U.S. ARMY PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH (PWB)
LEAFLETS FOR THE PACIFIC WAR

SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Ret.)

Note: Images from this article were used in a Naval War College book on the destruction of Japanese transportation, primarily focused on its shipping assets: An Accidental Campaign: Destruction of Japanese Transportation during the Great Pacific War.

I have written about a dozen articles on various Allied and enemy leaflets of WWII. In general, there were two basic kinds of American white leaflets used in the Pacific. “White” leaflets are those that are clearly American in origin. “Black” leaflets are covert and hide their origin and might appear to be Japanese military or civilian documents.

The U.S. Navy used Office of War Information (OWI) personnel to produce leaflets on Saipan Island. The leaflets were coded numerically, examples being 350 or 2400. The U.S. Army under General MacArthur produced leaflets that were coded with the letter "J," examples being 10-J-1 or 15-J-3.The first numeral is the number of the leaflet in the series, the last numeral is the unit, so 20-J-6 would be the 20th leaflet produced for the U.S. 6th Army. In some cases the same general leaflet was produced by both the Army and the Navy, though there might be minor changes in the vignette or the text. The Army also printed some leaflets with an "F" instead of a "J," these for the Filipinos. Readers who want to see more leaflets used in the Philippines should read my article A U.S. Army Newspaper Editor in the WWII Philippines.

There seems to have been some interchange between the Army and Navy PSYOP organizations. We see very similar images and text used by both, and in some of the leaflet data collected by Army personnel we find OWI leaflets. In the J. Robert Sandberg / Frank M. Hallgren PWB archives we find both types of leaflets. For example, they donated the following leaflets to the University of Nebraska:

Propaganda Leaflets and Text, Nos. 500-2026 (OWI)
U.S. Propaganda Leaflets, Serial Nos. 2J1-123J1 (PWB)

OWI Leaflet 520 / PWB Leaflet 04-J-1

We are not exactly sure of the extent of “partnership” but there must have been considerable interchange and correspondence between the two organizations or how would Sandberg and Hallgren in the Philippine Islands have accumulated so many leaflets prepared by the OWI in Saipan. We know that there were some OWI personnel attached to Allied headquarters to help with PSYOP planning and perhaps they were able to give the PWB propagandists some of their material to use as reference. For instance, OWI leaflet 520 “Militarists oppose Surrender” is found in the PWB files coded 04-J-1. OWI leaflet 518 “American Generosity” is found in the PWB files coded 03-J-1. The first “0” may indicate that the leaflet was also OWI.

In March, 2017, another PWB book appeared that had a great number of the OWI leaflets so there was apparently more interchange between the two organizations than I would have thought. The OWI leaflets were numbered: 104, 106, 403, 405, 407, 408, 410, 411, 507, 519, 701A, 706, 809, 2006 and 2009.

For more information on the OWI see my article OWI Pacific PSYOP Six Decades Ago.

The OWI Leaflet Newsletter dated 1 September 1945 (final issue). Tells us a little bit about the arrangement between the two propaganda agencies:

There was close liaison between the OWI representatives in PWB, and the OWI Honolulu office. Many of the leaflets distributed by the former were created and printed in Honolulu. Likewise, the “Rakkasan News,” a Philippines newspaper, was dropped in quantity by Superforts based in the Marianas.

An Early OWI Training Leaflet

A booklet entitled OWI Leaflet Maneuvers dated 6 October 1944 actually has an example of early OWI attempts at preparing a leaflet for Japan. The class was held in San Francisco without benefit of instruction or advice on leaflet technique from anyone with field experience. Eight new OWI agents were tasked with producing five leaflets completely on their own. They were assigned an artist named Gene Schnell, a Japanese translator named Sung Soo Whang, and a Davidson Printing Pressman named Richard Hubert.

Richard and another agent named Vic Glasband designed and wrote the third leaflet aimed at Filipinos to encourage resistance and to urge the overthrow of the Japanese on the Philippine Islands. They used a rather famous 1943 “War Production Board” Manuel Rey Isip image of a fighting Filipino already being used as a patriotic poster on the front, and added a long propaganda text on the back. The poster of course is in full color, the leaflet printed on the Davidson Press is in black and white. Some of the text in Tagalog is:

Filipinos:

It was the dream of Rizal that one day the banner of National Sovereignty would wave over the Philippines…

At the very brink of realization the dream of Rizal and the work for freedom of the Filipinos were frustrated by Japanese conquest and occupation…

People of the Philippines, soon you will have the opportunity to join hands with your old friends, General MacArthur, who respects and reveres the noble flame of freedom that burns within the hearts of all Filipinos. Together we will deal a smashing blow to the Japanese and thus assure the liberation of the Philippines.

General MacArthur

The story of General MacArthur’s escape from the Philippines is well known. American resistance was crumbling, and President Roosevelt, realizing the tremendous propaganda victory the capture of an American general would mean to the Japanese, ordered MacArthur to escape on PT boat 41, 11 March 1942, and on 18 April 1942assume the office of Supreme Commander, South West Pacific Area (SWPA) with headquarters in Australia. He was now in command of American Army, Navy and Air units as well as Australian, British and Dutch military forces in the Southwest Pacific.

Far Eastern Liaison Office

The Australians had been at war as part of the British Commonwealth for several years. Realizing the need for psychological operations (PSYOP), they began printing and disseminating leaflets in August 1942. Prior to 1944, the Australian agency known as the Far Eastern Liaison Office (FELO) was responsible for disseminating propaganda to all enemy troops and civilians. FELO produced more than 58 million leaflets in six different languages and numerous native dialects. The Australian War Memorial has 2,635 different FELO leaflets in its collection.

The Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) served as Gen. Douglas MacArthur's intelligence and covert action organization from July 1942 to the end of the war. It was a combined U.S.-Australian activity headquartered in Melbourne. FELO operated as Section D of the AIB. In June 1944 when MacArthur authorized the Psychological Warfare Bureau, FELO was confined to operations involving Australian, British and Dutch forces.

It is hard to try to write a complete description of all the things that the PWB did during the battle for the Philippines. I have looked at one of the books in my library, REPORT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA 1944–1945, this formerly classified "Restricted" book (with some annexes classified "secret") coded 0249333, and find several comments that might be worth mentioning. The booklet is a good one-inch thick, so what I’m writing will be edited for brevity and only contain a few paragraphs.

Japan’s people were thoroughly and falsely indoctrinated. They believed that:

Spiritually, Japanese troops were superior to all others.
Japanese forces always attack and win.
Japanese soldiers never surrender.
There was a holy war to liberate Asia from White domination.

Their indoctrination included strange concepts of the westerner

He was soft.
Physically he possessed no spiritual fortitude.
His strength lay only in materialism.
He would torture and kill prisoners.
His intent was to enslave.

The PWB established: Shortly after the victory of Hollandia, the commander-in-chief directed the establishment of a psychological warfare branch. Psychological warfare was new. It had never been taught in our military schools. There was no text. Planning, and a technique of presentation were pioneer fields. Many officers and men both at General Headquarters and the field doubted the effectiveness of psychological warfare against Japan. Few believed that the Japanese soldier could be made surrender conscious. Many were convinced that the Japanese would fight until they and their country were destroyed.

The office of War Information: already had established an office in Sydney, Australia, staffed by expert writers, broadcasters, artist, and publishers. In June, the OWI staff moved to Brisbane where they joined key military personnel provided by general headquarters. But before this group could hope to operate effectively, patient study, exhaustive research, indoctrination, and experimentation would be necessary.

Production and distribution: Truthful information was disseminated to the enemy by long, medium, and short-wave radio, loudspeaker, leaflets, news sheets, and magazines. Radio broadcasts to Japan were made in English and Japanese. By the close of the war, three mobile field units, self-contained, equipped to print, monitor, photograph, and broadcast, were available to the Sixth, Eighth, and 10th armies. A total of 222 million leaflets and news sheets were produced prior to VJ day, and for the month of September 1945, an output of 120 million were contemplated.

The Far Eastern Air Force: willingly distributed our leaflets and new sheets. In addition, FEAF made available transport planes to haul leaflets from Manila to forward air bases; at times as many as ten transports aircraft per week were required. FEAF personnel were well briefed on objectives of psychological warfare, and on the purpose of each leaflet dropped. Since the Commanding General of FEAF supported our entire program it never became necessary for formal General Headquarter orders to be issued directing these missions.

In tactical areas, observation planes did effectively spot-dropping on enemy units and a small number of leaflets were successfully distributed by shellfire.

Leaflets and broadcasters taunted:

Where is your Navy?
Do you trust your officers?
How is your supply situation?
Why not come to an honorable understanding?

This needling campaign proceeding the Leyte landing, our Radio asked Tokyo and the Admirals if their fleet would fight for the Philippines. Radio Tokyo immediately replied that the Japanese fleet was committed to the defense of the home waters. Broadcasters asked Tokyo to define “home waters” and probed further, broadcasters, would their admirals abandon the Army in the Philippines just had they abandoned their armies on the islands in the south. This program was jammed from the Homeland. The disastrous Japanese attack in Leyte Gulf on 24 October finally answered our questions.

Colonel Sidney F. Mashbir congratulated PWB on needling the Japanese fleet into the Leyte action. “No one will ever under-estimate the part which the campaign of ridicule, so ably carried out by the PWB, played in bringing the Japanese Navy out to be destroyed.”

In Manila, a weekly Japanese language newspaper known as the Rakkasan (“Parachute” or “Airdrop”) news was published each week. One to two million copies were dropped on enemy troops and the civil population in Japan. Prisoners of war in the Philippines said that the Rakkasan News was the only source of truthful information available to the Japanese soldier from the outside world.

Author Martin Bennett mentions Allied propaganda booklets reaching the Philippines in late 1942. These could have been FELO or AIB products:

Mitsuo Fuchida was in the Philippines in the fall of 1943 establishing air bases and while in a Japanese-occupied military dwelling was thunderstruck to find, on a table, several copies of a booklet entitled “I Shall Return.” The issues that Fuchida referred to were from December 1942 to May 1943. “Now I understood much more clearly the hostility of the local people. Such literature as this gave them hope and encouragement, assuring them that their allies had neither forgotten them now written them off as expendable. If the United States could smuggle these into the Philippines, it could also bring in munitions, supplies and agents.” 

Note: Fuchida was the lead pilot in the attack on Pearl Harbor. He was interviewed by historian Gordon William Prange in a book entitled God’s Samurai: lead pilot at Pearl Harbor. 

  

The Nightmares of Lieutenant Ichi

About booklets and publications, the PWB prepared several for use in the Philippines. Some of them are: 1-BF-1 Philippine Omnibook 10,000 issues; 2-BA-1 Psychology of the Japanese Soldier 1,000; 3-BF-1 Philippine Commentary 8500; 4-BA-1 Paper Bullets 6,000; 5-BA-1 Answer to Japan 1,000; and 6-BF-1 Little Ichi (Comic) 10,000 copies. The codes are "A" American, "B" Booklet, and "F" Filipino. 

Stanley Sandler, in Cease Resistance: It’s Good for you! A history of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations, 1999, lists the ten basic rules of psychological warfare adopted by FELO:

1. Be Paternal but not cold.

2. Avoid a superior attitude.

3. Do not offend or humiliate the enemy.

4. Avoid boasting.

5. Never blame the psywar recipients for the war.

6. Never corner the enemy without showing a way out.

7. Iterate that death is not the natural destiny of the Japanese soldier.

8. Be sincere.

9. Encourage psywar targets to draw their own conclusions.

10. Show that Japan could have a bright postwar future.

In An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets, Carl Berger writes about “Selection of Themes:

Leaflet messages, particularly in tactical leaflets, should avoid ridicule of the target and use of sophisticated political propaganda themes, and should concentrate on the use of simple messages directed to the target's basic and immediate needs and wants.

In writing or preparing a propaganda leaflet, there are no strict rules. We have learned, partly from the effect of German leaflets on our own troops, partly from other evidence, that hostile, condescending or sarcastic leaflets—no matter how much fun to write—defeat their own purpose. In a war among soldiers, recognition of the enemy’s soldierly qualities, credit for bravery, soldier-to-soldier talk (where these matters are pertinent and justifiable) are like butter on bread —they make it swallow easier.

The Leyte campaign during the liberation of the Philippines, a Seventh Division leaflet writer strongly objected to the sarcastic approach to the Japanese soldiers: "Why should we address them as 'Rats in a Trap' or caricature them as 'Sad Sacks?' These things only infuriate them and provide their officers with something to create unity in trying circumstances and to further their resistance."

Language specialists with the Seventh Division, who interrogated Japanese prisoners, agreed that American leaflets should include such things as praise for the Japanese soldier for his heroic conduct and a brief statement of the tactical situation, without exaggeration. "Any ridicule of the individual Japanese soldiers," they reported, "belittlement of his equipment, or insulting his leaders was found to create an adverse effect."

There were some members of the American Office of War Information assigned to the Australians, but MacArthur wanted none at his headquarters and no Office of Strategic Services (OSS) personnel in his entire theatre.On the rare occasion when MacArthur seemed to relent, his aides who were managing the various espionage and propaganda units put their foot down. They were very protective of the General. There are some wonderful stories of the "espionage" operations that took place as our friendly forces tried to infiltrate MacArthur's headquarters. The OSS managed to get a naval officer into MacArthur's HQ in the Philippines; he was ferreted out and sent home. Our British Allies in M.I. 6 were so frustrated at their lack of knowledge of what MacArthur was doing that they used Ian Morrison, a reporter of the London Times in Australia as a spy. When MacArthur's chief of the Psychological Warfare Branch submitted a plan for secret operations against Japan the OSS criticized it. MacArthur's headquarters responded, "Our experts state that your experts are obviously mere superficial observers."

We find another mention of the general’s distrust of the OSS in A Covert Affair, Jennet Conant, Simon and Shuster, New York, 2011:

…MacArthur loathed Donovan with a monumental hatred. The antagonism between the two was so deep that MacArthur had even sworn to court martial any OSS member caught operating in what he considered his exclusive territory. Rumor had it that the feud had its roots in the fact that Donovan had won the Congressional Medal of Honor during World War I, for capturing a German machine-gun nest single-handed, while MacArthur had been twice nominated for the medal and been twice denied…

Note the word “rumor” above. There may be no truth to the story.

While I personally believe that MacArthur did not want the OSS in his area because he did not want civilians that were not under his direct control in that area, it may be that MacArthur had a legitimate excuse not to allow the OSS into his area.  Bob Stahl says in the book, You're No Good to me Dead – Behind Japanese Lines in the Philippines, that MacArthur had his own AIB which was very much like the OSS:

One of the best kept secrets of World War II is the story of the activities of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB). In the southwest Pacific area, the AIB, an operating agency of theater G2 (Intelligence), was the counterpart of the Office of Strategic Services in the other theaters. It carried out clandestine activities behind enemy lines from the Solomons to Singapore, from Port Moresby to Manila, reporting Japanese shipping movements, aerial activities, weather information, and military intelligence. And inter-Allied agency, the AIB was comprised of Australian, British, Dutch, and American intelligence units, each operating in the geographical areas that had been under their country’s jurisdiction before the Japanese invasion. By penetrating Japanese-held islands far in advance of the many military campaigns, AIB agents gathering intelligence information paved the way for the Allied victory over Japan.

The Philippine Regional Section (PRS) was the AIB's operating arm in the American sector. Under the PRS the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (Special), an amalgamation of the 5217th reconnaissance Battalion provisional and a 978th signal service company, furnished these intelligence gathering services throughout the Philippine archipelago. The first Reconnaissance Battalion and the 978th signal service company were the first and only army units to undertake such a specialized mission during the second world war. While similar functions were carried out in other theaters, they were executed by the Office of Strategic Services, not the US Army. To this day, the story of these activities remains one of World War II the best kept secrets.  

Major General Charles A. Willoughby defends MacArthur’s WWII decision in MacArthur 1941-1951, McGraw-Hill, NY, 1951:

In Washington, “Wild Bill” Donovan’s OSS operatives had a fixed idea that they were arbitrarily kept out of MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Theater. Actually, MacArthur had to go along without the OSS because he couldn’t afford to wait for it. Unlike the war in Europe, the U.S. war in Asia was a “shooting war” from the start. Where the OSS in Washington had time to gather information about North Africa, about the “soft underbelly” of the Axis in the Mediterranean and about Europe in general, MacArthur had to improvise his intelligence from scratch with the Japanese breathing down his neck…

His G2 section was handed the job of organizing an Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) to interrogate prisoners and translate captured documents; an Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) to conduct clandestine operations, sabotage and espionage behind enemy lines (a counterpart of OSS); an Allied Geographical section (AGS) to gather and publish geographical information; and a Central Bureau (CB) to provide crypto- analytical services. To help get accurate information about what the Japanese were up to, the AIB took over the Royal Australian Navy’s system of “coast watchers.”

Colonel Allison Ind gives another reason in for the rejection of OSS assets in Allied Intelligence Bureau – Our Secret Weapon Against Japan, McKay Company, 1958. Allison says:

MacArthur felt that the various unorthodox units he was taking over from General Blaney [Australia] and the Dutch might submit to a certain amount of control from him there on the spot, but he was convinced that an attempt at domination by or absorption into another intelligence unit based in Washington would prove to be unworkable.

Starting about mid-1943, all leaflets had to be approved by South West Pacific Area headquarters. MacArthur was starting to realize the value of psychological warfare.

Psychological Warfare Branch

Psychological Warfare Branch Emblem

MacArthur used the Australians to help train his own people, drafted some FELO specialists and in June 1944 authorized the formation of the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB). This agency actually existed to help MacArthur reconquer the Philippines, a burning desire that had driven him since his defeat by the Japanese. As a result, the two organization’s areas of responsibility were divided, with FELO targeting the old Australian, British, and Dutch areas while the PWB targeted the Philippines.

The PWB is mentioned in the classified report Intelligence in War – MacArthur’s Intelligence Service 1941-1945. It says in part:

The establishment of an American Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) was approved by the Chief of Staff as a continuation of FELO, then operating primarily in British and Dutch territories. Leaflets were fired from 25-pounders and mortars, and thousands were dropped by the U.S. Air Force. Front-line broadcasts were developed to send messages to Japanese troops. Mobile propaganda units exploited recently reoccupied and enemy occupied territory to win native support for the Allied forces. In the battle for Manila, radio broadcasts were frequently employed in the expectation of lowering enemy morale and inducing the Japanese to surrender…In the period 1942 to 1945 a total of 222 million leaflets and news sheets were produced [this would be by FELO and PWB combined].

Major Steve A Fondacaro mentioned the MacArthur's PWB in his 1988 Command and General Staff College Master of Military Art and Science Thesis titled: Strategic Analysis of U.S. Special Operations during the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953. He said in part:

In the Pacific theater, psychological operations in MacArthur's Southwestern Pacific Area/Far Eastern Command (SWPA/FEC) were conducted by the Far Eastern Liaison Office (FELO), an Australian agency under the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) which controlled all clandestine activities in the theater. Formed in June 1942, FELO primarily conducted leaflet drops and radio broadcasts up until the SWPA/FEC assault upon the Philippines. In June 1944, MacArthur formed the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB), a primarily American unit, under FELO. It focused on leaflet drops, artillery delivered leaflets, newspaper drops and radio broadcasts to the Philippines and, later, Japan.

PWB initially consisted of seventeen U.S. Army officers, and twenty enlisted men. They were joined by nine Australian members of FELO. Some OWI personnel were also attached to Allied headquarters to help with PSYOP planning. We should point out that the two organizations often worked closely together and some leaflets appear to have been dropped by both. In this article we will call all the “J” leaflets Psychological Warfare Branch, but it is understood that they might have been created with the help of the Australians and may have been disseminated in some of FELO’s areas of operations. For instance, although a “restricted” document dated 1 December 1944 from The Psychological Warfare Detachment at SWPA headquarters clearly shows leaflet 6J1 (Abandoned) as a U.S. product, the Guide to the FELO Collection of the Australian War Memorial states that it is an Australian leaflet to Japanese troops. It is possible that since the Americans and Australians worked in partnership at PWB both sides took credit for the leaflet. In general the fact sheets that translated all the PWB leaflets used the following heading: Psychological Warfare Branch, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Area, APO 500.

Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers

Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers was MacArthur’s personal secretary and assigned as his psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) chief and thus in charge of PWB. In 1935 he wrote a paper entitled: The Psychology of the Japanese Soldier. Colonel Al Paddock says in U.S. Army Special Warfare - Its Origins, University of Kansas Press, KS, 2002:

Fellers, a 1918 West Point graduate, was one of a very few U.S. senior officers in the Pacific who had actually studied the Japanese military in some depth prior to the war. His “Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area,” completed in August 1944, provided the Psychological Warfare Branch with its organizational structure, goals, and operating procedures. Fellers believed that the purpose of psychological warfare was “to further the military effort by weakening the fighting spirit of the enemy and thus hasten Japan's decision to surrender.”

Feller’s original Study: The Psychology of the Japanese Soldier 1934ueger-1935

In his Foreword to the Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area he wrote:

All commanders realize the importance of high morale as a major factor in military success. To lower morale in an enemy army is as vital a mission as to establish and maintain high morale among our own troops.

A soundly conceived, effectively executed campaign of psychological warfare is as basic a part of any modern military operation as are tactics and logistics.

Enemy armies are comprised of soldiers who are individuals - people. What these people think and believe governs what they do, how well they fight and how long they fight. The mental attitudes of enemy civilians likewise have a direct and important bearing on the duration of the war and a close relationship to the fighting effectiveness of enemy troops.

Psychological warfare is the MILITARY application of the science, which analyzes, predicts and influences the behavior of people. In this theater, it includes all activity directed against Japan except guerilla and orthodox warfare and physical sabotage.

A properly directed psychological warfare program in the Far East could achieve objectives of far reaching consequence. A stubborn China, the heroic resistance of the Philippine people, and the stupidity of the Japanese aggressors prevented a racial war. Only by winning the peace can we avert a future racial war.

The favorable reaction of Oriental peoples to invading forces from the West is dependent upon a clear understanding of Western tolerance and liberalism. It is a responsibility of psychological warfare agencies to inform Oriental peoples of the idealistic and unselfish purposes of our war aims. Establishment of mutual respect and trust between Occidental and Oriental peoples presents to psychological warfare agencies a challenge of the highest order.

The Completed Feller's Plan studied by American forces at the Conference on Psychological Warfare against Japan in Manila,
7-8 May 1945. Each unit gave a presentation, including the Sixth Army, Eighth Army, Tenth Army, Seventh Fleet, etc.

In the plan, Fellers explains what a Psychological Warfare Branch would be and what it would do:

1. That the Psychological Warfare Branch can further the military effort against Japan by developing programs which seek to achieve the following objectives:Undermine morale by convincing the Japanese that: a. Military defeat is inevitable. Their land and air forces are inadequate; their tactics and strategy inferior; their fleet impotent. b. Their country is blockaded; their Pan-Asiatic dream is dead. c. Their country is divided. Disunity exists among the army, navy, and air forces; between civil and military population; officers and men. d. Continuation of the war will destroy Japan.

2. Charge the military clique with the responsibility of the war: a. Cite their incompetence in foreign affairs, on the home and fighting fronts. b. Prove they have lied and are still lying about the war. c. Explain their exploitation of racial prejudice. d. Show their misrepresentation of Western people.  e. Charge them with the responsibility for a national disaster. f. Drive a wedge between the Emperor and the people on the one hand, and the military clique on the other.

3. Encourage the people to: a. Seek self-preservation. b. Rally to save what is left of their country. c. Destroy the military clique and form a "Peace government." d. Throw themselves on the mercy of the United States.  e. Sue for peace on our terms.

BONNER F. FELLERS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Military Secretary to the C.-in-C.

Apparently, Feller’s report on the Japanese soldiers caused him some problems, He had shown it to several people and mailed it to some others for comments. A 28 February 1940 memorandum from the Adjutant general advises him that his research study was official as part of his military duties and was improperly shown to others. He is ordered to collect all the copies he has distributed and report when that is done.

On 18 December 1942, William J. Donovan requested that Brigadier General Fellers be designated an OSS representative in the Southwest Pacific area. That is odd because MacArthur had blocked all OSS interference in his domain. Sure enough, on 22 December 1942, a letter to Donovan explains that MacArthur is working with the Australians and has no need for a PSYOP officer. On 21 January 1943, Feller was appointed a member of the OSS in Washington D.C.

On 12 October 1943 General fellers received a letter thanking him for his 8 months working with the OSS Planning Group. On 9 December 1943 he is ordered along with 16 other officers to General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, signed by General MacArthur. Apparently, MacArthur understood that OSS period was simply an assignment and Fellers was still a military man and loyal to his commander. On 28 March 1943, MacArthur named Fellers his Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 (Personnel). On 28 September 1944, MacArthur decides to form a G-5 Section to oversee Psychological Warfare and Civil Affairs. On 14 October 1944, Fellers G-5 Section consists of 10 commissioned officers and 12 enlisted men.

On 27 November 1944 Fellers is moved from G-5 to Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief. Apparently, Macarthur had great faith in him. He held that position until December 1945. Fellers also held the additional duty of Chief of the Psychological Warfare Bureau from 2 May 1945 until 1 March 1946.

On 20 April 1945 a special form for General Officers describes Fellers:

A conscientious hard-working officer of sound judgement and excellent military ability who has had wide experience as a military observer and liaison officer. His service as an observer in forward areas has been outstanding. He is well educated, extremely tactful, and has a pleasing personality which makes him well liked by his associates. His physical endurance is excellent. Cool and effective under pressure.Completely loyal.

MacArthur asked that Fellers be made a Major General. Apparently, MacArthur’s recommendation was not approved. On 3 February 1946 with the war over Fellers was returned to his old permanent rank of Colonel. On 27 June 1945, Fellers requested retirement after 28 years of service. On 30 November 1946 his retirement was made official. After his retirement Feller’s rank was returned to Brigadier General on 16 August 1948. Fellers died of congestive heart failure at 0815 on 7 October 1973.

Among Feller’s higher awards and decorations are two Distinguished Service Medals and a Legion of Merit Medal. General MacArthur personally wrote the request for a second Distinguished Service medal and said in part:

Under his personal direction. Psychological Warfare not only made a material contribution to the war effort, but as investigation in Japan has disclosed, actually influenced and speed Japan’s decision to surrender. The Emperor himself has stated that Psychological Warfare was most effective in forcing him to hasten the end of the war…

Allison B Gilmore says in You Can't Fight Tanks With Bayonets, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE, 1998:

Feller's “Basic Military Plan” established three functional divisions with PWB: the Collation Section, the Planning Department, and the Production Section. Situated between these three sections and the Office of the Military Secretary in the chain of command was the executive officer, Colonel J. Woodall Greene. As executive officer, Greene implemented Feller's plans and policies, supervised administration, and coordinated the work of the three section chiefs and the field units. He also comprised the “Weekly Military Plan for Psychological Warfare” designed to achieve the organization's objectives in light of the changing military situation. Each week's plan was submitted to Fellers for his approval, and then distributed to the Collation, Planning and Production divisions to insure a coordinated effort.

The Collation Section studied intelligence reports from all over the Asia and the Pacific and identified Japanese vulnerabilities and ways to exploit them. The Planning Department prepared the PSYWAR operations. It scheduled leaflets drops, newspaper publication and radio broadcasts. It forwarded weekly directives to the Production Section where the newscasts, leaflets. news-letters and magazines were actually produced.

What the Japanese PW thinks of Thought Warfare

Since we mention the Collation Section we should depict one classified confidential publication that was produced by that section entitled What the Japanese PW thinks of Thought Warfare. This 3 May 1945 PWB booklet was meant to teach the PWB staff what was right and what was wrong with their leaflets. The reader will notice that we mention Japanese critiques of many of the leaflets in this article. In most cases those comments came from this booklet.

Many of the Japanese prisoners were more than happy to help the Americans. One suggested three major themes:

1. The Japanese soldier must be convinced that he will be treated humanely upon surrender.
2. The Japanese soldier must be convinced that American weapons are far superior to his own.
3. The Japanese soldier must understand the hopelessness of his own situation, and those of other Japanese in other sectors.

Of course, it was not only the Americans who wanted to influence the Filipinos by the use of propaganda. The Japanese were also busy from their first day of occupation as is documented by the classified confidential G2 (Intelligence) report, Japanese Propaganda in the Philippines, dated 25 February 1945. The report says that from the beginning of the Japanese occupation an extensive and systematic propaganda program was set into motion. The report quotes from a captured “Most Secret” Japanese military administration document. The Japanese document is over 20 pages long so we shall just mention a few pertinent points:

We must promptly revive in the Filipinos the spirit of the Far East. We must encourage them to live and die along with us by rousing their racial pride…We must study and understand the Filipinos as to their character, values, racial characteristics, racial feelings, customs, habits, virtues and faults…Propaganda must be promptly adapted to the characteristics of the area, to the existing attitudes of the people, particularly where they are concentrated.

Curiously, after studying their new proposed allies, the Japanese listed their characteristics. These were not very flattering. Of the 26 Filipino traits, we note:

They are four-flushers and show-offs; they are lazy and despise labor; they are much inclined to gambling and idleness; their standard of good taste is very low; they like drinking exceedingly; they can tell lies so calmly that it is very hard to tell whether it is true or not.  

With this attitude toward the Filipinos, it is easy to see why they treated them badly and were never able to win their loyalty and friendship. The Japanese Propaganda campaign was four steps.

1. The first was anti-American propaganda with the regular use of such terms as “American Imperialism,” “American exploitation,” and “American tyranny.”

2. The second step was the liberation of the Philippines with constant reminders that America did not liberate the Philippines, but the Japanese had every intention of doing so. The Japanese regularly used such terms as “the free and independent Philippines, “the Philippine Republic,” and “the Philippines for the Filipinos.”

3. The third step was the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Once the Philippines were free of American influence and believed itself to be an Asian nation the Japanese would absorb it into their Co-Prosperity Sphere, a union of all Asian peoples they called, “one big family of equitable give and take.”

4. The final step was the use of pro-Japanese propaganda to create a willingness of the Filipinos to submit and accept guidance from the Japanese Empire.

U.S. Sixth Army Commander Lieutenant General Walter Krueger

General MacArthur had personally selected Walter Krueger as one of his commanders. He said about him:

I don’t think history has given him due credit for his greatness. I do not believe that the annals of America have shown his superiority as an army commander. Swift and sure in attack; tenacious and determined in defense; modest and restrained in victory – I don’t know what he would have been in defeat because he was never defeated. The great mantle of Stonewall Jackson would certainly fit his ample frame.

Kreuger is mentioned in World War II in the Pacific: An Encyclopedia. Ed. Stanley Sandler. New York: Garland, 2001:

Following the capture of Manila in early March, the Sixth Army was assigned the arduous task of engaging the main Japanese forces on Luzon, which were strongly entrenched in the mountainous terrain east and north of the capital. It took Krueger until June to defeat the largest Japanese army encountered by American troops in the Pacific war. The cost proved high. Nearly a quarter-million Japanese died in the fighting, along with 8,140 Sixth Army dead and some 30,000 wounded.

Krueger received little publicity during the war, as MacArthur dominated the press releases from the theater. Indeed, in June 1945 the Christian Science Weekly Magazine published an article on Krueger, who now held four-star rank, under the title, “Mystery Man of the Pacific.” Uninterested in public acclaim and without political ambition, Krueger was content to do his job to the best of his ability. MacArthur no doubt prized Krueger’s modesty as well as his leadership talents.

A strict disciplinarian who cared deeply about the welfare of the enlisted men under his command, Krueger lacked the charisma of a Patton or Halsey. He planned his campaigns with meticulous care, then conducted them with prudence and skill. Consistent rather than bold in his leadership, Krueger successfully led Sixth Army to victory in twenty-one major engagements against a determined enemy. Known as “a soldier’s soldier,” Krueger died in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, on August 20, 1967, and was buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

MacArthur argued with Krueger on several occasions when he wanted the Sixth Army to race into enemy territory to gain ground at the risk of his soldiers. On one occasion he demanded that Manila be taken by his birthday, on another he moved his HQ ahead of Krueger’s trying to embarrass him into an attack. Krueger was a soldier’s general and refused to send his men forward with exposed flanks where they might be surrounded and killed. He believed in Special Forces and used the Alamo Scouts as a long range reconnaissance unit to find and identify the enemy. He formed his own Ranger Battalion. In the early fighting in New Guinea, Krueger had a 14 to 1 kill ratio over the Japanese troops. When he landed in the Philippines and was greatly outnumbered against a dug-in enemy, Krueger upped the ratio to 19 to 1. Near the end of the battle when he was fighting die-hard fanatics in Manila, Krueger reached a 21 to 1 ratio. Even after the arguments about Krueger’s careful planning and the way he nurtured his soldiers, MacArthur chose him to lead the ground forces for the prospective invasion of the Japanese homeland. He had complete faith in his subordinate. Of course, the dropping of the atom bombs assured that invasion would never take place.

Leaflet 11-J-6 - "General Krueger's Personal Message to Japanese Troops

On 7 December 1944, General Krueger wrote a personal letter to defeated and isolated Japanese troops. The text on the front is:

A Message to Japanese Troops from the American Troop Commander

Some of the text on the back is:

To all Japanese Soldiers

The officers and men of the American Army adhere to the rules and regulations of Geneva. If you are captured or voluntarily surrender, you will receive honorable treatment. You will receive food, medicine, and clothing. You will not be tortured or killed. Neither your name nor your picture will be sent to Japan. You will be in no danger of disgrace.

Walter Krueger
Commanding General
U.S. Forces

[Author's Note]: Curiously, this appeal by Krueger was not approved for distribution and was withdrawn. A 16 December 1944 note from General Bonner Fellers accompanying the disapproval said that “The leaflet was prepared by the G-2 Office, Sixth Army. They have been advised that future leaflets that future leaflets, if signed, will be signed by the C in C."  I believe that means that General MacArthur told Krueger that any future leaflets signed as "Commander"¯ would come from him.  

U.S. Army Tank Approaches 6th Army Headquarters in the Philippines

The U.S. Sixth Army, Commanded by Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, the son of a WWI Prussian Army officer, was deeply involved in leaflet design and production even before they reached the Philippines. Carl Berger mentions their PSYOP during the Philippine campaign in: An Introduction to Wartime leaflets, The American University Special Operations Research Office, Washington D.C., 1959. He says in regard to the U.S. Sixth Army and the leaflets in general:

On 11 September 1944 the G2 (Intelligence section) of the Sixth Army, which had been designated to make the invasion, drew up a detailed "Basic Sixth Army Plan for Psychological Warfare." The plan concluded that it was essential that the propaganda campaign against the Japanese should “create a receptive attitude toward leaflets, to develop confidence in our truthfulness and possible dependence upon our leaflets as a source of news concealed by their own leaders.

The initial invasion of the island of Leyte was scheduled for 20 October 1944. In preparation, propaganda personnel scattered around the Pacific were formed into special units and placed on temporary duty with Army headquarters. They wrote and produced large numbers of "advance" leaflets, including civilian bomb warnings and other instruction leaflets for the people of the Philippines. Three of the advance leaflets were proclamations by General MacArthur and Philippine President Sergio Osmena. These political leaflets announced reestablishment of the Government of the Philippines under President Osmena and outlawed the Japanese puppet government. A special leaflet called upon the Japanese commander to accord proper treatment of American and Filipino prisoners of war captured in earlier fighting in the Philippines.

The PWB published an 11-page booklet entitled Psychological Warfare in the Sixth Army – The Luzon Campaign. Some of the more pertinent facts in the booklet are:

The strategic dropping of leaflets on the target was begun by PWB, General Headquarters in mid-November 1944. 8,500,000 leaflets for example, being dropped during the month of May, and a total of 29,500,000 were dropped throughout the period 9 January to 30 June.

Of all leaflets, 92% were dropped by supporting units of the Fifth Air Force (the 308th Bombardment Wing, the 310th Bombardment Wing and the Fifth Bomber Command), 8% were dropped by artillery liaison planes. Artillery shells were employed to distribute leaflets on only a few occasions because of the difficulties of transporting the ammunition.

Paper Bullets – How they Beat the Jap

Speaking of artillery, it was very difficult to get the U.S. Army cannon-cockers to shoot leaflets at the enemy. They wanted to send high explosives over the front lines and cause extensive death and destruction. The PWB knew that the leaflets would expedite surrenders which would lead directly to military intelligence and a more efficient method to fight the war and a quicker victory. The PWB printed the restricted booklet Paper Bullets – How they Beat the Jap in an attempt to motivate the artillerymen to use the leaflet shells. The booklet even asks the rhetorical question:

What the hell kind of war is this firing leaflets at the enemy? Nobody ever got killed with a hunk of paper…Psychological Warfare, that’s what the Army calls it.

The 8-page booklet features one of the early “I surrender” leaflets aimed at the Japanese Army, explains the power of combat propaganda, and instructions on how to load and fire the leaflet shells. The back of the booklet depicts a Japanese soldier surrendering.

A Leaflet Explanation Card  

It was considered important to explain exactly why all those millions of leaflets were falling from the sky during the battle. One U.S. Army member of a Heavy Maintenance Repair Company, the 915th Ordnance Company, located in Manila (APO 358) during the war found this card stock leaflet falling from the sky. Note that they are using the old 5 x 8-inch that was popular in WWII and Korea. By Vietnam, the leaflet parameters had been studied in great depth and the 6 x 3-inch leaflet was the favorite because of its drift and spread over the ground.

Headquarters, Sixth Army, produced a record of their PSYOP campaign entitled Enemy on Luzon: an intelligence summary. It says in part:

When hostilities broke out between Japan and the United States, it was the common belief that no Japanese would ever fall into our hands, much less that he would surrender to our forces. Past events have shown, however, that such belief was erroneous. Japanese prisoners were captured, and more than half of those taken on Luzon voluntarily surrendered. A total of 7,297 prisoners of war were taken during the Luzon Operation; of these, approximately 5,100 were voluntary surrenders.

The strongest and most effective of the forces which reduced the Japanese morale was hunger brought on by the disruption of enemy supply lines. This factor was exploited, as well as other motivating forces, by Psychological Warfare. Among these were the cruelty of his officers, the hopelessness of the situation—accentuated by the devastating effectiveness of our bombing and shelling.

We Return

We don’t know much about this booklet explaining why the U.S. is going back to free the Philippine Islands but it is most likely that it was prepared by the U.S. Army Forces Far East and issued to the American invasion force troops. It bears American and Philippine symbols of the back. Inside are motivational comments and a map of the Philippine Islands. Some of the text is:

WHY ARE WE GOING BACK TO THE PHILIPPINES

There are a number of reasons we are going into the Philippines. Some of them are reasons of honor, others are reasons of plain military science. The “Honor” reasons require little note here: you know them well –

The great mass of Filipino people has placed their trust in the United States. We owe them a solemn debt. Filipinos fought besides Americans to the bitter end on Bataan. We owe THEM something. Our friends in the Philippines are still fighting the enemy, we must help them. The flags of the United States and the Philippine Commonwealth flew side by side over the islands….

[Note]: Of course, this title is a take-off on General MacArthur’s famous "I Shall Return" statement, which the U.S. Army hated. They always wanted that changed to "We Shall Return." 

Sixth Army Leaflet 102-J-6

This example of a tactical Sixth Army leaflet was prepared to be used against the Japanese defenders of Mt. Malepunyo. It depicts the Japanese in a box and clearly surrounded. The official description of the leaflet was “Special Surrender Leaflet, 6th Army.” The art is described as “Map of Mt. Malepunyo surrounded by American forces.” The text is:

SOLDIERS OF THE FUJI HEIDAN

This is the position of the Fuji Heidan on Southern Luzon. There is no safe place where you can retreat. We have prepared receiving stations for Japanese prisoners who are crossing our lines. You can stay in your isolated positions or you can come over to us and live.

If you wish to come under our protection, approach our lines during daylight hours carrying a white flag.

By December 1944 the unit known as the Fuji Heidan consisted of about 6,000 troops under the command of Colonel Masatoshi Fujishige. This unit was “hard Corps” and the Colonel is known to have told his troops, “Kill American troops cruelly. Do not kill them with one stroke. Shoot guerrillas. Kill all who oppose the Emperor, even women and children.” Since the leaflet mentions Mt. Malepunyo we can pinpoint its use to about the second week of April of 1945.

Leaflet 103-J-6 is all text so we will not depict it but it takes a much more reasoned approach to surrender. Some of the text is:

To the Officers of the Imperial Japanese Army:

You officers who have sworn to be fathers and mothers to your men – should you not discern right and wrong, in accordance with fundamental principles? Is this not the time to think of your men and the future of Japan? In other sectors of the Philippine battle area, certain Japanese officers…Have tried to force their men to remain in a hopeless situation and to die a dog’s death.

But the Japanese soldier in these areas, with greater wisdom and the belief in the future of a reborn Japan have decided to live for the future. In the night they have crept away from their units and hidden themselves, an in the day time they have approached the American lines to accept temporary hospitality…Honorable officers of the Japanese Army, assist your men to reach the decision to live; be their fathers in these times.

I have seen many different terms used for surrender but this is the first time I have seen it called “temporary hospitality.”

31-J-6 WARNING!

Another leaflet targeting the Japanese forces on Luzon was 31-J-6. It is all-text and warns the Japanese soldiers of the American approach:

WARNING!

The Unites States Army will occupy this area in the near future. The Japanese High Command knows that Luzon is impossible to defend. But – to save the face of those high officers you are condemned to fight and die in the mountains. You will never see your homeland again. You have been warned. Cease resistance now.

The Commanding General, U.S. Forces.

34-J-6

This leaflet was the idea of a Japanese prisoner-of-war on Leyte. He was a graduate of law at Nippon University but just a private first class in the infantry. The theme of the leaflet was Empire Day, 11 February. Some of the long text is:

EMPIRE DAY (KIGEN SETSU)

On this great occasion of your Empire Day, we sincerely celebrate with you. The day has deep significance. We must be thoughtful and recognize the essential nature and present state of the Greater East Asia War. We must also think realistically of the war…Defeat after defeat – tremendous losses suffered by your loyal comrades in battle because of the shortness of resources at home…The blame for these conditions must be laid on the stubborn Gunbatso and the ambitious men who strongly favor the continuation of the war.

There is a sinister cloud obscuring the will of the Emperor. Even though the people are making a mighty effort, the war is heading toward disaster. As is written in the history of the world, “Devouring ambition leads to military downfall.” Look into the past and you will see several examples of rises and falls. Who are the present Iruka, Dokyo, and Takauji [power grasping traitors to Japan], and where are they? We must think carefully and remove them; and we must promise to establish peace in this world as the Emperor wishes.

36-J-6

This United States Sixth Army leaflet is entitled "Aims" and depicts four members of a Japanese family on the front. This leaflet employs the use of homesickness as its primary psychological tool. Depictions of family members (possibly recalling the parents, wife, and child of a soldier) are captioned by the statement that the United States does not want to hurt Japanese families. This leaflet clarifies the goals of the United States as peace not conquest. In combination, this leaflet’s text and imagery offers the Japanese soldier a view of the people and places left behind in the homeland and the reassurance that they will be safe if the Japanese surrender. It was prepared on 17 February 1945 and uses nostalgia as a theme. The text is:

The United States does not want to hurt you or your families.

The back depicts Mt. Fuji with a cherry tree at the right. The text is:

America has no designs on Japanese territory, intending only to avoid
aggression wherever possible in securing a lasting peace for the world.

This leaflet was dropped on South Luzon, Philippines on 16th July 1945.

This 1944 Associated Press Wire Photo depicts American falling leaflets explaining the invasion of the Philippine Islands to waiting civilians on the Island of Leyte. The leaflets were written in English and local dialects and proved valuable in restoring order after the fury of the off-shore shelling.

Leaflet 3-J-6

This leaflet depicting a flight of B-24 Liberator bombers was prepared by the U.S. Sixth Army in the Philippine Islands. It targeted Japanese concentrations. It was designed to weaken the enemy’s will to resist and plant doubt about the strength of his own air force. The back of the leaflet depicts American fighters strafing and bombing Japanese troops. The text on the front is:

Only Americans Eagles are in the Sky. Why?

The text on the back says in part:

Soldiers of Japan in the Philippines

As you do not understand us, you may find it hard to believe our words. The truth of what we have to say, however, you may judge for yourselves.

Ask yourself how many Japanese planes you have seen in the sky in recent weeks. Why have they disappeared?

Are our planes ever challenged when they roar in the sky above you? What has become of the wild eagles who were trained to protect you?

Who has domination of the air above you? And have you not heard your Gumbatsu spokesmen say that whoever dominates the air will win the war?

What you know to be true here is true up and down the whole Pacific. Consider this well. Though you tighten your belts, can you honestly have any doubt about what lies ahead?

The "Gumbatsu" is mentioned in many American leaflets to the Japanese. The term represents what President Eisenhower would later call the Military-Industrial complex, a mix of high-ranking officers, government officials and leaders of industry.

Leaflet 9-J-6

This 16 September 1944 all-text Sixth Army leaflet was designed to look like a Japanese newspaper extra. It targeted Japanese troops in large concentrations that had not yet heard the latest news of their defeats. It told of a major defeat so the troops would hear of it before the Japanese leadership could put their spin in it and make it sound like another victory for their forces. The leaflet was produced within 12 hours of the battle’s end. This leaflet was called the "Morotai-Palau Landing Extra." The front of the leaflet shows the Japanese word "Gogai: which means "Extra." The leaflet is stained, perhaps from light or water.  The text on the back is:

AMERICAN FORCES LAND ON MOROTAI AND PALAU

501 JAP PLANES, 173 JAP SHIPS SUNK NEAR PHILIPPINES BY
U.S. CARRIER TASK FORCE BEFORE LANDINGS

The U.S. Carrier Task Force launched its first air attack on September 8. The assault was followed up by air strikes on September 11th and 12th.

The Japanese forces were on the defensive throughout. They made no effort to find and attack the American Naval force, which consisted of battleships, carriers and several hundred smaller naval craft. Japanese ships fled before the onslaught, but with little avail. Japanese planes took to the air over the Philippines, but only to defend their bases.

By September 12, Japanese power in the Philippines was demolished, and no further resistance was made to the final American air attacks.

On September 15, hundreds of American ships landed combat troops on Morotai and Palau. Morotai is 300 miles south of Davao. Palau is 550 miles east of Mindanao.

Berger goes on to point out that leaflets were dropped as part of a disinformation campaign to make the Japanese think that the invasion would hit the beaches of Mindanao. A week before the landings, 60,000 leaflets were dropped over Mindanao with the title, "Coming events cast their shadows," code number 3-J-6. General Yamashita (the Tiger of Malaya) later admitted that he expected Mindanao to be the target instead of Leyte. He adds:

Once the landings were under way, leaflets were given a general distribution throughout the Philippines. The islands of Luzon and the Visayas were targeted by Navy carrier-based aircraft, while Mindanao and Palawan were hit by Fifth Air Force planes based on Morotai.

Many of the leaflets also ridiculed Japanese military efforts and contained caricatures of the Japanese soldiers. Such an approach, Seventh Division leaflet designers complained to higher headquarters, had had an adverse effect on the Japanese and they recommended its discontinuance.

Between October 1944 and January 1945, when organized resistance on Leyte practically came to an end, an estimated 20,000,000 leaflets had been distributed throughout the islands. In January, Sixth Army moved onto the main island of Luzon, signaling the start of a new and greatly intensified leaflet operation on that island. In a six-month period an estimated 28,500,000 leaflets were disseminated over the island. During the final stages of the Luzon fighting, the emphasis in the American leaflets was on surrender, and special efforts were made in writing leaflets to take into account the local situations - about 4,500,000 of the leaflets aimed at the Japanese emphasized the “good treatment” theme; some 6,670,000 other leaflets were “Safe Conduct Passes.”

In the entire Philippine operation about 12,000 Japanese troops surrendered--more than in any other campaign in the Pacific. These prisoners were substantial refutation of the familiar argument that Japanese soldiers would not surrender.

Yamashita: The Tiger of Malaya be the Goat of the Philippines

General MacArthur’s restricted newsletter Maptalk to his own troops’ ridicules General Yamashita. At the end of the war Yamashita was executed for war crimes. There were many journalists that suggested this was done because MacArthur so hated the Japanese general. I have never believed that because I saw the way Mac kindly treated the Japanese emperor who was also considered by many to be a war criminal. Of course, MacArthur needed an obedient emperor. We shall never know. This is page one of a short 2-page story.

The Leaflet Newsletter dated 1 June 1945 talks about the immediate production of propaganda when U.S. troops landed in the Philippines:

Most psychological warfare is fought with words. But words can have high explosive power. When MacArthur finally returned with men and weapons, his landing craft also brought portable printing presses, radio equipment and loud-speakers ashore. A unit of the Office of War Information came in with the first wave and moved into Tacloban with the infantry. The OWI boys hunted up the local printer, re-opened his print shop while Jap planes still roared overhead. Within 24 hours the first Free Philippines Leaflets were being dropped, with the banner headlines:

“Americans Land in Philippines”

Underground workers placed a copy on the-desk of Jose Laurel, puppet president.

In less than a day, the Voice of Freedom went on the air and MacArthur was broadcasting to the people of Mindanao, Leyte and Luzon:

“I Have Returned”

This was part of a growing, general offensive against the pillboxes of the Jap mind.

The OWI forces in the Philippines are mentioned in the December 1944 issue of the WWII classified magazine Outpost News; U.S. Office of War Information Outpost Service Bureau. Some of the comments are:

First newspaper to be published in the Philippines since our men landed there October 20 was the Leyte –Samar Free Philippines, which made its appearance Sunday, October 29. Its headline read “Japan’s 16th Division Shattered.”

Romulo began making daily broadcasts October 31, President Osema has agreed to go on for us whenever he has something official he wants to announce.

The Leyte-Samar first issue of Free Philippines

Some of the articles tell the Philippine people that the invasion convoy was the biggest in the Pacific War - 600 ships; Victory pesos are now being used in the Philippines; 14,045 Jap soldiers were killed in the first 8 days of fighting; 21 Japanese warship and 298 aircraft have been destroyed; and the Americans have liberated 60 towns.

Acting Deputy Director George E. Taylor adds:

Naturally, our first target is the Japanese home front. And after that, the Japanese troops in the field...One of our greatest problems is getting enough workers who speak Japanese…At present we are working a PWB arrangement under MacArthur…

Free Philippines Magazine - 1 August 1944

William B. Breuer mentions the Free Philippines Magazine in MacArthur’s Undercover War, Castle Books, Edison, N.J., 2005:

Hundreds of thousands of copies of a pictorial magazine entitled Free Philippines were printed each month and shipped into the islands in huge cargo-carrying submarines. Splashed across the covers in huge, bold letters were the words “I shall return.” Loaded with pertinent photographs, the magazines reviewed the progress of the war on a factual basis. Maps, with angry-looking arrows pointing directly toward the Philippines, helped explain the true war picture – and MacArthur’s goal – to the hard pressed natives and guerrillas.

Free Philippines Newspaper, Volume 1 Issue 1

This newspaper dated “Sunday, March 25, 1945 – Manila”
reports the landing of General MacArthur on the Philippine islands.

As soon as the Sixth Army made landfall on Leyte the first thing they printed was a copy of the propaganda newspaper Free Philippines.

Stanley Sandler mentions the newspaper:

The most widespread and popular PWB Philippine news sheet was Free Philippines. This daily journal had actually pre-dated the American landings, being delivered to waiting guerrillas by submarine…Free Philippines was published in both English and Tagalog, but English was strongly preferred as being more “official.” Citizens would wait in line patiently for up to an hour for a copy….In all the areas through which we passed the people were famished for news. Whenever we stopped to deliver a few copies of Free Philippines, people literally stormed the weapons carrier for their copy.

Leyte-Samar Free Philippines – 12 November 1944

As the Americans moved forward and pushed the Japanese back, newspapers were printed for each location.

The Manila Free Philippines – 23 March 1945

Manila, the capital city, “The Crown of the Orient,” falls to American forces after a bloody and ferocious battle with fanatical Japanese defenders.

The Japanese Newspaper "The Leyte Newslette"

The Japanese had their own propaganda newspaper in the Philippines printed in Manila and entitled The Leyte Newlette (sic) for some unknown reason. I have read a few copies and they are generally full of German and Japanese military victories. The headline of the 8 December 1944 issue is: “Philippines joins other East Asia nations to celebrate 3rd Anniversary of GEA War.” “GEA” of course stands for “Greater East Asia.”

Returning to the Sixth Army:

Between October 1944 and January 1945, when organized resistance on Leyte practically came to an end, an estimated 20,000,000 leaflets had been distributed throughout the islands. In January, Sixth Army moved onto the main island of Luzon... In a six month period an estimated 28,500,000 leaflets were disseminated over the island. During the final stages of the Luzon fighting, the emphasis in the American leaflets was on surrender. About 4,500,000 of the leaflets aimed at the Japanese emphasized the “good treatment” theme; some 6,670,000 other leaflets were safe conduct passes. 

Perhaps because of the leaflet campaign, 12,000 Japanese surrendered in the Philippines. That is more than in any other campaign in the Pacific. The Sixth Army captured 7,297 Japanese troops and 70% of them came over holding surrender leaflets. Sixth Army reported:

The psychological warfare campaign during the Luzon Campaign was the most effective one carried on by the Sixth Army and demonstrated the power of propaganda as a tactical weapon.

There was also a Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan prepared by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. This plan included the following objectives or themes:
 

Undermine morale by convincing the Japanese that:

Military defeat is inevitable. Their land and air forces are inadequate; their tactics and equipment inferior; their fleet impotent.

Their country is blockaded; their Pan-Asian dream is dead.

Their country is divided. Disunity exists among the army, navy and air forces; between the civil and military population; and between officers and enlisted men.

Continuation of the war will destroy Japan.

Charge the military clique with the responsibility of the war:

Cite their incompetence in foreign affairs and on the home and fighting fronts.

Prove that they have lied and are still lying about the war.

Explain the exploitation of racial prejudice.

Show the misrepresentation of Western people.

Charge them with the responsibility for national disaster.

Drive a wedge between the Emperor and the people on one hand, and the military clique on the other.

Encourage the people to:

Seek self-preservation.

Rally to save what is left of their country.

Destroy the military clique and form a peace government.

Throw themselves on the mercy of the United States.

Sue for peace on our terms.

As you will see as we study the leaflets by theme. Almost every one of the above concepts is found in one or more leaflets.

Staff Sergeant Richard A. Cross

SSG Richard Cross was the Editor-in-Chief of the Daily collation summary of the Psychological Warfare Branch at General Headquarters. As we stated above, the Collation Section studied intelligence reports from all over the Asia and the Pacific and identified Japanese vulnerabilities and ways to exploit them. He was awarded a Bronze Star for his exceptional performance from 7 May to 2 September 1945. His citation states that, “Through his effort, a system for analyzing enemy reactions to psychological warfare was instituted which proved of inestimable value in operational planning.”

Suggestion for a Propaganda Leaflet

Richard Cross had many talents. We can see from the above suggestion that besides doing important intelligence work he also wanted to take part in the design and wording of leaflets. Here, he forwards the following comments to his superiors on 23 July 1945:

One of America’s biggest assets in this war is her superior productive capacity in relation to Japans’…This power has been consistently played up in our propaganda I know, but how specific have the statements been? I am again suggesting a leaflet which avoids generalization. The story of our production is so powerful that if told clearly it will do much to show the Japanese the futility of further resistance.

I suggest a map contrasting the land mass of the two nations. I would then add text comparing the production of planes, ships or tanks. We could also talk about the comparative production of steel, aluminum, etc.

On another occasion he suggested a threatening leaflet to the Japanese people:

The Japanese people expect a sharp increase in the air and naval bombardment in the coming months. Just how much of an increase can be clearly shown in a simple chart broken down into three 6-month periods.

    1. From the fall of Saipan, July 1944 to January 1945.

    2. From January 1945 to July 1945.

    3. Estimated from July 1945 to January 1946.

I believe that this chart, with a heading such as “What can the Japanese people expect in the coming months?” can be used without additional copy. However, it might be advisable to conclude, “In the next six months Japan will feel heavier bomb loads than ever experienced by Germany.”  

Official PWB Product Scrapbook

Sample pages from the Official PWB Product Scrapbook

During his time with General Headquarters in the Philippines Richard Cross kept several scrapbooks of the material that PWB produced. At the end of the war, he was given permission to bring them home. The official letter authorizing the scrapbooks is dated 1 November 1945. I tell you all this because the majority of leaflets that we depict in this article came directly from the scrapbook put together by SSG Cross.This personal scrapbook of Richard A. Cross bearing 86 PWB leaflets, 29 photographs and 70 typed pages was sold on eBay in June 2012 for $717. That was a bargain price considering the historical value. A second Cross scrapbook containing 128 U.S. propaganda leaflets, 26 Japanese leaflets and 29 official Signal Corps photographs sold in August 2012 for $4050. Perhaps seeing the prices these scrapbooks were sold for, the scrapbook of Major William Taylor was offered in November 2012 for $5,000. However, this book had already been heavily picked and contained just 40 different leaflets, many in duplicate to show the backs. As a result, the book received no bids. It was auctioned again in July 2013 estimated at $400. It sold for $484.

Decades after I wrote the above, quite by accident I found a similar collection by Colonel Karl F. Baldwin that he had presented to the Pacific University of Oregon from a PWB book he had received. It contained an 8 February 1945 letter written by Baldwin, a U.S. Military attaché in Melbourne, Australia, to Lieutenant Colonel J. Woodall Greene, Executive Officer, PWB. In it, Baldwin thanks Greene for sending him one of the PWB scrapbooks. The letter said in part:

I wish to thank you sincerely for the book you sent me setting up the proclamations and leaflets prepared by the Psychological Warfare Branch of the General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area…Please continue to send these to me and accept my sincere gratitude for the book which I shall treasure as one of the best records of the fine work of General MacArthur and your section in particular.

When I was photographing the leaflets from the Cross books, there were several that were covered by the translations or glued down to show the text instead of the image side. I did not add those to this article. Since the Baldwin file depicts a few leaflets that I could not photograph without damaging the books, I will add several leaflets from the Pacific University of Oregon Baldwin file to this article. My sincere thanks to the University for helping me to complete this history of the PWB.

Staff Sergeant Bill Wooley

Bill Wooley was a member of the Psychological Warfare Branch who started as a U.S. Army Private First Class with the invasion of the Philippines and ended up as a Staff Sergeant by the end of the war. He had been recruited by the PWB about March, 1944, while in the Replacement Depot in Milne Bay, New Guinea. He was sent to Australia where he spent the next three months learning the art and science of psychological operations. He was then assigned to the Army Air Force 308th Bomber Wing in Hollandia, New Guinea, a unit flying the North American Billy Mitchell B-25 twin-engine medium bomber. It is worth noting that other members of his unit were assigned to the Fifth Air Force, the 7th Bomber Group, the 494th Bomb Group, the 319th Bomb Group, the 11th Bomb Group and the 41st Bomb Group. Apparently every bomber organization got a PWB representative.

When the Americans hit the beaches of the Philippine Islands on 20 October 1944, Bill was on an LST and arrived at Leyte the day after the initial landings. He saw the entire battle of the Leyte Gulf and regularly dropped propaganda leaflets using C-47 Skytrain military cargo plane, B-25s and various fighter aircraft. He points out that most fighter pilots did not want to do leaflet missions (they had to fly low and slow and were targets for enemy anti-aircraft), but they always performed their mission. Apparently the fighters were P-47 Thunderbolts because a letter from 5th Air Force asks:

Your activity with P-47s in carrying out PWB missions is most interesting. Would you give me a description of the technique used in getting the leaflets out of the planes without injury to the pilot or canopy? I’d like to pass this information on to the 310th Wing.

Leaflet bombs are still in the theoretical stage. If you find the opportunity to use the caps and fuse, give it a try, especially utilizing a 12,000 to 15,000 foot altitude. If the caps detonate anywhere below 3,000 feet, the result should prove satisfactory. Pin-pointing must be narrowed to an area less than a mile square.

P-47s using dive-bombing tactics or coming in at tree-top level seems to be our only answer at present.

Leaflets were also sent to Tinian Island for dissemination by bombers, and Navy carrier planes dropped them on Manila and other targets. Bill sometimes took part in the night drop of tactical leaflets on Manila in support of the U.S. Army Infantry and Cavalry units. Although he had no part in the printing of leaflets he did have some input into their content. He also took part in some loudspeaker operations, including one occasion in southern Luzon where he rigged an amplifier on the wings of a small two-man Stinson L-5 Sentinel observation spotter aircraft and flew over a tough Japanese unit dug into a deep canyon and broadcast surrender appeals from American Nisei troops.

One of the Psychological Warfare Branch tents in the Philippines.
Notice that many of the leaflets hanging on the wall are also depicted in this article.

Bill received a commendation from his commander on 4 December 1944 that stated in part:

Captain Anderson has shown me your leaflet dropping report for 30 November. This is one of the finest pieces of work so far accomplished in our PWB activities and I want to take this opportunity to congratulate you upon your endeavors.

Bill also had a PWB scrapbook and told me that he believed that every member of the unit was awarded such a souvenir scrapbook upon discharge. Many of the leaflets in this article are from Bill’s scrapbook. Bill is probably correct because a Fifth Air Force Letter dated 28 October 1945 says:

The following item of American military equipment is hereby declared to be the personal property of SSG Bill Wooley. This equipment is surplus to the various agencies of the War department and its release conforms to the rules and regulations established by superior headquarters. 

One PWB Leaflet Book

Okinawa – the Testing Ground

Leaflet 136-J-1

This leaflet was titled “Is Japan Next?” It depicts a map of the Pacific with the line of American advance leading to Okinawa. It asks on the front:

The text on back is:

The American offensive rolls on relentlessly. As a result of the inferior strategy of the militarists, the Japanese forces were defeated everywhere. Meanwhile, however, the militarists continued to announce, "A great victory."

Today the American troops in the Pacific are being augmented by great forces from Europe. The Japanese homeland is being relentlessly bombed. The war is progressing rapidly toward Japan itself.

"Unconditional Surrender" means the end of the war and the destruction of the militarists. It does not mean the enslavement or the extermination of the people.

Leaflet 138-J-1
Another PWB Leaflet defaced by the addition of a stamp on the
attack transport McIntyre

 

DON’T BLOCK THE ROADS!

Another such leaflet meant to protect the Filipinos and to help with the American movement toward the front is entitled “DON’T BLOCK THE ROADS!” It is interesting to note that when Germany attacked France with Stuka fighter-bombers, one of the “Terror” concepts was to drive French civilians on to the roads to block the French defensive movements. Here, the Americans have asked the Filipinos to stay off the roads so they can quickly advance. This leaflet is uncoded. On the front, American tanks have been stopped by a mass of people on the road. The back of the leaflet has the same general image, except the Filipinos are now walking to the right of the road and the tanks and trucks are advancing with the text:

CLEAR THE WAY FOR THE FIGHTING MEN

A 5-Peso propaganda overprinted Banknote

Years after I wrote this article a young collector named Jonathan Lake sent me this Philippine 5-peso banknote that was apparently stamped with a similar message on the back. Note that MacArthur spelled his name just a bit differently so this could be a fake, or it cold be something produced in the field quickly with captured Japanese occupation notes where the spelling was not considered that important.

"I SHALL RETURN"
DON'T BLOCK THE ROAD
FOR THE FIGHTING MEN
GEN. D. McARTHUR

Leaflet 17-F-6

This 26 January 1945 Sixth Army leaflet for the Filipinos in Tagalog tells them how they can help the war effort and sabotage the Japanese. The leaflet is titled "Landing instructions” telling them how to avoid injury when the Americans land. I have seen this leaflet offered as “U.S. Army paratrooper,” and that is probably because the soldier seems to be wearing spit-shined Concoran jump boots. But, and this is a big but, as a sergeant I can tell you that no dedicated and motivated soldier would ever be caught with his hand in his pocket. A good sergeant would eat him alive for that. The leaflet was requested by the Intelligence Section of the U.S. Eighth Army in regard to their landing on the island of Luzon. It depicts a smiling American soldier on the front. The text on the back is:

FILIPINOS

You may help us with your liberation by:

Using roads only after military operations are complete.

Destroying bridges only when directed by American or Filipino forces.

Harassing small groups of individual Japanese, and if possible take them to friendly forces as captives.

Observing Japanese movements, numbers, positions and equipment so that you can report them accurately to American troops.

Giving aid, food, water, direction and information to small groups of soldiers like the one pictured on the opposite side of this sheet.

Your help will be needed to move food and supplies, and to improve your roads. Your municipal and barrio authorities will notify you, and you will be paid for your work.

The Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines will return with the armed forces. Its laws will be in effect. Obey them.

 

The Yanks have Landed On your Island

Leaflet 4-F-6 depicts American soldiers walking ashore. It was prepared on 23 September 1944 to be used on islands where the Americans land from D-Day to D plus 5. The back text is in English and warns the Filipinos to stay away from Japanese military objectives and ends with:

Remember: Planes, bombs and shells cannot tell a friend from a foe.

Leaflet 12-F-6

This leaflet to the Filipinos tells them to accept Japanese soldiers wanting to surrender because that means one less enemy to fight. It is in the form of a letter from Filipino Commander of Guerrillas Colonel Ruperto Kangleon. Readers should know that the U.S. Marines fought the Japanese with such fury that prisoners were seldom taken. Early in the war some Marines were killed by surrendering Japanese that hid weapons or explosives on their bodies. The Marine Officers used various bribes such as a case of beer or a day out of the battle line to get their troops to take prisoners. The Filipinos hated the occupying Japanese too. This leaflet reminds them that they are valuable prisoners. Some of the text is:

You can help hasten the end of the Leyte campaign by taking Japanese prisoners. Every Jap soldier who comes over to our side willingly is one soldier we will not have to kill.

On the other side of this leaflet is an appeal to Japanese troops to surrender to Filipino guerrillas. If the Japanese heed the appeal, and try to give themselves up, accept their surrender immediately. Be careful that they aren’t fooling you. But if they want to surrender allow them to do so and treat them well.\

The back is an all-text surrender leaflet in Japanese. This leaflet was dropped on 12 December 1944. It was requested by G-2 (Intelligence) of the X Corps. The text is:

SOLDIERS OF THE 30TH, 102ND AND FIRST IMPERIAL DIVISIONS AND SUBSIDIARY FORCES OF THE 35TH CORPS:

Ormoc town has fallen to American arms. General Yamashita has lost the last important supply and reinforcement port for Japanese forces on Leyte. He disposed your units to the north and east, exposing your flank, on the shore of Ormoc Bay, to our amphibious assault. Now you are trapped.

True indeed is the old Samurai saying, "The General reaps glory while the ten thousand dies."

Many of your comrades who have accepted our protection, have told us they would have ceased resistance earlier had they realized that the American and Filipino soldiers have been ordered to give food, medical care and good treatment to them.

These orders to the Allied soldier are now being repeated. On the other side of this leaflet is a message to the Philippine Guerrillas from their leader, Colonel Kangloon. It instructs them to treat well and with honor all Japanese soldiers who wish to cease resistance.

This is your safe conduct pass to honorable peace.

Patriotic symbols

A Flag Leaflet

Perhaps to prepare the people for liberation and celebration, the PWB printed flag leaflets that depicted the Philippine flag on one side in full color and the 48-star flag of the United States on the other side. The leaflet bears no code but my files show it was 4F1.

Stanley Sandler says about the flag leaflets:

From San Jose to Tacloban, the roads were lined with Filipino citizens, many of them with our combination Filipino-American flag leaflets in their hands, many more with them tacked up in front of their houses.

Heed Your Country's Call

I should point out that there is also a Philippine flag leaflet with text on the with no code, but a message titled HEED YOUR COUNTY'S CALL.

President Harry Truman

Leaflet 112-J-1

Some Navy OWI leaflets depicted or mentioned President Truman, (Examples are leaflet 2088: "A Message from the President of the United States to the People of Japan" and leaflet 2099 which quoted from a Truman speech on the subject of unconditional surrender). The PWB leaflets do not picture Truman at all as far as I can tell. As close as we come is this leaflet that quotes the president. Text on the front is:

The Defeat of the Military Leaders is the Victory of the People

The text on the back is:

AMERICAN PRESIDENT SPEAKS!

U.S. President Truman on 8 May last issued the following statement:

The more the war is prolonged, the greater will be the suffering and hardship of the Japanese people. Moreover, this suffering is entirely in vain. Until the Japanese Army and Navy throw down their arms and surrender unconditionally, America will continue her fierce attacks.

What effect will the unconditional surrender of the military authorities have on the Japanese people?

It means the end of the war and the end of the power of the military leaders who have brought Japan to the brink of destruction. It also means the return of soldiers and sailors to their families, to their farm villages, and to their various occupations. More, it means not prolonging the pain, suffering and slave-like status of the Japanese people, who cling to the vain hope of winning this war.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN SIXTH ARMY

The leaflet above was depicted and translated in this single-sided sheet: prepared by the Acting Chief of Staff, G2 (Intelligence). It was probably made by the Sixth Army to commemorate what they did in the early days of the invasion. It has no code number, but was probably given out during command briefings and to troops who folded it and carried it as a souvenir of their unit. It depicts a map that shows all the places they airdropped leaflets. Some of the more pertinent comments are:

Propaganda leaflet drops during the period 16 May through 22 May: Total leaflets dropped on Luzon during this period – 1,011,375.

One of the few Japanese field grade officers, a Lieutenant Commander who was a medical officer for a naval air unit, stated that he had seen three types of U.S. propaganda leaflets…after wandering around the Zambales Mountains for four months he made up his mind to surrender…He presented his ideas to seven men who were with him…The group then held a vote and unanimously decided to surrender.

A prisoner of war who surrendered on 11 May in Tayabas Province stated that he had seen many U.S. propaganda leaflets. He carried several surrender leaflets so that should he meet U.S. troops he would be able to surrender himself.

A prisoner of war…Saw PWB leaflets but was not impressed at the time and threw them away. Later when alone he reconsidered the leaflets…The prisoner of war was left behind by his unit due to illness. Prisoner surrendered to U.S. forces.

The Emperor

Leaflet 122-J-1

It was American policy not to vilify or insult the Japanese Emperor in any way since it was believed that would be counter-productive to the war effort. This PWB leaflet honors the Japanese Emperor’s birthday. Although it bears the “1,” it was requested by the Sixth Army for use against Japanese troops on Northern Luzon. The text on the front is:

Today is the Emperor’s Birthday

The text on the back is:

Today, 29 April 1945, is the birthday of His Majesty, the Emperor.

It is regrettable that you Japanese soldiers must greet this day of public festival defeated everywhere by overwhelming superiority of ground, air and naval forces, and that, faced with hopeless conditions, you must seek a useless death.

The military leaders who are responsible for this war are again unable to offer the Emperor a victory on his birthday. Rather, they are afraid of exposure of their own incompetence.

How much longer can these military leaders continue to deceive the Emperor?

  

Rear Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias

On 29 June 1961, Retired Rear Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias, 71, deputy chief of Naval Intelligence in World War II died of heart complications. Zacharias conducted radio psychological warfare against the Japanese high command in World War II. He became famous among PSYOP experts for his broadcasts to the Japanese which eased the way for their eventual capitulation by defining “Unconditional surrender” to them. He knew the Japanese leaders, spoke impeccable Japanese, and regularly explained that submission did not imply the overturning of their Emperor, their national system or their traditional way of life.

The Soviet Union

Leaflet 144-J-1

All through the war the Japanese and the Soviets warily watched each other. Both feared a sneak attack by the other. They were old enemies and had fought on more than one occasion. Because of Russian spies in Japan such as Victor Sorge, the Soviet Union was able to move some combat troops from their eastern defensive positions to help in the fight against Germany. Once it was clear that Japan was beaten, the USSR declared war on Japan and tried to grab some of the spoils. MacArthur quickly squelched that idea. In this leaflet, the PWB announces to the Japanese that they are now at war with the Soviet union too. On the front of the leaflet an American and a Soviet soldier shake hands. The text is:

INSPIRING HANDSHAKE

The text on the back of the leaflet is:

Red Army Strikes

The powerful Soviet Union has now joined the war against Japan. This means that Japan will now be compelled to meet most of the combined might of the entire world…

The fate that befell the German Army when it set out to overwhelm Russia is well known. The Russians not only stopped the invasion of the greatest army ever created, but the Red counter-offensive swept the Nazi Army back to Berlin and total defeat.

Despite heavy casualties, the Red Army is now at the peak of its strength both in men and arms. With its great fighting spirit, this battle-tested army has joined the forces aligned against Japan.

Surrounded by a ring of steel, the Japanese people must take action to avoid the utter destruction of their country.

Will you continue to allow the militarists to drag your ancestral country to utter ruin?

There is an interesting story behind this leaflet. Report on Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area 1944-1945 says:

Leaflets announcing the entry of the Soviet Union into the war were prepared four months in advance. Planners reasoned that if the Japanese Government were permitted to make the first announcement, there would be a fantastic claim of victory. If we announced it first, picturing the might of the Red Army, the psychological blow would stun the population. Seven million copies of the leaflet “Red Army Strikes” were dropped on Japan the day the Soviet Union declared war.

Because the leaflet was prepared in advance, a day after the Russians declared war on Japan American newspapers featured the leaflets for all to see. The photo caption was:

9 August 1945: PROPAGANDA LEAFLET DROPPED ON JAPS. “The Red Army Strikes” is the inscription in Japanese on the side of this leaflet dropped on the enemy homeland by U.S planes a few hours after Russia entered the war against Japan. The message in Japanese on the reverse side stresses that the Japanese people must take action to avoid utter destruction from the combined armed might of the Allies. (AP wire photo from Signal Corps radio-photo from Manila today).

Tactical Leaflets

Tactical leaflets are very interesting because in theory they are not part of some great strategic plan coordinated by governments, generals and local politicians. They are leaflets prepared on the ground and used against an enemy directly in front of friendly forces. A commander fighting a battle may request such a leaflet to be used on enemy troops a few hundred meters away in an attempt to encourage surrenders. They are produced quickly, “down and dirty” and usually in black and white for speed. We will depict a few tactical leaflets here that were clearly called in to help win a specific battle and have little connection to “the big picture.”

Leaflet 13-J-6

The 1st Cavalry Division was locked in a bitter battle with the Japanese defenders of Ormoc. The PWB Liaison officer attached to the division requested this leaflet on 20 November 1944 to break the Japanese morale. The text is:

Ceaselessly Firing

The text on the back is:

No sleep. No peace. Day and night the ceaseless firing of the artillery haunts you. Like devils, the shells find you and kill you. All around you can see your comrades dying after each barrage.

This leaflet bears a printing error and a Japanese prisoner pointed out that: 

The third character from the top in the right hand row is wrong and makes the leaflet ineffective.

Leaflet 39-J-6

The Americans took a terrible beating at Bataan early in the war and now the situation was reversed. The Japanese were holding out and putting up a strong defense so on 17 February 1945 a Major Anderson requested that this leaflet be prepared to convince them of the futility of further resistance. The text is:

Map Showing Position on Bataan

The name Bataan is significant to all Americans as a place where our soldiers were forced to retreat in early 1942. At the time we were unprepared for war.

Now the situation is reversed. We are strong. We are determined. We have the added advantage of having any escape route you choose blocked off. Our landing in the south denies you a means by which some of our men escaped to Corregidor. Help will not reach you.

Those of you who choose to live will receive humane treatment, food, tobacco, and medical care. Useless death on Bataan will not help you, your family, or your country. Think this over.

Leaflet 23-J-6

This leaflet targets Japanese troops in the Ormoc Corridor on the west coast of Leyte. It was dated 10 December 1944. It is in the form of a "News-extrafor dropping immediately after printing. Some of the text on the back is:

AMERICANS LAND AT ORMOC

Strong American infantry forces, supported by tanks, armored cars, and heavy artillery made a successful landing on the west coast of Leyte, four miles south of Ormoc, outflanking large Japanese forces. General Yamashita and his staff evidently did not expect the landing, military observers said. There was only slight ground opposition from the Japanese troops. The landing split in two the Japanese forces in western Leyte. Their 25th Division is cut off from its supply base at Ormoc and trapped between the new American beachhead and the American forces attacking north from the Danulaan area, eleven miles south of Ormoc - An entire Japanese convoy of 13 vessels, including four large transports, seven destroyers and destroyer escorts, was lost of the west coast of Leyte. The convoy was apparently heading for Ormoc with reinforcements the same time our troops were landing. During the day, 52 Japanese aircraft were shot down.

Leaflet 106-J-6

This leaflet depicts happy Japanese prisoners-of war. It was written by a Japanese prisoner who is actually in the picture eating a piece of chocolate. That chocolate might be the best propaganda. It is aimed at Japanese troops still fighting on Northern Luzon. The text on the front says in part:

We are all eagerly awaiting your arrival here. Our days are spent in pleasant surroundings. Our strength has increased with the food and special care the American soldiers have given us. We have renewed hop for the future.

The back is a long all text statement. It says in part:

Imperial Headquarters has announced the loss of Okinawa. The outcome of the war is now obvious. Several days before the fall of Okinawa, more than seven thousand Japanese soldiers surrendered, while in Northern Luzon hundreds are surrendering daily. These former soldiers are now safe and receiving food and medical attention. What is to be gained by further resistance? Further resistance will lead only to a miserable death. From my own experience I can guarantee you that your anxiety about your treatment is foolish. You will be given good treatment, food and medical supplies. Come to the American lines.

Bomb Warning

 

150-J-1

The concept of bomb warning leaflets is an interesting one. In theory it is a terrible idea because warning the enemy of where they will be bombed allows them to move anti-aircraft guns and fighter squadrons near to the target sites. For this reason, pilots hated them and did not want to drop them under any circumstances. On the other hand, strategic leaders knew that warning the Japanese of a coming bombing would cause the workers to flee the factories and tie up the roads, causing a drop in war production and transportation problems. Their observation that their military was helpless to protect them even when warned would destroy their morale.

The generals decreed that the warning would be disseminated. The OWI and the PWB handed this campaign in a very different way. The Navy dropped leaflets showing a B-29 bomber and listing a dozen cities that might be bombed in the near future. The message was “In the next few days, four or more of the cities named on the reverse side of this leaflet will be destroyed by American bombs.” That gave the Allied pilots a little leeway since the Japanese defenders did not know where or when the attack would occur. The Army did it much more dangerously. They dropped a leaflet that said that the city targeted would be bombed within three days. Apparently this worked quite well and the Japanese did admit to major problems with industry when such a leaflet was dropped. Almost a decade later when MacArthur was fighting the North Koreans, the Americans used an almost identical leaflet. Apparently it worked.

Leaflet 150-J-1 depicts what the Psywar specialists call a "streamer," depicting a bomb burst on the front with a bright red background and the text:

Civilians! Evacuate at once!

There is text on the back that says in part:

These leaflets are being dropped to notify you that your city has been listed for destruction by our powerful air force. The bombing will begin within 72 hours.

This advance notice will give your military ample time to take the necessary defensive measure to protect you from our inevitable attack. Watch and see how powerless they are to protect you.

We give the military clique this notification of our plans because we know there is nothing they can do to stop our overwhelming power and our iron determination. We want you to see how powerless the military is to protect you.

Systematic destruction of city after city will continue as long as you blindly follow your military leaders whose blunders have placed you on the very brink of extinction. It is your responsibility to overthrow the military government now and save what is left of your beautiful country.

In the meantime; we urge all civilians to evacuate at once.

[Author’s note]: the same image was used by American forces fighting in Korea in 1950. That leaflet had text in Korean warning of scheduled bombing raids and warning the people to evacuate 10 named cities, most prominently Pyongyang. That leaflet was coded 1013.

Bomb Warning leaflet Printed by the U.S. Navy Attack Transport McIntyre

The U.S.S. Marvin H. McIntyre (APA-129)

Over the years I have seen many American leaflets overprinted with comments and a postage stamp from an attack transport. The USS Marvin H. McIntyre (APA-129) was a Haskell-class attack transport of the US Navy. She was built and used during World War II. Originally designated "Arlington" for Arlington County, Virginia, she was renamed in memorial to Marvin H. McIntyre, Secretary to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who died in office in 1943, becoming the only Haskell-class ship not named for a US County. This attack transport had a printing press onboard and prepared the leaflets to be dropped by naval aircraft flying from aircraft carriers. I have always hated the overprints because they deface the leaflet. Still, we can assume that some smart sailor decided that there was a profit to be made from the leaflets. It appears he took them to the ship's post office and had them cancelled as a way to prove that they were in Japanese waters in 1945. On this version of leaflet 150-J-1 above the sailor has placed a U.S. one-cent George Washington postage stamp cancelled with the date 28 October 1945 and the name of his ship, the Marvin H. McIntyre. There is also a brief text:

Army occupation landing Oct. 28, ’45. The bomber plant city of Nagoya, Honshu J. Target of Doolittle’s raid.

The sailor probably thought that the stamp and cancellation would make the leaflets more valuable, but because they are fairly common and most collectors want pristine copies, I believe the defacing of the leaflets makes them less valuable.

 

Leaflet 18-F-6

Unlike leaflet 150-J-1 above which is more of a strategic leaflet aimed at the higher echelons of the Japanese military and government, Sixth Army leaflet 18-F-6 is a tactical bomb warning leaflet, probably dropped just ahead of the American military forces to warn the Filipinos to stay well clear of the fighting. It warns the Filipinos to stay off the roads and away from military targets.

Japanese Philippine Islands Warning Poster

This Japanese warning would normally go into my article on Japanese PSYOP, but it is so similar to the American PWB warning above that I thought it would be interesting to show it here so they can be compared. Note that the American leaflet says “We don’t want to hurt you,” while the Japanese leaflet leaves no doubt as to their intentions. Filipinos will be “shot to death.”

Propaganda Songs

Leaflet 19-F-6

When the U.S. Army hit the beaches of the Philippines Islands to drive out the Japanese occupiers, an entire series of “F” leaflets were prepared and disseminated. The first number in the code indicates the number of a particular series, the “F” indicates “Filipino,” and the final number indicates the army, in this case the 6th U.S. Army. This leaflet bears the lyrics of the song “Heaven Watch the Philippines,” written by Irving Berlin and dedicated to General Douglas MacArthur. The general in accepting the dedication said:

The Commander in Chief appreciates greatly the distinction of the dedication of a song by such a distinguished author and producer as Mr. Irving Berlin. He is deeply grateful to him not only for that, but for the magnificent aid he is rendering the Allied cause.

Instructional Leaflets

6-F-8

This leaflet was prepared to instruct the Filipinos how to act as they came in contact with advancing American troops. It mentions the danger of being on the roads and out in the open and warns against black marketeering although that term is not specifically used. It mentions the police, medical and financial aid. It sets the standard for transactions between the Filipinos and the United States Army.

Surrender Leaflets

Leaflet 8-J-6 (First Version)

Leaflet 17-J-1 (Second Version)

Although there were many types of surrender leaflets produced during the war, the most famous in the Pacific was the “I Cease Resistance” type. This leaflet had started with the text “I surrender,” but it was quickly found that the Japanese despised surrender and thought it cowardly. The leaflets were tested, revised, made larger so that they were more visible to both the Japanese and the American soldiers who might shoot the Japanese coming over to the Americans not realizing that they were surrendering, and eventually dropped in numerous forms. Readers who want to know more about this operation should read my article: The “I Cease Resistance” Safe Conduct Passes of WWII. I am aware of about 11 different versions of this standard leaflet, and more may exist.

The first version of the leaflet above was prepared by the U.S. Sixth Army for the Japanese on the Philippines. Notice that it uses the old “I Surrender” text. The message on the back is:

Brave Soldiers of Nippon:

The force to which you are attached has fought with great bravery. Rarely in the present war have we encountered such fighting spirit among Yamato warriors. We have gained deep respect for your courage.

But the war cannot be won by courage alone.

Our troops were able to attack you in overwhelming force because American factories have supplied us with superior weapons. You have felt their quality and power. Our planes dominate the field of battle. You are waiting for the Japanese Air Force but your expectation is in vain.

Your Force Commander ordered you into a hopeless attack. Then he delayed retreat too long, hoping in vain to retrieve his error. As the old saying goes:

“The General reaps the glory, while ten thousand sacrifice themselves.”

Now there is no escape. Your line of communication is cut off from the main Japanese force, and your escape route is now cut. Reinforcements cannot reach you. Every other Japanese unit is also cut off now. Some seek only to save themselves. Many others have honorably ceased resistance and are now in our care.

Your fate is like a flickering candle in the wind.

It is for you to decide whether you want to die a useless death or seek peace with honor.

This leaflet is your ticket to start a new life after the war.

The second version of the leaflet above is actually one of two versions of this “I Cease Resistance” leaflet with the same code number. The Japanese text on the front is the same on both, but the photographer has moved back so now there are four Japanese POWs with their eyes blanked out whereas on the first version only three are depicted. The text on the front is:

The text of the English message written above is:

This man is no longer an enemy, According to International Law; he is guaranteed personal safety, clothes, food, quarters and medical attention. 

The picture at the left shows some of your comrades who came over to our side.

Eyes are covered to protect their families in Japan.

Text on the back is:

TO THE GALLANT JAPANESE OFFICERS AND MEN

You have fought bravely without the aid of your Navy and Air Force while suffering from a shortage of food. Fate was against you, however, and you have come to the final stage.

Is a meaningless death the only thing left to you? Why don’t you seek the road to a new life and live for the future of Japan?

Your comrades, already under American protection, have recovered their health and are already enjoying a communal life.

This leaflet is a safe conduct pass to the American lines. Throw away you weapons and approach the American positions or sentry lines, carrying this message (or a piece of white cloth) on a stick. If you see an American soldier, raise both arms and obey his signs.

One leaflet may be used by a group.

I should point out that the original 17-J-1 leaflet had a blank back and this is considered a major error in leafleting since the enemy can place a message of their own on the back. In the case of the second version of this leaflet, the back bears an all-text message coded 141-J-1 and as a result it is also listed with that code number by the PWB. The same message apparently is also found on Leaflet 6-J-2 except that message adds "the Island of Luzon" to the text

Quartets

I called this section “quartets” because there are two groups of leaflets that are in the same series, and each contains four different small leaflets.

  

  

Leaflet 14-J-1 (A-D)

The first four leaflets are all exactly the same size, with a military scene on the front with a bright red background. One leaflet depicts a Japanese military truck, the second a destroyer, the third an artillery piece, and the fourth a Mitsubishi  G4M “Betty” bomber, also known as the Navy Type 1 Attack bomber, or Hamaki (cigar). All of the leaflets bear quotations from Japanese publications on occupied areas of raw production that have been lost. The American title for the series is "Tools of War." The text on the front of the four leaflets is:

1. Rubber is a special product of the South Seas.
2. Oil is a special product of the South Seas.
3. Light metals are important products of the South Seas.
4. Metals for steel and other alloys are imported products of the South Seas.

Some of the texts from the back of the four leaflets is:

Quotations from Japanese publications:

Captain Kurihara Etsuzo (Chief of Naval Operations) says:

For Japan too, the loss of the Dutch Indies would make it extremely difficult to carry on the modern warfare that we have today, the so called "War of Constant Production." Consequently, the Japanese struggle to retain the southern regions is one of our most important tasks.

American forces are now firmly established in the Philippines. How will this affect the war of supply?

 Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo says:

Japan’s great strength is due to her possession of the petroleum and other vital raw materials of the former Dutch East Indies.

In wartime, these distant regions are not just a southern extremity, but the vital “heart” of Japan. 

If this “heart” should be lost, Japan would be attacked from the air; it would be a “death blow” to Japan.

A Japanese prisoner said that some of the text on these leaflets was incorrect since for instance, Japan depends on Korea and Manchuria for such materials as bauxite and steel and not the Southern Regions.

Leaflets 132A-J-1 through 132D-J-1, The Question Mark Series

Each of the four leaflets in this series contains a single question on the front, with art on the reverse.

Leaflet 132A-J-1

132A-J1 depicts a large question mark surrounding Japan, Korea and Manchuria and asks, "Is the war strategy going well?"

132B-J1 depicts a calendar with the years 1943 and 1944 detached and the year 1945 about to fall. A question mark and the text, "How much longer will this misery last?"

132C-J1 depicts question marks over Japan and Tokyo and the text, "Is a prolonged war profitable?"

Leaflet 132D-J-1

132D-J1 depicts a country girl amid a shower of leaflets falling from the sky, looking at one at her feet marked "Facts.". The text is, "Why is it wrong to read leaflets?"

Since the Japanese were told that all leaflets were lies and should never be read, this leaflet encourages the people look at them. The leaflets bear the title, “Facts.”

President Roosevelt

Filipinos

In this leaflet coded 3-J-8 President Roosevelt sends a message to the Filipinos. He compliments them for keeping the faith and trusting in the United States, he promises liberation and asks them to continue helping the Guerillas and the American forces. The back of the leaflet is a patriotic image depicting the crossed flags of the United States and the Philippines.

  

An uncoded pre-invasion leaflet featuring President Roosevelt

This leaflet was probably dropped about 1943 like another uncoded leaflet we depict in this article featuring President Quezon. The front of the leaflet features Roosevelt and military leaders Nimitz and MacArthur, and a P-40 fighter and what appears to be a C-47 cargo aircraft. The back photographs state that Americans build schools while the Japanese burn them and shows American naval power and tells the Filipinos that America is completely mobilized for war.

Proclamations

Memorandum explaining the Four General MacArthur Letters

The 27 September 1944 document gives the order in which the four letters are to be dropped and explains that until they are they are to be considered top secret.

 

Memorandum explaining to the PWB personnel the code numbers of the various proclamations and the numbers of each printed.

To the People of the Philippines

Once General MacArthur and President Osmena returned to the Philippines they both issued a series of proclamations. Although none of these letter-sized proclamations bear a code, my files show that the early ones were all coded sequentially from 1(a)-F-1 to 1(h)-F-1 by the PWB. The first four by MacArthur, the second four by Osmena. More may exist. The first we show is probably the first MacArthur proclamation released on the day he returned. Once again he starts his statement with “I have returned.” Some of these proclamations show stains at the top and bottom since they were glued down in the PWB scrapbooks. The usual manner for removing them is to soak the page in warm water.

Whereas, the forces under my command…

In this Proclamation to the People of the Philippines, MacArthur basically states that he is back and now legally controls the Philippines. He tells the Filipinos to obey the laws of the legal government that he will institute.

There is another proclamation with this same title “Proclamation to the People of the Philippines” though different text. In it, MacArthur discusses what he intends to do with the courts, how he will prosecute war crimes, the new Philippine currency, the banks and a debt moratorium. In regard to Philippine currency he states that there will be new banknotes; and that the old ones before the Japanese arrived and that emergency notes printed by the pro-American guerrillas are all valid, but anything the Japanese or their collaborators prepared are invalid:

The New Philippine Victory Peso

A new victory series of Philippine Treasure Certificates (Victory Pesos) and Philippine coins, identical with pre-war issues, have been prepared and will be legal tender. The rate of exchange is two Victory Pesos for one American dollar. All pre-war Philippine Treasure Certificates are valid.

Japanese currency, Philippine National Banknotes (except for duly authorized emergency issues), notes of the Bank of the Philippines Islands, and New Central Bank notes are not legal tender. Transactions in these currencies are prohibited.

Providing for Military Measures to be Taken…

Another signed MacArthur proclamation was actually coded 14-F-6. This 29 December 1944 proclamation is entitled, “Providing the Military Measures to be taken upon the Apprehension of Citizens who have voluntarily given Aid, Comfort and Substance to the Enemy.” It explains in some depth that MacArthur will remove such persons when apprehended from any position of political or economic influence, arrest them and after the end of the war see that they are released to the Philippine government for judgement. This same statement is found on a larger sheet in the form of a proclamation with the same code number.

Prof. Augusto de Viana differentiates five types of collaborators in his book Kulaburetor, University of Santo Tomas Publishing House, 2016:

Political Collaborators - Consisting of members of the pre-War political elite; Economic Opportunists - Businessmen and politicos found opportunity to amass wealth as suppliers of strategic materials and other items needed by the Japanese war effort; Cultural collaborators - They were mostly staff members of publications that the Japanese utilized for propaganda; Civil order and police forces - They were members of the police and the Japanese-led Bureau of Constabulary; and Military quislings - The Makapili, Ganap, Palaak, Pampar, and United Nippon were formed directly to support Japanese army operations.

In fact, Jose P. Laurel, the collaborationist Philippine President who worked with the Japanese was arrested in Japan on 7 September 1945 and returned to the Philippines in June 1946. He was charged with treason but released under a general amnesty before the conclusion of his trial.

President Jose Paciano Laurel

A brief description of President Laurel from World War II in the Pacific: An Encyclopedia:

A Filipino politician, Jose Paciano Laurel was president of the Japanese-sponsored Philippine republic. Born at Tanauan, Batangas Province, on March 9, 1891, Laurel obtained law degrees from the University of the Philippines in 1915, Yale University in 1920, and the Tokyo Imperial University in 1938. Laurel, a fervent nationalist, detested colonialism and believed racial self-respect was important in the molding of a nation-state. He condemned the Filipino mania for Occidental norms and favored a school program encouraging indigenous beliefs and national solidarity. In 1936, he sent a son to study at Tokyo’s Imperial Military Academy.

In 1943, the Japanese formed the Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence, selecting Laurel as its president. As president, Laurel planned to utilize the Japanese presence to renew Philippine culture and values. Applauding the Japanese Military Administration as pursuing the genuine well-being of Filipino people and their rapid advance toward self-government, he pushed moral awareness and the creation of a citizenry committed to the general interest. Yet Laurel rejected the conscription of Filipinos and World India II in the Pacific 534 opposed the formation of a pro-Japanese force of volunteers. In 1944, he ordered military governors to provide laborers to the Nipponese army, demanding the cooperation of every male between the ages of 18 and 50. On September 22, he issued a proclamation recklessly declaring war on the United States. Fleeing to Baguio in 1945, he was brought to Japan to set up a government in exile. Once Tokyo surrendered, Laurel announced the termination of the Republic of the Philippines.

Patriots of the Philippines

Here the General seems to complement the Filipinos for their loyalty and help in his campaign. He explains that he will promulgate specific orders but expects their common sense to rule in all cases. The back his signed and the proclamation ends with the paragraph:

Above all, I call for unity among the people - that unity so essential to the development of maximum strength at this critical time. Let the depth of your patriotism and your love of freedom rise above all differences, factional quarrels, disputes and petty jealousies; that all patriots unflinchingly may march shoulder to shoulder toward a common destiny.

To Count Terauchi

This proclamation to the Commander in Chief of Japanese Forces is interesting because MacArthur is clearly disturbed. He has heard that American prisoners have been treated brutally. He warns of possible retribution to come.

MacArthur received some criticism for charging the former commander of Japanese forces in the Philippines, General Yamashita Tomoyuki, with war crimes committed in the city of Manila. Tomoyuki was 80 kilometers away from Manila at the time and out of communication with his troops. He was found guilty and executed in February 1946. Some critics believed that MacArthur simply wanted revenge because he had been beaten badly and forced to flee the Philippines at the start of the war.

Fellow Countrymen

This is the first of several proclamations by President Osmena. It bears no code but my records show that it is very likely 1(e)-F-1. It asks that Filipinos come forth to work for the Allies and for food production to feed themselves. President Osmena apparently published at least four proclamations because my files show codes for him from 1(e)-F-1 to 1(h)-F-1

My Fellow Countrymen

Osmena tells his countrymen here that MacArthur and freedom have returned. He urges his people to rise up and fight the Japanese as the Americans approach their homes.

Newspapers

Rakkasan News No. 21

Wherever American propagandists go, newspapers are sure to follow. Since the enemy generally only hears favorable news from his side, the Americans tend to make it a point to give him a more truthful and unbiased look at the current war situation. The Rakkasan Nyuso (“Parachute News”) was published by the PWB from about March to August 1945. The 4 August 1945 paper above has the following news stories on the front side:

The full text of the Potsdam Proclamation; MacArthur plans the bombing of strategic sites in Japan; Three Japanese convoys sunk; The toll of Japanese dead and taken as prisoners in the Philippines; peace is now possible if the Japanese choose it.

Rakkasan News No. 22 (Back)

This very historic issue of the Rakkasan news is dated 11 August 1945. That is five days after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. One of the main stories is:

Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, the most powerful weapon on Earth.

Other stories include: Heavy bombings of Japanese cities by B-29s; Japan blockaded by Minefields; Japanese hospital ship carries arms and unwounded soldiers; huge July toll of Japanese ships and planes; and MacArthur’s planes make Kagasaki port area a flaming inferno.

The photo in the center of the paper shows a Nisei (an American of Japanese descent) Sergeant holding his nephew on Okinawa).

Sandler adds:

The very popular and effective Rakkasan News was also published in Manila, but of course, for the enemy…All prisoners interrogated said it was a very professional Tokyo-type newspaper. Even those overwhelming majority of Japanese troops who did not defect were starved for news and could be influenced by U.S. PSYWAR news sheets…Between 20 and 26 May, 119 Japanese surrendered to XI Corps troops, and for the most part admitted they had been influenced by American PSYWAR, even though they were in fairly good condition; they particularly appreciated Rakkasan News. A Japanese Domei news agency correspondent’s report, found by Filipino guerrillas, stated that he looked forward to each issue, due to its timely news.

General Feller says:

Each week one to two million copies were dropped on enemy troops and the civil population in Japan. Prisoners of War in the Philippine said that the Rakkasan News was the only source of truthful information available to the Japanese soldier from the outside world.

Let us discuss the actual newspaper and its effectiveness for just a moment. On 19 October 1945, interviews were held with numerous Japanese officials about the effectiveness of American propaganda leaflets. They were rated as "very effective," "Effective," "Slightly effective" and "Not effective." The Japanese gave only four leaflets a rating of "Very effective," and the Rakkasan News was one of the four. Some examples of why they rated it so highly:

The Rakkasan News was effective and better than leaflets in results achieved. The contents of the newspaper have actual photographs and news stories that gave information on the true situation. The newspaper stirred up the curiosity of the people, they read it and began to disbelieve the sincerity of the military and Imperial Headquarters.

One Japanese prisoner questioned about his opinion of this propaganda newspaper by the PWB said that it was the most effective of all the leaflets, and recommended a way to make it even better:

Articles concerning the Emperor should appear at the top of the page, a precedent established by Japanese newspapers. Any item concerning the Emperor should be reprinted exactly as released by Domei [the Japanese news service], since the exact wording would then ring true to the Japanese.

Ji Ji Shu Ho – Issue Number Six - 24f-J-6

Another newspaper printed by the U.S. Sixth Army was Ji Ji Shu Ho (News of the Week.) This 8.5 x 11.5-inch newspaper was designed to infiltrate Japanese troops with true news of Allied action on all fronts, with emphasis on the Southwest pacific and the Philippines. Each issue was coded with the leaflet number “24,” a letter for the issue (“A” the first issue, “B” the second issue, etc.). The third issue dated 12 January 1945 with the headline “Powerful American Forces Invade Luzon” was 24c-J-6.

We depict Issue 6 above, with stories of American troops on their way to Manila, Japanese General Yamashita claiming that all is going well, a picture of “Mr. B-San,” the Japanese name for the B-29 bomber, and a Japanese style cartoon showing an aircraft carrier landing what it thought to be a fighter but turns out to be a seagull.

A U.S. Eighth Army newspaper was actually more like a newssheet. It was coded 1-(C)-J-8, dated 28 December 1944 with the title Jijitsu Shimpo (Factual News Account). Once again the letter “C” indicates the third issue of the newspaper. The newspaper was aimed at Japanese troops on Leyte.

The Classified “Confidential” United States Navy Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas Weekly Intelligence of 9 April 1945 mentions the Japanese thoughts regarding American psychological warfare:

JAPANESE CONCERN OVER PROPAGANDA

Some estimation of the effects of Allied propaganda warfare of Japan’s homeland is contained in a recent domestic radio broadcast by the chief managing editor of the Tokyo newspaper, Mainishi. “The Nefarious Schemes of the Enemy” was the title of the address. The speaker postulates that the outstanding aim of "the enemy's indiscriminate bombing attacks is to demoralize the people, along with the destruction of our fighting power."

Against a war-weary Japan, he foresees a general propaganda offensive in order to create a desire for peace among the people. The speaker continues, in part:

"The enemy has used every possible trick against our people. It is only natural that the enemy's efforts in spreading propaganda will be increased as the bombing attacks increase. In carrying out his machinations and propaganda the most important means used by the enemy are radio, newspapers, magazines, and handbills, dropped from the air.

"As for radio, due to skillful interference by our radio stations, the enemy's broadcasts have been completely sealed from the ears of our people. As the fighting is brought closer to our homeland, there is no doubt that the enemy will resort to every possible method, such as changing frequencies, to bring his propaganda to our ears. If you happen to be listening to a broadcast which is hard to understand, or which appears to be queer, that is an enemy propaganda broadcast, and you must turn the switch and pay no attention to it at all.

"Printed papers, such as newspapers, magazines and handbills scattered from the air, were distributed all over the place during the carrier plane attacks in February. Propaganda handbills, taking the form of newspapers and magazines, must have been printed in Honolulu for they are beautiful Japanese language prints which look as if they were printed in Japan. We must be vigilant because the enemy gradually may take up more skillful methods.

"To listen to or read enemy propaganda once or twice would not amount to anything but if this is repeated a great number of times, people may become interested. To take an interest in enemy propaganda material is equivalent to the first stage of being taken in by enemy propaganda.

"Recently we have been hearing frequent talks on just what part of our country is likely to be dangerous (In the event of an invasion) and whether we should evacuate (those areas) and seek refuge elsewhere. To spread such false rumors or to believe them means that you already have taken the first step in falling in line with the enemy's machinations and propaganda."

Maptalk

General MacArthur's SWPA Command had its own small news booklet. It was published by the Information and Education Section of the U.S. Amy Forces Far East. This issue is dated 23 December 1944. On 20 October 1944, American forces commanded by General MacArthur began their return to the Philippines by landing on Leyte. The Japanese were overwhelmed by the superior American forces and its ever-expanding air support. On 15 December US troops landed on the beaches of Mindoro. This classified Restricted 24-page page booklet had numerous articles including the fight for the Philippines, the war in Europe, the Battle of the Bulge, Yamashita, the Tiger of Malaya, and The German V-2 weapon. I depict the first two pages. 

"THE WAR IS OVER" LEAFLETS TO THE JAPANESE

Leaflet 127-J-1

This is a very scarce leaflet. I do not see them in any of the souvenir PWB scrapbooks.  These came after the emperor had surrendered and they must have been very hot souvenirs for American soldiers at the end of the bitter war. Leaflet 127-J-1 is titled Imperial Rescript Promulgated. It targeted all Japanese in the Philippines and 500,000 all-text copies were printed in Japanese, another 2,000 English translations. The front text is:

WAR IS OVER. IMPERIAL RESCRIPT PROMULGATED.

The text on the back is:

Japan has agreed to unconditional surrender. The war is over.

On August 15, His Majesty, the Emperor formally issued in his name, a rescript which officially ended the war for Japan.

There is no need for you to remain any longer in your present position. Throw away your weapons and without fear come to the nearest troops of the American or Philippine regular armies.

General MacArthur, who will soon leave for Japan as a Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, expresses his sympathy for you as soldiers and has ordered strict orders to all officers and men of both the American and Philippine Armies under his command to treat you honorably and to give you protection.

When you come to us, bring no weapons and carry this leaflet or a white flag. To prevent mistakes, come during daylight.

Leaflet 156-J-1

This leaflet is aimed at Japanese Troops in Ipo Dam, Wawa Dam, and Toresa Arcas. The text on the front is:

SHIMBU SHUDAN (GROUPING) OPERATIONAL ORDER #503

The message is in the form of a letter dated 6 September 1945, 1600 hours:

1. On 2 September 1945, the Empire (Japan) signed a Document of Surrender to the Allied Forces. On 3 September 1945, by order of the Emperor, General Yamashita, Commander-in-Chief of the 14th Army Group, signed a Document of Surrender to the Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces in the Philippines, which document is based on the Document of Surrender of the Empire.

2. By Order of the Army Group, I have signed a Document of Surrender to the Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces in the Manila Area, which document is based on the previously mentioned Document of Surrender. A summary of the Document of Surrender is attached at the end. On 4 September at 1400 hours , the Shimbu Shudan is relieved of its duty to conduct military operations.

3. All the operational and combat duties of all the troops under the command of the Shimbu Shudan are removed. All the above-mentioned troops are to assemble as quickly as possible in accordance with the following instructions and thereafter are to act as directed in the appended Document of Surrender.

Group H.Q.,  Kobayashi Group, Kobara Unit, Ito Unit, Kawashima Group, Kobayashi unit, Minota unit, Okida Group, Fuji Group, Kikuchlgnwa Detachment, Asano Detachment, Koto Detachment, and Kikuro Detachment. Units, individual soldiers, or attached civilians who are far from their own units may assemble at the nearest place of assembly

4. Regarding the surrender of weapons and supplies, and your equipment actions, you are to follow the directions of the American commanders with above mentioned places of assembly.

5. Naval units are to revert to the command of the South-West Fleet at their locations of 0300 hairs, 20th August.

Details are to be given by the Chief of Staff.

SHISUO YOKOYAMA
COMMANDER, SHIMBU SHUDA

Method of Conveyance: The printed orders are either to be dropped by observation planes or to be handed over by a special emissary.

DETAILS OF ORDERS AS DEFINED BY SHIMBU SHUDAN’S OPERATIONAL ORDER

1. The command of respective units shall be effective as usual.

2. The strictest military discipline shall be observed among every “HEIDEN” and “SHITAI” (Group and Detachment). All are required to act openly and fairly and maintain the dignity of the Imperial Army. Whoever disturbs military order shall be punished severely (shot to death immediately).

3. Even though the American Army may treat all Japanese forces which act according to this order as prisoners of war, the Empire of Japan will not regard them as having been prisoners after they return to the homeland.

MAJOR GENERAL SUMI
CHIEF OF STAFF, SHIMBU SHUDAN

APPENDIX

SHORT SUMMARY OF THE SURRENDER TERMS

In conformity with conditions in the formal surrender acknowledged and signed in Baguio, 2 September 1945, I hereby promise to fulfill the following terms.

1. In accordance with the order from the high command of the Japanese Army in the Philippines, I and the troops and auxiliary forces of the Shimbu Shudan which aro under my command, surrender unconditionally to the Commander of American Western Pacific Army.

2. I hereby order all troops in the area controlled by the Shimbu Shudan to immediately cease all hostilities to prevent destruction of all military and non-military materials and establishments, and to comply with all requirements that may be imposed by the Commander of the American Armed Forces in the Western Pacific or his representative

3. I hereby order the various commanders of the Shimbu Shudan to hand over all arms and ammunition, materials and food stuff intact to the American Forces at Ipo Dam, Wawa Dam, Santa Maria, or Toresa on at such times and places as will be designated by the American Commander.

 

Leaflet 157-J-1

This leaflet features an order of the Commander-in-Chief of Naval Units East of Manila. It targets naval units in Infanta, Lagaspi, Bunaran, Batangas, Palawan and Mindoro Areas. The front is text stating:

ORDER OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF NAVAL UNITS EAST OF MANILA

The back is in the form of a letter dated 6 September 1945 from Rear Admiral Furuse Kiko, Commander-in-Chief of the Naval units, East of Manila:

Order of the Commander-in-Chief of Naval units cast of Manila

1. I have received an order from the Commander-in-Chief of all units in the Philippines to the effect that all the units under my command (units at infanta, Legaspi, Bunaran, Batangas, Palawan and Mindoro) shall cease fighting.

2. In that order all the units under my command shall cease fighting immediately.

3. I, being in command of the (Japanese) units at infanta, have signed the instrument of surrender as directed by the commander of the American 38th Division and have started the withdrawal of my units.

4. The senior commander of each area shall keep contact with the Japanese units in his neighborhood, shall proceed directly to the highest American commander in each area, and shall act in accordance with the instructions of the American commander without delay.

5. Isolated units which cannot obtain instructions from their direct commanders and any soldier acting independently shall also obey instructions from. the American forces without hesitation.

End

Anyone who happens to pick up this order is required to deliver it to the nearest naval unit.

Conclusion

This is just a very short story to give an example of what General MacArthur’s Psychological Warfare Branch produced for the Philippine Campaign. Since over 200 leaflets exist, this article could easily be two or three times larger. Readers who want to know more about the psychological operations in the Pacific should read my articles on Australian and American Army and Navy general propaganda in The United States PSYOP Organization in the Pacific during World War II; the U.S. Navy and Office of War Information civilian operations in the Pacific Theatre in OWI Pacific PSYOP Six Decades ago; and the Japanese methods of psychological warfare in Japanese PSYOP During WWII. The four articles together give a very detailed account of psychological operations in the Pacific Theatre during WWII.

A PWB Certificate

Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers, Military Secretary to Commander in Chief General Douglas MacArthur, signs a standard certificate for a departing PWB propagandist.

General Fellers said that the U.S. suffered 59,510 deaths in the Philippines. The Japanese lost 314,387 troops. That is a 1 to 5.3 average. He believed this his PSYOP helped convince 12,181 Japanese troops to surrender. He says that be using the same ratio, had those troops fought to the death another 2,300 American troops would have been killed.

This was my last mention of Fellers when I first wrote this story. As time went by and there was some question of what he did not have more recognition, it was pointed out that General Eisenhower did not like him. I wondered how that could be and after studying several books and reports, including To War with Whitaker, Hermione Ranfurly, Pan Books, 1994. This was the diary of a British titled woman who took part in WWII while her husband was a prisoner of war. She mentioned Fellers a dozen times and it became clear why Ike did not like him. Eisenhower was the perfect general in Europe, he somehow kept the British and American and French troops with all the personalities and egos under control. We don’t insult anyone. We all get along fine here. Feller was a loose cannon. In early 1941 he was the US Military Attaché to the British Army in Egypt. Ranfurly says, He was an original and delightful person who seems to say exactly what he thinks to everyone regardless of nationality or rank. In June when Hitler invades Russia she says, Bonner Fellers is the only person I have met who thinks the Russians will survive – he has been to Russia recently and says the Germans have bitten off more than they can chew. In January 1942 in Cairo he says, I’m getting unpopular here. Not so much with your people as with the US Embassy in Cairo and in Washington; they think I am a defeatist but that’s not going to stop me saying what I think about the military situation, which is my job to do. The trouble is your top brass are overconfident which they’ve no right to be. Your gear is still inferior to the German’s, and you are less well led – too many senior officers are sitting on their arses at GHQ. If I get levered out, I shall join MacArthur – he’s the best soldier we have. Remember that MacArthur and Eisenhower did not like each other, and Fellers has just put himself in the MacArthur camp. In November 1943 Ranfurly meets Eisenhower and asks, if he knew Bonner Fellers, the American Attaché we all liked who was here during some of the Desert war. Eisenhower replied tersely: Any friend of Bonner Fellers is no friend of mine. Insulted, she immediately leaves. Ike called to apologize the next day, but she wanted no part of him. Unlike Montgomery, she was not charmed by Eisenhower.

And the last mention of him and certainly the worst blow was when it was found out that the Germans had broken the code he was given to report back to the states. This was not his code, it was an official code, but of course he was blamed. Bonner Fellers did not know that the Germans – and, separately, the Italians – were soon to break the American cipher with which he reported the news he culled from the British Commanders, with whom he was on excellent terms. His telegrams to Washington, for a while, became one of the best sources of Intelligence for Rommel who arrived in Tripoli on 12 February. Ultimately (in 1942) the British, through ULTRA, realized what was happening when they read signals between Rommel and Berlin; and then Bonner Fellers was moved.

And that seems to explain why Eisenhower did not care for Fellers. He was a loose cannon, said what he liked, would insult the British allies, and most of all had his mail read which helped the enemy and led to his removal.  On the other hand, MacArthur loved him and wanted to promote him.

At the end of the war MacArthur’s PWB was disbanded and became the Information Dissemination Section. The personnel were then assigned to work with the Japanese press, radio, theaters and schools. On 22 September 1945, the Information Dissemination Section was merged into a Special Staff Section, Civil Information and Education.

A bookplate inscribed to show the name of the book's owner.

Ex Libris is usually found on a bookplate glued to the back of the cover of a book. Collector’s use them to protect their books. Proclaim their ownership, and even to talk about the owner and show his personal habits and hobbies. Back in the early part of the last century they were very popular and artistic.

The bookplate above was found in a collection of WWII Office of War Information leaflets used against Japan. It could be a propaganda leaflet, but it shows no code. The blank back shows signs of gum. Looking carefully I noticed an impressed seal at the right front that read:

EX LIBRES JOSE SARTOS

I also saw a copy of this offered by a seller with the comment:

This leaflet was delivered by American aircraft to The Philippines, on December 8, 1944.

So, what is this item? I believe that probably it was airdropped during the invasion of the Philippines and a very patriotic Filipino saw the leaflet decided to use it as a bookplate. It depicts a Filipino mother over her dead son and a Filipino father holding his fist against the sky; their village burning in the background. The text is:

America Challenged! The Philippines Accepted!

MacArthur’s Final Leaflet to the Japanese in the Philippines?

This could be one of the most interesting leaflets from the Philippine campaign. We don’t know much about it, except that it was found with some military papers and was accompanied by a handwritten letter from a veteran that stated it was a surrender leaflet from Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita (the Tiger of Malaya) telling his troops to surrender. I assume the leaflet would have been printed by U.S. forces after the Japanese surrender and the general ordered to sign it and then it was reproduced and disseminated. Note at the bottom the English-language sentence: “Please bring this leaflet to the nearest Japanese unit or soldier.” If this item is genuine it would have told all the Japanese on the Philippine Islands that the war was over. The letter is difficult to read but we can make out most of the text:

Precious,

This is the grand order of surrender issued by General MacArthur and signed by General Yamashita on 3 September 1945.

He was commander of all Jap bastards in the Philippines. He was also present at General Wainwright’s surrender of Corregidor way back when…

He also (Yamashita) was partially responsible for the murdering of hundreds of Americans in the “Death March of Bataan.”

Forever yours faithfully,

“Daddy”

Yamashita’s signature is the very heavy scratching in the lower right-hand corner.

The text of the leaflet is:

This leaflet is being distributed by American airplanes to all Japanese personnel who are not aware of the official notification.

This order to cease all wartime hostilities is being issued from the highest authority. Each soldier must cease fighting at once. You are further instructed to communicate this order to other fellow soldiers. However, military discipline is to be maintained. You must continue to obey orders from your military superior. All units are to assemble at a convenient location. Contact the nearest American unit and await further instructions.

Military order from the northernmost base, 30 August 1945, the 20th year of the Emperor's Reign.

Allegedly this leaflet was also dropped by American aircraft as General Douglas MacArthur landed in Japan for the official surrender of that nation and the end of WWII. If true, this would be a PWB leaflet from MacArthur's PSYWAR Branch.

To All Persons in the Philippine Islands

Since we are talking about surrender leaflets here is one to the Americans, Japanese and Filipinos. It is clearly after the fall of the Philippines and tells everyone that Japanese soldiers coming out of the bush to surrender are to be unharmed and forwarded to the U.S. Army. It does not bear a code number, but I am sure this was a PWB leaflet and it is possible that the code number was lost when the leaflet sustained several tears. The back has a long surrender message to the Japanese soldier still in the field. Note: To save space I have severely cropped this image, in reality there was a large section missing at the lower left.

ADDENDUM

If the Japanese had not surrendered there were plans for the Army PWB PSYOP people In the Philippines to take part in the invasion of Japan:

Invasion of Japan PSYOP Chart

This chart from the Dr. Thomas H Huber Combat Studies Institute booklet Pastel: Deception in the Invasion of Japan shows that General MacArthur’s Army PSYOP operation in the Philippines would work hand in hand with Admiral Nimitz’s Navy PSYOP people on the Island of Guam to drop leaflets and deceive the leaders of Japan on where the invasion would occur. The real assault code-named Olympic was planned for South Kyushu on 1 November 1945. The deception plan code-named Pastel featured fake invasions of Shanghai on 1 October 1945 and Shikoku on 1 December 1945. The atomic bomb made all this planning unnecessary.

The Chusan-Shanghai and Shikoku deception stories were to be sold with leaflet drops, psychological warfare radio broadcasts, air reconnaissance, bombing and strafing, and a submarine-borne beach penetration landing. Leaflet drops in the Shanghai area were to be provided by the Far East Air Force (FEAF) and the content was to be directed at Japanese military or Chinese civilian morale. Drops were to be at the rate of two per week in early August, three per week in late August, then one every two weeks after the target shifted to Shikoku on 7 September. FEAF was also to show U.S. interest in the Shanghai region by conducting "aerial reconnaissance, photography, bombing, and strafing missions." These missions were to be flown three times per week before 7 September and once every two weeks thereafter. The extension of leaflet drops and air reconnaissance even after 7 September was required because PASTEL called for a latent threat to be maintained against the Shanghai region even though Shikoku had been designated the next main assault zone.

Back to Bataan

Whenever I see PSYOP used in a war film I like to add it to the article I have written about that part of the war. For instance. leaflets were dropped in the films Battleground and Dunkirk, and I depicted both in the stories of those battles. In the 1945 film Back to Bataan, a Filipino woman is depicted as a collaborator, but we later find out she is working with the Americans to drive the Japanese out of her homeland. The actress, Fely Franquelli plays the radio announcer Dalisay Delgado, the former love of a Filipino patriot. In the picture above, she has pretended to be a supporter of a Japanese plan to give the Philippines a “freedom” with strings attached. At the crucial moment, the guerrillas attack the ceremony and Dalisay grabs a microphone and tells the people the truth about the Japanese. Deception and radio propaganda all rolled into one.

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