THE 24TH PSYOP
DETACHMENT IN VIETNAM

SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Ret.)

24th PSYWAR Detachment Guidon

The 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was the first U.S. Army division to be deployed to Vietnam, leaving Ft. Benning, Georgia, and arriving in-country on 11 September 1965. It fought the first major engagement of the war, the November 1965 battle of the Ia Drang in II Corps in the Central Highlands. The Pentagon apparently decided during the planning stages of the deployment to attach a PSYOP detachment to the Cavalry as a “force multiplier.”

The 24th PSYOP Detachment (Field Support) was activated on 18 July 1965 from personnel of the 1st and 13th PSWAR Battalions assigned to the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, and the 3rd and 6th Special Forces Groups at Fort Bragg, NC.  The unit, authorized seven officers and twenty-one enlisted, was formed, trained and deployed to Vietnam in just two weeks. It was among the very first PSYOP detachments sent to Vietnam. There is some some debate as to what PSYOP unit first reached Vietnam, with the 1st PSYOP Detachment often getting credit. Official orders indicate that the 1st PSYOP Detachment (Provisional) was ordered to Vietnam on Temporary Duty Assignment of 90 days on 22 July 1965 and consisted of 7 officers and 17 enlisted personnel from the 14th Battalion (U.S. Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity Pacific). The list of unit members in later orders showed that instead of 24 members, just 22 actually deployed to Vietnam, 7 officers and 15 enlisted personnel. Although not named specifically, Captain John A. Hardaway seems to have been in command.

Later in 1965 a small unit of the Okinawa-based 7th PSYOP Group arrived in Saigon, but it was more in the form of an advisory team. The unit was made up of an eclectic group of soldiers. Former PFC “Combat Illustrator” John Magine recalls that some were Special Forces qualified, some were jump qualified, and some even had high altitude low opening (HALO) training. Others had no special training. All the members had some language training and skills. The unit was made up of enlistees and draftees. They were a mix, some from the 3rd Special Forces Group who wore the green berets with the flash, some had no flash because they were new, and some had a small color bar on the beret or wore just the standard military cap. It was a real mixture of skills and talents. The detachment was formed by Captain Blaine Revis who previously had commanded the 19th PSYOP Company. He selected some soldiers that he knew, and others were obtained by a call for “volunteers,” (a military euphemism that means “you, you and you.”). The new unit had almost no supplies and had to beg, borrow and steal equipment.

Brigadier General Joseph W. Stilwell Jr.
addresses the troops of the new 24th PSYOP Detachment
in July 1965 at Ft. Bragg prior to their deployment to Vietnam

1st Cavalry Division Patch

After a brief two-week training period in July 1965, they were all awarded a letter of Commendation by Brigadier General J. W. Stillwell, of the U. S. A. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare, (what we used to call an “Attaboy”), and then sent by troop train from Ft. Bragg to the Oakland Army Terminal from where they embarked in August for a 23-day trip across the Pacific on the troop ship USS William H. Gordon. After landing in Qui Nhon in September 1965, they found themselves loaded into trucks and on the road to Anh Khe to clear the area and prepare the site for the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division. The detachment arrived in Anh Khe a full week before the division. On 2 September they shed their “Field Support” title and became the 24th PSYOP Detachment (USARPAC).

An early view of the base at Anh Khe

The 24th PSYOP Detachment was assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division's G-5 because the section was understaffed for communicating with the Vietnamese populace and the laborers who would prepare the base at Anh Khe for the arrival of aircraft. It soon became apparent that the Cavalry Division had little interest in PSYOP support. The men did guard duty around the new base, some menial tasks, and as PFC Magine remembers:

We didn't have much contact with the 1st Cavalry. Of course, we were there before they were. We dropped some leaflets and did a few forward operations but mostly just secured the area until the Cavalry arrived. The leaflets were standard themes like "What is your girlfriend doing at home while you are here?" or “You will die in the mud...a terrible death...give up and we will pay you and give you soap to wash.” They were mostly hand illustrated in ink. There were very few photographs at that stage of the war.

A Typical home for members of the 24th PSYOP Detachment

In the early days we had our shelter halves, our C-Rations, and an occasional tarantula in a boot. Before we got our big general purpose tents, a couple of days of early monsoon rain made the standard trench around the shelter halves fill up with muddy water in about 30 seconds. We helped clear the area of brush and lay some perforated steel plate (PSP) runway and generally secured the area. We had some infiltration, an occasional firefight, and a little “incoming” as well. There was always something going on in the wire that would set off the flares about 0200 like clockwork. Other than washing your ass in a steel pot, and cold 1942 C-Rations it wasn't too bad.

We operated fairly independently in those days. Our Headquarters seemed to change frequently. Those were the days of in-country travel by seeing whose propellers or rotors were turning and then hopping on board. I recall one time having to hitch hike down Route 1 to get back because we had no chopper ride and we were left in a forward area. Two of us walked a while and there was a Chinook sitting by the side of the road miles from nowhere with the guys playing cards. When they finished we took off with them, picked up a sling full of ammunition and went home.

The detachment participated directly in attack planning which included control of civilians caught in the battlefield field of fire. On one major campaign called “Operation Eagle’s Claw” in the Bong Son Valley, the 24th PSYOP Detachment helped to relocate 5,000 refugees onto a temporary site and supply them with tents and food for over a month. They supported operations in the Bong Son Valley on at least three separate occasions and dropped millions of leaflets each time. The detachment had loudspeaker teams with Vietnamese linguists to call upon the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong units to surrender. The unit had one truck with printing press and produced a limited number of propaganda leaflets, but the majority of leaflets were printed and flown in from Japan. It also had several loudspeaker teams working in the field. Some were assigned to Korean (ROK) military units, other to the 101st Airborne Division. The Detachment made personal contact with the USAF 5th Air Commando Squadron and created a liaison that allowed both to mutually support each other.

The 24th PSYOP Detachment also worked with the U. S. Navy
broadcasting from speakers mounted on patrol craft fast (PCF) river boats.
The speakers were located at the back of the boat by the 50 caliber
machinegun turret. Here John Magine is seen on PCF-52.

PFC Magine recalls:

Our primary mission was to create the leaflets and go on special PSYOP field operations. I personally went on field operations in Bong Son, Phu Cat, Pleiku, and on a patrol craft fast (PCF) river boat.

On one operation two of us loaded some 155mm base ejection artillery rounds with leaflets out in a Bong Son cemetery. We had to screw off the base, pull out the powder bags, roll the leaflets and screw the base back on. Some of the leaflets were coded by JUSPAO “SP,” others bore our own codes.

I also took part in some C-47 night leaflet drops near Saigon. The leaflet mission near Saigon was before and after a Phantom mission where they dropped napalm. It always seemed strange to me as to why we would throw paper into a burning jungle, but hey...it was Vietnam.  We also dropped safe conduct passes and Chieu Hoi leaflets after Arc Light and Tiger Hound missions. Arc Light was B52 bombing and Tiger Hound was Ho Chi Minh Trail Interdiction.

B-52 Arc Light bombing mission

The first B-52 Arc Light bombing mission was carried out on 18 June 1965. Twenty-seven B-52F bombers of the 7th and 320th Bombardment Wings based at Guam were used to attack a Viet Cong jungle redoubt with conventional 750-pound and 1,000-pound bombs.   

From June through December, the 7th, 320th, and 454th Bombardment Wings completed over 100 missions to South Vietnam. These B-52s were used primarily in saturation bombing of Viet Cong base areas, but later they were used in direct tactical support of the Marine Corps' Operation Harvest Moon and the First Cavalry Division's fight in the Ia Drang Valley. 

SP5 Tom Zangla took this picture of Spooky in action from the 525th Military Intelligence Group MACV Team 21 Compound near Pleiku, Vietnam, in May 1969.

The unit members reminisced about the Arc Light missions: 

An Arc Light mission was composed of four elements.  

First, a fully loaded flight of B-52s with 500 pound bombs to be dropped over an area as wide and as long as the number of flights assigned to the mission. 

This was followed by napalm strikes within the mission zone. 

Then "Puff-the-Magic Dragon" (later code-named "Spooky" - now "Spectre") gunships would lace the area with withering minigun fire and in the case of "Spooky" 20mm cannon fire. This fire was so intense that a single 2 second burst would put a round on every square foot on a foot of a football field. When firing at night, it looked like a river of fire falling out of the sky and it sounded like a giant rip of heavy cloth. 

The fourth phase was the PSYOP exploitation. If the social rule, "dissonance seeks consonance," is true, those folks on the ground were extremely discontented (in shock, bleeding from their eardrums) and we could offer them a much better, safer, and more peaceful life. We would kick leaflets into the flaming jungle. We flew with the Fifth Air Commando Squadron. At first there were no leaflet ports in Puff and Spooky so we tossed the leaflets out the gun doors. 

The detachment had fully qualified Military Intelligence (MI) personnel assigned to interface with other MI units to extract actionable intelligence for Political and Psychological Warfare missions.

“Puff the Magic Dragon” C47 in action

Once I even tossed the leaflets down a chute inside of a “Puff the Magic Dragon” gun ship near Pleiku. There was a small metal chute on the left side of the aircraft behind the gun. There was one Hell of a racket and a giant tracer trail out past the tail.

I inquired more about the codes on leaflets produced by the detachment and the general consensus is that they bore no codes. One member stated:

I had the opportunity to drop a few million leaflets and do not remember any code.

Another said:

We did not, to my knowledge, use any identification code. I never heard of a requirement to code leaflets. So, I guess we didn't, unless someone else in the unit remembers that we did.

It appears from these comments that the 24th POD either used coded leaflets from other sources or prepared their own leaflets without code. 

The first commanding officer of the 24th Psychological Operations Detachment was Captain Blaine Revis. He remained the commander until February 1966 when the detachment became the 245th PSYOP Company.

Captain Revis is mentioned by another soldier who said:

The reality was that very few of us went into the field on operations. Most stayed in Anh Khe or later Nha Trang. Field operations were more or less volunteer, unless a specific assignment came down. CPT Revis would pop in and say “who wants to go up to Tuy Hoa?” and whoever felt like a trip would go along for the action. Some of us liked being out in the field, but most of the unit stayed at the base with various PSYOP duties. There were headquarters administration tasks and the creating and production of leaflets. Only a few volunteered for the field operations.

Captain Revis replies:

It wasn't quite that casual. I would ask for volunteers and I always had more than enough for hazardous jobs. Like John Magine packing Leaflets into a live 155. Like the First Sergeant Horace Hill going into a Vietnamese anti-American demonstration to gather intelligence on the mood of the crowd with the idea of counter-propaganda. Like Bill Hyder and others who volunteered to go on Puff the Magic Dragon missions. Some were never asked to go because their jobs were specialties like printer or base operations. Some were tasked frequently, like the loudspeaker teams. They had to go. The unit had six officers. I divided them into five support teams consisting of an officer and two enlisted and one interpreter. We had a team with the 101st Airborne Division, the ROK Capital Division, and on occasion the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

The U-10 Courier 

Staff Sergeant Bill Hyder recalls

The 5th Air Commando Squadron commanded by Major Robert Cresey had four U-10 Couriers and one C-47 Skytrain aircraft. We were all on flight status.  One mission was called "Fire Dragon." It consisted of one spotter aircraft, two A1E's Skyraiders, "Puff the Magic Dragon" and our leaflet C47. The spotter would find a Viet Cong camp late at night, the A1E's would light it up, "Puff" would fire thousands of rounds at it, and we would drop leaflets letting them know that the fire dragon was after them and where to go to surrender. We also had a campaign where we dropped leaflets with pictures of different weapons along with the price we would pay if they gave up and brought in a weapon. When a Viet Cong gave up and turned in a weapon, he got paid a reward, stayed in a camp for two weeks getting fed, and would sent to educational classes.  At the end of the two weeks he was returned to the general population. It was a good program, but apparently no one was keeping records.  Once they began keeping records it was discovered that some Viet Cong had surrendered three and four times. 

The last mission I went on was in the C-47 flying 100 miles west of Hanoi. I don't remember the altitude, but it was damn cold. We dropped the leaflets and the winds took them to Hanoi.  We were in the air nine hours. A real stupid thing for a guy to do with only two weeks left in-country. 

A Chieu Hoi Leaflet

Captain Revis says about the Chieu Hoi leaflets:

About ten years ago, I was in Hanoi talking with a government official who was, at the time of the conversation, the Minister of Mines and Minerals in the current regime. He had been the Viet Cong province Governor of Quang Ngai while we were in Qui Nhon. We were chatting about the war and I had asked about the effect of our psychological operations as far as he knew. He said he had heard of us. He said our most effective programs were the Chieu Hoi campaign and the “Flaming Skeleton” that John Magine drew. As I recall, we used John's artwork of the flaming skeleton on several leaflets. One of them read, “Born in the North to die in the South” which was etched onto a canteen obtained from a dead North Vietnamese soldier. Another was a poem which had been extracted from a NVA diary that we had been given by the II Corps G-2 (Intelligence). John had accented the reverse in grey with a Northern style house with a garden and smoke curling from a chimney, the poem superimposed on the art work. The text was rather long but in essence was a plaintive cry of homesickness and questioning the purpose of the war by an NVA soldier. Most of the 24th carried a supply of these leaflets and when we went into a restaurant or bistro they would wet the leaflet and paste it to the walls or ceilings. I am told that they were tough to peel off!

I asked Captain Revis to tell me more about the “flaming skeleton.” I do not recall ever seeing that particular image on a leaflet. He replied:

The flaming skeleton was depicted with a conical Vietnamese hat that had a red star on it and red flames all around the image.

At the time our main target audience was the Viet Cong. Through intelligence reports we knew that when the North Vietnamese Army was in an area they would integrate the Viet Cong into their units but would put them in the center of the formation to keep them from deserting. The Viet Cong didn't like the overbearing leadership of the Northerners and would, in the Vietnamese vernacular, "Di Di Mau" (“go quickly”), at the first opportunity. We wished to exploit that friction.

So, the flaming skeleton was in VC garb. Remember also, this was a time when one of the main psychological weapons of the war was napalm. It was used for everything. Clearing bunkers, cooking off mine fields, and clearing areas of enemy troops. We knew from intelligence reports that both the NVA and VC were psychologically vulnerable to the intense fires of napalm. Special Forces used a variation of napalm made with a concoction called “Foogas,” (from the old cartoon "Smokey Stover" which labeled anything that was “BS” foogas). The stuff was made with a drum of gasoline and several bars of GI soap or soap flakes to thicken it. Sometimes chunks of charcoal were added to make the mixture burn longer. Then a ¼-pound block of C4 explosive with a detonator attached to a trip wire was put under the container. Intruders were both illuminated and scared poopless from the resultant explosion. Anyway the result of a deployment of any form of napalm was psychologically profound. We knew of this fear and we sought to exploit it. Our leaflets were all developed from incoming and current intelligence with a calculated view of how to best exploit what we viewed as a weakness within the enemy ranks. Some leaflets were developed to support tactical operations by reminding the enemy of their weaknesses and the overpowering forces that faced them while others conveyed themes developed by ARVN and JUSPAO. The image of the flaming skeleton was well suited to a number of themes. And we used it frequently.

The 29 October 1965 overseas edition of Time discusses a strange PSYOP campaign:

Tucked away in their hammocks beneath the dripping rain-infested canopy, the Viet Cong guerrillas could hardly believe their ears. Out of the night sky came an ominous, warbling whine, like bagpipes punctuated with cymbals. It was Buddhist funeral music - a dissonant dirge cascading from the darkness. Then a snatch of dialogue between a mother and child: “Mother, where is daddy?” “Don't ask me questions. I am very worried about him.” “But I miss Daddy very much. Why is he gone so long?” Then the music and voices faded slowly into the distance and the platoon settled back to a restless sleep.

It was, of course, only one of many sights and sounds that the Viet Cong are greeted to every day, courtesy of JUSPAO - the Joint United States Public Affairs Office, which handles psychological warfare in South Viet Nam. Funeral dirges howl nightly over Viet Cong redoubts from the loudspeakers of JUSPAO planes, along with the tape-recorded cries of little children, and weird, electronic cacophonies intended to raise terrifying images of forest demons among the superstitious terrorists. During daylight hours, JUSPAO's eight aircraft dump tons of leaflets on the enemy - 3,500,000 a week, ranging from safe conduct passes to maps showing the best way to get out of Red territory. Says one of JUSPAO's “psywar” adepts; "We are the world's worst litterbugs."

This dirge and others like it came from the fertile imaginations of officers like Captain Blaine Revis, Commander of the 24th PSYOP Detachment. He told me that when queried by the Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division about what PSYOP could do to help win battles he answered:

One idea that I presented was to mount loudspeakers on some helicopters and to play tapes of the Vietnamese funerary dirges. (Really strange sounds but very effective in producing a mood of finality and defeat in the Viet Cong) The idea was represented in the movie “Apocalypse Now,” but in the movie instead of the funeral dirge they played the “Ride of the Valkyries.” I suppose the director thought it was more identifiable to a western audience. The dirge is played on a small instrument that looks and sounds like a miniature clarinet. From my past assignment in Vietnam I had noted that when a funeral procession went by and the dirge was played, even people who did not know the deceased became agitated and would sometimes cry openly. When I asked why, they would explain that even if they were young, it soon it would be their turn. I had recommended the use of the dirge to Major General Harry W. B. Kinnard along with painting some of the helicopters to look like the beast that carries people to heaven or Hell from this life. I do not know if he acted on the recommendation.

Revis also recommended against the dropping of the ace of spades “death card” on the bodies of dead Viet Cong.

General Kinnard asked me about the 101st Airborne Division’s idea of placing the ace of spades around the battlefield and on Viet Cong bodies. Bicycle Playing Card Company sent cases of decks of cards with all aces of spades. I told him that it was mistakenly a case of transposed symbolism, because we Americans look at the ace of spade as the death card, and the Vietnamese see it as a phallic symbol and would perhaps suggest the 101st was involved in necrophilia.

On 10 February 1966, the 24th PSYOP Detachment was re-designated the 245th PSYOP Company and became responsible for PSYOP in II Corps. Major Robert R. Piragowski was the first commanding officer. At Ft. Bragg he had commanded the 1st PSYWAR (Field A) Company, of the 1st PSYWAR Battalion. The 7th PSYOP Group 1968 Unit History indicates that the 24th PSYOP designation was used again in 1968 to rename their Korea Detachment. Orders dated 4 December 1968 redesignates the Korea Detachment, 7th PSYOP Group, as the 24th PSYOP Detachment. The first Commanding Officer was LTC Carl E. Baskin (4 December 1967 – 12 May 1968) followed by Major Dennis C. Howley (13 May 1968 - ?). This new 24th PSYOP Detachment “conducted audio and visual media psychological operations and conducted liaison with United States and Republic of Korea agencies as pertained to psychological operations.”

One former member of the 245th commented:

When the 24th changed over to the 245th, to my knowledge everyone stayed where they were. More personnel came into the 245th and its headquarters was established in Nha Trang. The operational teams stayed where they were. AA Team (Command) was in Nah Trang. HE-2 Team was with the 1st Cavalry Division, and HE-3 was with the Korean Tiger Division.

Another member added:

The 245th PSYOP Co was activated on 10 February 1966.   Personnel from the 24th POD (Nha Trang) and the detachment in Pleiku were absorbed into the company, although subsequently, some were transferred out to other units.   Also additional personnel were transferred in from Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) 6th PSYOP Battalion. They had traveled with the Battalion HHC from the continental United States (CONUS). 

Retired Army Master Sergeant Paul L. Johnson assigned to the 245th PSYOP Company (Nha Trang) as an HB Field Team NCOIC 1966-1967 recalls what it was like to try and change hearts and minds in those early days of the Vietnam War:

When I arrived in Vietnam in September 1966 I was a private first class with no idea of what PSYOP was all about.  I spent a week in-processing at 6th PSYOP Battalion Headquarters in Saigon and was then sent to the 245th PSYOP Company in Nha Trang.

I was just 19 and most of the soldiers in the outfit were about my age. Everyone was eager to teach me all they could as fast as they could. I learned more about PSYOP than I believed possible. I was taught everything from processing the field intelligence and photographs to laying out the leaflets for production.

I soon realized that we had two jobs. The first was to convince the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army soldiers to lay down their arms and stop fighting us. At the same time, we had a consolidation mission to bring the civilians to the side of the national government and to show them that we were their friends and in Vietnam not as occupiers, but only to guarantee their freedom and safety.  

I got to know the target audience really well when I was later assigned as the HB (loudspeaker) Team non-commissioned officer to a battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division. My teammate was First Lieutenant Charles Allen and we were really close, just the two of us working together with a Vietnamese interpreter. We tried to win over the civilian population and motivate enemy soldiers to cease resistance and go "Chieu Hoi." We had occasional victories and did bring some guerrillas over to our side.

I believe in my heart that the United States went to Vietnam in good faith and with good intentions. I left Vietnam in September 1967 a 20-year old seasoned Specialist Five field soldier and true "Psywarrior." I understood and believed in the phrase, "The pen Is mightier than the sword." I believed in the PSYOP effort I was part of. I think we helped a lot of people and saved some lives. In fact, I believed it so strongly that I volunteered for a second tour of PSYOP duty in Vietnam.

Leaflet 245N-296-67 produced by the 245th PSYOP Company

Leaflet 245N-296-67 is an example of the type of propaganda leaflet that the 245th PSYOP Company prepared and disseminated on the Vietnamese in support of the Korean Tiger Division. The front depicts a tiger clawing the hand of a Viet Cong trying to steal the food of Vietnamese farmers. 500,000 of the leaflets were prepared to alienate the people from the Viet Cong.

Text on the front is:

The fierce Republic of Korea tiger Division stops the Viet Cong from stealing the people’s rice.

The back is all text:

Dear Inhabitants,

The Viet Cong has circulated false rumors that they will liberate the Republic of Vietnam. It has promised you a happy and pleasant life. But what has the Viet Cong done for you so far?

The Viet Cong has been beaten in the continuing operations here. They are in ruin. Now they make desperate attempts to enlist your support in combat by threatening you and telling you that the Korean Tiger Division kills innocent civilians. The Viet Cong lies to you.

Dear inhabitants, The Republic of Korea Tigers have come to help plant your long cherish hopes for freedom and peace in this country. We are your true friends. We will stay here so that you people of Vietnam can enjoy a secure and prosperous life.

You have seen the Republic of Korea Tigers do many things in your interest. We do not lie. Your future is a full one. It is time for all of us to work together to reconstruct the land.

Leaflet 245N-342-67

The 245th PSYOP Company prepared 600,000 copies of leaflet 245N-342-67 in support of the 1st Cavalry Division in Binh Dinh Province. The purpose was to urge the people to cooperate in reporting sabotage and mines on the roads. The front of the leaflet depicts two photographs of dead Vietnamese killed by a Viet Cong mine. The text is:

Innocent civilians killed by a Viet Cong mine near Tra Luong Hamlet north of Phu My

The back of the leaflet is all text:

On Sunday morning, 11 June 1967, sixteen innocent civilians were killed when their Lambrettas ran over a mine placed on a highway by the Viet Cong. To stop these atrocious acts, persons knowing of anyone tampering with the highways should report this information to the Allied forces immediately. Your cooperation in solving these crimes will save your lives and the lives of your family. Help stop Viet Cong atrocities.

Leaflet 245N-351-67

The 245th PSYOP Company printed 200,000 copies of leaflet 245N-351-67 to exploit a victory of the Army of South Vietnam over the North Vietnamese Army at Tuy Hoa. The front of the leaflet depicts four photographs of dead guerillas. The back is all text:

The 24th PSYOP Detachment was one of the first psychological Operations units to deploy to Vietnam. Unfortunately, in those early days of the Vietnam War there seems to have been little understanding of how to use PSYOP and what it could do for the battlefield commander. In my opinion the detachment was misused. Captain Revis is kinder in his critique:

It was a new tool that commanders did not know how to employ properly. There was a learning curve and the numerous successes such as Operations Eagle’s Claw and Market Time as well as the follow-up to Arc Light and Tiger Hound operations give testament to the successes of tactical PSYOP.

Authors note: Operation Eagle’s Claw was a 1st Cavalry Operation in Binh Dinh Province from 11-28 February 1966 designed to surround and trap the enemy Quyet Chien Regiment in the vicinity of the mountains surrounding the Song Bien Valley. Operation Market Time was created 11 March 1965 by joining the US Navy and the South Vietnamese Navy in an effort to stop the flow of supplies from North Vietnam into the south by sea. Operation Tiger Hound was a special Air Force, Navy, Marine and Army task force that began on 5 December 1965 to interdict the movement of enemy troops, equipment, and supplies from neighboring countries into South Vietnam.

NVA Prisoner

Revis continues:

The officers and men of the 24th PSYOP detachment are the finest for bravery, innovation, and intelligence that I ever met.

During one Eagle’s Claw operation, John Magine and I were deployed to a forward position of a reconnaissance platoon. They had captured a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) hospital on the side of a mountain and they wanted to get prisoners. John and I went in with a loudspeaker.  I spoke Vietnamese and I called for those that could hear my voice to come to us because we had medicine and shelter and would protect them. After about five minutes there was a rustle in the brush right beside our position. The Reconnaissance Platoon had been in direct contact all day and was about to fire when John stopped them. An enemy soldier crawled out. He was wounded in both knees. The wounds were festering and he was in some pain. One of the recon guys had a jungle survival kit that had pain killers in it. We gave the prisoner one. Normally, an American would get two but the Vietnamese are sensitive to western medicine and we didn't want the guy to pass out. We propped his back against our back packs and used our helmets to support his knees. I personally cooked up a C-ration for him. He looked at me and asked what my rank was. I told him “Captain.” He then asked, “Why are you cooking for me?” I said, “Because you are hungry.” After that he told us where the NVA troops were deployed, how many men were left in his battalion, his house number in Hanoi, and anything else we wanted to know. I then asked him to call for others to come out. He did. After about ten more minutes a NVA Platoon leader came out. He had been shot though the right chest and had a sucking wound.

In today’s Army PSYOP is recognized as a valuable force-multiplier and no commander wants to go into battle without the psychological preparation of the battlefield. I quote general H. Norman Schwarzkopf’s comments on his need for PSYOP during Operation Desert Storm:

PSYOP...was a great threat to troop morale, second only to the coalition bombing campaign.

The United States Army is committed to psychological operations. I doubt that any American battlefield commander will ever go to war again without a complete knowledge of what the art offers and how to best use it. To do so is to invite defeat.