The Federal Republic of (West) Germany quietly sent some of its own
psychological warfare troops to aid the Coalition in the disseminating of PSYOP leaflets
by balloon. The Germans had mastered the technique during decades of balloon propaganda
warfare with the German Democratic Republic (DDR) since the end of World War II. The
German Federal Constitution frowned on such military aid outside of the Republic, and in
fact it was expressly prohibited, but the importance of reversing Iraq's conquest of
Kuwait was so vital that the German Government felt a need to get involved. The number of
operations the Germans took part in and the number of leaflets distributed is still
classified. It has been alleged that to meet the “spirit of the law,” the
Germans only sent Army Reservists and no actual Regular Army personnel. They were
identified as “technical representatives,” which gave them more cover. The
Saudis and the Turks did not know there were German military on site, just “Tech
Reps” (wink wink). Some reports state that German leaflets sent by balloon from Al
Quysumah airfield in Saudi Arabia in six missions between 30 December 1990 and 8 January
1991 totaled 540,000. As you read the descriptions of some leaflets in this article you
will find that I mention them as balloon-dropped.
Various documents give us general information such as the themes for balloon carried
leaflets. We know that 54,000 leaflets used the theme of surrender, 90,000 stressed that
Saddam was the blame for the war, and there were 186.000 dropped with themes described as
“other.” Another confusing 4th PSYOP Group document says that 342,000 leaflets
were distributed by balloon, waterborne and man pack operations. We know that 12,000 of
“The Wave” leaflets were floated onto the beaches of Kuwait. If we subtract that
number, we get 300,000, the exact same number as in the first document. I think we can say
that the man pack distribution was negligible and almost all of the 300,000 leaflets were
ballooned. We have one more fact. Leaflet product 3-I, the one we call V28 with the
wartime code name “Surrender - 2 frames” has the mission description,
“German S.” Perhaps this is the leaflet from the “surrender” theme.
The Germans operated from a site near Al Quysumah Airfield with the aid of the 6th U.S.
Army PSYOP Battalion and mostly sent leaflets by balloon into Southern Kuwait. According
to a 5th Special Forces Group Reconnaissance Team on the ground, one 12-foot balloon with
an aluminum deployment canister that came down near them was packed with leaflets C20 and
C26.
One document in my possession discusses the daily print requirements. It
mentions a mission called “German” and leaflet coded 3-I was printed on 26
January 1991 and 800,000 leaflets were in storage. From other documents we
know that 3-I was the surrender leaflet we code V28 in this article.
German Balloon Data
from a 2004 Power Point Presentation
We point out in this article that the German use of Balloons during Desert
Storm was kept very quiet, and nobody would admit to it. However,
in 1994 the Germans made changes to their Constitution
and now were allowed to legally take part in U.N. activities. Here
is a power point page they produced in 2004 to show what they could do with
balloons.
Curiously, one PSYOP officer told me that at just about the time of the Iraqi
invasion he had refigured all of the formulas in the American Handbook of Leaflet
Dissemination by Balloons. This handbook was originally a project of the CIA and was
almost entirely based on the Johns Hopkins study (Low, Medium, High Dissemination) that
was re-printed by the 7th PSYOP Group and then the 4th PSYOP Group. He said:
The formulas for leaflet calculations given in this book are wrong. A
sergeant and I worked out the correct formulas just before the gulf war in 1991, to within
around 99.991 percent accuracy of the tables in the book. The calculations for leaflet
dissemination have been fully automated first with GW-Basic and now with Excel combined
with the FalconView program.
When I asked this expert why the Germans were called in when the United States
apparently had the knowledge to do the balloon dissemination is said:
I guess it was a case of all the Allies pitching in. I think the Koreans could
have done the job just as well or better. Korea and Taiwan were good at that, both sending
millions of leaflets by balloon against their Communist adversaries.
Germany now has a large and active psychological operations force. It was
created on 1 October 1959 as a psychological warfare branch to send leaflets into the
German Democratic Republic (DDR). By 1 January 1960, the Germans established the first
Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (Lautsprecher und Flugblattkompanie).
According to West German Colonel (Ret.) Albert Hagemann, in 1961 psychological
warfare units started a leaflet and newspaper offensive against East Germany, its ruling
Socialist Unity Party, and its armed forces. The West Germans decided to rely on leaflets
for several reasons. There were few televisions and radios available in the GDR during the
1960s and balloon-launched leaflets promised a fairly high accuracy. Very soon the three
L&L Companies, one with each West German Army Corps, began to send eighty tons of
leaflets a year eastward, mostly by balloon
At one point the Germans and American 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in Böblingen informally traded some personnel to let
each side learn what the other was doing. This “good will” would pay off later
in Desert Storm.
The members of the unit prepared graphs and tables and wrote the first official
training and field manuals. They thought that if needed, they could deliver a payload of
leaflets right over Leipzig Railroad Station at 7 AM sharp. They used hydrogen balloons
that carried up to 8.8 lbs of leaflets, newspapers, or small booklets. They could launch
up to 6,600 lbs or 1 million leaflets to targets in East Germany on a single night. The
East German Communists were also counting. For the year 1968 they recorded 812 balloons
with 810,000 leaflets and in 1969 they recorded 271 balloons with 249,000 leaflets.
The printed material delivered by the psychological warfare units between August
1961 and August 1964 consisted of 232 different leaflets, newspapers, and, on occasion,
books.
On 30 June 1972 all West German propaganda operations ceased in the preparation for
the Basic Understanding Treaty of 21 December 1972, in which both German states officially
recognized each other.
In 1990 the unit was renamed OpInfo. Although the Germans admit no part in
the Persian Gulf War, they do admit to involvement in the postwar humanitarian Operation
Provide Comfort and the production of flyers and leaflets to inform fleeing Kurds about NATO
relief efforts and the support provided by aid organizations. In 2001, German PSYOP troops
joined the Coalition once again and served in Afghanistan.
ITALY
A Tornado over the desert in 1990, just before
the beginning of Operation Desert Storm.
(Image credit: ItAF)
Riccardo
Catalano wrote about the Italian Air Force contingent in Desert Storm in
Narrazioni Strategiche (Strategic Narratives). Riccardo was an Italian Air Force veteran
whose father-in-law was an engineer deployed to Al Bateen with the Italian
task force of 8 Tornadoes.
He says in part:
In 1991, a US-led international coalition (Italy
participated with the sending of 8 AM Tornadoes) attacked Iraq in
retaliation for Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. The operation, called
Desert Storm, is studied in military circles (among other things) also
because it has imparted lessons in the field of psychological warfare.
Shortly before the invasion, Iraqi forces embarked on a psychological
warfare campaign (PSYOP) to attempt to demoralize Allied troops and
influence world opinion. Despite the scale and audacity of the initiative,
these operations turned out to be a resounding failure, mainly due to a poor
understanding of the culture and mentality of Americans, what in terms of
communication and marketing was the "target audience" of that operation.
The voice of this campaign was a figure known among the
soldiers as "Baghdad Betty", an English-speaking Iraqi woman who radioed
propaganda messages to Allied troops. Its broadcasts began in September
1990, shortly after the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division arrived in Saudi Arabia.
From this moment on, the "Voice of Peace" of Iraq, as the propagandist
called herself, began to spread excellent music, with playlists that also
included great hits from the 60s and 70s, certainly more appreciated by the
soldiers of religious music that could be heard on Saudi radio stations.
Disparaging messages towards American troops were then broadcast along with
the music.
Baghdad Betty's broadcasts accused American soldiers of
drinking alcohol and desecrating Islam's holy sites. The goal was to reduce
troop morale; however, the poor understanding of American culture made these
broadcasts often ridiculous without having the intended effect. For example,
Betty broadcast messages that mocked American culture and tried to create
doubts among the soldiers. "Dear American soldier... are you ready to die
for a barrel of oil?" or "To all American soldiers in the Saudi Arabian
desert: Would you like to be one of those cripples who are pitied at charity
ceremonies?"
The response of Allied troops to these broadcasts was one
of hilarity. Although the music attracted the audience, the "persuasive"
messages conveyed were absurd and naive, with accusations against the US
military leadership so unbelievable that they were considered real jokes by
the soldiers. Betty's clumsy broadcasts thus proved to be an own goal for
Iraqi propaganda. One Allied officer remarked that "the only things that
make the boys happier than Baghdad Betty are the letters from home." The
result of the campaign demonstrates how off target the Iraqi psychological
warfare strategy was.
After the limited success of Baghdad Betty, the Iraqi regime launched the
"Mother Radio of Battles." But even this attempt was short-lived, as the
radio station was bombed and put out of service as early as mid-January
1991.
On
the other side, Allied PSYOP troops began broadcasting in Arabic using the
same frequency. These broadcasts proved to be very effective, unlike the
Iraqi ones. Colonel Jeffrey Jones, commander of the US Army's 8th
Psychological Task Force, later said "we were very effective. The Iraqi
soldier was vulnerable to anything we broadcast, which was basically just
the truth."
Allied PSYOP broadcasts used sometimes very harsh methods to capture the
attention of Iraqi soldiers. Jones recalls that "we would tell them that the
next day we would drop the biggest bomb we had on them, and then exactly as
promised, we would drop a Daisy Cutter" (BLU-82, a very powerful and noisy
device, which also produces a large mushroom cloud.) "The next time we
announced that we would drop another big bomb like that, desertions
increased dramatically." Indeed, unlike the Iraqi one, Allied psychological
warfare produced large numbers of deserters. Certainly, in a context of
unequal forces like that, the success of desertions cannot be attributed
only to the psychological effect, but the contribution it was certainly
remarkable.
Operation Desert Storm thus demonstrated the importance of a meticulous
understanding of enemy culture and mentality in conducting psychological
warfare operations. Iraqi PSYOP operations have not only failed to
demoralize Allied troops, but they have paradoxically boosted their morale.
In psychological warfare, whose basic principles are common to the world of
marketing and political, institutional, and commercial communication, the
first fundamental rule is to know your audience accurately and meticulously.
Breaking this rule only leads to catastrophic failures.
Before we leave the Italian contingent, I should point out that they lost
one of their Tornadoes. David Cenciotti mentions "Legion 15: The Story of
The Italian Air Force Tornado IDS Shot Down During Operation Desert Storm,"
in The Aviationist, 18 January 2021. He says in part:
The Italian
Air Force Tornado, deployed to Al Dhafra, UAE, as part of Operazione Locusta
(the first operational employment in combat missions for the Aeronautica
Militare since WWII), were tasked to launch their first mission in the night
between Jan. 17 and 18, 1991.
Based on the
official documentation, two four-ship formations were to take part in the
mission: the first one, radio callsign "LEGION 15", with four aircrews
belonging to the 155° Gruppo (Squadron), and the second one, radio callsign
"CAESAR 05", with aircrews belonging to the 154° Gruppo.
The aircraft,
supported by two KC-135 Stratotankers and all armed with 5x MK83 Retarded
1,000 pounds bombs (along with 2x BOZ countermeasures pods, 2x drop tanks
and 2x AIM-9L Sidewinders), were assigned single targets within four target
areas:
Antennas of
the Al Matla Umm Al Aish military camp.
Ammunition
depot at Unysh;
Army Corps
Logistical depot.
Army Corps
Storage Area.
Pilot Major Gianmarco Bellini and Navigator Captain Maurizio
Cocciolone
Photo by La Republica
At about 0430
the Italian attack aircraft releases all its 5 Mk83 on the target (that
would be declared as “Destroyed” in the official documentation) but 40
seconds later, the plane is hit by an Iraqi ZSU-23-4 battery and pilot Major
Gianmarco Bellini and navigator Captain Maurizio Cocciolone are forced to
eject before the aircraft crashes some 20 kilometers to the northwest of
Kuwait City. They are captured by the Iraqi Republican Guard, even though
their status will remain unknown until 20 January 1991, when Maurizio
Cocciolone is shown on Iraqi television in a propaganda video. Bellini is
feared to be killed in action because no news about him is given. The two
will be kept separate for the whole time of their captivity and released on
3 March 1991, after 47 days. They were the only Italian Prisoners of War of
the entire war.
Despite the
unfortunate first mission, the Italian contingent will successfully carry
out the subsequent 225 sorties for a total of 589 flight hours of Operation
Desert Storm.
POLAND?
Allegedly, Germany was not the only nation to have PSYOP troops involved in
Operation Desert Storm. A Coalition-nation officer told to me that there was also a Polish
PSYOP Company quietly working for the Coalition. We have no way to verify this statement,
but we do know that in 1991 General Franciszek Gagor was the Executive Officer/Deputy
Commander of the Polish Military Contingent to Operation Desert Storm and in 1991-1992 the
Deputy Sector Commander of the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).
THE CIA LEAFLETS
Several leaflets appeared after the end of the war that were not found in the
records of the 4th PSYOP Group or any other military files or documents. They all came out
of Iraq after the end of the war at a time that the CIA was working with the Kurds in the
North and the Shiites in the South and other anti-Saddam forces to overthrow the regime. I
have called them the “CIA Leaflets.” To be honest, I have no idea who printed
them. All we can say for sure is that they were first reported in Iraq several months
after the end of the war, and that all of the leaflets that have mysteriously appeared
seem to come from the collection of former intelligence agents. A small group of the
leaflets appeared in 1999 and were said to be from the personal collection of a former CIA
agent.
What do we know about the actions of the CIA during Desert Storm?
The Central Intelligence Agency is mentioned in the United States Army Special
Operation Command Booklet: Psychological Operations during Desert Shield/Storm - A
Post-operational Analysis:
At his direction (Office of the Director of the Joint Staff) the campaigns and their
component actions were divided into two sub-plans; a "white" (overt) sub-plan to
be executed by the Department of Defense, and a "black" (covert) sub-plan passed
to the CIA as a "recommendation."
In fact, few if any of the proposed actions were truly covert. Most of the
"non-white" actions involved clandestine delivery of overt US messages through
channels not accessible by the United States Commander in Chief, Central Command, e.g.,
the Kuwaiti resistance. The planning cell assumed the CIA had such access and therefore
suggested the agency as an appropriate action agent. The distinction was apparently lost
during the review process.
CIA Leaflet Exhibit – Langley HQ
In 1993, I was in the CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. It was lunchtime so we
went downstairs to eat. There is a small museum just outside their cafeteria. Not really a
museum as much as a series of glass cases holding CIA souvenirs from many wars. I looked
through some of the exhibits of exotic weapons, hollow coins, documents and cameras, and
found a display of leaflets which were identified as “CIA-Produced Pamphlets.”
The description was:
These CIA-produced leaflets were used during the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991).
Copies of the leaflets were air-dropped over a selected area before an Allied bombing run.
The leaflets gave the civilian people time to evacuate and encouraged the military units
to surrender.
I immediately recognized the leaflets as very similar to the 4th Group leaflets and
assumed that the CIA was taking credit for an Army PSYOP campaign. When I looked closer,
however, I realized that each of the leaflets on display were on a thin tissue-like paper.
They were just a bit different from the Army leaflets. These were the standard
“white” leaflets mentioned earlier in this article and numbered 27, 35, 36; 37,
and 38. Notice that the leaflets we mention below which seem to be more “black”
are not mentioned. The most important part of this exhibit is the CIA’s admission
that they produced leaflets. As expected, they are willing to admit producing the leaflets
that are known, but they avoid mentioning the clandestine “black” leaflets.
The CIA mentions some of their Desert Storm actions on their website. They say in part:
One of the Central Intelligence Agency's primary functions is to provide
intelligence support to US military forces. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm
(1990-91) were no exception. From the moment Iraq invaded Kuwait, CIA officers in
Washington and around the world worked to provide intelligence support for the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and Marines deployed to the Gulf.
The CIA formed round-the-clock task forces in its operations and intelligence
directorates the day of the invasion. The Directorate of Operations augmented appropriate
CIA stations overseas to handle anticipated increases in collection, reporting, and
liaison requirements. The Directorate of Intelligence increased the number of
``all-source'' and imagery analysts dedicated to the effort, while maintaining its core of
experienced Iraqi analysts:
The CIA assigned several military analysts to the Pentagon's JIC. The Iraqi experts
at CIA Headquarters and the CIA military analysts at the Pentagon maintained daily contact
with their counterparts at the Department of Defense. Soon after CENTCOM established its
headquarters in Saudi Arabia, CIA deployed JILE (Joint Intelligence Liaison Element) teams
to CENTCOM headquarters. The JILE teams were CIA's primary conduit for providing
intelligence information to the deployed US forces
If these were CIA leaflets, how were they made? They might have used a classified
military operation as a cover. Suppose that they were produced as a part of Joint Task
Force Proven Force, whose goal was the destabilization of the Saddam regime. A Pentagon
report to Congress states that JTF Proven Force was primarily an Air Force effort based in
Turkey, under the operational control of EUCOM, but under the Tactical control of
CENTCOM. JTFPF controlled over 6000 men and a numerous aircraft based in Turkey.
JTFPF contained an ad-hoc 21-person detachment that designed and prepared propaganda
leaflets. Might they have been involved? I recall at the time that they were considered
highly classified and at the start of the war we were encouraged not to even mention the
name “Proven Force.” Perhaps we will never know. In The Commandos - The
Inside Story of America's Secret Soldiers, Douglas C. Waller adds:
The Pentagon would handle the overt operations, such as making sure Iraqi
soldiers knew that a red cross meant a red crescent, and the covert operations would be
left to the CIA, which had already put together a small PSYOP group...But the CIA's PSYOP
capability was pitifully weak compared to the 4th PSYOP Group.
The NY Times reported on 19 January 1991 that President Bush had signed
three "findings." that allowed the CIA to join in the psychological operations.
The first authorized the CIA to take part in propaganda and deception campaigns. The
second gave permission for the CIA to work with Army Special Operations forces to support
guerrilla fighters in Kuwait. The third empowered the CIA to work to destabilize Saddam
Hussein's government. It was also reported that the CIA had taken over Kuwait's
intelligence apparatus. A final quote from the article is, “The Pentagon units are
coordinating efforts with psychological warfare experts from the CIA.”
Toward the end of Operation Desert Storm both the Kurds and Shiites rose up against
Saddam Hussein. It was rumored that the United States encouraged the Kurds to rise up
against Saddam and promised support for their rebellion. That always seemed strange
to me because as you can see from this article, none of the 29-million leaflets dropped on
the Iraqis called for a revolt against Saddam. In fact, some trial leaflets that were
prepared that did call for such actions were not approved for dissemination. The plan was
to defeat the Iraqi Army in the field and drive it from Kuwait, not to overthrow the
government. So, where did the Kurds (and the Shiites to the South) get the idea that the U.S.
Government wanted a rebellion? According to Philip M. Taylor in Munitions of the Mind:
A history of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day, Manchester
University Press, UK, 2003:
The blame falls on the Central Intelligence Agency. He states that there was an
uneasy relationship between white (overt) military PSYOP and black (covert) CIA PSYOP:
The latter consisted of black radio transmitters posing as Iraqi stations manned
by internal enemies of Saddam Hussein. Because none could supposedly detect the genuine
source of messages broadcast by these stations, they were able to deviate from the
official coalition line that desert Storm was about the liberation of Kuwait and not about
the overthrow of Saddam Hussein …Black radio stations therefore carried messages
encouraging an internal revolt within Iraq , but when signs of success in doing this
appeared towards the end of the war in the form of Kurdish and Shia uprisings, no actual
military support was forthcoming from the West. This was another classic example of the
dangers of policy and propaganda getting out of step.
The Kurds did revolt in March 1991, occupied the towns of Ranya, Sulemaniye, Arbil,
Dahuk, Aqra, and Kirkuk and put the province of Mosul under siege. Saddam Hussein
counter-attacked with a vengeance and his revamped Republic Guard drove the Kurds into the
mountains. It was a slaughter, apparently caused by the CIA disinformation, and led
directly to Operation Provide Comfort.
I have given all the leaflets CIA Codes. I will list them in the order that they
appeared along with the Johnson number. There is no information about the production
or dissemination of any of these leaflets.
Johnson 2015 offering
25 years after the end of the Operation Desert Storm Richard Johnson offered four of
the CIA banknote leaflets for a price of $85. He added a photograph to the offer that
indicates that he had saved at least a dozen of each of the banknote leaflets.
CIA1
F: Stealth aircraft climbs away from exploding Iraqi soldier. B&W.
B: In red: U.S. Marine Corps seal "United States Naval Infantry," and
text.
" Follow these procedures to cease resistance. Pull your ammunition magazine from
your weapon. Put your weapon on your left shoulder and aim the barrel at the ground. Raise
your hands over your head and walk slowly. Wave with a white cloth or raise this leaflet
to show you are willing to surrender. All Allied soldiers know this initiative shows that
you are willing to surrender."
The normal leaflet is in B&W. None of us could figure out why a red-back leaflet
suddenly appeared. Johnson called this leaflet V57.
CIA2
F: 25-dinar Iraqi banknote, white border. Color. Tissue paper. 6" x 3"
B: Saddam sits atop a pile of skulls. B&W.
"I can live for 20 years."
Johnson calls this F02.
His glorious Regime…
I thought it might be interesting to point out that a good idea never becomes old.
In WWII the American Office of Strategic Services in Berne, Switzerland, produced
clandestine “black” leaflets to be sent into Germany to sap their morale. Note
that number 163 depicts Hitler sitting on a pile of skulls. The OSS became the CIA and
almost 50 years later we see Saddam sitting on a similar pile of skulls on a CIA leaflet.
The text on the old WWII leaflet is:
His glorious regime is enthroned on this
CIA3
F: 25-dinar Iraqi banknote white border. Color. Tissue paper. As CIA2
B: Saddam stands behind eight starving children. B&W.
"We can live for 20 years. But our stores are empty and yours are full."
Johnson calls this F02.
CIA4
F: 25-dinar Iraqi banknote, white border. Color. Tissue paper. As CIA2.
B: Saddam lights a cigar with map of Iraq, drinks alcohol. B&W. Unknown text.
This item was first reported in Newsweek, 8 June 1992. Johnson calls this F03.
CIA5
F: 25-dinar Iraqi banknote white border. Color. Tissue paper. As
CIA2.
B: Grocer in empty store tears off banknotes from roll.
"At least it has some worth now."
The text is a sarcastic reference. The shelves are empty, but the
bank notes still have some value as wrapping paper. This item was also reported in Newsweek, 8 June 1992. Johnson calls it F04.
CIA6
F: 25-dinar Iraqi banknote white border. Color. Tissue paper. As
CIA2.
B: Saddam throws Iraq into the fire of war.
Newspaper headline: "The Green March – The War – The Butcher of Baghdad."
Richard Johnson does not list this leaflet in his book.
CIA7
F: 25-dinar Iraqi banknote white border. Color. Tissue paper. As CIA2.
B: Two Iraqi soldiers sit in the desert on rug with drinks in
hand.
"Have you heard what the Father of Radi has agreed to?"
Richard Johnson does not list this leaflet in his book. We have no
idea what this text refers to. It could be a nickname for Saddam or could be a reference
from the Koran. We do know from leaflet C80 that "Father of Khalid" refers to a
fool, so perhaps this is also a derogatory comment.
CIA8
F: The flag of Kuwait is at the left.
"The Free Kuwait."
The three Kuwait water towers are at the right.
"Long Live Kuwait.
B: The flag of Kuwait at the left.
"Greatness for Kuwait."
The three Kuwait water towers are at the right.
" Long Live Kuwait.'
CIA9
F: All text. Color
"The world is appealing to Saddam to cooperate because it doesn't want to fight
Iraq. The international community sent food to the Iraqi people but the assistance is only
finding its way to Saddam and his family. He doesn't understand the meaning of peace and
the only language he understands is violence, as he now threatens again to use violence
against you and your loved ones by ignoring international efforts to make peace.
B: All text.
"You have suffered so much for his foolishness. You tried to
repair the damage, but once again he is dragging the country to the brink of disaster by
his challenges to the international community."
CIA10
F: Bomb 78mm. B&W. As E02.
"Warning! This is only the beginning. This could have been a real bomb. We have no
desire to harm innocent people, but Saddam is leading you to certain death and
destruction. We want you to know the truth! Saddam is the cause. Yes, the Multi-national
forces have the ability to strike anywhere, and at any time. Warning!”
B: “The truth...eight years of war with Iran. Half a million needless
deaths. The victories - gone. Now, a generation in peril. A world united against Saddam.
No bargaining with him. Don't allow him to be the reason for your annihilation. Don't let
Saddam lead you to destruction.” 11 lines. 87mm in length.
Once again a very common black and white leaflet with a red back. This leaflet
is another item from the personal collection of an ex-CIA agent. Johnson calls it V02c.
Foreign Legion Daguet
