The story of psychological operations (PSYOP) in Vietnam is difficult to relate.
There were a host of originators of propaganda and the lines of authority and control are
difficult to unravel and chart. I have made an attempt in this article to outline the
order of battle (OB) as it has been published in official and other documents. This is an
ongoing project and one that I hope the readers will help me to finish. It is a labor of
love. The data is from official records, published books, magazines, field manuals,
interviews, and anecdotes. I believe it is fairly accurate, but I am sure that there are
many omissions. I ask any reader who can add to this story to write to me at the address
below. I will be happy to add any data that will make this story more complete.
In 1956 the Viet Cong, aided by North Vietnam, pressed war in the south, and South
Vietnam began receiving U.S. aid. Large-scale North Vietnamese troop infiltrations of the
south began in 1964, with the support of China and the Soviet Union. Masses of troops were
stationed in border areas of Laos and Cambodia.
In 1964, following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the United States began
air strikes against the North. Increased activity followed in 1965, including the use of
U.S. ground troops. Failure of U.S. and South Vietnamese efforts and disputes in the U.S.
over war aims led Richard Nixon in July 1969 to cease bombings of the North and to begin a
series of U.S. troop withdrawals referred to as "Vietnamization." U.S. bombings
of the North resumed in 1972-73. A cease-fire was negotiated in Paris in January 1973, but
it was never implemented. U.S. aid was curbed by Congress in 1974. Increasing attacks from
the North overwhelmed the remaining government outposts in the Central Highlands, and the
Saigon government surrendered on 30 April 1975. A Socialist Republic of Vietnam, with
capital in Hanoi, was established throughout Vietnam.
An Air Commando who was stationed at LS-20A (Long Tieng) and LS-153 (Mouang Kassy) told
me:
Trail Campaign Leaflet T-07.
JUSPAO carried out extensive campaigns to induce North Vietnamese troops
to surrender. The bulk of money and attention was focused on the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program to encourage Viet Cong to
"rally" to the cause of the Republic of Vietnam. Begun in 1963 and administered
by JUSPAO after its formation in 1965, the Chieu Hoi campaign resulted in billions of
leaflets, millions of posters, magazines, and leaflets, and thousands of hours of
loudspeaker exhortations encouraging Viet Cong defection; this is said to have been the
largest propaganda campaign in history, with over 10 billion leaflets dropped in 1969
alone. In addition to offering amnesty and good treatment, monetary rewards were offered
and paid to defectors who turned in weapons. Rewards were offered to third parties who
induced Viet Cong to defect, with special bonuses for mass defections. These schemes were
highly successful and were extended through 1969, but were terminated on 31 December 1969,
probably because of abuses in awarding the money. We should also mention the Dai Doan
Ket Program. This was a Chieu Hoi program aimed at middle and higher cadre in the Viet
Cong. Most officers had come from the peasantry and it was believed that they would not
rally to the Government just to be returned to the peasant class. This program promised to
accept high-ranking returnees and place them in responsible positions.
The 6 August 1967 PSYOP Guide prepared by the Office of the Psychological
Operations Directorate of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, mentions
the Dai Doan Ket Program:
Potential defectors need to be reassured concerning the treatment they will
receive after rallying and the opportunities offered them for reintegration into society.
Former middle-level and higher cadre have stated their desire to prove themselves by
working for the Government of Vietnam in jobs that make use of their qualifications.
Leaflets making specific reference to the “Dai Doan Ket” (National
Reconciliation Program) which is aimed at helping qualified returnees find employment
commensurate with their previous training and experience should be particularly useful in
appealing to this group.
There were numerous command and control problems at JUSPAO just as there were in the
field PSYOP groups and battalions. Colonel William E. Linn was the Chief of Policy, Plans
and Research and later the Assistant Director for Field Operations from March 1968 to
April 1969. He wrote a PSYOP After-Action Report on 6 June 1969 that details the
problems and recommendations for solving them. I will just mention a few of the more
important ones. COL Linn is particularly disturbed that JUSPAO was never warned in advance
about major policy shifts, and if given advance notice, was not allowed to utilize the
information for PSYOP. He gives as example the bombing halts of March 1968 and October
1968. On both occasions JUSPAO was ready to tell the Vietnamese people why the bombing was
halted. Because they had no guidance or permission they were unable to do so. As a result:
Hanoi propagandists had a field day pounding all Vietnamese target audiences that
they had won a total victory; to fight on until the U.S. aggressors are forced out of
Vietnam; that the North Vietnamese regime had not conceded anything to the United States
at Paris; and that the United States was required to admit defeat due to U.S. and world
public opinion; and that the bombing halt was proof that the communists’ fight in the
Republic of Vietnam was just and right.
Linn complains about the lack of a single person in charge of all PSYOP in Vietnam.
This complaint is seen again and again in after-actions. There was far too much division
of authority.
An interesting complaint is that although JUSPAO in theory is in general charge of
PSYOP, they are not cleared to know what black operations are being performed by MACV-SOG.
He worries that the two agencies might be sending different messages to the enemy:
It is recognized that this is a sensitive area, but we must also recognize that
the effectiveness of PSYOP is predicated, to a large degree, on a coordinated
effort. In the case of these two activities, the product they are attempting to sell
should complement one another; thereby adding to the credibility of each other’s
product.
Finally, a complaint that I have seen in almost every PSYOP after-action since the
Korean War is the training of personnel. Linn says:
As an example, in the Army the bulk of resources for PSYOP come from the Armor
and Artillery branches, while in the Air Force the majority are ex-bombardiers of other
SAC personnel. A further deficiency in the selection criteria is that officers selected
for the JUSPAO staff seldom if ever are “old hands” with background and
experience.
Curiously. Linn supports his own argument. His
signature block shows that he was a “Colonel, Field Artillery.”
Thomas C. Sorensen tells us more about special JUSPAO teams in The Word War,
Harper & Row, N.Y., 1968:
JUSPAO helped train six-man Van Tac Vu (Cultural Drama Service) troupes and
assisted in the production of their material. The entertainers - among them, attractive
actresses unaccustomed to hardship - traveled in black pajamas commonly worn by peasants,
and lived with the villagers as they moved around the countryside, performing twenty or
more shows a month. The troupes sang patriotic songs ("Vietnam, Vietnam" and
"Our House"), amused and indoctrinated the peasantry with primitive dramas about
villainous Viet Cong and heroic South Vietnamese soldiers and officials, and off stage
distributed medicines, seed, food, and pamphlets, and helped at chores ranging from
repairing damaged buildings to bathing infants.
The PSYOP Guide also mentions Culture Drama teams:
This group, made up of all types of entertainers, provides culture drama shows
for Vietnamese military primarily in the Capital Military District. Organic to each POLWAR
Battalion in the four Corps is a culture Platoon which provides entertainment throughout
the Corps area in the form of songs, dramas, dances and similar activities. In the remote
areas, these platoons may provide the only source of entertainment for the people.
Under the heading “Current Activities” the PSYOP Guide mentions
other programs of interest:
Armed Propaganda Teams are made up of ralliers under the Chieu Hoi
Program. The teams provide their own protection and have proven most effective in
obtaining ralliers, quite frequently by interacting with the families of known Viet Cong.
Mobile Training Teams provide on-site indoctrination training for the
Popular Forces in each of the four Corps. The purpose of the teams is to promote
solidarity and morale of the Popular Forces.
Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP). The basic intent of MEDCAP is to
establish and maintain a continuing spirit of mutual respect and cooperation between the
Vietnamese and U.S. military medical personal and the civilian population by providing
basic medical care to the people living in rural and often Viet Cong infested villages and
hamlets.
Under “PSYOP Programs” the 1968 Guide says:
The Chieu Hoi Program consists of all activities designed to cause members
of the Viet Cong and their supporters to return to the rightful and legitimate government
of the Republic of Vietnam.
The Dai Doan Ket Program extends the Chieu Hoi program to middle and high
level Viet Cong cadre.
The B-52 Follow-up Program. Within four hours of a B-52 strike leaflets
are dropped informing the enemy that he has been bombed by B-52s and showing him a picture
of the bomber which flies so high that he would otherwise never see it. It reminds him
that the bombers will come again and urges the Viet Cong to use the safe conduct pass.
The North Vietnamese personnel in South Vietnam Program is designed to
create doubts and fears in the minds of enemy troops about their chance of survival; the
dangers of injury and disease; burial in unmarked graves; the hopelessness of their
situation; the fate of their friends and relatives in the north, and the competence of
their commanders.
The Weapons Reward Program offers money and gifts for retrieval of weapons
and ordnance.
The Defoliation Program provides security for lines of communication by
removing dense vegetation that could be used to conceal ambush sites, remove jungle cover
from enemy base areas and infiltration routes, and provide increased visibility around
friendly installations. PSYOP programs can minimize any adverse psychological impact of
defoliation and reduce the effect of enemy propaganda by providing the population with
timely information. The defoliant used in Vietnam is particularly effective
against broadleaf vegetation and is harmless to men and animals.
The Frantic Goat Campaign formally known as “Fact Sheet ”
disseminates news and related facts to North Vietnam.
The Trail Campaign is directed against military and civilian personnel who
use and maintain the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
The Tallyho Campaign is conducted in the panhandle area of North Vietnam
against the civilians who maintain the lines of communications and warns them that the
lines will continue to be interdicted and bombed.
The later December 1973 Survey of Psychological Operations in Vietnam adds
more data about operations at the end of the war:
After the Paris Agreements were signed earlier this year, most leaflet operations
were halted. Operation Trail, a leaflet program against North Vietnamese troops on the Ho
Chi Minh Trail; the Royal Lao air Force Operation Fountain Pen, directed against North
Vietnamese troops in Laos, and Operation Rice River, directed against North Vietnamese
troops in Cambodia, continued for a period.
There is one Khmer language leaflet campaign. Operation Big Show, a gray leaflet
(without attribution) by the Khmer government…Operation Freedom Care, a white leaflet
(U.S. attribution) to Vietnamese communists in the Khmer Republic… the Khmer Republic
has a small leaflet program. The government of Vietnam leaflet program is sharply limited
and rated ineffective…
Most of the leaflet printing capability is in the hands of the
Americans…Giant presses are operated by the Seventh PSYOP Group in Okinawa and at the
United States Information Agency’s Regional Service Center in Manila.
There was no U.S. Army PSYOP commander, although JUSPAO was represented at
command level through a coordinating committee.
The President of the United States directed in 1970 that an Ad Hoc PSYOP Committee
on Vietnam be formed to provide direction for and coordination of psychological warfare
against the Vietnamese Communists. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group proposed the following
objectives for more effective coordination of psychological operations against the
Vietnamese Communists.
1. Develop a National Psychological Warfare strategy directed against the Vietnamese
Communists, including psychological objectives to be accomplished.
2. Coordinate the overall psychological warfare effort against the Vietnamese
Communists.
3. Provide thematic guidance.
4. Prepare periodic reports to the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs on our psychological warfare operations against the Vietnamese Communists.
5. Assess the anticipated psychological impact of Vietnam related policy options as
appropriate.
Other decisions relating to a psychological warfare strategy, as well as other
decisions covering major issues in the conduct of our psychological warfare against the
Vietnamese Communists, were to be referred to the President for approval. Additional
recommendations were to persuade the Communist Party leadership to change its policies;
increase internal tensions, doubts, and policies; and motivate the Vietnamese people to
question the wisdom of the North Vietnamese Government. The proposed targets were the top
Party leadership, the Party apparatus, the North Vietnamese people, and Communist forces
in the north and south. The themes developed for each target were designed to convince
them that the war could not be won and policies must be changed, to increase war weariness
and discouragement among troops and the population, and to cause resentment and tension
between northerners and southerners.
Leaflet Codes
The vast majority of Vietnam leaflets bore codes. For the most part they are simple to
read. In general, the originating unit placed its number first, then the number of the
leaflet (for that year), and finally the year itself. So, we would expect to find leaflets
starting with 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 244, 245, 246, etc. A leaflet will generally have a code
like 6-250-68 which indicates that it was the 250th leaflet produced (or distributed) in
1968 by the 6th PSYOP Battalion.
Early JUSPAO leaflets had the code "SP" (Special Project) before the leaflet
number. For example, SP-2250. JUSPAO removed the "SP" when it became clear that
it identified the leaflet as American in origin. The later leaflets would have only a
numerical code like "4450."
The earliest numbered leaflets (before they were marked with a unit number) simply
showed a numerical and a year. For instance, leaflets in the I Corps Tactical Zone in 1966
might just have a code like “104-66” or “149-66.” Later on, unit
designations were added. Number coded leaflets starting with “4-“ are Fourth
PSYOP Group. Number coded leaflets starting with “6-” are Sixth PSYOP Battalion,
“7-” are Seventh PSYOP Battalion, “8-” are Eighth PSYOP Battalion, and
“10-” are Tenth PSYOP Battalion. Higher numbered leaflets are usually the
earlier PSYOP Companies; “19-” are the 19th PSYOP Company, “244-” are
the 244th PSYOP Company, “245-” are the 245th PSYOP Company and “246-”
represents the 246th PSYOP Company. I have not seen leaflets starting “24-”, but
there may be some printed by the 24th PSYOP Company.
In addition, there were a number of special codes. Leaflets dropped along the Ho Chi
Minh Trail as part of the "Trail Campaign" had the letter "T." An
example is T80 or 95T. Leaflets dropped on North Vietnam during the Operation Fact Sheet
or Operation Frantic Goat of 1965-68 have very low numbers, from 1-151. There are other
codes such as "A" (the basic form of a leaflet when there is more than one
variation), "H" (handbill), "P" (poster) and "R" (reprint).
The code “NP” was the newspaper Nhan Van (Human Knowledge).
"CP" represents "Camel Path," the secret operation in Cambodia.
“ATF” leaflets were printed by the Australians.In addition, there are
other codes such as "CC," "F," “HQ,” “M”
(they seem to be all in the Cambodian language), “NT (with numeral),”
“P,” "S," "V," and
“X” (usually has the word “scrap” and “without regard to
dissemination characteristics” so they may be leaflets just printed in blank spaces
on sheets to utilize the paper more efficiently).
Leaflet X-6
The “X” leaflets are very strange. They seem to fit no pattern and usually
come with a comment such as “To be disseminated without regard to dissemination
characteristics with normal leaflet requirements.” In other words, even though
mathematical formulas were used for most leaflets according to their size and paper weight
to assure that they would drop on their targets, these “X” leaflets were just
added to the pile and were allowed to fall wherever they landed. Almost all of the
“X” leaflets that I have seen are in regard to the Paris Peace talks. The text
on leaflet X-6 is:
PEACE
The Party and the Government of the North will be found guilty by history if they
don’t end this senseless war.
The Vietnamese coded their leaflets with the letters "DV" and a long series
of numbers afterwards. The "DV" indicated Quan-Doi Viet Nam Cong Hoa (Army of
the Republic of Vietnam).
Leaflet DV15AH2268
Vietnamese PSYOP leaflet DV15AH2268 depicts President Ngugen Van Thieu and clarifies
his attitude towards the National Liberation Front. The text is:
THE PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS DECLARED:
There will be never a Joint Government in South Vietnam.
The back is all text:
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS AGAINST A JOINT
GOVERNMENT
President Nguyen Van Thieu has declared his willingness to talk to anyone in the
South Vietnamese Liberation Front, but the government of the Republic of Vietnam will
never recognize that Front as an independent organization.
Lately, with continuous failures in the battlefield, the Communists have spread
rumors that there will be a Joint Government in the South. Their sole purpose is to create
confusion among the public. However, the people of the South understand that the rumors of
a Joint Government are just a propaganda tactic of the Communists. Its sole purpose is to
cover their military and political failures.
There will be no Joint Government in the South.
The extent of the Allied propaganda effort in Vietnam is told by James William
Gibson in The Perfect War- Technowar in Vietnam, The Atlantic Monthly Press, NY,
1986:
From 1965 through 1972 over fifty billion leaflets were distributed in South and
North Vietnam and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and Cambodia; this vast sum was the
equivalent of more than 1,500 leaflets per person in both the north and the south. In 1969
the military and civilian propaganda apparatuses produced over 10.5 billion leaflets, 4
million pamphlets, 60,000 newspaper articles, over 24.5 million posters, and nearly
12 million magazines.
Press sheet
The uncut sheet depicted above consists of a mixture
of propaganda leaflets in the Vietnamese language and represents a sample press sheet from
the small format, high speed Hancho web presses. Two of them were used to print leaflets
during the 1966-1967 periods. Another press was added in 1968.
Declassified SOG documents show the extent of the leaflet operation in Vietnam. 31
million leaflets were dropped in 1964, 67 million in 1965, 142 million in 1966 and 271
million in 1968. MACV could produce 200,000 3x6-inch leaflets per eight-hour shift on its
Harris high-speed press. The PSYWAR Directorate had a Webendorf Press that that SOG was
authorized to use from 1600-2400. It could produce 500,000 leaflets per shift. In
addition, the deception mail operation produced 200 fake letters per month of various
types to be mailed into North Vietnam.
The black letter program was constantly being fine-tuned. A MACVSOG comment on the
subject states:
We plan to use notional leftist organizations abroad as originators of the
letters, but are beginning with a true leftist Japanese fishing organization. In line with
this, we are soon going to use a Paris-based Vietnamese, pro-Hanoi student
organization’s magazine to infiltrate subtle anti-Communist propaganda into North
Vietnam by making slight changes in some of the articles…
We will experiment in the printed media field, for example; calendars, fishing
hints, and tide tables are presently being obtained. Varying paper stocks are now being
used.
As the war progressed the black letter output went from 3,993 in 1965 to 6,000 in
1966 and 7,550 in 1967. The letters were mailed from Singapore, Paris, Hong Kong, Bangkok
and Tokyo, allegedly from North Vietnamese living outside the country. There were nine
general themes for the letters: Weakness in Communist ideology; Revision in North Vietnam;
Chinese imperialism; North Vietnamese mismanagement; Peace; Free Enterprise; Free society;
Resistance movements and the Chieu Hoi program. The letters were coded according to type:
Special: High level hard sell propaganda (400 letters per month).
Vulcan: High and medium level with a revisionist point of view. (50-60 letters
per week).
Thor: A personal letter with soft sell and human interest. (15 letters a week)
Mars: To next-of-kin of battlefield casualties. (10 letters per week)
Luna: Exploitation of captured Viet Cong letters. (as available)
I should mention here that we discuss black SOG operations in greater depth in our
article on the Sacred Sword of the Patriots League. Readers
interested in black operations are encouraged to read that article for more information on
the “dirty tricks” of the Vietnam War.
In Volume I of the Department of Defense contracted the Final Report
Psychological Operations Studies – Vietnam, Human Sciences Research Inc, 1971,
Drs. Ernest F. and Edith M. Bairdain mention the value of leaflets:
In regard to the best means for disseminating the Allied message among the Viet
Cong, members who rallied to the government stated that 99% saw propaganda leaflets, 100%
heard airborne loudspeakers, 98% saw radio sets, 34% saw newspapers, 13% saw magazines, 9%
heard ground loudspeakers, 7% read posters, 4% saw television sets and just 1% saw PSYOP
novelty items. Of the enemy who saw the leaflets, 81% of the VC and 97% of the NVA
actually read them. Of the enemy who heard the airborne loudspeakers, 89% of the VC and
98% of the NVA actually listened to the message. The authors point out that this
demonstrates that leaflets, airborne loudspeakers, and radio are the best methods to reach
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army personnel.
Republic of Vietnam Armed
Forces PSYOP
Although Americans like to believe that they invented PSYOP and are the masters of
the art, the Vietnamese were practicing PSYOP early in their war against the Communists.
On 1 July 1953 the Vietnamese Army had two PSYOP companies to conduct propaganda in the
1st and 2nd Military Regions (Later Corps Tactical Zones). On 1 January 1958 the unit was
renamed the Mobile Cultural Battalion. On 1 November 1959 it was renamed a PSYWAR
Battalion. On 1 March 1963 a decision was made to form 3 PSYWAR Battalions and the
original unit became the 1st PSYWAR Battalion headquartered in Saigon. The 2nd and 3rd
PSYWAR battalions would be assigned to the 2nd and 3rd CTZs headquartered in Pleiku and Da
Nang with a 4th battalion planned to be activated in the 1964-1965 time frame for the 4th
CTZ.
As an ARVN tactical unit the mission of the battalion was local civic action to
promote confidence in the government, to win the people from the influence of the enemy
and to encourage the people to stand up against the communists; troop morale operations
among ARVN forces to promote a fighting spirit and a strong determination to win, to
promote discipline and a willingness to sacrifice one’s life for the nation and the
people; and PSYOP campaigns against the enemy to break their fighting will and to cause
them to surrender. The original single battalion consisted of 602 men, but under the new
organization, each battalion was authorized 367 men. The battalions have the ability to
produce white, grey and black propaganda using leaflets, loudspeakers, printed material,
photographs and documents. Each battalion supports a corps, the companies support
divisions, the groups support regiments and the PSYWAR teams support battalions.
After the 1963 reorganization the ARVN PSYWAR battalion consisted of a Headquarters
and Headquarters Company, a Technical Company, and three PSYWAR Companies. The Technical
Company was comprised of a Special Operations Platoon, a Cultural Platoon, a Radio
Augmentation Platoon and a Press Platoon. Each of the PSYWAR Companies was made up of six
PSYWAR Teams.
Vietnamese PSYOP structure
The Vietnamese PSYOP structure was designed after that of the Republic of China on Taiwan.
Their General Political Warfare Department was made up of a Psychological Warfare
Department, a Political Indoctrination Department, a Social Services Department, Chaplain
Services, a Military Security Service, Information Services and the Political Warfare College.
U.S. forces were advised that because of the peculiar Vietnamese system, a POLWAR
Battalion was not to be considered the equivalent of a PSYOP Battalion.
The Vietnamese 10th Political Warfare (POLWAR) Battalion worked in I Corps with the U.S.
7th Psychological Operations Battalion. They shared the same compound in Da Nang and their
printing facilities were integrated. The 10th POLWAR consisted of four PSYWAR Companies, a
technical and administrative company, and a cultural drama platoon. Each PSYWAR Company
contained five Civic Action teams, one intelligence team, and one indoctrination team. The
first priority of the POLWAR Battalion was command information; informing and
indoctrinating friendly military forces. The second priority was winning over the civilian
population, and the third was PSYOP efforts aimed at the enemy. The POLWAR Battalion
worked under ARVN Corps Control, Often at division level, and with U.S. advisors available
as needed.
In a Vietnamese-language article entitled “Coastal Raiders” translated by
Donald C. Brewster, Tran Do Cam talks about Vietnamese psychological operations. He
mentions several operations:
Leaflet drops usually took place in the highly populated areas south of the 18th
Parallel.
Large quantities of leaflets were placed in the shell of an 81mm mortar that was
fired into the coastal villages and communities from the fast patrol boats when they were
1,500 to 2,000 meters offshore. The shell would explode overhead like a flare and the
leaflets would flutter down from the sky.
Sometimes the fast patrol boats also distributed radios wrapped in waterproof
plastic in the villages along the coast so that the population could listen to South
Vietnamese radio stations such as the Voice of Freedom (Tiéng Nói Tu Do), Mother of
Vietnam (Me Viêt Nam) or the Sacred Sword of Patriotism (Gươm Thiên Ái Quôc).
A former agent informs me that Brewster is incorrect with his comment about Mother
Vietnam Radio. He stated that Mother Vietnam radio came into existence after MACV-SOG had
phased out such boat operations.
The Special Operations Research Office of the American University (SORO) published
the classified A Short Guide to Psychological Operations in the Republic of Vietnam
in 1965. Authors Jeanne Mintz, Herbert Silverberg and James Trinnaman say about
radio operations:
In 1965 there were 11 radio stations in Vietnam broadcasting 120 hours a day.
(This does not include the “Voice of Freedom” PSYOP broadcasts). The stations
were located in Saigon, Hue, Quang Nhai, Qui Nhon, Banmethuot, Nha Trang, Dalat, Ba Xuyen,
Hoi An, Tuy Hoa and Tan An. The Hue station was used by the ARVN for propaganda
broadcasts. Of course, the Voice of American also broadcast on a great number of
frequencies to Vietnam.
The Voice of Freedom (VOF) was a major player in the “black” radio
operation. Declassified documents show that it produced 76 different programs weekly with
commentaries in Vietnamese, English and French. Some of the program titles are; Vietnamese
Traditional Music, Sounds of Poetry, Returnees Songs, the Roman Catholic program, the
Buddhist program, Activities Abroad and at Home, the Daily Battle Scene, News Analysis,
Propaganda and Truth, the Open Arms program and Liberation Deeds.
A knowledgeable source says that the SORO description of the Voice of Freedom as a
"black"station is wrong. At most it was "gray."
Other black Allied radio stations included the SOG fake Radio Hanoi clone broadcast
from Number 7 Hong Tap Street in Saigon; Radio Red Flag, the voice of an alleged breakaway
North Vietnamese Communist Party faction; and the CIA station Red Star Radio, allegedly a
dissident Communist group in South Vietnam. The small fixed-station radios disseminated to
the North Vietnamese by the Allies were codenamed “peanuts.”
By the end of the war the December 1973 Survey
of Psychological Operations in Vietnam says about the radio output:
There are five CAS-operated radio stations, three broadcasting in Vietnamese and
two in Khmer. Mother Vietnam Station, with a Tokyo Rose approach, broadcasts a daily basic
three hour program on five transmitters. The Sacred Sword of the Patriotic League radio
station, a black operation pointed toward Hanoi, broadcasts five hours a day. The Voice of
Nam-Bo Liberation, a black operation directed at communists within South Vietnam
broadcasts to the Mekong delta and Central Vietnam. The Voice of Khmer programs are much
the same as Mother Vietnam, and a black station, the Voice of the Popular Front of
Indochina appears to come from Hanoi but injects divisiveness between Vietnamese
communists and their Khmer allies.
The Voice of America reaches Hanoi from two medium wave transmitters. Big Squirt
at Hue and a million-watt transmitter in the Philippines.
Radio broadcasting by the Government of Vietnam consists of the Voice of Freedom
and two VTVN national radio stations. Channel A broadcasts 18 hours a day and can be heard
by North Vietnamese troops in the Vietnam-Cambodia border area. Channel B is the Political
Warfare station and broadcasts 18 hours a day to the Vietnamese armed forces and their
dependents.
The comment about "five CAS-operated radio stations" means that they were
"controlled American source" stations and the term was used in government
documents as a euphemism for CIA.
Mother Vietnam Radio was run by South Vietnamese Army psychological warfare staff
with American aid during the War. The station had broadcast from 7 Hong Thap Tu Street and
was code-designated “House No. 7.” It was a “grey” radio station and
moderate in comparison to other propaganda efforts. The station encouraged North
Vietnamese soldiers to defect to the South and sought to break their morale. On 20 April
1975, as South Vietnam was about to fall, the CIA sent all 144 staff members and their
families, totaling about 1000 people and equipment to Phu Quoc Island off the coast of
South Vietnam. The refugees were then picked up by the cargo ship “Pioneer
Challenger” and moved to Guam, from where they were eventually resettled in the United
States.
There is also a record of a PSYWAR Bureau. A mention of this organization is found in Monthly
Historical Summary, April 1966 (Declassified) Appendix II, from the Commander, U. S.
Naval Forces Vietnam. There is a long list of operations that were Civic Action or PSYOP.
We can’t tell in most cases which were Vietnamese and which was American, but in some
specific instances the Vietnamese are identified:
The PSYWAR Bureau issued 22,900 magazines, 52,400 posters, and 91,500 leaflets to
Vietnamese and U.S. units for further distribution. In a special project in conjunction
with JUSPAO, the Vietnamese PSYWAR Bureau produced 10,000 special posters depicting the
new Rung Sat Special Zone and Long Tau River security regulations. These were distributed
to the Rung Sat Special Zone and the four surrounding provinces for posting.
Military Black Propaganda
MACV-SOG
Military activities were officially described as providing
assistance to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Within the Military Assistance
Command Vietnam, the Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG) was charged with conducting
unconventional warfare, including black propaganda.
The Operations Staff Directorate was divided into numbered
divisions: OP31 through OP35. This was Navy nomenclature because MACV was originally
organized and supported by CINCPAC, a Navy dominated unified command. 
