear exit.
Four PV-1s were built, but only one was sent to the Pacific. It had a Navy crew of
three officers; a pilot, co-pilot and a propaganda officer to handle the sound gear. In
early embarrassing tests the loudspeakers failed from 2,000 feet and later blew a fuse.
The aircraft was finally sent to the Marshall Islands. On
15 February 1945, Polly made its initial 15-minute broadcast over Wotje Atoll at an
altitude of 4,500 feet. The aircraft played “My Blue Heaven” and “Red River
Valley” and broadcast a “hopelessness” message that had been recorded in Hawaii
by a Japanese prisoner-of-war. It took heavy fire and lost an engine. About the middle of
April, Polly left the Marshall islands and deployed to Okinawa. Immediately after the Okinawa
campaign Polly was replaced by four PB4Y2s Privateers, the Navy version of the Army B-24
Liberator.
A few days after the Japanese surrender the new loudspeaker aircraft flew over Tokyo
and played the song, “I Surrender Dear.”
Loudspeaker Team
The loudspeaker is the most effective method of reaching troops in the jungle
and in caves. Loud speakers can be mounted on jeeps, trucks, tanks and small crafts. It is
suggested that the most powerful reproducers be used. The louder the better since sound is
absorbed in the jungle. In some cases personnel 300 yards away could not hear the speakers
in the jungle.
Of course, the Japanese concept of enemy loudspeaker messages and leaflets is
different than that of the Americans. Master Sergeant John Blair talks about the
Guadalcanal battle in an article entitled “A Japanese Guadalcanal Dairy.”
On 16 January 1943, a Japanese soldier reports:
I heard one of the enemy talking busily in Japanese over a loud speaker. He was
probably telling us to come out. What fools the enemy are! The Japanese Army will stick it
out to the end. This position must be defended with our lives.
A day later on 17 January 1943 we find the entry:
According to the enemy broadcast, today they are going to attack our position.
However, we have no fear. I went to the battalion headquarters in the morning and saw
enemy propaganda sheets which were found in First Lieutenant Kasahara's area. The writing
was very poor.
Now that we know the philosophy and tools of the OWI, we need to study exactly
how the system worked. The following data is gleaned from a number of lectures the
students received during their training.
The OWI separates propaganda into two priorities. The first is the American
story, the people, their aims, their actions and how they are contributing to the war
effort. The second is to always tell the truth. Constant repetition of the truth is the
OWI way of news and information broadcasts. The OWI had no broadcast capability until
November 1942, when the government officially took over by contractual agreement the short
wave stations throughout the country. The OWI obtained station KGEI in San Francisco at
that time. However, using commercial radio, as part of the old Coordinator of Information
(COI) organization, they first broadcast on 8 December 1941 in Japanese.
The OWI was formed primarily to eliminate confusion and chaos, which came from
a number of different wartime agencies competing for radio time and space in newspapers. A
single agency was needed to bring order to the overseas propaganda campaign. Robert
Sherwood became the head of the Overseas Branch. The function of the Outpost people was
different in different areas. In neutral countries, they are purely informational. In
Allied countries, their duties were informational and psychological warfare. In the
Pacific Theater of Operations, there was an office in Honolulu and in Sidney, Australia. A
radio station broadcast from Brisbane. The OWI used the Australian transmitters to
broadcast to the Philippines. There was an office in Chungking, China.
Inside the organization, propaganda analysis takes the product of enemy radio
and turns it into material the OWI can use. Propaganda analysis deals primarily with the
enemy' radio output, Some 80,000 words a day are broadcast from Japan and Japanese
controlled stations and are monitored by us. Operations Intelligence prepares long-range
material. One of the Pacific problems is the sixteen-hour time difference between San
Francisco and the target cities in the Orient like Tokyo. That means that most of the
programs are taped here and broadcast during enemy peak hours. Some foreign language
speakers are easier to find than others. Good Japanese and Burmese readers are difficult
to locate, Thai readers are almost impossible. Broadcasts are also made in Chinese,
French, Dutch and Malay. In some cases, we hire people with almost no skills simply
because they speak the languages. We record most of the Japanese programs in Denver where
the agency has a number of Japanese employees.
How do we produce a radio program? The Contact Department finds various
notables and takes opinions or quotes from them that will appear on the show. The Special
Events Department goes to newsworthy events and records them. Radio writers in the
Features Unit combine the stories to produce a radio tape that is shipped to the Outposts
in foreign countries. The Outpost programs are mostly regularly programmed. The radio
shows are saved for six months since they might be used more than once. There are 15 radio
studios producing records. The OWI also “borrows” from regular commercial
broadcasting. Washington sets the editorial policy, and all shows are censored
by the Navy. The OWI produces about 850 programs a week.
The Japanese seem not to have feared the American radio to any great extent.
They did monitor San Francisco and Hawaii, but made no special effort to study them in any
depth. Sukehido Kabayama of the Foreign Office believed that Japan had almost completely
jammed Saipan radio. He believed that some small areas of Japan might be able to pick up
Saipan radio on occasion, but in general the transmissions were believed to be blocked.
The official belief was that Allied radio had no effect on the Japanese people prior to
Guadalcanal. After the fall of Saipan, the Japanese began to believe that the war could be
lost.
Kabayama thought that the best propaganda radio came from New Delhi and Chungking.
The American Hawaii radio broadcasts lacked appeal in that statements contained too much
challenge and not enough persuasion. One interesting point made was that because of the
speed with which the results of bomb raids were broadcast and the disruption of Japanese
communications, the government sometimes heard of the results of raids from San Francisco
before they were notified by local authorities.
George Mitiushio of the English Section of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation said
that KGEI from San Francisco was considered the most important American radio station.
However, the Foreign Office rarely let them hear the American broadcasts and as a result
they had no idea what the enemy was saying. He also downplayed Radio Saipan saying,
"It came in infrequently because of the jamming."
Most OWI agents scheduled for overseas duty were first sent to the University
of California where they were given a course in history, regional geography, and racial
customs. They were taught various forms of propaganda, and just as we teach today, they
were told that, “The best media for propaganda is the human voice. The closer you get
to the people you want to convince, the better it is.” The OWI did not censor itself.
It simply worked under certain guidelines. As mentioned earlier, the U. S. Navy was in
charge of censoring OWI output. One lecturer mentions that he is so programmed not to use
the word “radar” that he even has difficulty in mentioning it to the students.
If you have been trained never to point a weapon at a human in training, you will
understand his difficulty. Even knowing that the weapon is empty, the old taboos kick in.
The OWI coordinated their propaganda with the British. It traded information
with the British ministry of Information in exchange for their material. That makes sense
because the Allies needed to present a unified message that could not be misinterpreted.
An example is a case where the British are asking partisans to rise up while the United
States is telling them to lay low until an invasion. Plans came in the form of a Central
Directive, a main central policy document approved by a Washington board made up of
representatives from the OWI, State, War and Navy Departments, and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. There is also guidance. An example is the treatment of the Emperor of Japan. The
guidance was that the Emperor was a historic institution and it does no good to insult
him. The best way to create difficulty for Japan was to spread the idea that the Emperor
had been betrayed by the military clique and fooled into leading his nation into war.
Another concept was not to argue with the enemy. If we went on the defensive, that meant
that the enemy was on the offensive. Our propagandists were not to get into a shouting
match with the Japanese.
In Military Review, March-April 2005, Dr. Montgomery McFate discusses the WWII
PSYOP treatment of Emperor Hirohito in an article entitled “Anthropology and
Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship.” He says in part:
In 1943, Benedict became the head of the Basic Analysis Section of the Bureau of
Overseas Intelligence of the Office of War Information. Benedict also undertook research
on Japanese personality and culture, the effect of which cannot be overstated. Near the
end of the war, senior military leaders and U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt were
convinced the Japanese were “culturally incapable of surrender” and would fight
to the last man. Benedict and other OWI anthropologists were asked to study the view of
the emperor in Japanese society. The ensuing OWI position papers convinced Roosevelt to
leave the emperor out of the conditions of surrender (rather than demanding unconditional
surrender as he did of dictators Adolph Hitler and Benito Mussolini).
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