PSYOP AGAINST MILOSEVIC’S YUGOSLAVIA

Note: Portions of this article were used in the report USAF Psychological Operations, 1990-2003, by Dr. Daniel L. Haulman, 23 May 2003. In 2021, The Tillamook Air Museum of Tillamook, Oregon requested B-52 images from this article to be placed alongside the restored cockpit and forward fuselage of a B-52G. Murat Aslan wrote a PhD paper later published as a book titled INTELLIGENCE AND PROPAGANDA IN THE CASES OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND AFGHANISTAN. He was kind enough to credit this author’s article in his acknowledgements section for allowing him to show various propaganda products.

The article is not a history of the Balkan conflict as confined to the old Yugoslavia. It is a look at the PSYOP campaigns fought there in the past decade. By definition, the historical content of this report is just a brief review and meant only to give the reader an idea of what was happening at the time that a specific leaflet, poster, or radio broadcast was disseminated in that war-torn country.

Map of Yugoslavia

The United States found itself involved in the nation once called Yugoslavia several times in the past decade. There was a violent disintegration of that country after the death of Joseph Broz (Tito) in 1980. Tito had ruled a divided Serbian people. Those Serbs, the largest ethnic group of Yugoslavia, were spread over four "Socialist Federative Republics" and two Autonomous Regions. Much of this population shift had been caused by the Ottoman Empire conquests and the politics of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Some 42% of the Serbs were located outside Serbia proper.

      

Joseph Broz Tito                      Slobodan Milosevic

In 1989, a new nationalist leader by the name of Slobodan Milosevic took power in the Serbian Republic. He had previously served as the leader of Belgrade Communist Party and the Serbian Communist Party. He wanted to dominate all of the old Yugoslavia, but when it became clear that he could not, he decided upon the ethnic cleansing of his country and the creation of a Greater Serbia. He abolished Kosovo's autonomy. Croats and Slovenes feared that they were next in line. There were daily news reports of murders, rapes, mass killings and other atrocities carried out by the Serbs as Milosevic drove the minorities from their lands and homes, "purifying" his Greater Serbia. The problem of course, was that several portions of this new Greater Serbia were to consist of lands that had never been part of the old Serbia or populated by Serbians. This was a policy of naked aggression.

Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from the Yugoslav Federated Republic. In Croatia, ethnic Serbs and Croats begin a long, bloody conflict. Serb snipers fired on peaceful demonstrators in Sarajevo, marking the beginning of the war. The West recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state. Serbs killed 16 people waiting in line for bread in Sarajevo. The UN imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia. There were new reports of "ethnic cleansing," a policy of slaughtering Muslim inhabitants of towns or driving them away in order to create an ethnically pure region. There were reports of concentration camps and mass rapes.

The rapes are mentioned by Editor Dagmar Herzog in Brutality and Desire – War and sexuality in Europe’s Twentieth Century, Palgrave MacMillan, UK, 2009. Herzog published an article by Teresa Iacobelli entitled, “Investigating Mass Rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina through a case study of Foca.” Iacobelli points out that to stir up its people; Serbian leaders recalled both ancient grievances and the more recent memories of the Second World War. She notes that the media reinforced the idea of the Balkan crisis as merely a continuation of old antagonisms, neglecting to point out that these peoples had lived in peace with each other for forty-five years. She says that the goals of the Serb leaders were nationalistic and focused on the conquest of land to form a greater Serbia. In regard to rapes:

In total, it is estimated that between 20,000 and 50,000 rapes occurred within Bosnia-Herzegovina during the course of the war. [Estimates of European Union Commission and the Bosnian Government].

In the case of the Bosnian Muslim women, they were specifically targeted by Serbian military forces in an intentional policy of genocidal rape meant to destroy the Muslim population in the nation.

Milosevic’s actions forced the United Nations to deploy peacekeeping forces and begin humanitarian relief operations. Operation Provide Promise began on 2 July 1992. Twenty-one nations formed a coalition to resupply war-torn Sarajevo with food and medicine. The U.N. established "no-fly" zones over Bosnia. The United States mediated an agreement between the Bosnians, the Bosnian Croats, and the Government of Croatia to form a federation of Bosnians and Croats. This ended the fighting between these factions. The Bosnian Serbs remained belligerent and fired on coalition aircraft. They shot down an Italian transport killing the crew. When it became too dangerous to land at Sarajevo Airport, the cargo planes airdropped supplies.

Airborne PSYOP - Leaflet Operations.

The Task Force Eagle Newsletter mentions leaflets:

The MC-130E Talon aircraft is equipped for leaflet-drop PSYOP missions. Aerial leaflet operations in Bosnia, however, were conducted primarily by helicopter aviation. During the October 1997 operations centering on curbing Bosnian-Serb broadcast propaganda. Task Force Eagle launched a parallel, supporting information campaign to the SFOR program to counter the Serb broadcasts. The division commander appeared on local television outlets, both in person and by videotape to counter the anti-NATO and anti-SFOR broadcasts. However, as much of eastern Bosnia was outside the range of these television stations, leaflet operations presented a means to ensure broader coverage. Air distributed leaflets were a medium of communication that could reach this audience. PSYOP personnel prepared the leaflets with organic assets.

The leaflets were written in a tone meant to educate, rather than inflame passions. These products stressed such themes as the role of officials in a democratic society, especially the role of police as enforcers of the law rather than political police. Other leaflets presented the facts concerning international aid and the enforcement of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), also known as the Dayton Agreement.

These leaflets were distributed from helicopters over key cities and towns in the American-led peace enforcement zone in northeastern Bosnia and adjoining areas. This included every major Serb-held area in northern Bosnia where anti-NATO and the state-run media broadcast attacks on the GFAP. About 43,000 leaflets were distributed from the air and by soldiers on the ground. The leaflets presented information about democracy and responsible government, quoting democratic thinkers including such icons as Thomas Jefferson, John Locke, Plato and others.

Leaflets represented a very small fraction of the printed PSYOP products used in Operations. More effective print media were available to disseminate PSYOP messages. These other printed media included comic books, magazines, newspapers, and posters. Air-dropped leaflets in Bosnia achieved mixed results. Some citizens complained about their towns being "polluted" and having to clean up the litter after the air-drop operation, ridiculed the grammatical errors, and were insulted that such a technique was used.

The two Provide Promise aerial leaflets dropped on Bosnia

Two leaflets were prepared and dropped over Bosnia. They both depict a Hercules C-130 USAF cargo plane in front of a faint United States flag. Both leaflets picture crates falling by parachute marked with a bright red cross, and both are written in Serbo-Croat text, in Latin script on one side and Cyrillic on the other side.

On the first leaflet, the C-130 drops four containers. The leaflet tells the Serbs not to fire on the aircraft. They drop food for all the people. The text is:

American aircraft will be dropping humanitarian aid for all people. Do not fire on American aircraft. Food and medical supplies are intended for all people.

On the second leaflet, the C-130 drops three containers labeled "500 KG." This leaflet was prepared because of accidents that occurred in Somalia. Starving people rushed mindlessly into the drop zone only to be crushed by falling food crates.  The leaflet text is:

Danger! For everyone's safety, let humanitarian aid land before approaching.

This mission was mentioned in the 28 February 1993 issue of The Times of Northwest Indiana:

ABOARD A U.S. CARGO PLANE OVER EASTERN BOSNIA (AP) -- Two giant U.S. cargo planes cut their lights before dropping 1 million leaflets in awkward Serbo-Croatian telling Bosnians that help is coming. The Air Force C-130 Hercules turbo-prop airplanes began a mission designed to help an estimated 300,000 hungry Muslims besieged by Serbs. Food and medicine drops, to Serbs and Croats as well, are to follow in a day or two. The planes dropped the leaflets from more than 10,000 feet and under cover of darkness to minimize the risk posed by Serb anti-aircraft guns and shoulder-fired missiles. As the planes approached the first drop-off point in eastern Bosnia, the aircraft cut off all outside lights and switched to red interior lights to deter detection. Two crewmen, one wearing a parachute and the other a safety harness, were framed against the cobalt blue night sky as they kicked boxes of leaflets out the door. Attached to the plane by straps, the boxes dangled, scattering leaflets to the ground.

Before this first leaflet drop the U.S. Army’s 6th PSYOP Battalion had many alerts, false starts and partial deployments while the great powers decided if the action would be solely by the United States, under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or the United Nations. As a result, these first leaflets were designed in three different formats in Germany. Eventually it was decided that this would be a NATO operation, but the decision was already made that the first leaflets would display the American flag. The images were faxed via a secure link back to Ft. Bragg for printing by the Product Dissemination Battalion. When the leaflets were delivered shortly before the first drop they were found to be poorly printed with a “grainy” appearance. The PSYOP troops were very disappointed with the quality but it was too late to make any changes or reprint the entire stock of leaflets.

There were numerous published reports of the aerial leafleting. On 25 February 1993, U.S. aircraft dropped about 600,000 leaflets over Srebrenica, Cerska, Gorazde, and Zera. On 27 February, two C-130s dropped another million leaflets. Five C-130s dropped 80 1-ton food containers on 28 February. Aircraft dropped another one million leaflets on 1 March.

The two Provide Promise aerial leaflets not dropped on Bosnia

Two other leaflets were not disseminated. They bear the United Nations seal in the background. It is likely that these leaflets were the original design, but since the United States was taking the risk and sending American airmen into harm's way, the decision was made to show the American flag. This is only conjecture. The UN leaflets are actually a better product with a clearer sharper appearance. The text is identical, except that in the first leaflet the word “American” is deleted concerning the origin of the aircraft.

Three U.S. C-130s conducted the first night airdrops over Bosnia, releasing 16 tons of Meals, Ready to Eat (MREs) on 28 Feb 93. By the end of the operation, aircraft from 21 countries had flown 12,886 sorties into Sarajevo, delivering 159,622 tons of food, medicine, and supplies and evacuating over 1,300 wounded people.

Operation Allied Harbor was NATO’s first humanitarian operation. In the case of the Kosovo crisis, by the end of March 1999 the normal civilian non-governmental agencies were unable to cope with the massive influx of refugees into Albania. By 15 June 1999 there were 479,223 refugees in the country.

Operation Shining Hope Emblem

The round sticker above was used to identify non-military NATO and humanitarian relief vehicles so they would get less interference from the local populace while carrying out day-to-day tasks.  It was also a quick means of vehicle ID for gate guards at Tirana airfield. The Product Development Detachment of B Company of the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion printed about 7 million leaflets on four Risograph presses in the early days of the operation.

Operation Shining Hope Bumper Sticker

The bumper sticker above was attached to all U.S. relief supply cartons and cases.  Although SHINING HOPE was a NATO venture, the U.S. senior officers wanted to ensure that relief supplies from the U.S. were clearly identified.

Joint Task Force (JTF) Shining Hope was the United States contribution to Operation Allied Harbor. The mission was to conduct foreign humanitarian assistance operations in support of US government and non-governmental agencies and international organizations engaged in providing humanitarian relief to Kosovo refugees in Albania and the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Humanitarian Service Medal was authorized for U.S. military personnel who took part in the operation from 3 April 1999 to 5 June 1999.

Master Sergeant (retired) Rod Schmidt of the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion adds:

I wish I had a copy of a television commercial my guys (Rick Eller and Rob Hart) designed.  It was a non-interference commercial which asked the Albanian populace for their assistance in helping the Kosovar refugees by clearing roads for relief vehicles, etc.  It was very high quality and was broadcast on three separate Albanian television networks on a rotating and reducing cycle.  The first day it was broadcast, we had reports from the military police and relief organizations that Albanians were actually pulling off of the road to let them pass.

The Serbs continued to act aggressively toward their neighbors. This forced NATO to undertake an intensive, month-long bombing campaign in August 1995. These air strikes produced the desired effect. A cease-fire went into effect in October, and peace talks began on 1 November 1995. These negotiations produced the framework for peace known as the Dayton Peace Accords. Operation Provide Promise continued until 9 January 1996. On that date, the last USAF C-130 brought relief supplies into Sarajevo Airport and ended the longest humanitarian airlift in history.

US Servicemen came to Bosnia in December 1995 as part of the Implementation Force (IFOR), the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia created under the Dayton accords. Their mission was to enforce the agreement ending the Bosnian war. The mission in Bosnia represented the alliance's first major involvement in operational peacekeeping. IFOR had a one-year mandate to oversee implementation of the military aspects of the peace agreement. They achieved those goals by June 1996.

Information Wanted

This handout in Cyrillic asks the citizens to keep an eye out and report people who are destroying the property of returning refugees. The back is blank.

INFORMATION WANTED!

The International Police Task Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina needs your help in gathering information to help arrest the people responsible for destroying private property in areas where refugees are returning.

DON'T LET ANYONE HURT!

Remember, destroying private property is
a crime, not a political act.

DO YOUR CIVIL DUTY!

CALL THE NEAREST IMPLEMENTATION FORCE OFFICE FOR REPRESENTATIVES
WITH INFORMATION ABOUT THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY!

INFORMATION WANTED!

The PSYOP Campaign is mentioned in the report, Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Support Operations – NATO-led Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Following the signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement on 14 December 1995, which put an end to a four-year long war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN mandated NATO to oversee and enforce a durable cease-fire between the former belligerents. On 20 December 1995, a NATO-led multinational force, called the Implementation Force (IFOR) started OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOUR. On 20 December 1996, a smaller NATO coalition called the Stabilization Force (SFOR) replaced IFOR. In operation JOINT GUARD, SFOR received an eighteen month mandate to oversee and enforce the cease-fire.

In Bosnia, IFOR and then SFOR ran an information campaign designed to “seize and maintain the initiative by imparting timely and effective information within the commander’s intent.” The term information campaign refers to the coordinated and synchronized use of different information activities within the command. The campaign had three components.

A public information (PI) campaign designed to establish NATO’s credibility with the international media to gain support from the contributing nations for the mission. Public Information Officers executed this mission.

A psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign designed to influence the local population and its leaders in favor of IFOR troops and operations. PSYOP units (mainly American) undertook this aspect of the campaign.

A Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) information campaign designed to inform audiences about civil-military cooperation and to release information to aid the local populations. CIMIC elements (mainly U.S. Army) undertook this mission.

From reading the above it appears this cooperation with other nations ran smoothly. Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1998, by Pascale Siegel indicates otherwise:

A Combined Joint Task Force under CJ3 supervision was responsible for implementing the NATO psychological operations campaign. Under IFOR, the task force was called the Combined Joint IFOR Information Campaign Task Force (CJIICTF). With SFOR operations (20 December 1996), the name changed to Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force (CJICTF). Both task forces were directed by U.S. Army Reserve Colonels and were mainly composed of U.S. personnel and assets with supporting elements from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom...Political sensitivities not only made European nations reluctant to using PSYOP, but also complicated the command-and-control situation. From December 1995 to October 1997, U.S. PSYOP personnel (which formed the core of the CJIICTF) remained under national command and control. As a result of the 1984 National Security Decision Directive 130, the U.S. Department of Defense refused to place PSYOP forces under NATO command and control...The American refusal caused problems in everyday operations (such as coordination and logistics problems)...Finally, the U.S. refusal to place its PSYOP forces under NATO C2 caused tensions within the Alliance. European nations felt the PSYOP effort was not fully NATO and were therefore reluctant to become full participants...Finally in October 1997, the U.S. Department of Defense transferred U.S. PSYOP forces in theater to SACEUR’s command and control.

The “Rock of the Balkans” radio leaflet

A number of leaflets were prepared and distributed during this phase of the forced peace. IFOR had a radio station in Tuzla that played music, news and sports for the people. The Allies produced a standard radio leaflet that showed a radio antenna at the left and identified the station as:

Radio IFOR - Tuzla - Rock of the Balkans - 1017 kHz.

The number and location of the IFOR/SFOR radio stations varied throughout the operations. Originally, IFOR set up five radio stations located in the five most populated cities across the country: Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banja-Luka, Mrkonjic Grad, and Mostar (struck down by a lightning on 14 September 1996). During the first six months of SFOR operations, the Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force operated three radio stations in Sarajevo (Radio Mir), Brcko, and Coralici. In the fall 1997, the French agreed to man and operate a new station in Mostar. These radio stations operated at least 18 hours a day with music, news bulletins and messages.

The Task Force Eagle Newsletter, No, 99-2 dated January 1999 says about Radio Mir (edited for brevity):

During initial operations early in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Tactical PSYOP Teams established the technique of using local host-nation stations to air live broadcasts of interviews with PSYOP soldiers. Task Force Eagle PSYOP radio operations included using civilian commercial radio stations to air pre-recorded music programs that contained "commercials" in between popular music songs that reinforced PSYOP themes. One risk with this approach was, given these radio stations were outside military control, they could, potentially, broadcast propaganda masquerading as “news” that could counter the PSYOP messages.

To achieve more control over the medium, one of the Brigade PSYOP Support Elements (BPSE) established an FM radio station, Radio Mir, to provide a radio platform that would provide the listening public with a credible and unbiased source of information. Mir stands for Military Information Radio and is the Serbo-Croatian word for Peace. Radio Mir consisted of an FM transmitting tower and equipment belonging to the JPOTF (Joint PSYOP Task Force), supplemented with civilian sound equipment.

Before the new station was built, the BPSE had only been able to transmit pre-recorded shows on the transmitter and lacked any facility from which to broadcast live, or to record interviews or programs involving local leaders and civilians. The new facility allowed the BPSE to conduct live broadcasting to include call-in shows, and to coordinate, prepare, and subsequently transmit shows recorded in-house.

Initial operations were designed to build a listening audience by broadcasting primarily popular music. Having a radio station under direct military-control expanded the relationship built up between the BPSE and local radio journalists and broadcasters and added a new dimension to the BPSE’s capability to produce shows that would appeal to all the entities within the station’s broadcasting radius.

Programming on Radio Mir included:

1. Current news five times a day.
2. “Classic” rock and roll, "Top 40" hits, Rhythm and Blues, local area music, Euro-hits.
3. Interviews with SFOR commanders and the Office of the High Representative.
4. Broadcast talk shows with guest radio station personalities from local stations.

Radio Mir Sticker

DISPERSE

This leaflet was clearly used for crowd control. It was printed in several languages; I depict an English version here. This leaflet was handed out to crowds, and the back is blank.

JUSTICE FOR ALL

This folded 4-page handout is titled "Justice for all; the police work in a democracy" in Croatian. The image depicts "the scales of justice," showing that under the new governments everyone will be equal. The next three pages show numerous quotes from various famous people. For instance:

Freedom consists only in dependence on the law.
Voltaire, French philosopher.

The only stable form of government is the one governed by law,
and which does not depend on any person.
Immanuel Kant, German philosopher

Placement of the Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force in 1997
Note the Various Radio Mir Stations

The Task Force says about this chart:

These are our most important assets of communication, the combined and joint force which talks directly to the people of Bosnia Herzegovina, looks into their eyes, establishes force protection enhancing rapport, and gathers an extremely important sensing for the concerns of the people.

As you can see, we have tactical PSYOP teams deployed in Multi-National Divisions north from the US Army, in the south from the French, Spanish, and German Army (as well as brigade PSYOP support element 30, the American element residing in Sarajevo).In MND southwest, the British-led MND, regular troops are used in tactical dissemination missions. Supplied with tactical products from both the Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force in Sarajevo, and products, including Mostovi, produced in Banja Luka by the Information Operations team there, they disseminate on their own schedule, maintaining a stockage in their own storage area.

A PSYOP interpreter talks with residents of Brcko, Bosnia,
to get their opinions of the SFOR-sponsored "Radio Mir" (Photo by Henry S. Block)

Major John Mills discusses “PSYOP: Radio Operations in Bosnia,” in Special Warfare, fall 2001. He notes that from January 1997 to August 1997, elements of the United States Army Reserve's 11th Psychological Operations Battalion and personnel attached from other USAR PSYOP battalions deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina. He says in part:

After brainstorming numerous concepts, we hit on the solution - radio. Our radio-production capability was limited. Radio Mir in Sarajevo was producing various types of music tapes that contained intermittent soft-sell, radio-announcer voice-overs. We decided to use radio to broadcast translations of open-source information from existing international news media (Reuters, the Associated Press and United Press International) to supplement the information products produced by the headquarters of the Combined Joint Task Force.

A PSYOP specialist (left) and one of the local Bosnian
interpreters prepare to broadcast from inside an MSQ-85 shelter

We needed a dedicated broadcast booth and professional-quality equipment. The answer was an MSQ-85B shelter. The MSQ-85B mobile audiovisual shelter was at the time one of the primary systems of the PSYOP community. This HMMWV-mounted shelter was fielded during the 1980s. The shelter provided a complete capability for recording, editing and reproducing audio and video products. Had it been equipped with an FM transmitter, it would have been a complete broadcast studio.

Our major objective was to put out a message that would forcefully explain the SFOR's right, under international law and under the DPA, to seize indicted war criminals. We translated press releases from the Coalition Press Information Center, or CPIC, in an attempt to counter the tirade of messages being broadcast in Serbian controlled areas. Each week, at Radio Tuzla, we produced and broadcast a 30-minute show that came to be titled "The Week in SFOR."

From January to August 1997, the information campaign in Bosnia used local radio to communicate the SFOR message to the formerly warring factions. While it was difficult to precisely measure the program's effectiveness, the success of the combined efforts of the SFOR was reflected by a lack of active hostilities. The radio program laid the groundwork for establishing long-lasting relationships with the local radio-station managers and personnel - some of the people who controlled what was being communicated in Bosnia.

A member of the PSYOP TASK Force (POTF) displays a box of the
audio tapes prepared for the distribution to Bosnian radio stations.

U.S. Army Reserve Major Thomas Bergman is a member of the 18th PSYOP Company, 10th PSYOP Battalion, 7th PSYOP Group. He was activated in December of 1995 for a tour in Bosnia. He had three Tactical PSYOP Teams, two in support of the two Military Police battalions supporting Tuzla and Lukavac and one attached to the NORDPOL Brigade (the Nordic countries, the Baltics, Poland and the United States) in Doboj.  His unit provided the first U.S. Army Reserve PSYOP soldiers in Bosnia reporting to the 4th POG. In regard to the radio comments above he says:

Concerning IFOR radio broadcasts, the information attributed to Major John Mills first utilizing civilian radio and conducting a weekly show is incorrect.  I realized that the canned IFOR taped music and messages were inadequate from the start.  By the time the tapes reached the remote transmitters from Sarajevo, the news was outdated.  I requested funding to buy air time on local radio stations but was denied. I approached several Tuzla radio stations and pitched the idea of a weekly hourly call-in talk show where we could give out current news and answer questions from the populace.  Radio Tuzla agreed and in early spring 1996 I began conducting a weekly show with the aid of my interpreter. 

In regard to how PSYOP performed in 1995 he says:

All in all, as far as product design, dissemination and propaganda support of our supported units, PSYOP failed miserably.  We were ill-prepared for a mission which involved more than kicking radios and surrender leaflets out of airplanes especially when we were competing with superior forms of existing local media. 

Tactical PSYOP Teams provided loudspeaker
support during some tense attempted border crossings

On the positive side he adds:

One of my teams was temporarily attached to the Russian Brigade in the Republika of Serpska to provide loudspeaker support during some tense attempted border crossings by displaced civilians wishing to return to visit their homes, cemeteries, etc.  My team was housed and fed by the Russians for almost a week and that may have been the first time that a U.S. PSYOP element directly supported a Russian unit. 

Commando Solo

The Task Force Eagle Newsletter adds: 

A multi-purpose asset capable of conducting both PSYOP and Electronic Warfare, the EC-130E, Commando Solo, is an airborne platform “primarily designed for PSYOP.” Commando Solo can conduct psychological broadcast missions in the standard AM, FM, HF, TV and military communications bands. Missions in Bosnia were flown at maximum altitudes possible to ensure optimum propagation patterns Highly specialized modifications had been made to the latest version of the EC-130E. These included enhanced navigation systems, self-protection equipment, and the capability of broadcasting color television on a multitude of worldwide standards throughout the TV VHF/UIIF ranges.

Three Air National Guard EC130E Commando Solo aircraft were deployed from the 193rd Special Operations Wing in Harrisburg, PA, to a base in Italy, an hour flight across the Adriatic Sea from Sarajevo. This was a direct response to persistent hostile Bosnian-Serb radio and television propaganda from the Karadzic faction. Operating from Brindisi, Italy, the Commando Solo EC-13OEs were equipped with high-power transmitters for TV, AM, and FM radio broadcasting. The plane’s Electronic Warfare capabilities also allowed it to operate as a jamming device. In this mode, Commando Solo had the potential to jam Bosnian-Serb hard-liners’ television and radio broadcasts or simply overpower their signal and replace propaganda with PSYOP programs. When used to broadcast programming over the adversary signal, the aircraft is performing a PSYOP function.

In mid-October 1997, unidentified elements inside the Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Serpska or RS) sabotaged television transmitters, taking the legal government’s programming off the air in much of the eastern part of the RS. The pro-Karadzic faction resorted to propaganda to claim that the lack of normal programming was due to the “illegal” actions of the Stabilization Force. Shortly afterwards, SFOR used Commando Solo in a live mission to transmit on a frequency normally used by Bosnian Serb TV, actively countering the adversary propaganda by explaining that the absence of normal programming was due to the actions of the Bosnian-Serb leadership.

Bosnian Propaganda Posters

The website Balkan Transitional Justice published an article on 7 April 2022 that said in part:

Daoud Sarhandi, the British author of the new book Bosnian War Posters, first went to Bosnia and Herzegovina with a humanitarian aid team just after the conflict ended in 1995 and was deeply affected by what he saw. A couple of years later, he was living in the Bosnian town of Tuzla and started collecting hundreds of posters and examples of political graphic design that tell a unique story of what happened during the war years, illustrating nationalist propaganda, appeals for resistance and peace, and the horrors of the siege of Sarajevo which began 30 years ago this week. The book, which is published in May 2022 by Interlink Books, contains reproductions of about 350 of these posters. We illustrate some of the posters below:

Wake up Europe!

The fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina is in our hands – join us! 

 

Unofficial wanted posters for Bosnian Serb political and military leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic

A calendar produced to promote Serb ‘Red Berets’ forces in the Bosnian town of Brcko in 1995.

In 2009, the U.S. Government asked the Rand Corporation to study the use of PSYOP and report in a document entitled Understanding Commanders’ Information Needs for Influence Preparations. The researchers were not pleased with the Bosnia PSYOP campaign. They say in part:

For the PSYOP contribution to influence operations, target audience analysis was not terribly sophisticated, as PSYOP units lacked adequate language skills and regional expertise. As one brigade commander complained, “PSYOP messages were bland, ineffective, and not properly targeted to the local population.” In Bosnia, U.S. and NATO PSYOP units employed a wide range of delivery tools, including magazines, newspapers, handbills, and radio and TV stations. All of this notwithstanding, PSYOP had difficulty identifying pivotal demographic or other groups, so theme selection was not appropriately tailored to specific audiences. This resulted in products being generated that often were not culturally appropriate, although there was improvement in this area after U.S./NATO forces had been in country for a while. In short, the written record suggests that PSYOP doctrine did not prove useful in executing PSYOP at the operational level.

As of March 1997, IFOR/SFOR had produced 51 television spots to be given to local stations throughout theater.

More than 3 million posters and handbills were disseminated throughout theater between December 1995 and November 1997.

An American PSYOP Soldier distributes voter registration leaflets in Tajsici, Bosnia

The Task Force Eagle Information Operations Newsletter of January 1999 mentions some specific leaflet operations during 1997. Some of them are:

Leaflets were distributed from helicopters over key cities and towns in the American-led peace enforcement zone in northeastern Bosnia and adjoining areas. About 43,000 leaflets were distributed from the air and by soldiers on the ground. The leaflets presented information about democracy and responsible government, quoting democratic thinkers including such icons as Thomas Jefferson, John Locke, Plato and others.

On 16 October 1997, Task Force Eagle delivered by air, over the city of Brcko, leaflets which urged the inhabitants not to vote for Karadzic and his supporters. Later that month, U.S. helicopters dropped leaflets on the city of Bijeljina in preparation for the November municipal elections. These leaflets supported the Plavsic regime in Banja Luka.

The IFOR Coalition Joint Information Campaign Task Force (CJICTF), supporting the peace operation in Bosnia, arguably produced more diverse printed products than any other mission to date. They produced newspapers, newspaper articles, handbills, posters, magazines, comic-books, and flyers for both the military and civilian implementers of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

The primary mission of IFOR and SFOR Psychological Operations was to deter armed resistance and hostile behavior against IFOR/SFOR troops and operations.

Mine Warning Leaflets

Warning to Protect Children

Remember Mines Kill – Tri-fold handout

This leaflet is designed to educate people on how to recognize the danger of mines and avoid them.

Mine Awareness

This 1999 SFOR handbill depicts various mines, grenades, mortars and Claymores on the front and the back and warns civilians against touching any of the dangerous explosives.

Mine Poster

This 1998 SFOR poster depicts a child and asks how anyone can believe that mines are harmless. 

Warning civilians about the danger of unexploded ordnance has always been a priority of the Allied military forces. Above is a selection of warning leaflets to the civilians residing in Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo and other parts of the old Yugoslavia.

Mine warning leaflet

This leaflet depicts seven different explosive devices and has a bright red triangle with the word "Danger." Another shows a child’s foot about to step on a mine or a child about to touch a half-buried mine. The text is:

MINES AND UNEXPLODED AMMUNITION MEANS CAN KILL!

DANGER!

DO NOT ATTEMPT TO HANDLE THESE OBJECTS
REPORT THEM TO PEACE ENFORCEMENT FORCES IMMEDIATELY

This is a playground.

This is a warning handout for the children of Bosnia to beware of explosives. It tells them to play in playgrounds in parks, but not to play in areas that might hold mines or explosives. The back is blank. The text is:

This is a playground...

This is not!

Tell children to stay away from areas where there may be unexploded ordnance and mines and report such places.

TO ANY MEMBER OF IFOR.

 

Mines kill...
Images courtesy of www.war-images.com

This 1996 IFOR Bosnia mine awareness leaflet depicts various types of landmines and says:

Mines kill. Don't touch them

 

GTA 5-10-38
Countermine Identification Training (CIT) Program
17 June 1997

As in almost every war the United States fights, mine awareness cards are prepared to protect the troops. They are usually given away as training aides to any member who requests them from Supply. These cards are restricted to U.S. military personnel to protect technical or operational information and are to be destroyed when no longer needed so that the enemy cannot see them. There are 52 cards in this deck: 1 glossary, 1 mine awareness brief, 1 fuse characteristics, 1 fuse types, 19 antipersonnel mines, 10 antitank mines, 8 booby traps, 10 fuses and 1 mine system. The anti-personnel card above shows a mine of the type the United States calls a “Claymore.”

  

The Superman PSYOP comic book  

There were many other propaganda publications used in Bosnia. Perhaps the most interesting is the mine-warning 12-page Superman comic book entitled "Deadly Legacy" that was produced pro-bono  with DC Comics. The cover shows the man of steel swooping down to save a two young boys who are about to pick up an explosive device on the ground. The back of the book shows Superman flying the children to safety and the text:

Superman has come to help the children of Bosnia-Herzegovina! But even when he can't be here, you can keep yourself safe from land mines! Mines kill kids! For more information on how you can prevent these accidents, call the mine action center.

IFOR distributed over 1 million of the magazines in their first year in Bosnia.

Lieutenant Colonel Nick Swayne was the liaison with DC Comics in New York City tasked with the mine-awareness project that had the blessing and backing of then First Lady Hilary Clinton. The military paid for the materials, ink and transportation, but not the art or concept work. It supplied the photographs of Bosnians, local homes, landscape and backgrounds and the comic book artists did the rest.

The French were not enamored with the comic book, apparently disturbed that Superman represented “Truth, Justice and the American Way.” Superman was very popular among the youth of Bosnia, but was the subject of consternation among certain allies. 

Philip M. Taylor criticized the Superman Comic book in Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day, Manchester University Press, UK, 2003. I find it hard to accept his premise but he claims:

A classic example of how such well-intentioned propaganda can backfire, this comic had to be withdrawn when it was discovered that some young children were deliberately walking into minefields in the hope that Superman would come and save them.

This comment is rejected by Major Jeffrey White who told me that it was never withdrawn from circulation, and definitely not as Phil Taylor suggests, based on the rationale that he cited. Major White never saw any comic books returned to Sarajevo.  He did feel that there was a significant undercurrent of anti-American sentiment among the NATO Forces, but the criticisms did not bear out in any of the post-testing in Bosnia. There was never even one incident where it was reported that a child went into a known minefield hoping to be rescued by Superman, nor were there any other incidents provoked by the comic book.

LTC Swayne states that he recalls two minor negative reactions to the comic book. The first occurred when he coordinated with the United Nations Mine Action Center in Sarajevo prior to putting their phone number on the back cover of the comic book and matching poster. They were not prepared for the number of calls that flooded their office.  Overnight their office went from a “Sleepy Hollow” to a place where the phone never stopped ringing.

The second was something that did not come out in pre or post-testing among the 10 to 15-year-old target audience.  It was brought up by the International Press Corps at the unveiling of the comic book in the Sarajevo Holiday Inn. They posed questions about the sexist nature of the comic in that the girl was always the subordinate character. The comic was made for an audience and culture where that is the case whether we like it or not. As a result, although it was an overwhelming success among the target audience, it was scrutinized by the international press because it did not depict an unrealistic dominant role for the female characters.

Sergeant Mark Jenkins of the 6th PSYOP Battalion was not very enthused about the comics. He was a stickler for details, planning and Intelligence studies and the comics just appeared one day with the order to disseminate them. He told me:

I disagreed with them on principle, i.e., that they were pushed on us from outside and had not gone through our campaign planning process, nor were they coordinated with any of our existing mine-awareness efforts. So my reaction, as I recall, was, “Whatever,” and I hoped they might do some good. But I was definitely worried it was further evidence of our pre-packaged “ready-fire-aim” approach to it all.

The Talon

The Talon was an Army-funded magazine (It calls itself a newspaper) produced in the interest of the servicemembers of Task Force Eagle headquartered at Eagle Base. The Talon was published weekly by the 1st Infantry Division at Tuzla. I chose to show readers the issue of 31 October 1997 because it features the distribution of the Superman comic book. Two pages in the center of the magazine illustrate a scene from the magazine and four comments by soldiers. One soldier handing out the comics says:

You definitely feel important. The way they look at you, you feel they think of you as Superman. They crowd you. Sometimes little kids come up and touch you. The kids know who Superman is.

The caption says in part:

In Bosnia, they promote peace with a Superman comic book, assorted magazines, and polite personal contacts. When all else fails, they can clamp large loudspeakers to their Humvees and speak with resounding super voices. The Superman comic is written in English and Serbo-Croatian, the latter with Cyrillic or Latin alphabets. The books warn children to avoid minefields and unexploded munitions.

Herald of Progress

Another magazine is the Herald of Progress which features news from the region, economic development, security, and sport in its 12 illustrated pages. Later issues had additional pages. The magazine tells the readers:

The Herald of Progress is SFOR's source of information for the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Please feel free to reprint any of the articles of the Journal of Progress journalists that appear in this issue. previous or next edition of this magazine.

We only ask:

Reprint the articles in their entirety without changes.

That the name of the author of the article be found under each reprinted article.

Reprint only articles that have the signature of a journalist from the Herald of Progress. If the article was not written by a journalist from the Journal of Progress, they had to obtain permission for reprinting directly from the author of the article.

The Task Force Eagle Newsletter adds:

The Herald of Progress (HOP) was a dramatic departure from former, traditional PSYOP print journalistic endeavors. It was a “Madison Avenue-quality” monthly journal with pertinent articles, color photos, and political cartoons and commentaries. Additionally, it was decided to diminish the divisive nature of language by publishing articles in both Latinic and Cyrillic alphabet. The HOP editor and the PDC Chief chose to experiment with combining articles in both alphabets in one edition. Use of this format more than doubled the number of articles that could be produced in a single edition. Except for several negative comments from hard-liner Croats, who refused to accept any publication in Cyrillic, this format received positive comments from all Bosnians: Moslem, Croat, and Serb alike. Many people who responded to a survey could not immediately recognize a different format, since they all read both Latinic and Cyrillic equally well. The market segment or target audience of the HOP was the adult audience.

A "free trade" banknote leaflet

Another leaflet is in the form of a Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Narodna Banka Jugoslavije 20 Novih Dinara banknote of 1994. The front left of the leaflet looks like the banknote, the front right is all text:

In Business...More customers equal more sales and suppliers and more competition equals lower cost for consumers. How can you influence this market? Encourage FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. It makes economic sense.

The back of the note depicts a small vehicle and a map. The text is:

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. Everyone wins.

The leaflet encourages all of the various ethnic mixes of the area to open the borders for free trade with each other.

By December 1996 with the transition from IFOR to SFOR, the PSYOP task force organization somewhat changed. The headquarters and Product Development Cell (PDC) became multinational instead of all-U.S. with French and British liaison officers assigned to the Combined Joint Information Task Force headquarters. The British-led division acquired some printing equipment in spring 1996 to develop products specific to its area of responsibility.

Chef de Bataillon, M. E. Limon discusses the British and French effort in a Joint Services Command and Staff College Defense Research Paper:

The British deployed up to 14 members of their 15th PSYOP Group to support the US led NATO PSYOP or IFOR Information Campaign. The IFOR Information Campaign was conducted by the Combined Joint IFOR Information Campaign Task Force headed by a US full colonel. The British were represented at divisional level, at theatre level, and at the Multinational Coordination Cell which dealt with strategic issues and was involved with the “Herald of Peace,” the theatre-level Information Campaign newspaper.

In mid-March 1996, the British troops achieved the capability to produce their own printed products. By late March 1996, the British Divisional PSYOP element had print, reproduction, audio/radio, video and other imagery capabilities and three Land Rovers and trailers. By spring 1996, IFOR had established a strong link with the independent radio station in Banja Luka, (“Radio Big”). Personnel from IFOR appeared on a weekly show that combined music, conversation and questions from a live audience to deny any rumors and misconceptions and to promote a greater understanding of IFOR’s role.

Grbavica is liberated.

Speaking of March 1996, the last suburb of Sarajevo, a neighborhood called Grbavica, was officially turned over to the Muslim-Croat Federation effectively ending any possibility that the city would be surrounded and attacked by the Serbs in the future. Grbavica was the fifth and final suburb to be transferred to the federation under the terms of the Dayton peace agreement. Bosnian officials replaced Serb street signs, spoke of the final unification of the city, or trotted about in processions with Bosnian flags. Over a thousand Serbs remained in the city, and the above leaflet reassures them and others who left earlier that is they have committed no crimes, they are welcome. The text is:

The Supreme Command of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Grbavica is liberated.

Honest Serbs, who do not have blood on their hands, can return to the liberated territory.

Steven Collins goes into greater detail in “Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and Constraints” in Parameters, summer 1999.

By contrast, in the Multinational Division Southwest area, controlled by the United Kingdom, the importance of PSYOP was recognized early. The UK military, drawing upon its extensive experience in Northern Ireland as well as its intimate familiarity with the region as part of the UN Protection Force, knew the critical importance of the battle for Bosnian "hearts and minds." Thus they requested deployment of US tactical PSYOP soldiers and radio broadcast equipment. However, as with the French-led division, dissatisfaction with slow product support and a desire to control its own product development processes led the UK to field its own PSYOP element at its headquarters in Banja Luka. This element continued to disseminate some products made by the PSYOP Task Force headquarters in Sarajevo, but the emphasis in the region was centered on its own PSYOP magazine, handbills, and other materials produced in Banja Luka. Once again, oversight from Sarajevo was limited.

SFOR Headquarters, Banja Luka “Metal Factory.”

British Corporal Rob Walker was an Adjutant General Corps clerk in the Banja Luka “Metal Factory.” This had been an actual factory but was taken over by the Multinational Task Force Northwest as a base for the Bosnia and Herzegovina stabilization force EUFOR (formerly SFOR). Rob worked in Information Operations (Info Ops) as their clerk and soon helped with printing leaflets in the Info Ops rooms. The team was made up of various British Officers, both Active and Reserve, illustrators and some officers and senior noncommissioned officers from the U.S. Army. Later, Walker was assigned the task of writing horoscopes for the free Mostovi (Bridge) newspaper. The Mostovi staff was made up of Brits and Americans and the layout was done by a Royal Marine Illustrator. 35,000 copies of this 12-page publication were regularly distributed. 

Limon continues:

In 1994, French forces were unable to conduct PSYOP. There were no PSYOP specialists to advise the commanders in the field, and no printing facilities to communicate with the local population or factions. PSYOP campaigns were limited to what can be called Civil Affairs. In 1995 an attempt was made to define “Operational Communications” within a frame of Civil-Military Affairs. Later, a service paper refined this concept by stating that Operational Communications aim at legitimate military intervention by explaining the objectives and roles of the forces to the local population and warring factions, and countering hostile propaganda activities directed towards friendly troops and the civil population.

Steven Collins adds:

Multinational Division Southeast, under the control of the French, originally kept PSYOP at arm's length. The French reluctance to incorporate PSYOP into their plans was largely a legacy of their remembrance of French PSYOP's dubious role in the war in Algeria in the late 1950s and early 1960s and participation in the attempted coup against Charles de Gaulle in 1961. The French also seemed to mistrust the motives of the US PSYOP personnel, who dominated the early effort in Bosnia. Over time, the French began to accept increased US PSYOP support, including a PSYOP radio station in Mostar and a small group of US tactical PSYOP soldiers who disseminated materials. The French frustration with the Byzantine nature of the US/NATO PSYOP product approval process contributed to their desire to develop their own capability in order to influence the PSYOP context more directly. This led to the establishment of a French-run PSYOP radio station and creation of a French/Spanish/German PSYOP print product development capability in Mostar, all with virtually no oversight from the PSYOP Task Force headquarters in Sarajevo.

Radio Horizon Flyer

Apparently, the French did trust the Belgians. Belgium has a small PSYOP Support Element (PSE) unit called the Information Operations Group (Info Ops Grp) consisting of about 30 regular military personnel and selected reservists as needed. After the loss of ten Belgian paratroopers in Rwanda in 1994, apparently stirred up by the racist propaganda radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (“Land of a Thousand Hills Free Radio and Television”), the Belgians realized the need for a PSYOP unit of their own.

The Belgian PSYOP patch. 

Their first operation was in late 1999 in Kosovo where they installed a PSYOP radio station called “Radio Horizon” in the Belgian camp called “Center City” in the French-occupied section of Kosovo in Leposavic.

Even the name used for the campaign became an issue. Target Bosnia states that some members of the North Atlantic Council did not want to be associated with a “psychological operations campaign.” Changing the name to “IFOR Information Campaign” seemed to ease these fears. However, there is little doubt that the “information campaign” was a psychological operations campaign. It was conducted by PSYOP forces and according to NATO’s draft peace support psychological activities doctrine. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe PSYOP staff officer stated that “I could not use the term ‘psychological operations’ when I first briefed at North Atlantic Treaty Office Headquarters because that would have upset some nations.”

An unnamed author discussed the United Kingdom PSYOP operation in Kosovo in an untitled British Joint Services Command and Staff College abstract:

Approximately 104.5 million leaflets were dropped by the coalition, primarily by the US, but despite the 78-day bombing campaign the Serbian Army withdrew largely intact. One commentator lamented that NATO’s PSYOP efforts were belated and perceived as threatening as well as being effectively countered by the Serbs who were able to demonstrate that modern high-tech precision weapons could be deceived using simple camouflage and concealment techniques. Reflecting on this in a House of Commons Select Committee, Air Vice-Marshal Mike Heath stated:

“There was no U.K. information campaign during the Kosovo crisis. When we came out of it and we had firmly come second, we realized that this was something we needed to do pretty quickly.”

The campaign in Kosovo marked the inception of the Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations (DTIO) and the beginning of PSYOP integration into the wider Information Operations (INFO OPS) strategy in Kosovo.  However, Kosovo also highlighted a “weakness” in capability as the adversary demonstrated a clear awareness of the importance of Information Operations and were able to counter NATO PSYOP very effectively.

The French, German, Italian, and Spanish contingents all conducted PSYOP activities in support of their missions. The Italian contingent developed a comic strip featuring Bugs Bunny to raise children’s awareness of mines. There was little coordination between these efforts. Additional themes were added to the list of PSYOP priorities. The CJICTF was tasked with promoting democratic action, adherence to the rule of law, acceptance of returnees, and the ability of SFOR to enforce a secure environment in an even-handed manner.

  

The German magazine Mirko

Major Richard C. Sater wrote a 19 September 2001 article about Mirko that appeared in the SFOR Informer. It said in part:

Mirko

Mirko gives a face to a magazine named after him, a monthly publication specifically targeted to teenagers in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The glossy, colorful pages include interviews with celebrities (singers, writers, and film stars), both national and international, Britney Spears side by side with Boris Maric, a young poet from Brcko. Fashion, sports, films, the pop charts, reader letters … just like any other teen magazine… published by NATO's Psychological Operations Task Force, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe.

The magazine is a tool, and a very effective one. A quick look at the contents reveals the subtle message: we share common interests, and we can get along. Tolerance is a key message, and Mirko is a forum aimed at a specific audience.With a monthly circulation of 160,000, the publication has a devoted readership. Three versions are published each month; 90 percent of the run is Serbo-Croatian, with half printed in the Roman alphabet and half in Cyrillic. The third version alternates each month between English and German.

The name of the magazine has no special significance - it's simply a boy's name - but "Mirko" was chosen because the name is common to all three of the primary ethnic groups in Bosnia: Bosnian-Croats, Bosnian-Serbs and Bosnians…Once the issue has been approved for release, it is printed in Sarajevo and readied for distribution. The magazine has enviable name recognition. It's estimated that 89 percent of the young people know it…

Target Bosnia adds:

A monthly youth magazine. The German OPINFO battalion developed Mirko, a monthly magazine designed to appeal to the teenage audience. Publication began in June 1996 and production increased to reach a hundred thousand copies per edition in Fall 1997. Throughout the operations, various nations involved in the PSYOP effort retained review or approval authority. For example, German PSYOP forces, which developed the monthly youth magazine Mirko, had to send each issue back to Germany for a final review before dissemination. This review was established as Germany wanted to avoid any problem with its World War II legacy in operations. To make sure that no material could be misinterpreted, all editions of Mirko went back to headquarters in Germany for final review (although not for approval). This process did not cause delays. As Mirko was a monthly publication, there was always time for the review process to take place without delaying publication or dissemination.

The Task Force Eagle Newsletter says:

The German Opinfo Battalion, decided to “market” or target their magazine, Mirko, to teenagers. This periodical was one of the most popular and successful PSYOP products. The five-man German team in Sarajevo developed concepts and aligned each edition to support selected PSYOP campaign objectives. This method reinforced PSYOP messages to the whole Bosnian population. Mirko served as an excellent vehicle for opening a dialogue between TPTs and local adults through their children. Surveys indicated that adults enjoyed the magazine as well.

There were also several magazines and newspapers published by the Allied forces. U.S. forces in Sarajevo published a weekly news magazine called Herald of Peace. The paper, each edition of which numbered 150,000 copies, was initially published in Stuttgart, Germany, later in Zagreb, Croatia, and finally in Sarajevo.

Then Major Roger Smith (Ret.) with then Captain Karl Zetmeir (Ret.)

My good friend retired Lieutenant Colonel Karl Zetmeir was the publisher of the Herald of Peace for a short time. He told me about his experience with the magazine:

One of the most professionally satisfying psychological operations products I ever worked on was the Herald of Peace. Though a relatively short-lived product, it represented the hard work and true dedication to our craft on the part of its PSYOP soldiers as no other. In a leaflet-dominated world often marked by simple illustrations and hip-shoot phraseology, the Herald of Peace stands in a class of its own.

 

The Herald of Peace

We simply called it “the HoP.” It was a magazine produced by the Combined Joint Information Task Force (CJICTF) in Sarajevo, Bosnia from 1996 through 1997. I myself reported to the CJICTF in June 1997, where I worked for the Product Development Chief, Major Roger Smith, as the Officer in Charge for all print product development, which included being Chief Editor of the HoP, as well as the Budget/Finance (BUDFIN) officer for our overall PSYOP campaign efforts. The officer I was replacing in both those functions was Captain Roger Lintz. Roger’s drive and initiative had raised the bar from the HoP’s initial format to that of a glossy, four-color, 36-page, TIME-quality magazine. He’d also negotiated a robust print contract with a Zagreb-based company that made this quality leap possible. Our transition from his team to mine was seamless and we eagerly accepted this challenging job.

The operational direction of the HoP came from our boss Roger Smith. Roger insisted the magazine hold true to stories that supported the Stabilization Force’s country-wide objectives, and we focused on themes like freedom of movement, election participation, and other peace initiatives. The major stories covered subjects like the recently restored Sarajevo ambulance service or the purchase of new firefighting equipment. We deliberately steered clear of ‘collage’ photos of US or other nation’s military forces conducting peacekeeping operations, unit rotations, changes of command, etc. One Stabilization Force logo was found on the inside cover, along with letters from the chief editor (Roger Lintz, followed by myself) and our Noncommissioned Officer editor (Bob Kellogg followed by Hans-Marc Hurd) in each issue. In retrospect, we were going for the same appeal as that of a “Readers Digest,” that even older copies would be interesting and fresh to a war-devastated target audience, particularly in the hinterlands, that rarely saw any printed media at all.

Mujo, Grujo and Lujo walk a fine line between peace and war
Herald of Peace – July 1997

In addition to its varied stories, the HoP had its own unique political satire cartoon. The Balkan-renown and award winning cartoon artist, Hasan Faslic was contracted to write for us and he created “Mujo, Grujo and Lujo,” representing a Serb, Croatian and a Bosnian. These three characters reduced very controversial political issues into simple and humorous cartoon illustrations. Also hired were two other host-nation illustrators who created crossword puzzles and horoscopes for each issue. We published 250,000 copies of the Herald of Peace each month. Following lessons learned in disseminating the first few editions, we printed articles in both Latin and Cyrillic alphabets in a page-alternating style that prevented the magazine from being torn in two by the recipient just to keep the portion in “their” preferred alphabet. Horoscopes enjoyed wide popularity among all three entities and we deliberately placed this on the back cover, so serve as the ‘hook’ to generate interest.

Many times we’d disseminate copies to people on the street to watch them start reading the horoscope, then take out a pen and begin working the crosswords. As we’d return to our vehicle a half hour later, we’d see those same folks now thumbing through the rest of the articles. The arrival of a new printing was always met with great excitement and anticipation within both the Combined Joint Information Task Force and Stabilization Force headquarters. Bundles of the magazine would then be divided between our allies and disseminated across Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I was Chief Editor for two monthly editions of the Herald of Peace before production was abruptly stopped in August of 1997. That month the Combined Joint Information Task Force was inspected by a PSYOP Assessment Team (POAT) headed by the then 4th Psychological Operations Group Commander and a small staff. Suffice it to say our vision of a PSYOP publication didn’t match theirs. Among other things, they wanted a portion of the issues printed in English for the Stabilization Force HQs staff, coverage of SFOR units included, broadened from what they thought was a Sarajevo-centric focus, and most importantly, they wanted the HoP printed every two weeks so the articles would be more current. As the Budget/Finance officer who paid the bills for all the PSYOP products we made in each media, I knew these conditions far exceeded our contracted print agreement. Production of the Herald of Peace thus came to a sudden and disappointing end. We continued to publish “Mujo, Grujo and Lujo” as independent cartoons in various Bosnian newspapers. However, in a particularly satisfying victory that Fall, the same Combined Joint Information Task Force print contract that had once produced 250,000 copies of the Herald of Peace across BiH was used to mass-print voter registration cards in the nick of time to ensure that the first nation-wide democratic elections in Bosnia could take place. Ours was the only unit capable of accomplishing this feat.

The Task Force Eagle Newsletter adds: 

The paper, each edition of which numbered 150,000 copies, was initially published in Stuttgart, Germany, later in Zagreb, Croatia, and finally in Sarajevo.

When they were published in Germany and Croatia, air assets transported them to Sarajevo, where they were distributed throughout the country. About 50,000 copies were placed in kiosks, located throughout the Federation. The remaining 100,000 copies were disseminated by traditional methods where Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPT) conducted face-to-face distribution. The newspaper was published for about 16 months, when it was replaced by a monthly magazine named the Herald of Progress. Both periodicals proved to be popular and effective organs for information, primarily targeting the adult audiences in both entities, while serving the needs of the military and civilian administrators.

Under SFOR the Herald of Peace became the Herald of Progress with a circulation of about 100,000 by 1997. Its admirers stated that the Herald of Progress was a dramatic departure from former, traditional PSYOP print journalistic endeavors. It was a “Madison Avenue-quality” monthly journal with pertinent articles, color photos, and political cartoons and commentaries. It was published in both the Latin and Cyrillic alphabet.

Sergeant Mark Jenkins of the 6th PSYOP Battalion tells us more about the Herald of Peace, some of these facts from his After Action Report prepared 11 June 1996.

Production work for the Herald of Peace in Zagreb began the week of 25 December 1995.The first Zagreb issue was laid out on 28 December 1995 and printed at Radin Press over the weekend. Dissemination began in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 4 January 1996. Approved articles were received early in the week (usually Tuesday), translations were completed by Wednesday evening, Disk files were prepared and forwarded to EuropaPress on Thursday, printing over the weekend, quality control check on Monday, delivered and placed on pallets on Tuesday, shipped to Bosnia on Wednesday.

After production in Zagreb ceased with issue 21, remaining personnel in Zagreb deployed forward to Sarajevo on 22 May 1996.

The approval process proved to be slow and unwieldy; placing extreme time pressure on the translation section to meet weekly deadlines.

Jenkins also mentions problems that were not in his AAR. For instance:

There were meaningless bureaucratic change requests. One time we were told to change the word “happy” to “glad,” even though it translates to the same word in the foreign language. Naples was annoyed that some of the broadsides we printed said “We will react to enemy actions against our convoys.” They wanted “unfriendly” instead of “enemy,” but once again it's the same word in Serbo-Croatian, "neprijatelj," literally “un-friend.” These kinds of problems caused added time and work to people on a very tight schedule.

Target Bosnia adds:

IFOR printed a weekly newspaper, The Herald of Peace. This publication became a monthly called The Herald of Progress with SFOR. In Fall 1997, the Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force (CJICTF) decided to only print special editions of The Herald of Progress. The CJICTF printed 100,000 copies of most of the first 65 issues published by fall 1997.

  

British Forces magazine Mostovi

British forces in Banja Luka printed a regionally attuned newspaper insert and later a magazine called Mostovi. The German forces in Sarajevo published a bright and lively monthly magazine for teenagers entitled Mirko. Publication began in June 1996 and production increased to a hundred thousand copies per edition by fall 1997.

Germany deployed more than 1,350 soldiers in the crisis area. They included soldiers of the PSYOPS forces who have been part of an international Press and Information Office (PIO) since May 2001.

It was their task to convey the mission and goals of SFOR by means of targeted information campaigns. Added to which, they were to influence the attitudes and behavior of the target audiences so that the spiral of violence was broken, and the Dayton Peace Accord respected. 

The SFOR Informer