
The mission of the 4th Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Group (Airborne) during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm was to provide operational and tactical PSYOP in support of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) objectives and tactical PSYOP in support of United States Army Central Command (USARCENT), United States Marine Central Command (USMARCENT) and United States Special Operations Command Central (USSOCCENT) objectives. Additionally, the 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) was to be prepared to provide PSYOP support to USSOCCENT and USARCENT for the liberation and restoration of Kuwait.
The 4th PSYOP Group Cell along with the 8th PSYOP Task Force (POTF), working with the CENTCOM J3 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, developed the USCENTCOM operational and tactical PSYOP plan "Burning Hawk". This was completed on 23 September 1990.
The 4th PSYOP Group Cell along with the 8th PSYOP Task Force were subsequently joined by the Headquarters, 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne), the 6th PSYOP Battalion (Airborne), the 9th PSYOP Battalion (Airborne), and the PSYOP Dissemination Battalion. Additionally the 13th PSYOP Battalion a reserve PSYOP (POW) Battalion and five reserve tactical PSYOP companies were activated to augment the 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Logistically, the tactical PSYOP companies were satellited off the active battalions they supported.
The 4th PSYOP Group coordinated and managed all PSYOP activities during both DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Pre hostilities PSYOP activities began on 30 December 1990 and continued throughout the air and ground phases of the war. PSYOP activities in support of battlefield preparation included leaflet operations, broadcast operations and loudspeaker operations. PSYOP activities in support of offensive ground operations also included leaflet operations, broadcast operations and loudspeaker operations.
Human Intelligence: Throughout Operation Desert Storm, the primary intelligence support for Psychological Operations was Human Intelligence (HUMINT) HUMINT provided accurate psychological impact indicators. Direct indicators from deserters and defectors assisted the Commander in adjusting PSYOP campaigns for specific target audiences. As leaflets were developed during Desert Storm, they were tested on cooperative EPWs (enemy prisoners of war. Some of the recommendations for changes to the leaflet's illustrations made by these EPWs were:
After command direct adjustments, EPWs began reporting indirect indicators. An example of this, was the prohibition of listening to radios or possessing coalition leaflets. As the ground war commenced HUMINT became more abundant and painted a "clear picture" of the enemy situation. HUMINT was consistently accurate; however, it was not as timely as it could have been.
Signal Intelligence: Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) initially held an important role early during operation Desert Shield. This is primarily because HUMINT was very limited in its reporting. First indicators of low morale of Iraqi soldiers came from signal intercept. SIGINT was one of the building blocks of essential intelligence used to create PSYOP products.
Specific tasks accomplished by the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm included:
The 4th PSYOP Group researched and developed over 29 million copies of 38 different leaflets (approximately 29 tons. There were five general themes for these leaflets:"Surrender", "US/Coalition Superiority", "Inevitability", "Saddam is the Cause", and "Abandon Equipment". These leaflets were disseminated between 30 DEC 90 and 28 Feb 91 by 110 different aircraft sorties. Listed below is a matrix that depicts the basic leaflet themes and their method of delivery:
|
BALLOON |
MC-130/HC-130 |
F-16/FA-18 |
B52 |
TOTAL |
| Surrender | 54K | 11.5M | 810K | N/A | 12.4M |
| Inevitability | N/A | 4.3M | 2.3M | N/A | 6.6M |
| Abandon Equip/Flee | N/A | 1.3M | 585K | N/A | 1.9M |
| Saddam's Fault | 90K | 1.8M | 835K | 2.0M | 4.7M |
| Other | 186K | N/A | 3.4M | N/A | 3.5M |
| Total | 330K | 18.9M | 7.8M | 2.0M | 29.1M |
* NOTE: Leaflets were also disseminated by helicopter, however those statitics are not available.
The 4th PSYOP Group established the "VOICE OF THE GULF" radio network which begun broadcasting on 19 January 1991. It operated continuously through 1 April 1991 with more than 210 hours of live broadcasting and 330 hours of prerecorded programs. A total of 2072 news items were aired along with 189 PSYOP messages. The VOICE OF THE GULF network consisted of three ground based transmitters, a 50 KW AM transmitter located at Abu Ali, Saudi Arabia broadcasting on AM 1134; a 10KW AM transmitter located at Qaisumah, Saudi Arabia broadcasting on AM 1179; and a 1KW FM transmitter located at Qaisumah, Saudi Arabia broadcasting on FM 87.5 and two Volant Solo EC-130 aircraft broadcasting on AM 690 and FM 88.5 and 87.9.
During the phases of the air and ground war the Voice of the Gulf was the most reliable source of war news to the Iraqi soldier and the citizens of Kuwait. The Voice of the Gulf continued to counter Iraqi disinformation by broadcasting information programming into Kuwait, Southern Iraq, and Southwestern Iran.
The 4th PSYOP Group fielded 71 Tactical loudspeaker teams. These teams provided support to USARCENT (both XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps), USMARCENT and USSOCCENT. Loudspeaker teams broadcast surrender appeals, harrassment and deception tapes. Most loudspeaker teams had Saudi Arabian, Egyptian or Kuwaiti linguists attached to execute live broadcasts as the situation dictated.
In many cases entire units surrendered without firing a single shot As a result, thousands of Iraqi soldiers surrendered and countless American and coalition casualties were spared. Some specific examples of the effectiveness of tactical loudspeaker teams were:
Loudspeaker teams were also innovatively employed for prisoner control at the EPW camps with broadcasts designed to accomplish prisoner pacification and underscore Military Police authority.
The 4th PSYOP Group (A) efforts were vital to the overall success of all US forces in Operation DESERT STORM. The integration of PSYOP radio and leaflet operations into the air campaign contributed significantly to the high defection rates among Iraqi soldiers. The effectiveness of the radio messages and leaflets were repeatedly confirmed by EPW debriefings. EPW also reported that some Iraqi commanders read surrender instructions aloud from leaflets to their units in formation.
So how successful was the PSYOP campaign in Desert Storm? The International Red Cross reported that nearly 87,000 Iraqi soldiers turned themselves over to coalition forces, most of them clutching the leaflets or hiding them in their clothing. All incidents of surrender were bloodless.
