THE ARMED PROPAGANDA
TEAMS OF VIETNAM

It is probably correct to say that almost any nighttime visitation of Viet Cong into a village was preceded by an armed propaganda team that explained the Communist cause and prepared the people to meet the needs of the combat forces. The enemy Armed Propaganda Team could move about within the village and pass as farmers or tradesmen. For instance, David Hunt mentions the APTs in an article entitled Villagers at War: The National Liberation Front In My Tho Province, 1965-1967. Some of his comments are:

Government of Vietnam cadres only came into the hamlets when it was convenient for them to do so, while (Communist) Front cadres who operated openly - that is, who possess legal papers, whose National Liberation Front affiliation is secret - seem to live within the community. The situation in the villages is relatively favorable to the Saigon regime in that the local Front organization cannot function above ground during the day, and Saigon’s “Armed Propaganda Teams" (the idea for such teams, including the name itself, is borrowed directly from the NLF) and regular troops can move around without fear of being hit hard by guerrillas or other NLF units.

The Communist method is mentioned by Colonel William F. Johnston in the article “Neglected Deterrent: Psychological Operation in Liberation Wars,” Military Review, May 1968. Some of his comments are:

Vietnam is not a new type of conflict. Almost every facet of it is simply an adaptation of strategy, tactics and psychological techniques which Mao Tse-tung evolved in China.

In the early stages of the Viet Minh – French conflict, Ho Chi Minh’s guiding principal, according to General Giap, were armed propaganda which would insure that “political activities were more important than military activities,” and “fighting less important than propaganda”; and” not to attempt to overthrow the enemy, but try to win him over and make use of him.”

What the agit-prop cadre said was usually based on a detailed prior investigation by a secret Communist agent in the village. In this way, what they had to say made good sense to the villagers.

Between 1955 and 1960, the US agencies in Vietnam made the same errors that President Diem had made. The real Communist threat of generating power through agitation and armed propaganda based on grievances of the masses was discounted…It was not until 1959…that US priorities turned to psychological warfare as a weapon…but by this time the Viet Cong had five years’ uncontested opportunity to agitate, propagandize, organize, and discipline the masses under an experienced underground Viet Cong military-type chain of command or infrastructure.

Propaganda to the Masses

This picture depicts a member of an armed propaganda team or a political organizer proselytizing to South Vietnamese villagers. Most villages in the South had a cell of three communists assigned to watch and oversee village activities. Two of the cell members were generally known by the locals, the third was always secret, even to the two members of the village cell. Thus, the two known cell members reported on the villagers, the third unknown member verified what the two reported, and, in addition, reported on the first two.

If we are to believe Stuart A. Herrington in Stalking the Viet Cong – Inside Operation Phoenix: A Personal account, Ballantine Books, NY, some Communists used the propaganda teams to avoid being placed in military units. He mentions a young communist named Hai Chua that wanted no part of being shot at by the South Vietnamese and Americans. Herrington says:

As the resistance flared into a full-scale war it had become impossible to remain neutral. The pragmatic young peasant volunteered to work as an entertainment cadre for the Viet Minh – a job that required him to serve as a guitar player in a troupe of artists that entertained the troops with songs and skit extolling Viet Minh victories.

Chua would later become a Communist official in his village and spend much time hiding in Cambodia to avoid the war. Eventually he would defect to the south. It is possible that he never heard a shot fired in anger.

To get an idea of how the Viet Cong operated there is a confidential South Vietnamese military intelligence report on the actions of a Communist Armed Propaganda Team in Kien Hoa Province dated 3 June 1967. It states that on 23 May 1967 a mobile information and propaganda group of about 150 Viet Cong with loudspeakers, generators and other information equipment set up two platforms from which they entertained the local Vietnamese civilians with movies of the fighting in Central Vietnam, comedies and propaganda. A day later on 24 May, the same group moved to Thanh Thoi Agroville (a fortified hamlet of the Agroville Program). At about 0800 the ARVN forced apparently called in an air strike and reported 47 VC killed and another 19 wounded. The propaganda equipment was reported destroyed. 

The previously classified Confidential MACV Combined Intelligence Center VC Propaganda Factbook dated 29 March 1969 adds:

Entertainment Teams: VC entertainment teams direct propaganda through short plays, folksongs, dances, poetry readings, and story-telling. Mobile entertainment teams exist at regional and provincial levels. The mission of these teams is to “promote patriotic awareness among the masses by performing the classical Vietnamese music and drama.” The size of mobile entertainment teams varies greatly. The typical team consists of about 20 members, often includes women and teenagers, and performs plays, songs, dances, and poetry and prose readings. The team, accompanied by an armed Viet Cong platoon, travels throughout its region or province. Occasionally, it is equipped with a generator and a microphone.

A typical incident involving an unusually large mobile propaganda team follows: On 18 July 1967 an unidentified psychological warfare company with an estimated strength of 150 men was located at Wi Ta. The company was armed with five Chinese communist light machine guns, automatic rifles, and individual weapons. Personnel wore gray and black clothing. The mission of the unit was to sing and play music for the local people of Military Region 5. They called all the young men and girls together for training concerning their plan to prepare to kill Americans.

Armed propaganda teams (also called agit-prop teams) are used by the VC to effect face-to-face communication with people living in or bordering on GVN-controlled territory. The VC consider face-to-face communication as the most effective means of disseminating propaganda. Armed propaganda teams place primary emphasis on lecturing, sometimes utilizing loudspeakers or megaphones. Lectures have the advantage of having great psychological impact, demonstrating to the people the relative ease with which the VC move within GVN controlled areas and reinforcing VC presence in the minds of the people. One VC prisoner, formerly a member of an armed propaganda unit, described his unit’s activity in the following manner: “We conducted our business during the day. We moved furtively among the trees in the jungle to find people who were cutting wood, gathering wood, or bailing out water. We would stop and talk to them about the Front.”

Proselyting

This photograph was taken from a captured North Vietnamese APT member. It depicts a North Vietnamese armed propaganda team proselyting in the field with farmers. The caption is “Two or three Communist cadre will approach a farmer in the fields and offer to assist him while they talk. It is not a hard sell, but rather a simple informal discussion of the problems and difficulties which face the people."

My friend U.S. Army Staff Sergeant (Ret.) Sam Eaton told me about an experience his wife Bac had with a Viet Cong propagandist as a 15-year-old teenager in 1968 while living in An Long five miles from the Cambodian border.

The propagandist was named Hoi, a hard-looking communist who demanded the attention of the young girl. She was forced to appear friendly and hospitable as the Viet Cong drank her tea and ate freshly roasted peanuts. He began his lecture:

Tonight we study about honorable Uncle Ho Chi Minh and about life and death. The old people said that dying in glory is better than living in shame. Have you ever heard that before? It is about dignity, courage and honor. We will always put our country and its honor above our lives. I am one of Uncle Ho’s heroes. Look at the courage I display, going from camp to camp, and spreading Uncle Ho’s word. You would do well to mold yourself on my brave model.

Bac said that a few days later when a lone American reconnaissance aircraft flew over the village Hoi opened fire on it with his AK47. The villagers were aghast. Soon afterwards, two fighters appeared. The farmers knew enough to stay very still so as not to invite attack and to wave a Republic of Vietnam flag to show that they were loyal to the government; Hoi once again fired his AK47 from a nearby creek. The aircraft strafed his position with machinegun and rockets.

Hoi suddenly burst from the reeds minus his black pajama shirt and waving a South Vietnamese flag. It was clear that the hero of the revolution had every intention of using the Saigon flag to save his life. Bac watched him hiding among the farmers and recalled the Vietnamese saying, “The coward dies many times before his death.”

Captured North Vietnamese Female Performers

Two women from a Communist entertainment group of 13 members were captured by the 1st U.S. Air Cavalry Division in An Khe during September 1966. Both said they left Hanoi for the South at the beginning of the year to perform in Viet Cong-controlled areas. Their fate is unknown. Note the woman in the left had a watch, which could imply she came from a well-off family.

The South Vietnamese Answer

Before the first Indochina War of 1946-1954, there were some of patriotic songs written by young musicians from the Vietnamese Youth & Student Association to strengthen the fighting spirit against the French and Japanese occupation (Starting September 1940).

In 1954, an entertainment group called the Doan Van Tac Vụ was established under the Defense Department during the First Republic of Vietnam period. It appears that both the Northern and the Southern Armies used such groups for psychological warfare purposes.

APT Handbook

The American and South Vietnamese governments envied the Communist success and decided to counter enemy propaganda by employing their own propaganda troops. One of the problems, of course, is that the Government of Vietnam Armed Propaganda Team would usually be accompanied by armed U.S. troops, which probably led to a lack of credibility on their part. What do we know about the Government of Vietnam Armed Propaganda Teams? There is a wealth of information in the APT Handbook, an undated guide that was issued to the American advisors of the APTs. Some of the data in the handbook was also published as Chieu Hoi Operational Memorandum 1/69: Administration and Operation of the Armed Propaganda teams. I have edited some of the data in the handbook for efficiency and to make it more concise:

This handbook was prepared so that advisors and managers of the Chieu Hoi Program, the Intelligence and Psywar communities and other persons who are interested in the means and methods of face-to-face inducement will have a better understanding of the APT and its administration and operation. Armed Propaganda Teams represent the most effective of all returnee media. The results they obtain will vary proportionately to the skill with which they are employed, their training and their motivation. In the past, much of their full potential has been alleviated by the lack of complete understanding of not only what they might possibly accomplish but also of the very basic fundamentals of organization, training, tactics, etc.

Government of Vietnam Armed Propaganda Team

The handbook defines the Armed Propaganda team:

During the summer of 1964, the Ministry of Chieu Hoi conceived the idea to better exploit the experience and knowledge of selected Chieu Hoi returnees (ex-Hoi Chanh) following their release from the Chieu Hoi Center. They decided to use ex-Hoi Chanh to go back into Viet Cong controlled or contested areas to talk to the people, relate their experience on both sides, discuss the policies and aims of the Government of Vietnam and tell the people about the Chieu Hoi Program. This would not only place the Hoi Chanh in a positive position to help the Government of Vietnam but at the same time show the people that those who have seen both sides recognize the Communist cause as unjust and desire to fight against it.

The APT is the primary action arm of the Ministry of Chieu Hoi for face-to-face inducement of enemy military and political personnel to change sides. This para-military force is provided to each province and functions as part of the provincial Chieu Hoi Program. The Armed Propaganda Team has no combat function, only being lightly armed for self-protection while conducting operations in uncertain or contested areas.

This official military photograph dated 8 October 1969 depicts a member of an Armed Propaganda Team placing JUSPAO propaganda poster 2680, “Where is the Truth,” to a hut in a small hamlet near Phan Thiet in southern II Corps. The faces on the poster are all former high-ranking VC officers who returned to the government under Chieu Hoi.

The history and organization of the Armed Propaganda Team is discussed:

The first two APT companies were established on 1 October 1964 by the Ministry of Information / Chieu Hoi. These companies, each with a strength of 74 personnel and composed of two 36-man platoons, were initially located in Binh Duong, Long An, and Quang Ngai provinces. The outstanding success  of these companies led to the establishment of an additional 25 companies during 1965 and 1966.The authorized complement of Armed Propaganda Teams was increased to 45 companies in 1967 and 65 companies in 1968.The authorization was increased to 75 companies in 1969.

The annual force structure of the Armed Propaganda Team is determines by the Ministry of Chieu Hoi based on provincial inducement requirements. After coordinating with the United States Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV) the force level is subject to review by the Director General for Budget and Foreign Aid as part of the Ministry budget.

Major factors which are considered in the distribution of the Armed Propaganda Teams are the Province Pacification Precedence List, available targets, and the ability to recruit and manage.

The Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) as of 1 April 1969 is mentioned:

The largest element of the APT is a company. It consists of a company headquarters and three 23-man platoons for a total of 74 personnel. Each platoon consists of a platoon leader, an assistant platoon leader and three seven-man squads. Each squad has a squad leader and two three-man sections. Individual clothing was purchased using the Ministry budget while field equipment was supplied by U.S. Department of Defense funding.

Each Armed Propaganda Company is authorized the following major equipment:

1. 2 trucks
2. 2 trailers
3. 5 38-caliber pistols
4. 57 M2 carbines
5. 3 Browning automatic rifles
6. 6 Thompson submachine guns
7. 3 30-caliber machine guns
8. 4 PRC-10 radio sets
9. 3 public address sets AN/U1H-5
10. 3 recorder-reproducer sets AN-TNH-2
11. 3 portable loudspeakers

A U.S PSYOP soldier stands watch as an ARVN soldier broadcasts a surrender appeal.

Apparently Chieu Hoi officials did not care to give up command of the APTs because the booklet clearly states:

The Ministry expects each Armed Propaganda Company to be self sufficient and not dependent upon Chieu Hoi cadre.   Chieu Hoi chiefs in each province must rely more on the commanders. Commanders must be allowed to command.

Who makes up the ranks of the Armed Propaganda Teams?

Personnel of the APT are selected from ex-Hoi Chanh on the basis of their leadership ability, demonstrated loyalty to the government and ability to communicate effectively with the people. Any ex-Hoi Chanh, man or woman, may be recruited for employment as an APT if they meet the following prerequisites:

1. Must be genuine Hoi Chanh.
2. Must not be guilty of prior criminal acts or military desertion.
3. Must be no younger than 17 nor older than 50 years of age.
4. Must be free from the draft.

If selected, the Chieu Hoi Chief prepares a dossier containing:

1. Application for employment (with biographical data).
2. Health certificate.
3. Relocation certificate.
4. Agreement to be assigned any place where needed.
5. Five photographs.

The temporary employee is entitled to a $2,500VN base salary each month. Once the dossier is screened and checked the temporary employee is appointed as a permanent APT member. He then qualifies for additional subsidies such as a 30% inducement for family, functions and a rice allowance. An additional payment of $525VN is authorized for a wife and $450VN for each child. The maximum payment for a Company Commander can be $5030VN, while a basic member of the APT can make as much as $3450VN. Should he be killed, one year’s salary will be paid to his beneficiary. He will also receive payment for permanent-type injuries. This is based on the percentage of disability and length of service. The family will also receive payment if the APT member is captured or abducted by the Viet Cong while on an operation. APT members may be awarded the Gallantry Cross with Palm, Gold Star, Silver Star or Bronze Star. Surprisingly, the funds to support the Armed Propaganda Teams compose approximately 60% of the Ministry of Chieu Hoi annual budget.

An Armed Propaganda Team Member hands out a
Government Newsletter to a local Citizen.

The Handbook explains the many missions of the Armed Propaganda team in detail:

SECTION II. MISSIONS

Disseminate the Chieu Hoi policy among the population, denounce all crimes and rebut all arguments of the Viet Cong propaganda through psychological operations.

Contact and encourage VC soldiers to return to the GVN.

Provide security for Chieu Hoi centers and hamlets.

Assist military operations in the recovery of VC weapons and ammunition caches.

Assist local security forces in the discovery of VC underground operations.

Within the framework of the above missions, the APT will perform the following functions:

Organize meetings, talks, culture/drama performances, distribute leaflets, posters and publications to disseminate Chieu Hoi policy among the people, paying particular attention to those persons residing in contested or Viet Cong controlled areas.

Visit Viet Cong families to induce them to persuade their relatives to return to the Government of Vietnam.

Assist VC soldiers to return to the Government of Vietnam.

Send letters to the returnee’s former comrades to persuade them to return to the Government of Vietnam.

Assist military and security services in the identification of VC underground agents.

Assist military operations in the identification of VC weapons and ammunition caches.

Although these missions have been long standing, they are often mis-interpreted. The APT is not a combat unit. The Ministry considers the APT to have a primary mission of Chieu Hoi psyops activities with secondary utilization being directed toward security of the Chieu Hoi facilities and assisting military operations. The APT should be prepared to assist in the protection of Government of Vietnam citizens and property when under direct attack by the Viet Cong but the APT should be relieved of any tactical assignment as soon as the security situation permits so that it can return to its primary propaganda role.

South Vietnamese APT Member
Douglas Pike Photograph Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive.

Private First Class Nguyen Van Danh of the 25th Division of the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) at Long An Province, 25 kilometers south of Saigon. He is a member of a nine-man special Armed Propaganda Team whose principal task is to encourage the Viet Cong to defect to the government. The result in Long An Province, a onetime Communist stronghold, is 1,990 returnees since January 1, 1969. Most of the recent returnees said they were influenced by contacts from APT members.

Mervyn Roberts makes some of the following points about the Armed Propaganda Teams in his 2016 paper: United States psychological operations in support of counterinsurgency: Vietnam, 1960 to 1965:

Under Edward G. Lansdale‘s guidance, the United States assisted in training the psychological warfare forces…A hasty instruction program taught soldiers how to enter a village and greet civilians in a respectful manner. Additionally, he built Armed Propaganda Teams (APT). These were 20-man squads trained in psychological warfare, heavily armed and equipped with U.S. Navy loud-hailers, bull horns, and some larger French voice amplifiers. The men were selected for their patriotic motivation and carried leaflets, booklets and posters, and at times, phonographs, films, film projection equipment, and simple medicines…

One ploy the teams used was to offer to exchange a villager‘s old, faded photo of Ho Chi Minh, for a fresh new color photo of South Vietnamese President Diem. The teams knew that if they entered the huts and pulled down the pictures of Ho Chi Minh, they would only anger the villagers.

Readers might wonder if these teams were worth the trouble. Did they really help in the fight against the Communists? They did. I have read about 100 reports where the teams brought in Viet Cong members and weapons. Here is one from a report written February 1970. The teams are using a new plan called “Operation Tune In.” They are opening conversations with the people and listening hard. One result:

Team members were encouraged to seek the opinions and aspirations of the Vietnamese with whom they come in contact. At Ap Chanh village, members of the Armed Propaganda Team obtained information about a secret Viet Cong meeting place, a political indoctrination class and a cache containing numerous mortar rounds and several grenades. While supporting a Civic Action program in Duc Ngai village, local villagers volunteered information that led to the discovery of a complex bunker system containing a large number of enemy weapons and ammunition.

Bruce Kinsey mentions the Armed Propaganda Teams in GOOD GUYS: The Quiet Americans Who Worked to Pacify Vietnam:

The Armed Propaganda Teams grew out of an unusual Central Intelligence Agency-U.S. Operations Mission-U.S. Information Agency effort concocted in Quang Nam province in 1964 and dubbed “People’s Action Teams.” A 15-man Vietnamese team, indoctrinated and often led by USIA officer Frank Scotton, penetrated VC-held and contested hamlets. Its purpose was to undertake small civic action projects, propagandize the residents, and collect intelligence – all in the wake of the near collapse of the Nguyen Khanh government in Saigon.

In 1969, Chieu Hoi’s most successful year ever, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) judged the APTs “the most effective method of inducing returnees.” By then the teams were operating as small units, often without outside military support, as part of 74-man companies under the GVN province chief. That same year 75 companies were operative, with more planned. It was later estimated that Armed Propaganda Teams caused 25% to 50% of all defections. The program was, however, subject to excesses, as Dave Garms, who advised the Chieu Hoi program in Go Cong province noted:

“The APT was supposed to be a political propaganda arm of the government in general and of the Chieu Hoi program in particular. The members were to be armed only for the purpose of defending themselves in contested areas.... In practice, however, the toughest and fiercest of the returnees tended to join the APT, and their enthusiasm for killing their former comrades sometimes surpassed that for converting them. They could be a difficult lot to control, and the province chief of Go Cong, rather than control them, had actually incited their more violent tendencies.”

Retired Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen mentions Armed Propaganda Teams in his 2020 US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute paper: Death by a Thousand Cuts: Weakening an Insurgency through a National Reconciliation Program Three Case Studies: Malaya, Vietnam, and Iraq

The Armed Propaganda Unit program started in October 1964. USAID employed especially trained ralliers (male and female) to promote the Chieu Hoi program in Viet Cong-dominated areas. USAID selected ralliers with demonstrated leadership, patriotism to the government, and strong communication skills.

Starting in February 1968, Armed Propaganda Team personnel attended a formal four-week training course on psychological warfare and basic military tactics. Accordingly, provincial Chieu Hoi chiefs exercised operational control of Armed Propaganda Teams.

While the basic unit was a platoon of 35 ralliers, Armed Propaganda Teams (three ralliers) functioned as agents for disseminating Chieu Hoi propaganda in villages. As former Viet Cong, they embodied the government’s promise of reconciliation, thereby effectively countering Viet Cong propaganda. Lightly armed for self-protection, APT ralliers conversed with villagers about their experiences, the reality of communism, Viet Cong injustices, the Chieu Hoi program, and RVN government goals and reforms. Since many villagers had relatives and friends in the Viet Cong, these personal interactions served to encourage defections through trusted associations. In this regard, one Chieu Hoi adviser considered APTs as the most potent propaganda service for the war effort.

As the war progressed, the number of Armed Propaganda companies surged from two in 1964 to around 84 in 1970, totaling 5,400 male and female ralliers. By 1969, all four regions and 44 provinces contained Armed Propaganda Companies. The task organization was as follows:

The Armed Propaganda Company consists of three platoons of 74 ralliers.
The Armed Propaganda Platoon consists of three squads of 23 ralliers.
The Armed Propaganda Squad consists of two Armed Propaganda Teams of seven ralliers.
The Armed Propaganda Team consists of three ralliers.

The Armed Propaganda team Bodyguards
Courtesy of the Headless Snake

Harry Wagner mentions the fighting capabilities of the Armed Propaganda Teams in The Headless Snake, self-published, 2018. Wagner was involved in PSYOP in Vietnam from 1966 to 1968 as the Director of Psychological Operations in II Corps. Almost every mention of the teams in this article is about their songs, dances, plays and civic actions. Wagner says that he used them for more military purposes. I have not read such statements anywhere else:

As my work with military intelligence expanded I began to employ the Armed Propaganda Teams as a blocking force in different main force assaults on enemy positions. My association with military and CIA operations became more involved…A top secret attack plan was developed and deployment of forces was to start in two days. I deployed 100 members of the teams into a blocking position in support of the regiment.

Wagner mentions using the APTs as his bodyguard and says they were very protective of him:

They wore black clothing, which was the traditional garb of the Vietnamese. The APT Chief (a Hoi Chanh) was concerned for my safety when I wore American clothes in the field with them doing PSYOP in contested enemy areas. I explained it was to separate me as a guest in their country…I was there because I wanted to help the Vietnamese and stop the violence…After we failed in Vietnam over 2,000 of them were executed by the Viet Cong.

Sergeant Jack O'Neil with Armed Propaganda Team (APT)

Kinsey tells us the theory of the Armed Propaganda Teams. Another trooper who actually worked with them told me how some of it was practiced in reality, at least in his area of operations. Former Sergeant Chad Spawr, former PSYOP Team Leader of the 6th PSYOP Battalion in Vietnam from 1968 to 1969 said:

Sergeant Jack O'Neil was my best friend. We met in September 1968 at the Quan Loi Base Camp in Binh Long Province, where Jack was PSYOP Team Leader for the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). I temporarily replaced him for his R&R; shortly thereafter, Jack moved to another unit and I followed him as Team Leader in Quan Loi. Jack was the first PSYOP team leader to organize and deploy the Armed Propaganda Team (APT), composed of one American PSYOP soldier, an interpreter, and between five and seven armed former NVA soldiers. Our APT’s worked at the village and hamlet level to counter enemy propaganda and to provide a local intervention either before or after Allied operations in specific areas. That these were dangerous operations is an understatement. Jack refined the model that several of us thereafter applied.

Private Nguyen Van Broadcasts by Loudspeaker

This November 1969 photograph combines three of my favorite subjects, the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program, the South Vietnamese Armed Propaganda teams, and the use of loudspeakers for psychological operations. This is an original press photo. The back gives a description of what is going on in the photo.

A nightly appeal. Seated in his quarters, Private Nguyen Van Danh hooks up a loudspeaker system with speakers on the roof of his hut to read Chieu Hoi (returnee) appeals from midnight to 1 a.m. and from 3 to 4 a.m. This spoken appeal is intended for Viet Cong who might be sneaking around in neighborhood rice paddies

According to South Vietnamese officials, 5615 Viet Cong guerillas turned their backs on communism during October. This is more than in any previous month in the history of the war. One of the reasons is because of troopers like Private First-Class Nguyen Van Danh of the 25th Division of the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) at Long An Province, 25 kilometers south of Saigon.

Private Danh, 27, carries a submachine gun for combat, but does much of his "fighting" with a microphone, leaflets, and flags. He is a member of a nine-man special Armed Propaganda Team whose principal task is to encourage the Viet Cong to cast their lot with the government.

The results in Long An Province, a onetime Communist stronghold, is 1990 returnees since January 1, 1969. Most of the recent returnees said they were influenced by contacts from APT members.

Sergeant Chad Spawr in Quan Loi about December 1967.

Chad said that his only orientation to the Armed Propaganda Teams was as follows:

1. This is your team and you are the team leader.

2. They all are North Vietnamese Army soldiers who have defected.

3. You will work with Vietnamese and American ground units to “pave the way” for friendly entry into village areas, explain that we are friends, and tell a brief story about how bad the Viet Cong and NVA are. Use “stay behind” tactics as needed to exploit favorable situations.

4. Tell people that the Viet Cong and NVA are foreign invaders seeking to capture Vietnam for the Russians and Chinese.

5. Provide local patrols to identify caches and potential hazards such as trip wires, mines, etc.

6. Assist local Regional Force and Popular Force units in ambushes as requested.

Chad pointed out that his Vietnamese team members were absolutely expert at picking ambush sites, teaching the Americans NVA tactics, etc. He said that he never lost a man on one of their ambushes; they were amazing soldiers.

He rarely had a portable loudspeaker. When I pointed out that there were hundreds of pre-written messages available he said that he never saw any of them:

We used the speaker for a couple of reasons. One was to get folks assembled when we went into a village; we would ask the cooperation of the village chief to assemble folks, and used the speaker for that. Other times, when we'd participate in a village seal and search, we'd use the speaker to warn folks about correct behavior, not to challenge troops, move into open areas, etc. I don't recall ever using a speaker with scripts; in fact, I don't remember there being any scripts. When we needed something said, we planned it with our Hoi Chanh's. As I spoke a good bit of the language, we could put together a message that they'd deliver.

We used it one time to try and coax some VC out of a small village where they were trapped. That was near An Loc. It was three VC, trying to hide in a covered bunker. They were pointed out by the old lady who lived there. My Hoi Chanh’s worked hard but weren't successful. The VC wouldn't come out, and were assisted into the next life with a couple fragmentation grenades.

In early February 1969, we were operating from Quan Loi. We were called to work with a platoon of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment that was putting up a block to stop an enemy unit that was under airstrike about 5 kilometers north of An Loc. We set up on a ridgeline about a half kilometer from the area being bombed, and saw three NVA trying to escape in our direction. They were unarmed, and running toward us. One of our Hoi Chanh's stood up and called to them. They were not in uniform, so the NVA must have thought we were friendly. Once they got closer, it was too late. Had they been armed, we would have killed them. As it was, we were able to take them prisoner. We gave them to the 11th ACR guys.

On another occasion Chad mentioned this in more depth:

While serving as PSYOP Team Leader for 2nd Brigade of the 1st Cavalry, I often operated an Armed Propaganda Team based in An Loc. This team, composed of enemy soldiers who had defected to the Allies, was literally armed and trained to perform PSYOP missions in contested villages and hamlets. All team members were experienced combat veterans. The team I led was composed entirely of former North Vietnamese combat soldiers. They were tough, hardened, good soldiers. On 2 February 1969, this team successfully captured three enemy soldiers fleeing US air strikes between An Loc and the Cambodian border. These POW's were a gold mine of tactical (Order of Battle) information. I was proud to lead these men, and still am to this day.

His troops also participated in prisoner snatches working with Regional Force and Popular Force units. Often, he would camp out for a few days at an RF/PF encampment, running patrols at night to identify Viet Cong infiltration into local villages.

Chad concludes:

We seldom did much actual propaganda, never showed a film, and seldom held group meetings in villages. I always felt it was very casual, and that much of what we did was “made up” as we went along just to say that things were being done. It was nice to read your article and see the official policy and what we were supposed to do. It would have been nice if we'd actually done it, but I did not find that was how we worked in the field. My participation ended when I was sent to Operation Montana Raider where I was wounded and eventually sent home.

Sergeant Rich Hosier with the Former Viet Cong Colonel who went Chieu Hoi

Sergeant Rich Hosier had a very difference experience with an Armed Propaganda Team. One of the interesting things about the Vietnam War is that everyone had a different experience. The men that fought in 1965 had little in common with the men that fought in 1973, and those in the Delta hardly understood the battles that took place in the Highlands.

Rich was trained in Intelligence at Ft. Holabird, Maryland and thereafter assigned to the 6th Special Forces at Bragg. He did no Special Forces training. He did attend jump school at Ft. Benning, Georgia and Jungle Expert School at Ft Sherman, Panama.

The 6th PSYOP Battalion Booklet

Although he had no PSYOP training he was assigned to the 6th PSYOP Battalion in Vietnam in August 1967. He was issued a 5-page booklet entitled The 6th PSYOP Battalion that explained the mission: “To conduct psychological operations in support of military operations in the Republic of Vietnam…” From there he was sent to the 244th PSYOP Company which later would become the 7th PSYOP Battalion in Da Nang. He was then sent to Chu Lai to support the 23rd Infantry (Amercal) Division where he started his “On-the-Job training.” He went on various missions winning “hearts and minds” and showing movies. He always started with hygiene movie to explain the proper way to brush your teeth or bathe a child, and then he would show a real Hollywood movie. The favorites were Westerns. The Vietnamese loved the horses! Once his team was laughing as they watched “The Green Berets” although it was in English and most of them couldn't understand a word of it.

Sergeant Rich Hosier, Marine Sergeant Bob Conticelli and Hoi Chanhs by the Loudspeaker Helicopter

He was placed on a team supporting the 196th Light Infantry Brigade led by Marine Sergeant Robert Conticelli who had attended PSYOP School at Ft. Bragg and taught Hosier the basics and kept him alive. Bob was part of a contingent of about 14 Marines that were sent from Bragg to Vietnam and assigned to infantry units. Rich also worked with a Marine Lieutenant Stone, but only did about three missions together. About that time they were no longer were using officers to lead teams but were instead placing Noncommissioned officers as team leaders. Rich told me:

We were an HB Team (Loudspeaker), with no team members. We would broadcast on the ground and from helicopters using a cassette player with tapes sent to us from Da Nang. We usually had a script so we knew what the message was and sometimes we took the S3 (Operations) interpreter on missions for live broadcasting. We dropped leaflets by the thousands. Leaflet drops were very sophisticated. We would identify a target; usually a village and the pilot would help us with wind direction and tell us when to drop. Some missions we flew while a battle was going on. I remember at least three times when our tactical leaflets identified the enemy units so the messages were very personal. Broadcasting and dropping leaflets was very dangerous as we flew very slowly at an altitude of about 1,500 feet. I can't ever remember not getting shot at when doing this.

Leaflet 7-646-68

Rich mentions teaching the Vietnamese Hygiene. Here is a leaflet from the 7th PSYOP Battalion that is one of several that teaches a mother how to bathe her child. The text is:

Soap and water help you clean germs on the skin. You should bathe your child with soap and water every day to prevent skin disease.

Rich continues:

At this point, in late 1967 most American infantry officers did not understand our purpose or want our support. They did not understand the PSYOP mission. In early 1968 we became an Armed Propaganda Team and acquired a number of Hoi Chanhs from a Chieu Hoi center in Tam Ky. The place was run by an ex-Viet Cong colonel. He would pick out best of the best and we would go down and pick them up. When I left in 1969 we had 8 Hoi Chanhs and an interpreter on our team. This bought a whole new dynamic to our team. We targeted certain high risk villages and would call for a Medical Civil Action Program (Medcap) mission to help the people while we wandered around talking to the villagers. We eventually set up a network of 5 villagers from different places who were giving us tactical information. There was some risk. We got word that an informer from one village had information for us and when we went in we were ambushed after being there for about an hour. We tried to track the informer down but never found him.

One time we got word through this network that a North Vietnamese political officer was going to be in a certain village. We planned a “snatch” and sure enough the guy was there and we captured him. Most of the time the Informer’s information was about enemy movements, numbers, etc. In our area of Operation many of the Viet Cong were upset with the North Vietnamese Army because they stole the villager's food. In fact the Former Viet Cong Colonel we worked with defected after being in a horrific fight with NVA over such problems. This became a theme for broadcasting for us and he helped us with the messages as well.

As time went on most field commanders realized that PSYOP could save lives. It was nothing for us to be called to several battles in just a few days. After TET things got worse as the NVA increased their efforts. Where earlier we were appealing to villagers and local VC the message to NVA soldiers was entirely different. We would tell the Viet Cong that you are helping foreign invaders who steal your food, fight you and care little about your family or village. To the North Vietnamese we would tell them that they were in a foreign land fighting for politicians far away with no reason for them to be there and they would die in unknown places, in unmarked graves and their families would never find their graves. That worked well on the real Buddhists. Our whole team mission and perspective changed along with the level of serious engagements we encountered. We used speakers 75% of the time both on the ground and in the air. We continued to drop large number of leaflets especially when a major operation was in the works. At one point Bob and I flew two-a-day missions for 27 straight days!

I was reassigned in April of 1969. Two of the men that had trained with me and took over my team were killed in May 1969. Both were teammates and friends. I mourn them every day.

Rich mentions the use of movies for propaganda and they are a mixed blessing. In another operation, an effort to impress one Montagnard Village, a PSYOP Team was sent in to win their hearts and minds. The tribe lived in Stilted Huts with no modern conveniences and the PSYOP team decided to entertain the tribe members with a movie. The team members brought a 16 mm film projector, screen and portable generator. Since the Montagnards did not speak English, the Americans selected an action-packed "Western.” As might be expected, the Montagnard villagers were thoroughly engrossed with the action on the screen. Then came the fateful scene where the wagon train full of settlers was attacked by Indians. The villagers watched intently as the Indian’s arrows struck the settlers. Suddenly, the sound of a bugle playing “Charge” was heard as the U.S. Cavalry came riding in to the rescue, charged heroically and opened fire on the Indians. The excitable Montagnards rose as one, grabbed their crossbows and started firing arrows at the screen. The Montagnards, who dressed similarly to the Native Americans with loin cloths and carried bows, had identified with the Indians in the film. The morale of the story is simple. Know your target audience.

My personal favorite movie story is from Japan soon after the war ended. In those days you watched movies on a mat and you could buy Saki. I am there with a pretty young lady and we are watching I think (but I am not 100% positive) “Flying Leathernecks.” Now this is a WWII propaganda movie designed to help Americans hate the Japanese, so the locals don't have much to cheer about. Then came that scene where the handsome young Navy pilot is forced to jump out of his aircraft. He does so, and a grinning ape-like Japanese Zero pilot machine-guns him in his parachute. The crowd went nuts. They were on their feet cheering! It was the first thing they had to cheer about all night. I thought it was kind of funny. We were trying to manipulate minds and we did so, but Japanese minds.

South Vietnamese Army Loudspeaker Truck
Saigon Mission Association

A South Vietnamese three-wheeled loudspeaker truck from February 1973. Notice that the children hold printed items so I assume that the girls in the back were handing out coloring books or handbills.

An article entitled “The Armed Propaganda Team – Former Enemy Soldiers Spread the Government’s Word” appeared in Hurricane Magazine of March 1969. The magazine is an authorized monthly publication of II Field Force Vietnam. It is published by the 16th Public Information Detachment and the Information Office:

The APT members are inspired by the zeal common to converts to a new cause. The zeal is channeled by rigid discipline. APT members are subject to dismissal for the slightest infraction. The APT works on the enemy VC and NVA through propaganda.

Perhaps the most effective weapon has been the leaflet on known enemy hideouts, hamlets and infiltration routes. Powerful speakers on airplanes and trucks verbally drive the PSYOP message home. A new type of leaflet is being prepared for use that features a picture of a recent rallier with a hand-written message. Called “The Pony Express,” the program operates in the area of the rallier’s former unit. In the more secure areas, the APT is joined by the PSYOP Culture-Drama Team. Made up entirely of x-Viet Cong, the group travels the countryside presenting skits, sing-alongs, magic shows and patriotic verses…

In their extensive search for weapons, ammunition, explosives, supplies and resistance itself, the APT returns with confiscated material on 90% of its missions.

J. A. Koch authored an Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) report in January 1973 entitled: The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971. He says about the Armed Propaganda Teams:

Variations of the ex-insurgent psychological warfare team were employed in the Philippines, Malaya, and Algeria. In Vietnam, in 1964, it took the form of armed propaganda teams of ex-Viet Cong who rallied under the Chieu Hoi Program. These paramilitary units have become the primary "action arm" of the Ministry of Chieu Hoi for face-to-face inducement for enemy military and civilian personnel to rally to the government side. Particularly during the early years they were invaluable in establishing the credibility and bona fides of the government, i.e., they were living proof that the government did not kill or mistreat Viet Cong who rallied.

The primary mission of the APT has been to disseminate Chieu Hoi propaganda -- leaflets, banners, posters, film -- on a person-to-person basis, in the hamlets and villages of contested or VC-controlled areas. The teams were originally lightly armed to provide them with self-protection and the confidence needed to operate in these insecure areas.

By 1971 APTs were also being assigned to assist other counterinsurgency programs, e.g., the National Police, as interrogators and identifiers of VC travelers, the PSDF in their training to counter VC tactics and techniques. There are also now seven five-man lecture teams composed of the most highly intelligent Hoi Chanh, who systematically visit schools, colleges, business groups, and military camps and units and have proved highly successful. By the end of 1971 these assignments were holding priority over all other activities of the APT.

Culture-Drama Teams

A Culture-Drama Team arrives at a village

We mention Culture-Drama Teams above from both North and South Vietnam. Like any good idea from the North, the South was quick to copy it. JUSPAO Field Memorandum 57 dated 5 August 1968 is entitled, Organization and Operation of U.S. Supported Culture-Drama Teams.

Culture-Drama Team on the road

The American memorandum does give the Communists credit. Some of the comments are in part:

Culture-drama entertainment in rural hamlets is a traditional expression of culture in Vietnam. Roaming culture-drama teams began to operate in the days of the Chinese domination and the tradition has continued through modern times. Because of the widespread familiarity of the peasant with culture-drama teams and the wide acceptance of this traditional culture form, the communists seized upon the concept and developed it into a PSYOP weapon.

During recent years the government of Vietnam with support from U.S. organizations has employed culture-drama teams to assist in accomplishments of its objectives. The most successful has been the Van Tac Vu [Office of Literacy Producing] program, which over the past two years has operated from 13 to 20 teams.

A culture-drama team is a group of young and talented artists, organized to conduct PSYOP programs through the use of entertainment.

A culture drama team is a group of young and talented artists, organized to conduct PSYOP programs through the medium on entertainment. Each team should be composed of from five to nine members. Experience has revealed that a good balance is achieved by the formula of two-thirds male members, one third female. These teams tour the hamlets of remote and contested rural areas entertaining the people and using entertainment as a medium for PSYOP messages in support of programs and objectives of the Government of Vietnam. Such programs and objectives include, but are not necessarily limited to those of National reconciliation and Chieu Hoi, Revolutionary Development, the Government of Vietnam Image, the refugee and Police Programs, Phoenix, Regional Forces/Popular Forces, and other pacification efforts. The teams perform not only in village/hamlets, but also in refugee and Chieu Hoi Centers and at Regional Forces/Popular Forces outposts. When necessary and feasible they operate in direct support of military operations.

Before leaving the provincial capital on an operation, the team should contact organizations conducting PSYOP in the province and pick up leaflets, posters, magazines, and other materials supporting current PSYOP programs for distribution in rural areas.

  

These two photographs were in the papers of Don Rochlen, who was chief of Special Projects for the Joint U.S. Public Relations Office (JUSPAO). He said that the young Vietnamese women depicted are part of the Cultural Drama teams sponsored by both the U.S. and Vietnamese governments. These girls are on the Vietnamese-Cambodian border in 24 January 1971, on their way to entertain the troops during the Tet holidays.

Just about a month before Tet 1971 (30 January 1971), the ARVN opened Operation Toan Thang 1/71 in Cambodia, hoping to draw the PAVN from Laos back to Cambodia. That was probably why the girls were in Cambodia to entertain the troops. The operation was just a ruse: the actual Allied operation was Lam Son 719 in Laos, which began on 8 February 1971.

This particular group seems to consist of high school students. They would sing songs to show appreciation to the soldiers, especially during Tet, when, like Thanksgiving in the U.S., all soldiers want to be home with their families. The school children in the South did this voluntarily and received no extra credit for their actions. Those students, who were probably in the musical club of their school, would take trips to entertain the soldiers at some bases or Military hospitals. Sometimes teachers who were ARVN veterans had the connections to get military trucks for these trips. Notice that one girl is wearing a U.S. M69 flak jacket.

Cultural-Drama Performances

The basic mission of a culture-drama team is to perform for populations of rural areas. Such teams normally perform once or twice a day. If the security situation permits, they conduct night performances. The typical performance lasts for an hour or more and includes modern or traditional Vietnamese songs, a magic show, skits, plays and humorous tales. Dances may be performed if the requisite talent exists. Virtually all of the material is PSYOP oriented, i. e., it serves the objectives of the Government of Vietnam program.

Cultural Seed Planting

This activity is directed toward school children and other youngsters of elementary and early secondary school age. In Cultural Seed Planting sessions, children learn patriotic songs and develop pride in being citizens of Vietnam. Woven into the singing sessions are lessons designed to encourage children to respect their teachers, to obey their parents, to get along with their friends , to love their native country, and to identify themselves clearly with the elected Government of the Republic of Vietnam. Parallels are drawn between the present defense against aggression and struggles in past centuries against other invaders. Cultural Seed Planting is conducted at schools, in parks, in orphanages and at other locations where children may be assembled. This is a regular, daily task for the teams. A normal session lasts from one to two hours.

Spiritual Guidelines for the Van Tac Vu Cadre

Each member of a Van Tac Vu Team is guided by three cardinal principles:

Principle 1: When you come, make the people happy.
Principle 2: When you leave, make the people miss you.
Principle 3: When you stay, make the people love you.

The entire effort of the Van Tac Vu Cadre is guided by these principles. No actions that contradict these principles are allowed in the Van Tac Vu family.

Each member of a Van Tac Vu Team is guided by three cardinal principles:

Principle 1: When you come, make the people happy.
Principle 2: When you leave, make the people miss you.
Principle 3: When you stay, make the people love you.

The entire effort of the Van Tac Vu Cadre is guided by these principles. No actions that contradict these principles are allowed in the Van Tac Vu family.

The Five Precepts are:

1. Place the national interest and the ideals of freedom above everything.
2. Judge and guide all daily activities with a good conscience.
3. Serve with a determination to develop the national combat Culture-drama.
4. Study diligently to broaden your range of knowledge.
5. Strictly carry out outlined plans and policies.

There is also a list of 12 actions forbidden to the team members. I will not list them all but some of them are: Don’t infringe on people’s property, don’t borrow money from the people, don’t wear strange or "dressy" clothes, don’t browbeat the people, don’t charge for performances, don’t read or view pornography, and don’t engage in illicit love affairs.

There are four obligations: Each member must purchase and keep one musical instrument, they must buy their own black pajama uniform and nylon slippers, and the women must buy their own makeup.

The basic pay for a team member was 2,500 Vietnamese dongs per month. Bonuses were paid to those who had seniority, rank, or special skills.

Van Tac Vu member leads children in a "Sing-along"

The Van Tac Vu teams are mentioned in another official memorandum dated January 1968. It says in part:

One of the oldest cultural traditions in Southeast Asia is the role of the wandering minstrels who pass on ancient legends and carry the latest news from village to village by means of song, dance, and fold drama. Today, this tradition is carried on by the Van Tac Vu cultural drama teams in South Vietnam. From March 1966 to June 1967 the Van Tac Vu teams performed before nearly 10% of the entire population of South Vietnam.

The teams have four missions in their work in rural areas. The first of these, the cultural dramatic performances occupies around 40% of their time. The Van Tac Vu organization has thus far produced 15 plays, 28 modern songs, and 45 songs based upon traditional music forms.…The second mission of the teams is called “cultural seed planting,” in which the teams visit the village school and the children are taught patriotic songs of Vietnam and told in simple terms the goals of the government and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. During the first year of operation, the teams have taught more than 180,000 children to sing the National Anthem of South Vietnam…The teams’ third mission, civic action and information, aims at both demonstrating the team’s desire to help the rural populace improve their own village and at the same time inform them of the programs and policies of their national government...The fourth mission is to help local artists to organize entertainment programs so that the work of the Van Tac Vu teams can continue and expand after the teams leave the area.

Both Radio Hanoi and the radio of the Viet Cong have referred to the teams as dangerous elements to be avoided by cadre and the rural population. The teams have been exposed to enemy fire and there have been several incidents or terrorists throwing grenades or firing into the audience. Since 1966, 2% of the team members have been killed and 12% have been wounded…By wearing the black clothes of the Vietnamese peasant, traveling in sampans and on bicycles, engaging in locally-determined civic action projects, and living with the residents of the villages they are visiting, the team members demonstrate their concern for and identification with the rural Vietnamese.

Van Tac Vu Magazine #11

In order to keep the program going, JUSPAO printed a monthly Van Tac Vu magazine filled with material such as songs, poems, plays and skits. In addition, they trained and supported a national demonstration team available for performances or training upon request. They taught the teams to perform a show lasting about an hour or more and containing songs, a magic show, skits, plays and humorous tales. Much of the PSYOP was aimed at children and was called “cultural seed planting.” In order to identify with the people, the teams were also expected to take part in some manual labor in each hamlet, sweep out market places, repair fences, wash babies, etc. The teams were given “Spiritual Guidelines:”

When you come, make the people happy.
When you leave, make the people miss you.
When you stay make the people love you.

Thomas C. Sorensen tells us more about the special JUSPAO teams in The Word War, Harper & Row, N.Y., 1968:

JUSPAO helped train six-man Van Tac Vu (Cultural Drama Service) troupes and assisted in the production of their material. The entertainers - among them, attractive actresses unaccustomed to hardship - traveled in black pajamas commonly worn by peasants, and lived with the villagers as they moved around the countryside, performing twenty or more shows a month. The troupes sang patriotic songs ("Vietnam, Vietnam" and "Our House"), amused and indoctrinated the peasantry with primitive dramas about villainous Viet Cong and heroic South Vietnamese soldiers and officials, and off stage distributed medicines, seed, food, and pamphlets, and helped at chores ranging from repairing damaged buildings to bathing infants.

A Cultural Drama Team Working with the Australians

The Australians sometimes used these teams to calm the Vietnamese villagers while they did a “Cordon and Search” of the area looking for weapons and members of the Viet Cong. The team stands on the back of an Australian Mark 3 vehicle.

Former Australian Sergeant Derrill de Heer mentions the Cultural Drama Teams in his Masters’ Thesis: Victoria per Mentum: Psychological Operations Conducted by the Australian Army in Phuoc Tuy Province South Vietnam 1965 – 1971. Some of his comments are:

On some occasions the Australians supported Vietnamese Cultural Drama Teams who sang, danced, and performed in comedy and drama acts on temporary stages, sometimes on the back of vehicles parked in the village. Some skits were designed to convey very subtle propaganda messages to the audience to demonstrate the virtues of the Saigon government and the drama teams were very popular with the villagers.

[During Cordon and Search operations] While the villagers were in the assembly area after being screened by the appropriate officials, the Australian PSYOP team would set up broadcast equipment to provide them with entertainment by a Vietnamese Cultural Drama team. Officials would inform them of events to be held in their area in the near future.

Cultural Drama Team
Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam

The Department of the Army Contact Team in Vietnam Study entitled Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam, dated 7 June 1969 says:

Cultural Drama shows were extremely effective mediums for dissemination of PSYOP messages to rural target audiences in the Republic of Vietnam according to PSYOP leaders. There were 36 Cultural Drama Teams conducting operations within the provinces providing entertainment in the form of songs, dramas, dances and magic shows to audiences in the villages and hamlets. The objectives of the Cultural Drama Teams were to achieve a spiritual identification with the rural masses, to win their favor and to establish a channel of communication between the masses and the GVN.

The teams used PSYOP as part of their cultural drama shows to support various government programs and activities. The teams accomplished this task by providing entertainment. Each performance lasted approximately one and a half hours and included modern and traditional songs, magic shows, dances stories and skits. PSYOP themes of virtually all the material was politically oriented, e.g., “Chieu Hoi,” nation building, the anti-communist effort, social reforms and elections.

Propaganda to Music – Associated Press Photo

JUSPAO prepared a number of publicity photographs showing the Cultural Drama Teams in action in July 1967. The text said in part:

Entertainment for the villages is a weapon being used in South Vietnam. Small Cultural Drama teams of men and women tour hamlets and villages, putting on simple shows, teaching songs to the children, and helping with village projects. Here members of a team teach songs to a school class. The program is run and financed by the Americans.

John Campbell with three female members of a team he directed in Long Huu

John R. Campbell, a civilian psychological warfare advisor in Vietnam in 1965 was the Director of Cultural Drama Teams from 1966-1967. He says about this program in Are we Winning? Are they Winning: A Civilian Advisor’s Reflections on Wartime Vietnam, Author House, 2004:

I ran 15 teams (and they literally had to run every 24 hours to stay ahead of the Viet Cong) of Vietnamese entertainers throughout the whole of South Vietnam’s countryside. We taught children pro-government songs and they in turn innocently serenaded us with their well-rehearsed pro-Viet Cong songs…We were told repeatedly that they liked our show much better than the similar roving VC propaganda teams because  their shows were obligatory and filled with dull and serious rote ideology…The daily cost of running our 15 Van Tac Vu teams countryside was the equivalent expenditure of ten 105mm shells…Perhaps, however, because of the considerable expansion of the “Rural Development” program in the country side, or simply to economize, all of the Van Tac Vu teams were eventually collapsed into one and put on television. This had its downside as there was no possibility of television reception in the rural areas where there was no electricity.

The Van Tac Vu Badge

The performers only wore these badges for identification when first entering a village. Once inside, the team removed the badges and worked at blending into the rural landscape in plain black peasant dress.

Campbell tells of the teams entering villages in small groups of five or six entertainers, the size based on the fact that they could all fit in one small Tri-Lambretta taxi. He points out that they wore the same black pajamas that the peasants did, and never carried weapons. However in the Korean area of operations the troops so hated the Viet Cong that they were known to shoot at anyone wearing black pajamas. The result is that in those areas the team was authorized to wear brown pajamas. Of course, that meant that the entertainers could not blend in with their civilian audience. As soon as the teams were out of the Korean AO, they went back to black pajamas.

Campbell says of the teams says in his dedication:

Despite my entreaties to the US Information Agency they were all left behind to their fate…They had all been subsequently awarded our agency’s Group Superior Honor Award “For superior service to the JUSPAO program as drama teams operating in rural Vietnam under conditions of severe hardship and at great personal danger to their members.”

The JUSPAO PSYOP Guide also mentions Culture Drama teams:

This group, made up of all types of entertainers, provides culture drama shows for Vietnamese military primarily in the Capital Military District. Organic to each POLWAR Battalion in the four Corps is a culture Platoon which provides entertainment throughout the Corps area in the form of songs, dramas, dances and similar activities. In the remote areas, these platoons may provide the only source of entertainment for the people.

Monta L. Osborne was the Chief of Field Development Division in the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in Saigon. Here he mentions the Van Tac Vu in his diary entry of 13 January 1968:

Tomorrow I have to leave early for Tan Son Nhut, (the Saigon airport), leave for Nha Trang, attend a conference there, and leave Nha Trang after lunch for Saigon. One of our most interesting activities is the Van Tac Vu (Cultural Drama) teams. We have just produced a 30-minute film on their activities. This is a group of young people, men and women, all of whom possess artistic talents. They travel about the remote hamlets of Vietnam bringing entertainment to the people, and, along with entertainment, a PSYOP message. They take enormous risks for their meager salaries and some have been killed or wounded by the Viet Cong. The VC recognizes this as a program dangerous to them and they are trying to kill it off. Still, we get more volunteers than we can use. We have recently expanded from 13 to 20 teams. Now I am trying to get a draft exemption for the young men, because they are too valuable to lose to the armed forces. One of my branch chiefs handles the Van Tac Vu program.