COMBINED TASK FORCE (CTF)
LIBERIA PSYOP

LTC Thomas W. Collins wrote about the U. S. Army’s response to that humanitarian disaster in an article entitled "Joint Efforts Prevent Humanitarian Disaster in Liberia," Army Magazine, February 2004 says:

In July 2003, the two main Liberian rebel groups launched an all-out offensive to remove Charles Taylor as the president of Liberia. The fighting between rebel and government forces was often marked by roving bands of armed, drugged-up young men shooting indiscriminately and robbing defenseless civilians. Both sides employed thousands of child soldiers. Close quarters urban combat killed over a thousand civilians in the July fighting alone.

In July 2003, following a cease-fire, the U. S. Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF) was directed to establish a joint task force (JTF) and provide support to military forces of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as it led peace support operations in Monrovia, Liberia. ECOWAS, Britain and France asked the United States to lead a peace-keeping operation designed to separate and disarm the warring factions and establish an environment where a transitional government could take control of the country. ECOWAS pledged 3,000 troops for an intervention force and asked the United States to pledge 2,000 troops in this effort. President Bush agreed. JTF Liberia’s was assigned the task of helping to prevent a humanitarian disaster and create a secure environment for humanitarian organizations to resume operations in Liberia.

JTF Liberia began deploying forces to Africa in late July. At its apex, JTF Liberia consisted of over 5,000 service members from the SETAF headquarters, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, the three-ship Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group, 3rd Air Force’s 398th Air Expeditionary Group, U. S. Army Europe’s 21st Theater Support Command, and the Army’s 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). On August 4, the JTF deployed a 45-member forward headquarters to the USS Iwo Jima positioned off the coast of Liberia. The U.S. promised to commit troops to Liberia after President Charles Taylor stepped down from power and left the country. Taylor went into exile in Nigeria on August 11. Within minutes, U.S. warships were visible from Monrovia's port.

Leaflet LBM3aD02 – U. S. Forces are near

The 6th PSYOP Battalion (6 POB) deployed a five-man PSYOP Support Element (PSE) to Vicenza, Italy. These elements enable tactical commanders to communicate directly with the enemy and foreign civilians. At the same time, the Product Development Center (PDC) was making and sending PSYOP products via "Reachback." The product (or psychological) Development Center, is normally the regional PSYOP unit that designs information products and programs and makes recommendations on psychological actions in support of military and national objectives. Reachback is a term used for the ability to exploit resources, capabilities, and expertise not physically located in the theater or joint operations area. In the case of JTF Liberia, the leaflets were prepared at Ft. Bragg, and then forwarded via Siprnet to Vicenza. Siprnet is the secret Internet protocol router network. In plain English, Siprnet is a private classified network that is physically separated from the Internet. The leaflets were reviewed in Vicenza and then sent to the U. S. Embassy for approval and the Iwo Jima for printing by the Navy. This was a quite complicated procedure as the PSYOP had to be coordinated and approved by the U. S. Army European Command, the Iwo Jima, the U. S. Ambassador and Monrovia. The 6th PSYOP Battalion was assigned two loudspeaker team attachments, which were deployed to the Iwo Jima. There performed some missions on the ground in Liberia, and were critical in helping the U. S. Navy print the PSYOP products aboard ship. The major in charge of the PSYOP element went to the U. S. Embassy where he eventually became a key advisor to the U. S. Ambassador. The PSYOP element redeployed after a few weeks, but the Major at the embassy stayed in-country for another two months.

Specialist Heidi Cardona of the 6th PSYOP Battalion was a MOS 25M multimedia illustrator member of the 5-person PSYOP team led by Major Garcia in Longare, Italy, that prepared and printed the Liberia leaflets and posters. Once the project was well underway she went forward with the team to Monrovia, Liberia where they worked hand in hand with both the Marines and the U.S. Embassy. She says in regard to the operation:

In doing the products, I based my designs on what the PSYOP troops envisioned. They told me the kind of images they wanted and I put their basic concepts on paper. It was a team effort. We put the products together with their concepts and my design skills.  

We were there as peacekeepers. We were there to tell them to “play nice and to get along.” It was proven by the end of the war that the messages we gave them helped. We gave them good visual images and basic, simple words for them to understand their situation and the consequences of their actions.

The most difficult aspect of the operation for us was that when we started out we weren't on location. We were in a different time zone so it was difficult to get an immediate response from the U.S. Embassy and to learn the reactions of the local people. 

Billboard

Towards the end of our mission, we ended up erecting billboards so that everyone could see how the U.S. and the U.N. were just in Liberia to help. I think it was a successful mission. They now have a new president and things seem to be getting better.

Liberian Citizen with PSYOP Leaflet

Many of the leaflets held out a carrot and a stick. On one side they showed massive food stocks ready to be issued to the people, on the other side they would show armed troops, military vehicles or aircraft. The 25 July photograph above depicts a displaced Liberian man reading a leaflet informing Monrovians that U.S. Marines are authorized to use deadly force to protect the embassy. The leaflets were distributed by U. S. troops guarding the American embassy in Liberia's capital. The embassy was heavily guarded and fenced in by razor wire since a series of mortar attacks on the capital. The leaflets bore an image of an armed U. S. soldier against a Stars and Stripes background. Some of the text is:

U. S. Troops are authorized to use deadly force, if necessary, to carry out their mission. To avoid an incident, keep away from the embassy compound. When in the vicinity of the embassy, make no sudden movements or threatening gestures. U. S. Troops are authorized to use deadly force.

LTC Collins adds:

In addition to facilitating logistical support, the JTF played a central role in information operations. Contending with reams of information, periodic outbreaks of fighting in the countryside, rumors and misinformation, the JTF had to aggressively conduct information operations or risk the mission unraveling. The information operations working group, located at the JTF main headquarters, developed plans and information products for the JTF forward staff to coordinate through the country team. These products included public service announcements, radio broadcasts, leaflets and newspaper advertisements. These products were critical to gaining public support as well as shaping the environment for the arrival of U.N. forces.

Leaflet LBM5aD01 – U. S. Forces continue to monitor…

Conclusion

LTC Collins concludes:

During JTF Liberia’s two-month deployment to Liberia, a peace agreement was implemented; forces of the warring factions were separated; air and seaports were reopened; and the United Nations and private humanitarian organizations resumed delivery of badly needed relief. With a humanitarian catastrophe averted and the arrival of United Nations peace-keeping forces on October 1, the mission of JTF Liberia was accomplished. An unqualified success, this mission serves as a highly successful model for future support and stability operations.