OPERATION MOOLAH
THE PLOT TO STEAL A MIG-15

There are virtually hundreds of cases where warring nations have made cash offers to the enemy. Sometimes the money is for defections or weapons. Other times it is for aid to friendly personnel or to purchase loyalty to a friendly government.  We are going to discuss one of the most amazing of the reward campaigns, the attempt to steal a combat-ready Soviet MiG-15 Fighter for one hundred thousand dollars. This entire operation is a mystery. There is still a great deal of doubt about who first conceived the idea of stealing a Soviet Fighter plane. To make it even more interesting, there is some doubt as to whether anyone ever really expected to get an aircraft.

The previously classified report Guerrilla Operations 1952, published by the Headquarters, Guerrilla Division, Far East Command, Liaison Detachment, 8240th Army Unit, mentions the American desire for a MiG-15:

A complete MiG-15 is one of the highest priorities establish by the Air Force. The Air Force and Navy will offer support for any feasible project that will acquire a MiG-15. The MiG-15 technical orders are highly desirable. These are sometimes carried in the cockpit.

Why did the United States need to study a MiG-15? The Soviets designed the new fighter just after WWII. It was a high-altitude interceptor able to reach almost Mach 1, maneuverable at high altitude, armed with cannons, and had the ability to stay in the air for over 1 hour. The Soviets powered it with their copy of the British Rolls-Royce jet engine that had a higher thrust than the original. Its performance was superior to that of any Western fighter. The MiG-15 totally outclassed the American P-51 Mustangs, F-80 Shooting Stars, and the F-84 Thunder jets. The Americans had to wait until December 1950 for the arrival of the swept-wing F-86 Sabre-jet. Even then the MiG-15 climbed faster, and was every bit as maneuverable.  

We do not often think about what the entrance of the MiG-15 did to the UN forces early in the Korean War. The U.S. Army War College discusses this in an article titled “The Danger of Technological Surprise: Expect the Unexpected or Suffer the consequences.”

In late October of 1950, rumors of mysterious swept-wing jet aircraft reached United Nations Command in Korea. On November 1st, the MiG-15s attacked UN aircraft across the Yalu River. Their Soviet pilots blinded aerial intelligence-gathering along the Chinese border with North Korea, facilitating the passage of Chinese Communist armies. They would soon force the longest retreat of an American Army in history, after a massive onslaught, later that month. Within a year, Soviet MiGs drove B-29 and B-26 bombers of the U.S. Far East Air Forces out of the daytime skies. Meanwhile, America scrambled to get F-86 Sabres, its only aircraft capable of combatting the new foe, into theater as it cranked up production and reclaimed the 60 it had sold to Canada.

The MiG-15s’ capabilities shocked American leaders and the U.S. Air Force (USAF). No one thought the Soviet Union and its allies had the knowledge and skills to build such jets. American technical intelligence had failed. Congressional hearings cited captured German scientists and imported British jet engines as possible explanations for the quick Soviet advances in aeronautical engineering, but the result remained that the rest of the air war over Korea would be radically different than what had been expected, entailing greater challenges and much higher costs. 

The name of this mysterious plot is Operation Moolah, the Korean War effort to entice a Communist pilot to fly a MiG-15 fighter to an allied airfield for a reward of $100,000.

There are several versions of how this campaign came to be. A Saturday Evening Post article entitled "How to knock the Reds off balance" stated that the Russian Research Center at Harvard University conceived the plan. In the late 1950s, the Center rejected any question of it being involved in propaganda and a member of the staff told me "We are mainly a research organization publishing scholarly works."

Alan K. Abner has a completely different explanation in PSYWARRIORS – Psychological Warfare during the Korean War, Burd Street Press, Shippensburg, PA, 2001. Then Captain Abner was the Chief of the Psychological Warfare Branch of the United States Air Force Air Resupply Communications Service stationed at 2400 Newark Street, Washington DC during the Korean War. He says that intelligence reports indicated a degree of dissatisfaction in the Soviet Air Force. As a result, his strategic “think tank” put forth the plan to offer $10,000 for a Soviet MiG. He wanted the plan classified Top Secret and there would be no leaflets or radio broadcasts. The offer would be passed by rumor behind enemy lines so that the United States would have deniability and could state that it had no official knowledge of the offer. He states that he sent the plan to the Pentagon on a Monday, and he was shocked the following Saturday to see newspaper headlines reading, “General Mark Clark offers $100,000 Reward for Russian Jet.” Abner says that his crew was quite disappointed to have received no credit for the idea.

General Mark W. Clark, who was President Emeritus of the Military College of South Carolina (The Citadel) at the time I spoke to him in 1967, mentioned a second version of the origin of the operation. He recalled that a war correspondent hatched the plot sometime in 1952. He did not recall too much about the origin of the plan, and even told me “I do not recall the identity of the newsman who developed the idea. In fact, I don’t believe I ever knew who it was.” He said that during a night of heavy drinking the correspondent allegedly got to thinking about the mythical western hero, the Lone Ranger. This led him to consider the masked rider's silver bullets. The idea of silver bullets against North Korean, Chinese, or Russian troops then evolved into the idea of an offer of silver or cash that might cause a member of the enemy armed forces to defect with a desirable weapons system.

The correspondent wrote a fictional tale of an imaginary interview with a bogus United States Air Force general. This is where the concept of offering a reward for a combat-ready Russian MiG fighter first appeared. It was a gag, an attempt at humor. According to Clark, the U.S.A.F. staff in Tokyo liked the idea so much that they rewrote the offer and forwarded it to Washington D.C. By November of 1952, after several months of considering the idea, Washington approved the concept; the Pentagon made some minor changes, and authorized Clark to offer a reward for a North Korean Air Force jet fighter. The UN would offer political asylum and fifty thousand dollars to an enemy pilot in an attempt to get a late-model undamaged Soviet Fighter Plane. To sweeten the pot, an extra fifty thousand dollars would be given to the first pilot to take advantage of the offer.

General Clark was right about the war correspondent, but had either forgotten some of the background of this very interesting story or wanted to protect the writer's name. I interviewed him shortly after the war. I will now report on a third version of the story, from the man who actually gave birth to the idea of Operation Moolah.

Edward Hymoff was the Bureau Chief of the International News Service in Korea during the late stages of the war. He told me that during fall of 1952 he and General Clark were aboard a U.S.A.F. Constellation flying to Tokyo. They talked during the long flight and Hymoff mentioned his concept of offering $100,000 for a combat-ready MiG-15. The newsman recommended that the UN broadcast the offer in several languages. He also thought that the U.S. should offer asylum in the United States. Hymoff said "He (the defector) wouldn't have any worries the rest of his life, plus, he would be a rich man, tax free."

Hymoff did not take the idea seriously. It was just casual conversation. He speculated that Clark gave the idea to his Intelligence Section, who sent it to the Central Intelligence Agency. He told me that Clark later told him that the CIA recommended against the operation. Hymoff was not an admirer of the CIA and told General Clark to ignore anything they told him.

Dr. Charles H. Briscoe and Robert W. Jones, Jr. mention the campaign in “Operation Moolah,” Veritas, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2011

The UN Commander in Korea, General Mark W. Clark, made the first radio broadcast in English. The radio message was repeated in Russian, Chinese, and Korean and followed by air-dropped leaflets. A million MOOLAH leaflets were dropped on North Korean airfields before the end of April and another half million followed in May 1953.

The article compares the MiG-15 with the F-86 and notes that their speed is about the same, but the Sabre has double the range. They can reach about the same altitude but the MiG can climb a bit more quickly. The MiG was armed with three cannons and the Sabre had six machine-guns. The MiG could carry about 200 pounds in bombs while the Sabre could carry 5,300 pounds of bombs.

    

Soviet MiG 15

VS

U.S. F-86

	GENERAL
1	Crew	1
33 ft 2 in	Length	37 ft 1 in
33 ft 1 in	Wingspan	37 ft 0 in
12 ft 2 in	Height	14 ft 1 in
221.74 ft	Wing Area	313.4ft
7,900 lb	Empty Wt	11,125 lb
10,935 lb	Loaded Wt	15,198 lb
13,460 lb	Max. Takeoff Wt	18,152 lb
364 gallons	Fuel Capacity	437 gallons
1× Klimov VK-1, turbojet, 5,950 lbf	Powerplant	1× GE J47-GE-27, turbojet, 5,910 lbf
	PERFORMANCE
668 mph	Max. Speed	687 mph
520 mph	Cruise Speed	513 mph
745 mi	Range	1,525 mi
50,850 ft	Service Ceiling	49,600 ft
9,840 ft/min	Rate of Climb	9,000 ft
49.3 lb/ft	Wing Loading	49.4 lb/ft
0.54	Thrust/Wt	0.38

ARMAMENT

Guns:< 2x NR-23 23mm cannons (80 rds/gun) & 1x Nudelman N-37 37 mm cannon (40 rds).	Guns: 6 × 0.50 in (12.7 mm) M2 Browning machine guns (1,602 rounds/total).
Rockets Uunguided rockets on 2 underwing hardpoints.	Rockets: variety of rocket launchers; e.g: 2 × Matra rocket pods w/ 18× SNEB 68 mm rockets ea.
Bombs: 2x 100 kg (220 lb) bombs, drop tanks	Bombs: 5,300 lb (2,400 kg) / payload on four external hardpoints.

(Photos and chart courtesy Veritas magazine)

Regardless of which of the three scenarios is correct, we do know that Operation Moolah (GI slang for money) was ready by April of 1953. On 1 April, the U.N. Joint Psychological Warfare committee approved Operation Moolah. The data sheets of the Headquarters, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, 8239 AU, APO 500, are all dated 20 April 1953. The United Nations Command would offer $50,000 to any pilot who flew his MiG-15 to the south. It offered an additional $50,000 to the first pilot who took advantage of this offer. The campaign used both radio and aerial leaflets in the Russian, Chinese, and Korean languages. It was believed at the time, and later proven, that all three countries provided pilots for the air war over North Korea. Each of the three countries (The U.S.S.R., China, and North Korea) operated their own air force units as if they were fighting against their enemies. No pilot served in another country's air force unit. All the MiG-15s, however, were marked with North Korean insignia (A red star inside red and blue circles).

Russian Language Blue Leaflet (Front) Leaflet Code # 5701

It is interesting to note that a photograph of this leaflet was released by the New York Bureau of the United Press on 2 May 1953 to newspapers using that service. Some of the caption with the picture is:

Reds to get Green for MiGs

Tokyo: This is one of the leaflets, written in Chinese, Korean and Russian and addressed to “Courageous jet pilots,” which offers a $100,000 reward and freedom to the first Communist pilot who delivers a Soviet-built MiG-15 jet fighter to the Allies…The dramatic offer which also applies to “other Russian-built jet combat types,” was made not only to obtain a new MiG, but to prey on the morale of the Communist Air Force, whose pilots must now watch each other as well as fight. Clark’s statement was broadcast to North Korea and Communist China and the leaflets were dropped over the Yalu River to flutter onto the Communist air bases just across the boundary.

Russian Language Tan Leaflet (Front) Leaflet Code # 5703

Chinese Language Blue Leaflet (Front) Code # 5502

Korean Language Blue Leaflet (Front) Code # 2508

Korean Language Tan Leaflet (Front) Code # 2510

There are slight variations in the wording of the leaflets, depending on which of the opposing forces is the target. The code number of the Russian-language leaflet is 5701 or 5703, The Chinese leaflet 5502, and the Korean leaflet 2508 or 2510. This probably means that there is a Chinese-language tan leaflet coded 5504. All the leaflets have the same general appearance. They are on a blue or tan-tinted paper and are about 8 x 10 inches in size.

Private Charles R. Gaush doing Color Correction on a Leaflet Negative

U.S. Army Private Charles R. Gaush was a photo lithographer assigned to the 3rd Reproduction Company, 8239th Army Unit, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group. He was deployed to Japan in early 1953 from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. He told me:

The Omiya Printing Plant

We got the leaflet “copy” from Headquarters in Tokyo, printed it at our Omiya printing plant; a former Japanese optical shop. The leaflets were then sent to Tachikawa Air Base. The “MIG” leaflets were loaded into leaflet bombs (We didn't call it the Moolah leaflet at the time because the operation was secret). They would be stored and then suddenly shipped out in the middle of the night. The Air Force would wait for a strong wind blowing north into China. The bombs were loaded in the B-29s which flew at maximum altitude exactly over the Yalu River where they were dropped. Our intelligence said they were found some 200 miles up into China. We printed many 4 x 5-inch leaflets; but mostly we did 5.5 x 8.5-inch which is exactly 1/8th of a 17 x 22-inch press sheet which our four Harris LTV presses printed. We also printed some 8 x 10-inch newspapers.

VICTORY THROUGH INFLUENCE

In 2022, about 20 years after I wrote this article, Dr. Jared M. Tracy, Deputy Command Historian for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command wrote a book titled VICTORY THROUGH INFLUENCE, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas, that discussed the history of Psychological Operations in WWI, WWII, and the Korean War. The book mentions the printing of the Operation Moolah leaflets:

On 27 April, the 1st RB&L Group launched a major new campaign called Plan Moolah, bolstered by radio broadcasts and the "$100,000 leaflet," in Korean, Russian, and Chinese. General Clark offered $50,000 to any enemy pilot who turned in his "modern, complete, combat-type jet aircraft in flyable condition to United Nations forces,” and a $50,000 bonus to the first person to do so. The plan had two advantages. First, it might take enemy planes out of the fight and into United Nations possession. Second, if that did not happen at least it would “foster mistrust and non-confidence in the ranks of Communist pilots." The 3rd Reproduction company printed 1.2 million leaflets for Clark’s "MiG offer" by 22 April. The 1st RB&L Group later reported that Moolah had a profound psychological effect. As evidence, it claimed that the enemy had grounded MiGs for eight days after Moolah commenced and had flown 21% fewer sorties from May to June than it had 60 days prior to the launch of the plan. 

The Russian language leaflet 5703 and the Korean language 2510 are both on Tan paper. This implies there is a sixth Chinese language tan colored leaflet. Charles R. Gaush explained that he had helped produce what he called the “tan” leaflets. He suspected that the objective of the tan leaflet was to get a more advanced version of the MIG. He told me:

The number MIG-17 keeps running through my mind but I'm not sure which version they were after. This project was classified as Secret and I recall we were not allowed to talk to anyone about it. The leaflet was made from a 16 x 20 charcoal drawing done at Headquarters and this was combined with the text in three languages. It was printed as a tan/black duotone. The tan leaflets were printed late in the war and before they could be disseminated the armistice was signed. Since they could not be used they were all burnt - some 900,000 eight by ten leaflets. Their destruction took several days.

[Author’s note] I thought that the vague memory that the second leaflet might have asked for a MiG-17 to be unlikely because at that time the most advanced Soviet fighter was the MiG-15. The MiG-17 had just been developed and the Soviets would not have given them to North Korean pilots. MiG-17s saw combat for the first time over the Straits of Taiwan when the People’s Republic of China clashed with Republic of China F-86 Sabres in 1958. Retired Republic of Korea Major Jae Hyon Kim perused the leaflet and found no mention of the MiG-17 so we assume that the message was very close to the same message as found on the blue leaflets.

The front of each leaflet consists of a letter signed by General Clark on the stationery of the Far East Command.  The text is:

Headquarters
Far East Command
APO 500

20 April 1953 

To:  Brave Pilots of Jet Aircraft
Subject: A Road to Freedom

Pilots! The Far East Command offers its help to all brave pilots who wish to free themselves from the vicious whip of the Communist regime and start a new and better life, with proper honor in the Free World.

The Far East Command offers you refuge, protection, human care and attention. You are given full guarantee that your names will remain secret if you so desire. Pilots! Your brave move will bring you to freedom and will give you opportunity to live in the future without fear for your well-being. Besides that, your heroism and decision will help others by pointing to them the road to freedom.

The Far East Command will reward $50,000 United States dollars to any pilot who delivers a modern, operational, combat-type jet aircraft in flyable condition to South Korea. The first pilot who delivers such a jet aircraft to the Free World will receive a bonus of an additional 50,000 US dollars for his bravery.

Following is a list of instructions to all pilots who desire to free themselves from the Communist yoke.  Escapee pilots will fly to Paengyong-do Island, fifty (50) kilometers south of Chodo Island. From Paengyong-do escapee pilots will proceed to Kimpo Air Base at 6100 meters altitude, descend over Kimpo Air Base, and proceed to make an immediate landing. UN Aircraft will accompany escapee remaining always above and behind, unless low clouds or visibility prevent escapee from locating Kimpo Airbase. If escapee is unable to make a visual let-down,  he will proceed to the Seoul area at 6100 meters and circle with his gear down. A United States aircraft will then fly close abreast and lead the way to the landing field. Upon initial contact with UN Aircraft, or if at any time UN Aircraft attempts attack, escapee will immediately lower landing gear and rock wings violently.

The Free World shall welcome you as an old friend as well as a hero.

Mark W. Clark
General, United States Army Commander-in-Chief
Far East Command

The leaflet instructions were later critiqued by the defecting North Korean pilot. He said:

During the last 90 days of the war, MiGs seldom flew to North Korea. Chodo is 100 km (62 miles) southwest of Pyongyang in the Yellow Sea. To fly to Chodo would be all but fatal at that time. Moreover, flying from Chodo to Paengyong-do, 50 km (31 miles) over the sea does not make any sense. Nobody had ever heard of Paengyong-do in the Yellow Sea. Finally, proceed from Paengyong-do to Kimpo, 200 km (124 miles) at 6100 meter (20,000 feet) altitude. Any MiG following the above flight path for defection would have been an easy prey for the Sabre jets. The USAF had not instructed F-86 pilots with escorting procedures for defecting MiGs. They were unaware of the Operation Moolah. Might I have defected then if I had seen the leaflet? Absolutely not. Flying safely to reach Pyongyang from China in 1953 was impossible. To reach Chodo out in the Yellow Sea without being shot down in 1953 was unthinkable. I would have never followed the leaflet’s instructions. I would have done exactly what I did disregarding the escape flight route in the leaflet. I Waited until after the armistice and took off from a North Korean airbase close to the DMZ. It was the wisest decision in my life. As it turned out, my escape plan, including the timing, was carried out perfectly. Subsequently, I have fulfilled my lifetime goal of coming to America.

Russian Language Leaflet (Back) Code # 5701

Chinese Language Leaflet (Back) Code # 5502

   

Korean Language Leaflet (Back) Code # 2508

Korean Language Leaflet (Back) Code # 2510

The back of the leaflet depicts a MiG-15 and the text, slightly changed on each version:

Courageous Pilots! If you like freedom...If you have courage...If you want to live a better, honorable life.... This is your opportunity of once in a thousand years! Free yourself from the Communist tyranny! Fly your jet toward the free world.

Courageous pilots! The Far East Command U.S. forces offers its help to all brave pilots who wish to free themselves from the Communist yoke and start a new and better life with proper honor in the free world.

General Mark W. Clark, Commander in Chief, Far East Command guarantees you refuge, protection, humane care, and attention. You have our full guarantee that your name will remain a secret if you so desire. The Far East Command will reward with the sum of $50,000 US dollars any pilot who delivers a modern, operational, combat-type jet aircraft in flyable condition to South Korea. The first pilot who delivers such a jet aircraft to the free world will receive an additional $50,000 US dollars bonus for his bravery.

There is a letter explaining directions to you on the other side of this leaflet. After reading the instructions, fly to freedom.

There is also a photograph of a Polish Lieutenant Frank Jarecki who defected earlier. He first lived in the United Kingdom, later moved to Erie, PA. The text is:

This is a picture of a Polish Air Force Lieutenant who, piloting a Soviet-made MiG-15 jet, escaped from the iron curtain and landed safely on the Danish island of Bornholm. He received political asylum and is now living comfortably in England.

This is an excellent propaganda message since it proves to the reader that it is possible to defect with safety.Curiously, The CIA man who looked after him when he first came to the United States later became the mentor of the North Korean pilot.

The Chinese and Korean language versions of the leaflet have an additional short message:

This is a message from the Americans to any jet pilot who reads Russian. If you know such a person, please give it to him. It tells him how to escape to the UN Forces.

The leaflet for Chinese pilots is identical, except that there is an additional request in the Korean language that asks the finder to hand the leaflet to a pilot that can read Chinese.

Two B-29 Super-Fortresses dropped more than one million of the reward leaflets along the Yalu River on the night of 26 April 1953. The Air Force dropped another half-million leaflets over Sinuiju and Uiju airfields on the nights of 10 and 18 May. At the same time, The United Nations beamed a concentrated radio attack at the Communists all along the "Bamboo Curtain." Fourteen radio stations in Japan and Korea stated in Korean, Russian, Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese that the United Nations would pay $50,000 dollars for a MiG and guarantee protection for the pilot. The pilot who we will mention later that actually flew his MiG-15 south told me:

When the two B-29s dropped those million Moolah leaflets along the Yalu River, my MiG-15 Squadron was stationed in Tunghua Air Base, about 50 miles north of Manpo on the Yalu River. The Americans dropped no leaflets there and we had no radio. I do not believe any North Korean pilots saw the leaflet. Our unit had returned to the Dandong airbase in early July 1953. All the MiG-15s flew to combat from China most of the time. My squadron was the only one stationed in Uiju airbase in November-December 1951. After repeated B-29 raids, we moved to Dandong airbase in Manchuria. In the summer of 1952, we stayed in Uiju a few days at a time.

If a North Korean pilot had read one of the leaflets, the money offer would have meant little. No one could have trusted the authenticity of the offer, and North Koreans knew nothing about the purchasing power of the dollar. Operation Moolah may have overlooked the most important point: the defecting pilot had to be an anti-Communist who wanted political asylum in the United States, Therefore, a statement in the leaflet of guaranteeing freedom and a job in America after defection would have been more effective.

We should note that at the time the air base was called “Antung,” but like the change in name from “Peking” to “Beijing,” the Chinese have since changed the name of the base to Dandong. Researchers wanting to learn more about the Soviet Air Force during the Korean War should search under both names.

While all this was going on, it seems that there was little hope on the part of the allies that the plan would work. According to Time Magazine, dated 11 May 1953, General Clark's Psychological Warfare Chief stated, "I have absolutely no expectation of seeing a single MiG." Stephen E. Pease comments on the unpopularity of the plan in Psywar - Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953, Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, PA. 1992. He adds, "President Eisenhower was not in favor of Operation Moolah, He thought it was unethical to offer money to a defector; he should defect for ideological reasons."

The defecting pilot agreed. He said,

He is absolutely correct!   In addition, the determined defector must prepare to die if it fails I certainly did. It is a life and death gamble with 80% chance of failure. Picking up an enemy leaflet and reading it is a capital crime and punishable by death in North Korea. We had a radio in our barracks in 1952. The dial was firmly set at official N. Korean Radio Station in Pyongyang. Nobody could touch the radio dial. It was forbidden.

A brief word here about Eisenhower’s thought. An author by the name of Blaine Harden wrote an article entitled “America’s $100,000 Deal with a North Korean Defector And how it went awry” for Politico Magazine, 17 March 2015. What he said about the operation was much like what I said here, but there is a lot of interesting comments about President Eisenhower’s annoyance at it all. The author says in part:

Dwight D. Eisenhower had run for president in 1952 in part on the promise to end the Korean War. He did not want the fighter jet and worried that its theft might undermine the fragile armistice…Eisenhower hated the notion of paying off a “Commie thief.” He and his administration secretly tried to renege on paying the reward. He also wanted to make sure that the North Korean pilot, whose name Eisenhower had yet to learn, would not blow the $100,000 on booze and broads. Better yet, he wanted to find a way to pressure the pilot to turn down the moolah altogether. Two days after No landed the MiG at Kimpo, Eisenhower told his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, to pay the reward “under some sort of trusteeship.” Then Dulles received a telephone call from Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, who was worried that the Eisenhower administration would be “in trouble” if it did not pay the reward.

More than eight months after he stole the MiG—No finally learned what the Eisenhower administration was going to do with his moolah. A bank vice president laid it out for him in the main office of Riggs National Bank on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington. If No would sign the papers on the table in front of him, the banker said, then $100,000, tax-free, would be deposited in his name. There were a number of conditions. The money would go into a trust, and No would not have access to the principal, because the government worried he might spend it too fast and too frivolously. He would receive a onetime payment of $5,000 to help get him started in a new life, cover his housing and pay school fees at the Newark campus of the University of Delaware. He would receive a monthly stipend of $250. No did not understand what a trust fund was…He refused to sign. After two days, No was persuaded that the trust fund was not a trick, and he walked back to the bank. No signed the papers.

This is an interesting story. Eisenhower clearly did not want the MiG and did not want to pay the reward. The CIA and the Air Force wanted the MiG and wanted the world to know that America was honorable and would pay what it promised. Everyone met in the middle. No would get his money but parceled out slowly and painfully, and the United States Air Force could test the MiG and the CIA could tell other contacts that “Our word is our bond.” Back to our story.

At the same time, our allies and our enemies criticized this operation as being against all the "civilized" rules of warfare. In Great Britain's House of Lords, a Labor Peer stated that the attempted bribe was "Dastardly." Prime Minister Churchill thought that although the plan was within the rules of war, the timing was bad. The London Catholic Herald called the offer a "Deplorable Business." while the Catholic Times of London stated that the "Almighty dollar is doing an ill service to humanity when it attempts to buy the souls of men. The London Tablet called the plan "not so much a crime as a blunder."

The United States government tolerated the criticism without answering in kind. Had it wanted to embarrass the British, it might have mentioned that during the Communist rebellion in Malaya they had offered cash for the bodies of Communists "Dead or Alive." One leaflet dropped over the jungle by the Royal Air Force offered thirty thousand dollars for the body of the Secretary General of the Central Executive Committee.

Winston Churchill was correct in questioning the timeliness of the offer, since peace talks were going on at the time of Operation Moolah. However, General Clark pointed out that the exact moment to launch the campaign was selected with great care. Korean President Syngman Rhee was being difficult at the time, with his own ideas about how the talks should be carried on and what concessions, if any, should be granted. There was a possibility that the North Koreans might try to take advantage of the dispute among the allies. Therefore, General Clark chose to give them something to "Chew on." The United Nations made the reward offer on the very day that armistice talks resumed in April, toward the end of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners in Operation "Little Switch."

Why did we really make the offer?  We already know that Clark wanted to give the Communists something to worry about while he worked out his differences with President Rhee. Is it possible that the propagandists had another motive? Time Magazine of 11 May 1953 stated “At best, the offer was designed to sow tension and mistrust among the Red flyers…there was even the possibility that, to prevent defection, the Reds might ration fuel, thus limiting the time that the MiGs can stay in the air to patrol and fight.”

 

MiG-15                                                             F86 Sabre-Jet

The MiGs had been elusive in 1953 and it was difficult to get them to come up and challenge the F-86 Sabre-Jets of the U.S.A.F. Up until the time of the Moolah offer, dogfights were fairly sporadic.  The Communists pilots usually knew their business, and if things appeared to be going badly, they would scamper toward the protection of the Yalu River.

This all changed drastically after Operation Moolah. Could the sudden aggressiveness on the part of the Red pilots be due in part to the reward offer?  Although the Air Force wanted a MiG, could it be that this was not the primary purpose of the offer? Did we hope to cause a "loss of Face" by the Red pilots, as well as a purge of unreliable elements?   If the Communist Party leadership feared defections, they might ground experienced but "politically unreliable" pilots.  The result would be that only loyal Communist Party members would take to the air, regardless of their expertise. The Russians were certainly worried. They immediately jammed broadcasts in their language, although they allowed the Korean and Chinese broadcasts to pierce the Bamboo Curtain. They also grounded all their pilots to assure that no defection would occur.

What was the result of the Moolah operation? The Reds grounded their air force for eight days. It might have been weather, or it might have been time needed to weed out the pilots who were liable to defect. Whatever the reason for the halt, there is no doubt that with the return of the MiGs, a new breed of pilot was behind the stick. The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953 says, “They were willing to engage in combat, but they had far more enthusiasm than ability.” These were the most aggressive, and by their record, the worst flyers of the entire war. In the ninety days following the Moolah broadcasts, The Allied air forces destroyed 165 MiGs at a cost of just three friendly aircraft. Young politically correct pilots flying MiG-15s attacked repeatedly only to fall in flames before the thundering guns of American F-86 Sabre Jets. A fantastic ratio of 55:1 in favor of the Fighter aircraft of the United Nations. The Air Force has compared these aerial battles to the "Marianas Turkey Shoot" of World War Two fame where the back of Japanese naval airpower was broken. Although we shall probably never know for sure, there can be little doubt that during those brief ninety days our enemy were young Communist Party members with more political reliability than flying ability.

The Communist Chinese knew the F86 Sabre well

Here is one of their spotter cards, a 5.1 x 7.4 inches a two-sided leaflet printed on glossy paper. The back gives all the information and statistics on the American jet fighter in Chinese. Of course, the Americans had similar aircraft recognition cards, but in the form of playing cards.

A second explanation for the loss of so many enemy aircraft could be the change in Allied strategy. The F-86s had virtually besieged the MiG airfields near the Yalu River in China in the last 90 days of the war. Many of the 165 MiGs were shot down while taking off and landing. Typically, the MiGs took off and dropped the wing tanks immediately to pick up the speed and engaged in dogfight at low altitude at full throttle. The MiG can fly less than 30 minutes in that kind of flight condition.

The British humor Magazine Punch parodied the idea of a North Korean defector in a cartoon. Two Communist officers inspect the barracks of a fighter squadron.  There is a line of bunks, each with a framed picture of Mao Tse-tung hanging overheard.  One bunk, however, had a large photograph of Marilyn Monroe.  Nearby we see a leaflet stating "UN offers $100,000 for MiG."  One of the inspecting officers turns to the other and says, "It's okay Tovarisch.  He's been grounded."

Photo of the Actual MiG-15 Flown to South Korea

Did we ever get a MiG? The answer is yes, but the pilot claimed to have never heard of the offer. On 21 September 1953, a MiG-15BIS appeared over South Korean air space.  Nobody saw the MiG-15 approaching Kimpo airbase against the flight pattern from north until after it had touched down on the runway. The defecting pilot “wagged” his wings and fired four colored flares, red, yellow, green and white, to indicate that he was friendly, in distress, and intended to land. The air base was ringed with anti-aircraft guns and he wanted to be sure that there was no mistake or thought that he was attacking the field. The Kimpo airbase radar was out for overhaul on that day. The MiG pilot spotted a half dozen F-86s on practice flights in the Kimpo's southeastern sky at slow speed but the American pilots failed to notice the MiG coming down for landing. An F-86 was landing at the same time at the other end of the runway and the two fighters passed at high speed barely avoiding a head-on collision. Five months had passed since the dropping of the "Moolah" leaflets, and not a single defecting aircraft had been delivered.  The offer had all but been forgotten, and President Eisenhower later stated that he had thought the operation cancelled after the signing of the truce in Korea. There is some doubt that the American pilots were even informed of the Moolah offer. As the North Korean pilot taxied in front of the F-86s on alert at alert pad, one pilot said that he had very nearly pulled the machine-gun trigger to destroy the MiG-15 preparing to park in front of his fighter. If he had seen the MiG-15 in the air, he would have surely shot it down. There were only Americans on the ground when the MiG pilot got out of his aircraft. There were no Korean pilots to translate for him. All the Americans could do was shake his hand and welcome the young defector.

The canopy opened, and from the plane stepped a cocky young lieutenant in a blue flying suit.   While the American pilots watched in open-mouthed wonder, the Red pilot tore up a photograph of North Korean dictator Kim Il-sung, and handed his pistol to a nearby F-86 pilot in a jeep on the way to the 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing Headquarters. Early reports were that he had torn up a picture of his girlfriend, but North Korean pilots were forbidden girlfriends during the war. They were warned that many girls were South Korean spies.

I know where the story of his girlfriend came from. Airman 2nd Class Joe Duncan was an F-86 flight line mechanic assigned to the 334th Fighter Interceptor Wing at Kimpo Air Force Base (K-14) from December 1952 to December 1953. He told me:

I was on the alert pad the day the MiG landed. The pilot split two F-86’s taking off (leader & wingman), one went west and east. The MiG landed & taxied to the alert pad scaring the hell out of us. The pilot on his way down from the cockpit, stopped, reached into the cockpit and came down with something in his hand, crunched it up and threw it on the ground. I picked it up to offer it back to him. He refused the photo of a young lady. When security arrived I turned the Photo over to them. As I recall there was only 3 of us airman at the alert pad initially, along with our weapons-carrier type vehicle.

I asked the pilot about this but he said that the airman was mistaken. He repeated:

No, the picture I smashed on the ground was a picture of Kim Il-sung in a small frame. His picture was in the instrument panel of every North Korean plane. No intelligent person would have thrown a girl's picture on the ground after such a fateful flight to freedom. Besides, no North Korean fighter pilot was allowed to have a girlfriend during the war. I have been asked about that picture of a girl for 60 years and now I know where the story started.

Lieutenant No visits the home of the Okinawa B-29 bomber Wing Commander
Colonel Schweitzer took the photo of No with his children and wife in October 1953

Back to the landing - After a few moments of shock, the defector was rushed to intelligence while his MiG Fighter was placed in a well-guarded hangar.The North Korean Lieutenant, No Kum-Sok, explained his motives to the officers assigned to interrogate him.  He had been brought up in a Christian atmosphere and educated in a Catholic Mission School.  Although he had learned to shout Communist slogans and profess loyalty to the Party, he had always carried within himself the pro-western thoughts and ideals instilled during his early schooling.Many of the Russian soldiers that he had met had deepened his convictions.As a youth, they had come to his house and demanded wine at the point of a bayonet.  As the years passed, Lt. No often saw the Russian troops reeling through the streets in drunken stupor.He later stated that the average Russian infantryman was an “illiterate peasant who supplemented his small pay by looting our homes.” As a child, Rowe dreamt of becoming an American citizen. When he was accepted by the North Korean Naval Academy at age 17, He was the youngest in the academy and also the youngest North Korean jet pilot who flew in the Korean War. The day he entered the Academy he began plotting an escape to freedom.

In his biography, A MiG-15 to Freedom, McFarland & Company, North Carolina and London, 1996, Lieutenant No tells how he convinced the Communists of his loyalty.

I was twice decorated, with the Red Flag Medal (similar to the American “Silver Star”) and Gold Medal (similar to the American Distinguished Service Medal, given for flying 50 combat missions). I was considered an enthusiastic and inspiring young Communist…I was vice chairman of my Second Battalion Communist party, squadron commander of four jet fighters, and the only pilot in my division whose MiG bore the treasured Youth Organization Seal…All that time I was living a gigantic lie…I shouted red slogans, berated true Communists for “not hating the enemy enough,” and practiced Marxist antics with more apparent zeal than my comrades.

I was the youngest Communist jet fighter pilot of the war, entering battle at the age of 19 in 1951. I believe I was younger than any American jet pilot in that war.

I spoke up against American “imperialism” during air force meetings, some with the entire division of 3000 people. I became the designated officer called upon publicly to read statements from Kim il-Sung and Stalin…I was expected to make frequent denunciations, and I played the role to the hilt, even though it turned my stomach. Not even rank stood in the way of a skillful denouncer. I once denounced our chief of staff….

He entered the North Korean Naval Academy for the purpose of receiving a free college education. He secretly planned to defect from North Korea and Kim Il-Sung's navy at the first opportunity. When the Korean War broke out, he was one of 80 North Korean Naval Academy cadets who passed a rigorous physical examination and were transferred to the North Korean Air Force. Along with the other cadets, he was trained by the Soviet Air Force in Manchuria, and became one of the first generation of North Korean jet fighter pilots.

Retired USAF Colonel John Lowery mentions the North Korean Academy in an article entitled “Lt. No,” Airforce-Magazine.com, July 2012:

Discipline at the academy was severe. Cadets had no days or weekends off, no chance to leave the base, no vacations, and no visitors until graduation. Beards and mustaches were forbidden, and cadets were instructed to shave daily—but not provided razors. Their solution was to pull out the whiskers with their fingernails.

Classes in calculus, physics, chemistry, meteorology, navigation, communist history, gymnastics, calisthenics, even infantry training and marching for military parades, were held seven hours a day, seven days a week. The cadets were allowed only two hours each day for study and about four hours per night to sleep.

Once the war started, their day-to-day life became even tougher. The 150 cadets in No’s class were moved 60 miles north and housed in a newly constructed railroad tunnel that had not yet been equipped with rails. The floor was muddy and the air dank. There he and his classmates lived, taking infantry training and enduring endless political meetings that denounced American aggression.

When the Korean War broke out, he was one of 80 North Korean Naval Academy cadets who passed a rigorous physical examination and were transferred to the North Korean Air Force. Along with the other cadets, he was trained by the Soviet Air Force in Manchuria, and became one of the first generation of North Korean jet fighter pilots. Lowery continues:

Lieutenant No and his classmates completed their MiG-15 training in September 1951. Life as a North Korean fighter pilot was severe. He and his classmates were never given a furlough or overnight pass—or even a full day off the air base. They were not allowed to drink alcohol in public. Although the young pilots were all single, dating women was forbidden. They were warned that many young Korean girls were South Korean agents.

When the North Korean Naval Academy selected Lt. No for pilot training, graduating from flight school became his first priority. He knew that being a pilot would increase his opportunities to defect. His MiG-15 squadron was the first North Korean MiG-15 unit thrown into aerial combat from Uiju Airfield in North Korea in early Nov. 1951. After repeated B-29 night raids on the field, including strafing by F-86 fighters, all the MiG-15s relocated to Dandong airbase in Manchuria. Lt. No’s fighter squadron was stationed in Dandong airbase most of the time until the war ended on 27 July 1953. He flew over one hundred combat missions against F-86 Sabrejets from 1951 to 1953. During that time, he had several near-misses with death, but survived the war without being shot down and having ever shot down any plane.

 

Lieutenant No in his Flight Suit

North Korean pilot No Kum-Sok at the Kimpo Air Base near Seoul after flying a
MiG-15 across the border in September 1953.
(Joe Scherschel/The LIFE Picture Collection/Shutterstock)

Lieutenant No it what appears to be borrowed
"fatigues" on his way to his first news
conference in Seoul on 22 September 1953.

After years of thought on the matter, No Kum-Sok decided that his only chance for a free and honorable life was through defection to South Korea. He had, therefore, waited until the bombed-out airfield at Pyongyang had been reopened by the Communists. He told me about that hectic time in a recent conversation:

The Korean War Armistice went into effect at 2200 on 27 July 1953. My squadron was at Antung Air Base on that morning.  We knew the day would be the last day of the shooting war.   At late morning, two F-86s Sabres appeared above the base looking for a dogfight but there were no MiGs in the air. The planes dived down and Buzzed a few feet above the runway at sonic velocity. It was quite menacing with the sonic boom and the two planes sharply pulling up for near vertical climb with continuous roll-overs.

Most North Korean MiG pilots departed for North Korea by truck that evening. About six pilots missed the departing truck. I was one of them.  We got on an old barge at the Manchurian side of the Yalu River and started to cross at night.  It was very unpleasant, cool and misty.  About the middle of the river, the ship got stuck on a shallow sandbar at low tide, so we spend the night on the roofless barge in a constant cold drizzle. I was tired and was very uncomfortable. The pilots on the barge were jolly and jubilant for surviving the war. Was I happy too? The answer is “yes” and “no.” Yes, I was happy for surviving the war.   But, no, because I had an unfinished personal mission to accomplish; escaping to South Korea. 

National Museum of the United States Air Force Display