PSYOP ORDER OF BATTLE
FOR VIETNAM

The Maritime Studies Group was the action arm of OP-31: the Maritime Studies Branch, and was responsible for covert maritime operations conducted by the Vietnamese Coastal Security Service (CSS). Its cover name was the Naval Advisory Detachment. The capability to carry out missions against North Vietnam was maintained through extensive training at Da Nang and by conducting operational missions against selected targets in South Vietnam.

OP-39: Psychological Studies Group. See OP-33.

Leaflet operations were sometimes credited to more than one branch, probably depending on whether the task was the production or the dissemination of the leaflets. All black propaganda and currency counterfeiting emerged from OP-33. Leaflets were disseminated with the assistance of OP-34 and OP-35.

SOG comprised about 400 soldiers at a given time. About 100 soldiers were doing actual combat duty, with each of the three Command and Control units of OP-35 having about 36 Americans.

MACV estimated that there were approximately 5,000 Meos, 4,000 Thais, 2,000 Nungs and 3,000 Muongs living in North Vietnam. All through the war MACV asked permission to form these groups into a resistance movement against the Communist North Vietnamese. The problem was that once the United States accepted the moral responsibility for such a resistance movement, it would be committed to support it with personnel, material and funds. No one in Washington wanted to accept that responsibility. Commanders in the field were constantly reminded that current U.S. policy did not advocate the overthrow or change in the government of North Vietnam.

United States Navy PSYOP

Blue Eagle

Although seldom mentioned, the United States Navy was also involved with psychological radio operations in Vietnam. The first "Blue Eagle" aircraft was constructed in January 1965 using a NC-121J Lockheed Super-Constellation shell. Blue Eagle I was the first project aircraft and configured to do AM, FM, and SW radio broadcast missions. A crew of naval officers and enlisted personnel was selected. Operational and flight training began in July 1965. The aircraft was sent to Vietnam shortly afterwards where in October it broadcast the World Series to American troops and became the world’s first operational airborne broadcast station. United States Navy RMC Steve Robbins told me:

I spent three of my four flight tours in Vietnam flying this bird. Blue Eagle I (aircraft 131627) was one of four Navy Project Jenny broadcast birds that we built and operated. This bird was a radio-only bird (unlike the other three which were radio/TV broadcast birds.  Blue Eagle I, after doing a test flight in Vietnam which rebroadcast the World Series from the United States, was assigned to PSYOPS operations.

Two Blue Eagle aircraft were based at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon to broadcast Channel 11 of Armed Forces Vietnam Television (the American Forces Vietnam Network), and Channel 9 of THVN (the official station of the Government of Vietnam) in South Vietnam until 1970. 

A third aircraft was based at Da Nang Air Base to provide airborne PSYOP broadcast missions for MACVSOG off the coast of North Vietnam from 1966 to 1970. It took part in psychological operations from 1965-1967 and earned the nickname “Da Nang Dirty Bird.” John Plaster mentions the Project Jenny missions in his book about SOG and it was Blue Eagle I that flew those missions.  

Plaster says about Project Jenny in SOG: the Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam:

In Project Jenny, a U.S. Navy EC-121 aircraft broadcast SOG radio programs while flying off the North Vietnam coast, a technique that confused enemy radio direction finders and, because the radio wasn’t far away, tended to overwhelm local station signals.

This was a highly classified mission and most of the crew did not know they were working for at the time. In 2001, personnel who served with SOG were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation by direction of President George Bush.

Robbins continues:

After 1970, the Blue Eagles were retired to the bone yard to lick their war wounds and the Navy got out of the airborne broadcasting business. The U.S. Air Force then  took over these missions with Coronet Solo broadcast birds (which were essentially remakes of the navy birds) and ultimately the Commando Solo EC-130 airborne broadcast platforms currently flown by the Pennsylvania Air National Guard 193rd Special Operations Wing.  

It is also interesting to note that in order to make the TV programs work as a psychological operation; the United States Agency for International Development provided 500 television sets for Vietnam. They were placed in public squares, store windows, or wherever Vietnamese citizens were likely to gather.

Robert J. Kodosky mentions television in Psychological Operations American Style – the Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond: Lexington Books, Lanham, MD, 2007. Some of his comments are:

The medium JUSPAO placed the most hope for enhancing the image of the Republic of Vietnam remained television…USAID procured an initial 3,500 television sets for distribution and also took on the responsibility of maintaining their operation…Within three years, Americans had inundated the Vietnamese countryside with television sets. They distributed well over 100,000 units with “approximately 2,200 sets in pagodas, public meeting halls and other central locations where large groups can congregate.”

Beach Jumper Insignia

The United States Navy tactical cover and deception units were called Beach Jumpers. The units were founded in WWII and used again during the Vietnam War. There were over a dozen detachments and teams. Some of their psychological operations were:

Beach Jumpers Unit 1 Detachment A was responsible for employing PSYOP which would become one of the Beach Jumpers' Vietnam missions and later, their unclassified cover activity. This included propaganda leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts, which Detachment A conducted during all major operations in 1966.  

Detachment D conducted psychological operations in support of Task Forces 115, 116, and 117 operating in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam.

Detachment F rode River Patrol Boats conducting psychological operation on the Cua Viet and Hue rivers in northernmost I Corps. It dropped over 260,000 leaflets during Operation “Daring Rebel” which was a multi-battalion assault on the Hoi An area against the Viet Cong. The leaflets carried rally themes of Chieu Hoi, population control directives, and pleas for local population assistance. Aerial broadcasts, which followed the leaflet drops, carried the same themes and were made by Vietnamese liaison personnel. 

Team 13 conducted psychological operations from River Patrol Boats on all waterways in country. Additionally they supported both Army 5th Special Forces A and B Teams and Navy SEALS. For their efforts, Beach Jumper Unit One Team 13 was presented the Navy Unit Commendation which said in part:

Beach Jumper Unit 1, Team 13 operated with units of the United States Navy, the United States Army, and the Vietnamese Navy In carrying out psychological operations and combat missions of a classified nature. By April 1971, the Team had established detachments throughout the IV Corps area, effectively covering the fifteen provinces of the Mekong Delta with their diversified psychological operations capabilities; including loudspeaker broadcast equipment, leaflet drops, civic action projects, and other techniques.

John B. Dwyer tells us more in Seaborne Deception, the History of the U.S. Navy Beach Jumpers.

The Beach Jumpers often took part in deception operations. For instance, in order to fool the Viet Cong and make them think that PBRs were in the area when they were in fact back at base refueling:

Team 13 transmitted prerecorded helicopter background noises and simulated chopper voice traffic over PBR primary communications circuits…Conducted only at night, the notional transmissions were varied to avoid stereotyping and to ensure credibility.

Other operations include:

During Operation Lam Son 19 (the Multidivisional incursion into the Laotian Panhandle) SOG carried out diversionary insertions at four bogus landing zones and conducted simulated parachute raider and actual resupply bundle insertions at eight phone drop zones…

Flying in Army helicopters they played taped music…over enemy territory. The purpose…was to draw enemy fire in order to pinpoint the location of the Viet Cong on the ground. Orbiting gunships would then swoop down for the kill…The heavy metal rock music selection by Iron Butterfly was the most effective noise for drawing enemy fire.

Lieutenant Commander C. R. Hershey, Commander of Beach Jumper 1 discussed his unit capabilities and recommended that the PSYOP capabilities of the U.S. Navy be expanded in a report entitled “Concepts for the Employment of PSYOP within the Pacific Fleet.” Some of his comments are:

The successful employment of psychological operations, within varying situational requirements and geographical locations, requires a flexibility of responses and mobility to deploy rapidly…The Navy, with these inherent capabilities, stands ready to conduct PSYOP where troops have not yet been placed ashore…It is mandatory that the Navy’s ability to conduct psychological operations should not be allowed to become dormant between conflicts.

The Navy’s large combatant ships and many of the smaller vessels have organic graphic arts, duplicating and photographic facilities which are supported by trained personnel…The core of personnel, although small in number would include billets for military and civilian experts who have an educational background and training in the political and social sciences. Of course, the necessary skills required by photography, lithography and electronic would be acquired from military schools…This group would be mobile and flexible, in that they could deploy to any area to assist the commander in psychological operations on very short notice and could expand rapidly under the aegis of the task force or another commander.

There is currently a naval command, which is the only permanent naval unit tasked with the conduct of psychological operations…Upon being tasked with PSYOP during the Vietnam War, this naval unit was quick to respond in acquiring the additional skills and training necessary to take timely advantage of the fleet’s organic leaflet production and disseminating facilities as well as employing its own broadcasting equipment…For example: the unit has been able to print leaflets, containing a defector’s statement and photograph and disseminate it over the target area in less than six hours…I am the Commanding Officer of Beach Jumper Unit 1 and the organizations that I have been referring to as meeting the above requirements are the Navy’s Beach Jumper Units…The Beach Jumper Units can be the Navy’s mobile and effective nucleus for PSYOP.

We mention above that the Navy would fly loudspeaker aircraft to draw fire and then use gunships to attack the Viet Cong. The Army sometimes did the same thing. I should point out here that this is not the way to get the enemy’s trust. A PSYOP Lieutenant recalls:

I remember when the PSYOP squadron I worked for got shot up particularly bad one night while playing Robert Brown's "Fire" to the Viet Cong over the big University 1000-Watt speaker. The next night they went up again but “Spooky” flew with them. Our speaker plane flew a wide orbit playing "Fire" again, and Spooky flew opposing orbit. It was night and the speaker plane was lit up like a Christmas tree to draw attention. Spooky was blacked out. The enemy opened fire with everything they had. Spooky opened up with all three miniguns on at high cyclic rate and mysteriously all of the ground fire suddenly ceased.

   

An alleged CIA forged Viet Cong stamp

It was not only the military that produced black propaganda. There is an alleged propaganda postage stamp printed by the Central Intelligence Agency. According to the Vietnam Postage Stamp Collection of the Armed Struggle for the Fatherland Safeguard, Tran Quang Vy, The 1964 10 xu stamp commemorated the victory at Ap Bac on 2-3 January 1963. This was the first major victory of the Viet Cong over a full division of the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN). Although the South Vietnamese forces were supported by artillery, tanks and helicopters, they suffered 200 killed and another 300 wounded. Five American helicopters were shot down during the battle. The vignette on the stamp depicts a Viet Cong machine-gunner downing an American CH-47 Chinook helicopter. The stamp was catalogued by Stanley Gibbons as NLF5.

Western Stamp Coillector published an article on 5 April 1982 entitled “Ex-Agent’s charges suggest CIA forged Viet Cong stamp.” The story told of an interview in The Washington Post where former Central Intelligence Agency member Frank Liechty stated that he saw sheets of the Viet Cong stamps in a CIA file in the 1960s. He claimed that documents in the file described an agency plan to fabricate evidence of outside support of the Viet Cong. The high quality of the printing would indicate to all that they were produced in Hanoi because the guerrillas in the south could not produce such stamps. Liechty claimed that the CIA intended to send letters written in Vietnamese all over the world and to journalists as part of a plan to facilitate greater US involvement in the Vietnam War. He said that the stamp appeared on the cover of Life Magazine dated 26 February 1965, two days before President Lyndon B. Johnson published his “White Paper” on the war. A week later, two Marine Corps battalions were sent to Vietnam. Liechty was fired in 1978 and depending on who you believe he is either a disgruntled ex-employee or an agent with a conscience that the CIA could no longer control.

Genuine stamp. Note the accent mark over the letter A	Fake Stamp. Note the accent mark over the letter A

There are numerous difference between the two stamps. Two of the more obvious are:

On the genuine stamp the letters are sharp and the lines straight while the fake has crooked lines of varying thickness. The accent mark over the first “A” in “MAT ” has the point at the bottom while in the fake it is at the top.

When I spoke to a Vietnamese specialist about the alleged CIA fake he replied:

I confirm the stamp is a forgery made by the CIA. We have always heard about this forgery and attempted to discover some facts about it.

A former CIA agent who was stationed in Vietnam during the war adds:

I next examined your forged stamp in high magnification. The incorrect diacritic mark in the word MAT is the correct "lazy crescent moon" mark but mysteriously it has been inverted making it totally impossible in Vietnamese. The inversion clearly proves it a non-Vietnamese fake. You can also see in the fake an unexplained extra graphic element which connects the “M” and the “A” together. There is no reason for it to exist in a genuine Vietnamese stamp since it blots out the linguistically very important dot under the A.

My conclusion: It seems a relatively poor fake. The genuine Ap Bac stamp on your psywar page is clearly the genuine source from which the fake was copied.

Military White Propaganda

 

 

Military Assistance Command – Vietnam

The MACV PSYOP Directorate employed Army, Navy and Air Force personnel and operated under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff J3 (Operations). It served in an advisory role to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces as well as a supervisory role to U.S. forces.

MACV consisted of a Development and Analysis Division which developed, reviewed, evaluated and analyzed programs and policies.

The Operations Division exercises staff supervision for all support activities of U.S. and Vietnamese forces.

The Political Warfare Division advised, assisted and supported the Vietnamese General Political Warfare Department and its subordinate elements.

JUSPAO Leaflet Drop Mission Sorties Board

Although elements of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) prepared some white propaganda leaflets, much of the white printed propaganda of the Vietnam War was produced under MACV by two U.S. Army Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Groups. For Army organizational purposes (probably beginning in the early 1960s), South Vietnam was divided into four Corps Tactical Zones. Ranging from the north to the south, I Corps was in the north abutting North Vietnam, in the foothills and coastal regions east of the Annamite Mountains; II Corps was in the country's least populated region, encompassing the rugged central highlands and central plateau; III Corps was on the densely populated alluvial plain surrounding Saigon; IV Corps was the heavily populated and agriculturally productive Mekong Delta.

The original military psychological operations unit assigned to Vietnam was the 1st PSYOP Detachment (Provisional), which arrived in 1965. In late 1965, a small unit of the Okinawa-based 7th PSYOP Group arrived in Saigon.

The 7th PSYOP Group was constituted 19 August 1965 in the regular Army and activated 20 October 1965 and assigned to the Ryukyu Islands, located in the Machinato Service Area. It was attached to IX Corps for operation and Training. The 7th PSYOP Group was the successor to the U. S. Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity, Pacific, (USABVAPAC) which was disbanded 20 October 1965. The 7th assumed all missions and functions previously administered by USABVAPAC and transferred members and equipment.

The 7th PSYOP Group was tasked with support activities in Okinawa, Vietnam, Taiwan, Korea, Thailand and Japan. The group consisted of the 14th PSYOP Battalion, the 15th PSYOP Detachment, the Japan Detachment, the Korea detachment, the Taiwan Detachment, and the Vietnam Detachment.

The Japan detachment was located at North Camp Drake. It produced the magazines Koryu, Chayu-Ui Pot and Shurei No Hikari (for Okinawa. In 1968, they added a magazine for Vietnam entitled Thong Cam (Mutual Understanding). The detachment produced a number of PSYOP products for Vietnam, including; 1,640,000 calendars, 23,150 magazines, 2,575,593,530 leaflets and 661,570 booklets. 

The Taiwan Detachment was located in Taipei. It maintained liaison between the 7th PSYOP Group and the Republic of China. In 1968 they trained 25 Chinese PSYOP personnel at headquarters in Okinawa.

In September 1968, a two-man detachment was authorized for Thailand. It supported the Royal Thai armed forces.

In Vietnam the Group worked in support of the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV). During 1965 The Okinawa printing plant produced 125 million leaflets for MACV and the Vietnam Detachment produced another 62 million on its web-fed press in Saigon. The Detachment maintained liaison with the Joint United States Public Affairs Office and the Military Assistance Command Political Warfare Directorate. In September two members journeyed to Vietnam to plan and conduct the first high altitude leaflet and toy bundle dissemination over North Vietnam. They returned again in December to assist in a Christmas toy drop over North Vietnam.

In March 1967, the detachment took part in the production of a bar of soap with eight different PSYOP messages that became visible as the soap was used. 25,000 bars of soap were ready for the annual Tet campaign of February 1969. The 7th Group Detachment produced about 800,000,000 leaflets a month for the U.S. forces in Vietnam in 1968. They worked with JUSPAO to print 2,000,000 copies bi-weekly of the PSYOP newspaper Tu Do (Free South). The detachment also printed six different calendars with a run of 1,720,000 copies and six PSYOP booklets with a run of 330,000 copies.

Major Barger adds:

The initial forces for deployment to Vietnam were drawn either from the ranks of the 7th PSYOP Group, based in Okinawa, or from stateside units, for the most part  those stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. According to official order of battle records, elements of the 7th PSYOP Group totaling 143 soldiers conducted psychological operations in Vietnam between 20 October 1965 and 1 December 1967, and additional elements continued to perform missions in Vietnam throughout the war.

SP4 William Boyle was a member of the 7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa. He said:

Our unit had a detachment in South Korea, another in Japan, and had sent some members temporary duty (TDY) to Viet Nam. In May 1965, a larger TDY detachment (about 20 of us) was sent to Bien Hoa attached to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. We were quartered at an old French villa near the river that was already used by the Special Forces. We set up shop in Bien Hoa and used our portable (tractor-trailer carried) presses to print leaflets which we dropped from specially outfitted C-47's,  which were also used as loudspeaker platforms for night missions over Viet Cong territory).

In June 1965, an American Special Forces A camp was overrun. We went to help reestablish the nearby village, which had been largely destroyed in the battle. We operated on the principle that civic action was an integral part of the effort to win the hearts and minds of the people, and visited many hamlets, villages, and towns to evaluate the needs - whether emergency food supplies or construction materials or improvements in public services (schools and clinics).

During the time I was in Nam our detachment was assigned to the 173rd Airborne, the Military Assistant Command Vietnam and the United States Army Vietnam.

I spent many hours in choppers and little fixed wing bush planes, along with many hours in C47's on both day and night missions. My tour ended in May, 1966, and until then the unit had suffered no direct enemy attacks.

Colonel Harold F. Bentz, Jr., commanded the 7th PSYOP Group on Okinawa from 30 November 1968 to 16 May 1972. After four years he was superbly qualified to discuss some of the problems he faced during his multiple tours. Some of the points he makes in  his Senior Officer Debriefing report are:

One major problem regarding PSYOP is the lack of understanding and appreciation for PSYOP by some senior military commanders. Although the situation has improved somewhat during the past decade, there are still some senior commanders who do not fully recognize the importance of the PSYOP weapons system as it is employed in a politico-military conflict situation.

One perennial problem that confronted the 7th PSYOP Group was the fact that not all officers assigned to the group had formal PSYOP training or experience.

It appears that the U. S. Army is deficient in the number of qualified printers…Such personnel shortages seriously reduce the requisite flexibility necessary to support strategic operations…

The Group was responsible for printing approximately 80% of all the PSYOP printing requirements for Vietnam…The Group had to utilize three printing plants, The USIA Regional Service Center in Manila, the U.S. Army Printing and Publications Center in Japan, and the 7th PSYOP Group printing plant.

The 1,000,000,000 Leaflet is Dropped

In March 1967, the 7th PSYOP Group Commander, Colonel Lundelius personally assisted in dropping the one billionth leaflet printed by his unit for high altitude dissemination.

In 1967 the unit was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation for their support of military operations. Besides the units mentioned earlier, the 7th PSYOP Group added a Radio Detachment (Provisional) Vietnam. The unit now had 41 linguists who were proficient in 11 different languages. During 1967 they printed 7 billion propaganda leaflets for Vietnam and Korea. Their printing capability was enhanced by using the U. S. Army Printing and Production Center in Japan, and the Regional Service Center in Manila.

The small detachment’s Vietnam HQs were bombed by the VC in December of 1966 and they moved to 8 Vinh Vien Street. Later they moved to 16 Pham Ngu Lao in the Cholon section of Saigon (The Cruz Compound in the Saigon rail yards). They coordinated the activities of four loudspeaker teams, supervised two leaflet dissemination courses, and assisted members who were on temporary duty (TDY) with MACVSOG. Their motto was "Credibility Through Communication."

Anh Khe, September 1965

The 19th PSYOP Company was formed at Ft. Bragg in 1964. The first Commander was Captain Blaine Revis. In July 1965, Revis was asked to form the 24th PSYOP Detachment and deploy to Vietnam assigned to the 1st Air Cavalry Division at Anh Khe. The 24th PSYOP Detachment was formed from personnel of the 1st and 13th PSYOP Battalion assigned to the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC. The unit, consisting of six officers and 24 enlisted, was formed, trained and deployed to Vietnam in just two weeks. The detachment arrived in Vietnam in September 1965 and assigned to support the 1st Cavalry Division G5 Section at Anh Khe. The Section was understaffed for communicating with the Vietnamese populace and the laborers who would prepare the base for the arrival of aircraft. It soon became apparent that the Cavalry Division had no interest in PSYOP support, so Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) ordered the detachment moved in November 1965 to Nha Trang as part of the II Corps Operations section (G3). The detachment participated directly in attack planning which included control of civilians caught in the battlefield field of fire. On one major campaign called "Operation Eagle Claw" in the Bong Son Valley, the 24th POD helped to relocate 5,000 refugees onto a temporary site and supply them with tents and food for over a month. They supported operations in the Bong Son Valley on at least three separate occasions and dropped millions of leaflets each time. The detachment had loudspeaker teams in the field with Vietnamese linguists to call upon the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong units to surrender. They had one truck with a printing press and produced a limited number of propaganda leaflets, but the majority of leaflets were printed and flown in from Japan. Some members were assigned to Korean military units, other to the 101st Airborne Division. The USAF 5th Air Commando Squadron was formed to support the unit. In February 1966, the 24th was re-designated the 245th PSYOP Company and became responsible for PSYOP in II Corps. 

The 25th PSYOP Detachment was Commanded by CPT William R. Perry and made up of seven officers and 15 enlisted men. In 1965 it was deployed to Southeast Asia from San Francisco on the USNS Hugh J. Gaffney along with elements of the United States Army 1st Cavalry Division. Anti-war protestors pelted the troop ship as it sailed under the Golden Gate Bridge. The Detachment ran the ship’s radio station on the 17-day voyage. The Gaffney docked at Qui Nhon in September of 1965. The unit was immediately trucked to an air strip where they were flown to Pleiku by C-123 and headquartered in an old French compound at the II Corps MACV headquarters north of Pleiku while a permanent barracks was built for them. The unit’s primary mission was to support the American and South Vietnamese troops in the II corps geographical area with PSYOP capabilities to include leaflet production, Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) field trips, movies and operations in friendly Montagnard villages. Members of the unit were with the 1st Cavalry in November 1965 at the battle of Ia Drang.

Montagnard Leaflet 7-320-69

The Montagnards mentioned above were a native people looked down upon by the Vietnamese. Both the Republic of Viet Nam and the Viet Cong persecuted them. Many of the natives were forced into the Viet Cong to carry supplies and do other laborer-type work. The above leaflet is one of a series that was prepared without text since many of the Montagnards were illiterate. The front of this airdropped 3x6-inch leaflet depicts a native with the Viet Cong who finds a Chieu Hoi leaflet and then surrenders to a government soldier. On the back of the leaflet the soldier has his arm around the Montagnard in a friendly manner, and in the final drawing the native is home with his wife and children.

Leaflet 245N-49-67

One of the more attractive leaflets produced by the 245th PSYOP Company depicts a soldier of the Republic of Vietnam riding on horseback carrying the flag of his nation and trampling the communist flag. The picture is very heroic in a traditional military manner. The text on the back of the leaflet is:

Citizens Living in this Area Please Take Notice.

Don't Run, Don't Hide

Don't run and don't hide from the Allied military forces patrolling on the ground or above you in helicopters. Stay where you are until you receive further instructions. You will be told what to do. If you follow instructions you will not be harmed.

First Lieutenant Bob Harvey of the 25th PSYOP Detachment (later Detachment B of the 245th PSYOP Company) reminisces about his Vietnam duty from September 1965 to September 1966:

Captain Perry was a good Commanding Officer of the Pleiku Detachment for the period he was with us, about September 1965 to June 1966. We all had a lot of respect and admiration for him.   He was part Apache Indian and part German. He was a real Regular Army trooper, an infantry officer with a Combat Infantry Badge. The PSYOP command was not for him. He petitioned to get out in the bush and engage the enemy. He finally got transferred down south to a combat unit and was replaced by Captain Henry (Lee) Dunn, a nice guy from Wyoming who was the Commander from about July 1966.

The introduction of the 25th PSYOP Detachment into the Central Highlands of Vietnam at Pleiku in September 1965 coincided with the buildup of 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) at An Khe just to the East.  The mission of the detachment was to collect intelligence regarding enemy weaknesses and vulnerabilities, develop themes and materials to exploit these vulnerabilities, and disseminate appeals and messages via leaflet, loudspeaker and other means.  The detachment had highly trained PSYOP officers and enlisted men who had specific expertise in psychological operations, counter insurgency, media development, graphic design, leaflet production, audio production, photography, and other selected skills.

The specific missions planned and executed by the unit included imbedded field teams to collect information relative to enemy vulnerabilities and develop and disseminate propaganda to their soldiers.  Aerial loudspeaker and leaflet missions flown in U-10, C-47 and UH-1 aircraft were conducted throughout the major campaigns, and leaflet missions over the tri-country border area (infiltration trails) were commonplace.

The first major ground operation was a field team comprised of one PSYOP Officer and two support  specialists from the 25th Detachment, and one Vietnamese interpreter.   This team was attached to the 1st Cavalry during the Ia Drang campaign (November 1965) and was able to ascertain NVA vulnerabilities as the basis for PSYOP efforts in the II Corps border area throughout the remainder of 1965.

With the introduction of elements of the 25th and 4th Infantry Divisions into the Central Highlands in 1966, the Detachment (now redesignated 245th PSYOP Company “Detachment B”) participated in numerous campaigns and sweeps of known enemy locations for the purpose of exploiting troop weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Many of these brigade size campaigns were staged out of the large open fields in and around Pleiku, with New Pleiku Airbase (USAF), Camp Hollaway (US ARMY AIR), and the MACV II Corps Headquarters providing support.  The Detachment’s production facility, located at the MACV compound, was able to react quickly to the latest intelligence, and develop/produce PSYOP media and material in support of field operations.

Generally, the detachment developed and produced much of its own material, however, major leaflet drops (most along the Cambodian border) of thousands of pounds of leaflets by C-47 required leaflets to be produced at Battalion in Saigon or in Manila.  These were shipped to New Pleiku Airbase by transport for loading into the C-47 following its arrival from its base in Nha Trang.

Lieutenant Winston Groom

Second Lieutenant Winston Groom talks about his activities during the early days of the Vietnam War with the 245th PSYOP Company:

I brought over a detachment of about 30 men out of the Psywar Company at Ft. Bragg in mid-June, 1966. We boarded the U.S.S. Gaffney for the long trip over. Upon arrival, I went several weeks without a specific assignment while I studied the local operations, but nobody in command seemed to know exactly what we were supposed to do.

One morning I was suddenly told to get my stuff together because they had a job for me. When I got to headquarters Major Piragowski told me I was to be the PSYOP team leader attached to the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. While I awaited the arrival of my assigned unit, I worked with the PSYOP team leader of the 101st Airborne Division brigade, which was still operational in the area. I went on missions a few times with the 101st. At this stage of the war we were hampered by bad equipment, including loudspeakers, which were WWII vintage and rarely worked. It took a one man to carry the speaker that weighed about 40+ pounds, and another to carry the batteries, which weighed about as much.

Once the 4th Infantry Division went operational, their 1st Brigade, the one I was attached to, was assigned to Tuy Hoa. The Brigade Commander Colonel Austin told me, “Well, son, whatever you do, get on with it, and we'll give you all the help you need, but just don't get in the way of our operations.” The Division let us use their chopper and U-10 light aircraft. I took part in some U-10 operations and threw out thousands of leaflets that were ordered from Saigon or Nha Trang. I had no idea what they said, because they were in Vietnamese, but was told that they were as good as anything to throw out of the plane, and that the natives in the villages liked them because they could use them for toilet paper.

During the day all the native villages and hamlets ran up a Republic of Vietnam flag and soon as night fell they took them down and ran up the Viet Cong flag. This so incensed Major Jack Lugee, a Forward Artillery Controller one early morning as he flew over a village that he swooped down and not only buzzed the village but came away with the Viet Cong flag wrapped around his landing gear.

The 245th PSYOP Company in Nha Trang continued to ship me tons of leaflets and Chieu Hoi safe conduct passes that I dropped out of the U-10 at selected coordinates based on where intelligence said there was Viet Cong activity, which for all practical purposes included the entire province. We probably could have done some good with the bullhorn if any of the battalions had been able to hold contact with the enemy long enough for us to get there. The PSYOP Team was simply too small to go out with the rifle battalions on a regular basis, and besides we had only one bullhorn that worked sporadically, no matter how many times a day I had it tested and worked on.

We did manage to get some airborne missions using loudspeaker broadcasts of tapes we had made, either with the U-10 or by requesting a C-47 out of Nha Trang. Another problem was that it was nearly impossible to interrogate prisoners to find out if any of our propaganda was working. I asked on a number of occasions if I could at least submit questions for them to ask the prisoners, but I never got a straight answer. We were working in the dark.

I next was attached to Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) on the southern edge of Tuy Hoa. I was provided with a PSYOP truck that had loudspeakers, photo equipment, and a big PSYOP logo painted on the side. I did some election work, my interpreter asking the local people to get out and vote over the loudspeaker.

Photo of the 60 killed Viet Cong taken by Lieutenant Groom

Toward the end of my tour the Viet Cong attacked a Government of Vietnam Army post about six kilometers from Tuy Hoa. I rode out to the site of the battle and photographed about 60 bodies. Shortly after that I flew back to San Francisco and resumed my civilian life.

It is my considered opinion that the U.S. Army did not care at all about PSYOP at that time. If it had, it would have emphasized comprehensive training and positioned competent intelligence officers in the slots, and they would have kept at least some kind of tabs on what was going on; provided advice, help, and decent equipment.

By early 1966, Army psychological operations were being carried out by the 6th PSYOP Battalion stationed in Saigon. Demand overwhelmed capability, and in December 1967 the 4th PSYOP Group was formed from the existing PSYOP battalion and its companies. Available data on military psyop unit composition and periods and places of duty are incomplete and sometimes contradictory. The following is our understanding of the order of battle of U.S. PSYOP units in Vietnam.

6th PSYOP Battalion

 

Kin Do Theater in Saigon after the theater was blown up on 1 December 1966
(Photo courtesy of Rick Hofmann)

The small early PSYOP detachment was followed by the 6th PSYOP Battalion, a command-and-control unit under USARV Special Troops, which arrived in Vietnam from Fort Bragg on 7 February 1966. During its independent existence (until 1 December 1967) the 6th PSYOP Battalion was the US Army's primary support unit for PSYOP in Vietnam. Headquarters was initially in the Kinh Do Theater in Saigon except for the radio and TV advisors, and the printing facilities, although a lot of paper and printing supplies were stored on the first floor where the seats had been. After the theater was blown up by an estimated 50 kilograms of “plastique,” (Staff Sergeant Ron Baker told me that he believed it was a satchel charge that blew the roof off the building he called the Capitol Theater), it moved some distance away to a small, modern, three-story building near Cholon that had been an auto shop. Our next location was down by the bridge, a small Japanese warehouse compound. That remained the HQ location until they moved downtown to the railway area. In the fall of 1967, the battalion headquarters moved to the Saigon Railyards, now referred to as the Cruz Compound. The 6th PSYOP Bn operated independent of the Saigon-based Vietnam Detachment of the 7th PSYOP Group.   The 7th Group was represented at the Japanese warehouse; they had a small liaison party there, two enlisted men and one officer. At this time the printing plant was located on the Binh Loi Canal, about a block away from the last bridge before the long ride to Bien Hoa. The unit was located in the compound of the ARVN 50th POLWAR Battalion, which turned out to be built on top of an old French ammunition dump. The dump was discovered about June 1967, when excavating for the concrete pad and building to house the new 3G press. The site was moved once the dump was discovered.

245th PSYOP Company HQ in Nha Trang

On 10 February 1966, three companies were formed within the 6th PSYOP Bn to provide tactical propaganda support.

 1. The 244th PSYOP Company served I Corps from an initial station in Nha Trang (in II Corps), with a detachment in Quang Ngai in I Corps. Looking through the Detachment 2 Quang Ngai Leaflet and Poster Catalog I note that besides preparing products for American forces, they printed a large number of items for the 2nd Division of the 12th Division Tactical Area (DTA). An Army of the Republic of Vietnam DTA comprised two or more provinces; the DTA commander was also the ARVN division commander, and the DTA was his permanent Tactical Area of Responsibility.

2. The 245th PSYOP Company served II Corps from Pleiku (in II Corps).

LT Robert Harvey and his team from the 245th PSYOP Company drop leaflets from a C-47 Aircraft along the tri-country border (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) in an attempt to reach infiltrators coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

PSYOPS in Vietnam – Indications of Effectiveness. JUSPAO Planning Office, Saigon, Vietnam, May, 1967 mentions the 245th PSYOP Company:

From 1 January to 1 October 1966, Air Force planes dropped over one billion leaflets for the 245th PSYOP Company. Men of the 245th designed and printed over 61 million of these leaflets with their own facilities. Five thousand hours of loudspeaker missions were logged in the same period.

More than 6,000 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars defected in areas where the leaflets and loudspeaker missions were employed by the 245th. This was a 300% increase over the same period of the previous year.

3. The 246th PSYOP Company served III Corps from Bien Hoa, about 20 miles northeast of Saigon in III Corps.

Dave Kolchuk was a Specialist 4 (E4) with the 246th PSYOP Company of the 1st PSYOP Battalion in Vietnam from October 1965 to October 1966.  He was stationed in the “Train Compound,” an old French villa a few miles from Bien Hoa.  He was an Army Illustrator supporting III Corps. He told me:

My job was to design, and produce leaflets, flyers, and posters.   We also did public relations work for schools and hospitals. I learned enough of the language to give some translation support. Once printed, I participated in leaflet drops and loudspeaker operations on air missions with the US Air Force out of Bien Hoa Air Base. I had enough hours and missions in various aircraft to earn crewman wings from the USAF. 

Leaflet 246-55-67

Specialist 4 Eugene Simmons was an illustrator in the 246th PSYOP Company (Professional Litterbugs) for all of 1967. He recalls that Viet Cong prisoners of war would sometimes be isolated, interviewed and photographed. They would be asked to write a note to their combat buddies letting them know they were at alive and healthy. Photos would be taken and a leaflet produced with a photo of the prisoner on one side and his handwritten or typed note on the other side. Leaflet 246-55-67 depicts Nguyen Van Tuong. 50,000 leaflets were printed to be dropped by air over the 315B Unit at the request of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division. The text on the back says in part:

To Mr. Tu Thach and Friends of the 315B Unit

Hello Mr. Tu. Today I have some words for you and members in the Unit. Five years ago we were living together but I did not know where my honor was. I saw only the deaths everyday, was in need of many things and lost my freedom. The future was hopeless. I decided to leave the unit when I received the call from the Republic of Vietnam. Now I am really free. I enjoy life with my parents and my wife and family. The Republic of Vietnam has given me a house and the means to make a living…

Staff Sergeant Robert "Dennis" Brown was a member of the 246th PSYOP Company in Vietnam during 1967 and 1968. He was first attached to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and later the 25th Infantry Division. He recalls dropping leaflets daily from U-10 Courier aircraft, C-47 Skytrain aircraft, and UH-1D Huey helicopters.  He also regularly played Cheiu Hoi tapes. He was involved in various “hearts and minds” projects such as Medical Civil Action Programs (MEDCAP) with Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and Special Forces teams.  He says he doesn’t know how successful his efforts were, but he did get positive feedback on one occasion:

A “grunt” with the 101st Airborne Division told me that a Hoi Chanh had stepped out from behind a tree and surrendered to him while he was on patrol. He said that if it had not been for the Cheiu Hoi leaflet that the same VC would have probably killed him. 

4. Later, on 19 November 1966, a fourth company, the 19th PSYOP Company of the 6th PSYOP Battalion, was formed in Can Tho to provide advice and support in IV Corps.

Leaflet 19-80-68

Not many leaflets from the 19th PSYOP Company can be found today. This one in a cartoon style depicts a farmer being drafted by the Viet Cong, lectured, then having second thoughts and informing on the Communists. In the final picture he is shown with his happy family holding presents in one hand and cash in the other.

Although command of the four tactical companies lay with the commander of the 6th PSYOP Bn, operational control lay with the four major area commanders in the Corps zones. During this period, JUSPAO had numerous USIA representatives operating throughout the country. These civilians maintained close contact with the four tactical companies within the 6th PSYOP Bn.

4th PSYOP Group 

Because of the increased need for psychological warfare support, the 4th PSYOP Group was constituted in the Regular Army in Vietnam on 7 November 1967, and was activated on 1 December 1967 with headquarters in the Saigon Railyards (later, headquarters may have moved to the Tan Son Nhut Air Base near Saigon). The 6th PSYOP Battalion became the 4th PSYOP Group; the four companies currently operating in the Corps Tactical Zones became battalions within the 4th PSYOP Group, as reported in the following paragraphs. (All four companies disappear from the order of battle as of 1 January 1968.) The 4th PSYOP Group departed Vietnam on 2 October 1971.

The Department of the Army Lineage and Honors list shows that the 4th PSYOP Group was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation and streamer embroidered “Vietnam 1967-1968,” and the Republic of Vietnam Civil Action Honor Medal, first class, and streamer embroidered “Vietnam 1967-1970.” It adds:

During its four years of service in Vietnam, PSYOP brought about the creation of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office which issued PSYOP policy guidance. During the "Chieu Hoi” amnesty program, an estimated 200,000 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese surrendered to the South Vietnamese government. They credited their defection to the PSYOP message which influenced their decision to leave their former units.

4th PSYOP Group sign in Vietnam
(Photo courtesy of Dave Boyers)

The 4th Group PDC unit in late 1968
(Photo courtesy of Dave Boyers)

The 4th Group print shop loading dock - 1968
(Photo courtesy of Dave Boyers)

SP4 John D. (Dave) Boyers was a member of the 4th PSYOP Group from January to November 1968. He recalls his service:

I arrived in the Republic of Vietnam the day before the 1968 Tet offensive began. We were told that we were in a highly secure area and that not a shot had been fired for weeks there. That night, what we thought were celebratory fireworks kept getting louder, until we realize it wasn't fireworks at all.

I was involved in setting up the first photo processing laboratory at 4th Group Headquarters in Saigon. The lab was in the last Quonset hut at the left end of the row in the Cruz Compound. It contained a darkroom, an art department which consisted of some layout tables and a varityper, and a small audio recording studio.

[Note: The Varityper was a highly ingenious word processor of the pre-digital age. This machine could use over 300 different type styles and write in 55 languages. It produced neat, camera-ready copy for offset printing, at a cost much lower than that of conventional printer's methods. The machine used by the 4th Group was an early model that did not correct spelling, punctuation, or grammar, and did no text formatting without complicated extra work on the user's part. It was a typesetting device which was capable of full justification. It still required that diacritical marks be inserted into the finished document by hand, a long and difficult task].

[Note 2: Another 4th Group member tells of building the PSYOP complex:

It was at the old train yards in what's now called the Cruz Compound.  We moved there in late summer of 1967. We had been located at the 50th ARVN PSYOP compound on the Binh Loi Canal, the last bridge before heading up the road to Bien Hoa.  We were ordered out of that location when our Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams discovered we were running our presses on top of what used to be an old French ammunition dump. Years of monsoons had washed the covering soil away and all kinds of ordnance, exploded and non-exploded started peeking up through the ground. We therefore packed up and moved our operation to Saigon].

4th PSYOP Group Print Plant guard post.
Note: Storage tank in the foreground was for diesel fuel for
the compound's generator. The warehouse in back
was where the chemicals and paper were stored.
(Photo courtesy of Dave Boyers)

The compound was a fenced area consisting of several parallel Quonset hut with their front ends facing the street. A steel roof covered the center few huts. The print shop was between the row of huts and the street, situated to the right of the main entrance. The main entrance had a guard post which was manned by an MP. The rest of the compound had four or five posts, one at each end and a couple along the railroad tracks. These posts were manned by our enlisted personnel.

Prior to building the photo lab, we took our film to the Air Force Photograph Shop at the airport for processing, and it was a long and sometimes dangerous drive. Once we could process our own film and prints, we started producing some tactical leaflets. We formed what we called a quick response team, made up of an officer, a photographer and an interpreter. I don’t recall all the details, but I do remember going to shoot photographs of captured and surrendered Viet Cong after several battles in and around the Saigon area.

Civilian homes burn after May 1968 rocket attack
on the 4th PSYOP Group warehouse.
(Photo courtesy of Dave Boyers)

Surveying the damage after the May 1968 Viet Cong rocket attack.
(Photo courtesy of Dave Boyers)

May 1968 rocket attack damage to the 4th PSYOP Group print warehouse
(Photo courtesy of James Andrzejewski)

About 14 May 1968, the warehouse where the printing paper and chemicals were stored was hit by a Viet Cong rocket. I seem to recall that it was close to Ho Chi Minh’s birthday on 19 May and I guess the Viet Cong wanted to help him celebrate. A number of small huts behind the stores that faced the warehouse were set on fire. No one at the unit was hurt, though the guard bunker on top the fuel tank was actually only about 50 feet from the impact point of the rocket that hit the warehouse.

The photographic darkroom was right next door to the warehouse. Shrapnel from the attack went through two interior walls of the Quonset hut and through the steel drum of our brand new Pako print dryer. The darkroom was then moved a few buildings away and rebuilt about three times bigger. We were able to develop and print black and white film. We had no use for color at the time because almost all our leaflets were printed in black and white. Some leaflets had color added, but we never used a four-color process at that time.

We also produced a magazine for Vietnamese civilians but I don’t recall any of the details of how it was distributed, or any reactions to it.

Another effort we took part in was a small, fixed-frequency AM radio receiver which was air dropped. I wrote and photographed a brochure that went with the radio, explaining how to turn it on and listen, and to not be afraid to open the package. The radio sample I used was made of brown plastic, has an earphone for a speaker, about the size of a pack of cigarettes, with the inside filled with a black tar so it could not be used for any other purpose than to listen to our PSYOP broadcasts.

We also wrote a handbook on how to use the PSYOP loudspeaker.  Several of us in PDC had had commercial broadcasting experience before our service, and we built a small recording studio where we interviewed subjects to make loudspeaker tapes. I made transcripts of some of those interviews which featured the unbelievable hardships the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army faced.

SP5 James Andrzejewski and his Printing Press

Army Specialist 5 James (Ski) Andrzejewski was an 83F (offset pressman) assigned to the 4th PSYOP Group in Saigon from 1968 to 1969. He was a printer when he joined the Army and received additional training at Fort Belvoir, VA. He ran one of the three web presses where he recalls printing about 7 leaflets to a sheet, and about 25,000 to 30,000 sheets an hour. The sheets were cut up by Vietnamese civilians using a large mechanical cutter. He estimates that he personally printed 250 to 300 million leaflets, but says that he never kept a single one.

Another Rocket Attack

Andrzejewski recalls that the VC tried to rocket the hotel that housed the members of the 4th PSYOP on one occasion in 1968 but missed. In the above picture he looks down from the roof of the hotel on the damage caused by the rocket. He says that the second rocket attack must have been a late evening on a weekend because he worked nights printing leaflets during the week. He was in the hotel and the men were not allowed out of the hotel after 10:00 p.m. so the rocket attack would have come later when he was locked down. He heard the explosion and looked out the back window to see the street covered in flames. The American soldiers immediately went downstairs to the shelter in case there were further attacks. The next day he went to see the damage and all the close-packed houses built of wood were destroyed and there were charred bodies everywhere. He still carries that image in his mind.

Sample Leaflets on the Wall near the Printing Press

The gift of the radios is mentioned in Stars and Stripes of 18 July 1967 in an article entitled “Drop Radios on North – Psywar Experts.” The article says in part:

American psychological warfare experts have proposed the dropping of small transistor radios into Communist North Vietnam in order to get allied views across to the population.

Informed sources said the idea was presented to Leonard Marks, Director of the United States Information Service when he visited Saigon recently.

The said Marks reacted “enthusiastically ” and asked for cost estimates on the radios in lots of up to one million, an indication that serious consideration is being given to the idea.

The radios would be packed in plastic cases with a spare battery, giving them 20 hours playing time. They would be dropped by tiny parachutes and fixed at a pre-set frequency which would pick up the Voice of America or the Vietnamese government’s Voice of Freedom station in South Vietnam.

The Communist North Vietnamese reported the finding of Allied propaganda radios on many occasions. Some of the MACVSOG reports of the discoveries are as follows:

On 2 May 1965, fisherman found large and small boxes floating in the water. The small boxes contained children’s clothing and handkerchiefs. The large boxes were sealed with green tape and wrapped in a nylon bag. When opening the eight large boxes they found radios, about 25cm long and 10cm high. The listeners noted that the radios played Vietnamese music and talk stations. Within every box was a piece of paper that said, “This radio set is donated to the people of North Vietnam. Do not allow anyone to take it from you. Keep it to follow the situation.” Security forces found out and two days later confiscated 23 radio sets within the Tuong Lai commune.

During the night of 9 July 1965, rangers using rubber boats landed on the coast. They advanced 3 kilometers into the mainland near Yen Diem and laid 25 radio sets there, one of which was turned on.

The Communist North Vietnamese also reported the finding of Allied propaganda gift boxes:

About Tet 1965 on three occasions gift boxes were found drifting in transparent plastic boxes near Liem Lap hamlet. They contained children’s clothes, handkerchiefs, lighters, pencils, pen and pen holders, and fishing lines and hooks. Security agents confiscated the boxes saying that if they were brought home they would explode. In addition, if the finders wore the clothes after 3 months and 10 days their skin be swollen and they would die from poison that the enemy soaked into the cloth.

Prior to Children’s Day in October 1965children found plastic boxes containing a child’s yellow T-shirt, 19 sewing needles, 1 roll of thread and many buttons. They took them home.

SP4 Cal Crane making a print in the
HHC 4th PSYOP Gp darkroom in Saigon, 1968.
(Photo courtesy of Dave Boyers)

Unknown pressman working in the HHC 4th PSYOP Group
printing facility in Saigon, 1968
(Photo courtesy of Dave Boyers)

Forklift loads leaflets onto a truck going to the airfield
(Photo courtesy of Dave Boyers)

Several of the 4th Group commanders were tasked with writing an after-action report at the end of their tenure. These reports were “not releasable to foreign nationals,” and it is clear why.The officers are very honest and point our numerous shortcomings in the policies of the Vietnamese government. These reports would have cause a major political problem if they had been read by the Vietnamese leaders at the time.

Lieutenant Colonel William J. Beck commanded the 4th PSYOP Group from 15 October 1967 to 7 October 1968. He discusses some of his unit’s problems and successes in the declassified Senior Officer Debriefing Report. He notes that one of the major problems during the war was that the Vietnamese people did not identify with the Government of Vietnam and vice versa. He says that there are few national symbols like a “father figure,” and one of the few symbols that he had been able to utilize was the Tet celebration. [It sounds like COL Beck would love to have had “Uncle Ho” to build his propaganda around]. He complains that PSYOP is complicated by the lack of any substantial economic or social progress and lack of promised land reform.

Other problems are mentioned by Edward N. Luttwak in a 1991 article entitled “The Impact of Vietnam of Strategic Thinking in the United States,” who says that it takes more than just words to produce worthwhile propaganda. Deeds are just as important. He gives an example that hopefully is exaggerated:

The Agency for International development would come to a village in Vietnam and help it out…the next day the air force would bomb the village. Then a Special Forces team would go in to work with the survivors and rebuild the village and train them in self defense. Next the artillery would barrage the village. Then a psychological operations unit would pass around leaflets and explain the importance of fighting the Viet Cong. Then the navy would flatten the place with its gunfire.

Beck points out that the U.S. and Vietnam treat PSYOP in a completely different way. The Vietnamese try to propagandize in the Chinese manner, winning the loyalty of their followers, the beaurocracy and the armed forces; while the masses and ethnic minorities are secondary considerations. The Americans, on the other hand, want the hearts and minds of the masses if success is to be achieved.

He notes that the ARVN Political Warfare Battalions are not well trained and it would take at least one year to bring them up to the level of a US PSYOP battalion. He complains that there is some frustration at the lack of signs of tangible success, and this has led to gimmicks like the ace of spades calling card, sky-lighting effects, and ghostly loudspeakers. He says that this has reduced idea formation to the level of gimmicky and desperate attempts to find a quick solution and dramatic breakthrough. He concludes, “This is not good PSYOP.” The Colonel ends with a warning that the Vietnamese must be trained to take over PSYOP, but it should be clearly understood that they are not presently capable of doing so and need extensive training.

LTC Beck was replaced by Colonel Taro Katagiri who commanded the 4th PSYOP Group from 4 October 1968 to 13 March 1970. He discusses some of his unit’s problems and successes in another declassified Senior Officer Debriefing Report. He points out that captured enemy documents show that they are most concerned by pacification operations within Vietnam. Yet, the Colonel found that most members of his organization were unfamiliar with the pacification program. He had to redirect his personnel to support the campaign. He pointed out that the enemy regularly attacked the government’s ability to protect people, so PSYOP should build up the image of government agencies and encourage people to report information on the enemy. He also thought it important to produce propaganda clearly depicting the Viet Cong and PAVN as “Enemies of the People.” He notes that the enemy relies on face-to-face grassroots propaganda, but do not hesitate to use terrorism in support of their aims. He complains that the South Vietnamese government’s propaganda is fragmented with the Ministry of Information on the Civilian side and the General Political Warfare Department with its five Political Warfare Battalions on the military side. He points out the difference in manning and equipment between US and Vietnamese battalions. The American unit is authorized eight model 1250 multilith presses and two sheet-fed 17” x 22” presses, compared to the Vietnamese who have just two model 1250 multilith presses.

Katagiri is proud to point out that in 1969, 47,000 of the enemy became “Hoi Chanhs.” That is two and one-half times the number of the previous year. Fifty-seven people rallied from one village in September and claimed that they had been influenced by Chieu Hoi leaflet drops. At the same time, he says that supplies and maintenance are inadequate, mostly because the Group uses non-standard, low density equipment such as multilith presses, Hess and Barker presses, paper cutters, plate makers, AN/UIH-6 public address systems, a 50,000 watt radio station and the like.

He concludes that there needs to be better method of coordinating and unifying the PSYOP message. The army needs senior officers to understand what PSYOP can do. He gives an example of a brigade commander who boasted that his Chieu Hoi program consisted of two howitzers, one named “Chieu” and the other “Hoi.” He tells of pilots not wanting to drop leaflets because “That is mixing politics with war.” He wants an appreciation of PSYOP taught to all officers from early in their training.

7th PSYOP Battalion

In the I Corps Tactical Zone, the 7th PSYOP Battalion of the 4th PSYOP Group was formed in Nha Trang from the 6th Bn's 244th PSYOP Company.  It was officially constituted 7 November 1967 in the Regular Army as the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion.  It was activated 1 December 1967. Since elements of the 244th PSYOP Company were already in Danang, the 7th PSYOP Battalion absorbed the unit and was headquartered there. It departed Vietnam on 21 December 1971 and was inactivated at Fort Lewis, Washington. A 1968 U.S. Army 4th PSYOP Group booklet for newly arriving members says:

Winning the hearts and minds of the people of I Corps is one responsibility of the 7th PSYOP Battalion in Da Nang. Working closely with the Marine Corps, the battalion also provides PSYOP support for all operations in the northernmost corps. This support comes in the form of leaflet and broadcast messages and field teams. During the 1968 Tet Offensive, the battalion provided teams to such areas as Hue and Khe Sanh to give assistance to Allied units in battle scarred areas. The battalion headquarters is located on the ARVN 10th Political Warfare (POLWAR) Battalion compound. Enlisted men of the unit live in the Palace Hotel while Officers reside in the Hotel Than Nhat. During off-duty time, the men of the battalion relax at one of the many beaches located in the Da Nang area. Although the city itself is off limits to American military personnel, many recreational facilities are provided within a short distance of the battalion compound.

Captain Anthony Mottle was a Detachment Commander in the 7th PSYOP Battalion based in Da Nang in 1970. When asked about his duties he said:

The mission of the unit was to support the various units in I CORPS. We had a propaganda section in Da Nang that produced leaflets for units such as the 1st Marine Division, the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division at Phu Bai, The 23rd (Americal) Infantry Division at Chu Lai and the 1st Brigade of the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division. We had a Vietnamese psychologist working for us in the propaganda section. We usually assigned two-man teams to the supported units that went out with the maneuver forces to broadcast to the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army troops. We had helicopters at our disposal at the various units to broadcast to the enemy and disseminate leaflets. We also participated in Medical Civic Action Programs.

The Unit’s awards and decorations include the Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army) for Vietnam 1967-1968, Navy Unit Commendation for Vietnam 1967-1968, Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm for Vietnam 1971, and Republic of Vietnam Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class for Vietnam 1967-1970. Like the Phoenix, the 7th PSYOP Battalion was eventually reborn. It was redesignated 16 June 1996 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 11th Psychological Operations Battalion, and activated at Washington, D.C.

Leaflet 7-697-70

One of the more interesting PSYOP campaigns supported by the 7th PSYOP Battalion was Operation Searchlight. It was launched in Military Region I and was designed to influence enemy soldiers to defect during the Tet truce period of 1970 - 1971. Giant searchlights would be aimed at the sky and the enemy urged to follow the beam to the searchlight where they could safely surrender. It was not a success and there is no record of defectors at any of the 22 searchlight sites. The above leaflet was prepared by the 7th PSYOP Battalion for Operation Searchlight. It depicts a pair of searchlights aimed skyward and the Chieu Hoi Symbol. The text is:

During the cease fire period of Tan Hoi New Year, all United States, Vietnam, and other Allied bases will turn on their searchlight at night. The searchlight will help you to find freedom. Move toward the direction of light, hide your weapon and wait until the daylight to rally. When getting close to the Government of Vietnam or Allied units, shout aloud “CHIEU HOI.” You will be welcomes and receive good treatment. Guide the Government of Vietnam or Allied forces to recover your weapon for a reward.

MOVE TO THE SEARCHLIGHT
DO NOT LET YOURSELF GET KILLED IN THE DARK

Leaflet 3211/HPWS/18

It is interesting to note that in the 1950s the British has successfully conquered a Communist insurrection in Malaya. American propagandists studied the British techniques carefully. Note that British Leaflet 3211/HPWS/18 was printed about 1954 and depicts three guerillas discussing a searchlight in the distance. It is clear that the Americans copied the concept of the searchlight leaflet 16 years later. The text on the back is:

SEARCH LIGHT LEADS YOU TO THE ROAD OF ESCAPE

Look for the bright ray of the searchlight in the night sky. The searchlight is shining from the road.

If you want to escape from the forest to start a bright new life then run in the direction of the light to reach the road. The road will take you to a brand new happy and peaceful living environment.

Before you reach the road, please hide your weapons and ammunition. Then run to the road, raise both your hands high above your head and try to stop the first car that passes by.

All military drivers have been ordered to help you, and at the same time, civilians that assist you will receive a cash award.

If you stay in the jungle you will definitely be either shot dead ravaged by disease and hunger. A lot of people have escaped from the jungle and saved their own lives. Don’t you want to save your life? Sacrificing yourself for an unnecessary and losing battle is a stupid thing to do.

You will definitely not be abused and you will immediately receive good food and medical treatment.

Come and join the side where your friends have already begun a new life.

8th PSYOP Battalion

In II Corps, the 8th PSYOP Battalion of the 4th PSYOP Group was formed in Nha Trang from the 6th PSYOP Bn's 245th PSYOP Company. Company B of the new 8th PSYOP Bn was formed from a small detachment of the 245th Company. Co B worked in the ARVN II CTZ HQ area, in conjunction with the 20th ARVN PolWar Bn. Its personnel lived first at Camp Smith and later at “Artillery Hill. 

Making a recording for loudspeaker broadcast

  

PSYOP Radio Station outside Pleiku City

The 1968 Army publication states:

In May 1968, a field team from the 8th PSYOP Battalion, using powerful ground loudspeakers, coaxed 95 North Vietnamese soldiers from a battered village North of Hue. The scope of Group PSYOP support in Vietnam is boundless. In II Corps, an 8th PSYOP Battalion advisory team assists Vietnamese radio broadcasters in programming PSYOP messages to hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese civilians, NVA soldiers and Viet Cong.  8th PSYOP Battalion radio technicians man the Group's 50-thousand watt transmitter from its hilltop site outside Pleiku City. In connection with the operation, PSYOP aircraft have dropped thousands of small transistor radios to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army troops. All are pretuned to the station's frequency. The 8th PSYOP Battalion provides PSYOP support for all of II Corps. To provide adequate coverage in Vietnam's largest corps it became necessary to detach one of its companies from its headquarters in Nha Trang and station it permanently in Pleiku. The Nha Trang and Pleiku elements have printing and field team capabilities. The company at Pleiku also maintains a small PSYOP Development Center (PDC), which is an extension of the Group PDC system.

Newspaper article of the April 68 VC attack on the 8th PSYOP Bn Radio Station
(Photo courtesy of Rick Hofmann)

In addition to other duties, the battalion was charged with operation of the Group’s 50,000 watt AM radio station in Pleiku. The mission of the station was to broadcast to audiences in a large area in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. The radio station had it problems. It was in a very exposed position. It had a guard tower manned by its own staff, barbed wire, and fence posts around it. The station was an outpost, not located within a defensive perimeter of any unit. The station was made up of modular vans that were partially dug into the hilltop and sandbagged. Another problem they had was jamming from Radio Hanoi. The Americans had bought tens of thousands of radio receivers and placed them all over the country so people could listen to the broadcasts. Initially these had fixed frequency reception, but they were easily jammed. They later provided tunable radios, so that listeners could change stations as the Americans attempted to avoid the Communist jamming.

The Viet Cong sent about 20 sappers against the radio station on 24 March 1968. They threw satchel charges into several of the sandbagged modules and destroyed the radio tower. 7th PSYOP Detachment Commander 1LT Michael Merkle was killed in the attack and the Viet Cong lost about a half dozen sappers. Radio Hanoi bragged about the attack the morning afterwards. A new tower was shipped to Vietnam from the 7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa, all modules replaced, and the radio station was back on the air and the system fully functional in exactly ten days.

In the Delta city of Can Tho, a 10th PSYOP Battalion advisory team assisted in the operation of the first television station for the heavily populated Mekong Delta.

Former Infantry Captain William W. Forgey mentions the attack:

The tower had been blown down by satchel charges. I do not remember if there was a mortar shelling by the enemy, but the attack was swift, concentrated, and over in a short matter of time.

Even with several 50 caliber machine guns that exposed position was untenable. The skill and courage of the crew that not only repaired this station, got it back on the air within 10 days, but also continued to man it from the edge of civilization (as we knew it) was astonishing. It was basically raw courage that kept that station going.

This attack is discussed in more depth in the Veritas, Journal of the Army Special Operations History, Volume 2, Number 3, 2006. Author Robert W. Jones Jr. says in part:

The radio station was essentially an outpost – it was not inside any unit’s defensive perimeter. As such, the small compound was very vulnerable to attack…What distinguished the compound from the other American facilities in Pleiku was the 250-foot radio antenna. It quickly became a Viet Cong rocket and mortar aiming post and rounds were received almost daily. It was guarded by a Vietnamese Army squad. The 23rd ARVN Division was responsible for outer perimeter security in Pleiku.

The article discusses the attack much as we have already done above, and goes on to state that:

During 2007, The 4th PSYOP Group will dedicate the new Media Operations Complex in memory of First Lieutenant Michael A. Merkel. The proposed memorialization plaque reads “1LT Merkel made the ultimate sacrifice for his nation and the people of the Republic of Vietnam. His sacrifice will serve to inspire all PSYOP dissemination soldiers, past, present, and future as to the significance and dangers of their mission.”

I should also point out the great confusion of studying Vietnam War military history. We have pointed out that one source credits the 10th PSYOP Battalion with running the radio station while another mentions the 7th PSYOP Group.

Gary L Grunow writes to say that:

The radio Station was under the 4th Group Headquarters and not the 8th PSYOP Battalion. The Radio Station Commander from 1970 - 1971 was Captain James Hlay. He led a separate detachment of about 30 people. Their barracks was on Artillery Hill outside of Pleiku. They also maintained living quarters at the radio site.

You have my assurance of continued assistance in the post-settlement period that we will respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam.

But, Nixon and Kissinger were in the process of making a deal with the Communists that allowed the North to keep 160,000 of its forces in South at a time when the American presence was down to 27,000 troops. When Thieu balked at the secret agreement he was threatened and black-mailed by Nixon. Henry Kissinger quotes a Nixon letter to Thieu in The White House Years.

I have therefore irrevocably decided to proceed to initial the Agreement on January 23, 1973 and to sign it on January 27, 1973 in Paris. I will do so, if necessary, alone. In that case I shall have to explain publicly that your Government obstructs peace. The result will be an inevitable and immediate termination of U.S. economic and military assistance which cannot be forestalled by a change of personnel in your government. I hope, however, that after all our two countries have shared and suffered together in conflict, we will stay together to preserve peace and reap its benefits.

Once it became clear that the United States would not fulfill its promises to the Republic of Vietnam in 1975, Thieu wrote back to Nixon:

If the Americans do not want to support us anymore, let them go, get out!  Let them forget their humanitarian promises!

Australian PSYOP 

The United States was not alone in helping the Republic of Vietnam fight for its independence. Five other nations also sent troops; Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Thailand and the Philippines. Australia formed its own psychological operations unit for the first time since World War II. The 1st Psychological Operations Unit was formed as a divisional unit and allocated for duty with the 1st Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy province in the far southeast of Vietnam in the III Corps military area. Among the members were printers, photographers, intelligence personnel and other specialists. The Australian unit received aid and advice from U. S. Advisory Team 89 based in Ba Ria, Phuoc Tuy Province. The unit printed about 130 different leaflets, most coded with the letters ATF, though some leaflets are found without the "ATF" or with no number at all.

We mention “intelligence” a dozen times in this article. Douglas Pike spent fifteen years in Vietnam. He was one of a small group of “Hanoi watchers” who has said that the United States never really used its intelligence apparatus to learn what was going on in North Vietnam. He calls the American efforts “modest, parochial and less than adequate.” He says that even with 450,000 American servicemen in Vietnam the Hanoi watchers never numbered more than a dozen. They argued amongst themselves about whether Ho Chi Minh was a Communist or a nationalist. They argued about who was in charge between the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. They debated if the Soviets or the Chinese where in a position of greater influence. Pike points out the difference between WWII and Vietnam. In the former there were hundreds, perhaps thousands of individuals assigned to knowing every aspect of the enemy. He suspects the reason so little was done during the Vietnam War was the belief that American firepower was so great that it really did not matter what the North Vietnamese did. They were irrelevant. They could be bombed back to the Stone Age, so why bother learning their plans and intentions? He does not use the word but he implies a certain "arrogance" at the highest level of government.

Down at the tactical level where “the rubber meets the road” the military was very involved in intelligence activities. Some comments from a high-placed American Army intelligence agent:

The very sensitive intelligence files at [deleted] were very detailed about enemy military and civilian personnel, to include the southerners' families (if they had them) and their addresses and their names.  Lesser detailed collateral intelligence versions were at [deleted]. There were more details available to U.S. agents within the RVN National Police files. We could and did combine our files with the Vietnamese and have very detailed information about many of the southern communists so we could have air or ground dropped leaflets and/or fake documents that sent them home to check on their families. Very few sensitive reports went above Colonel level and never back to Hawaii and/or DC unless someone requested them or someone else (CIA, etc.) sent them back for their own files. The Australians and New Zealanders worked very closely with us from collateral to very sensitive intelligence operations and the gathering of the intelligence too. It was a pleasure to work with them, and to supply them with reports from my [deleted] and [deleted] files

THE PLAYERS

We mention General Edward Lansdale as a special advisor to Director Barry Zorthian in the section on JUSPAO at the beginning of this story. Colonel (later General) Edward Lansdale (USAF) is mentioned in The Vietnam Experience - Passing the Torch, Boston Publishing Company, MA, 1981. He was apparently the master of "Dirty tricks." Lansdale had served with the Office of Strategic Services in WWII. In the 1950s, Lansdale was transferred to the Philippines-based Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG), to advise the intelligence services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines that were then faced with a serious threat to national security posed by the Communist Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, (People's Liberation Army). While involved in the campaign against the HUKs, Lansdale helped create an ingenious military and intelligence operation that utilized a local and much feared legend: that of the terrifying Asuang Vampire. He said:

To the superstitious the HUK battleground was a haunted place filled with ghosts and eerie creatures. A combat psywar squad was brought in. It planted stories among town residents of an Asuang living on the hill where the HUKs were based. Two nights later, after giving the stories time to make their way up to the hill camp, the psywar squad set up an ambush along the trail used by the HUKs. When a HUK patrol came along the trail, the ambushers silently snatched the last man of the patrol, their move unseen in the dark night. They punctured his neck with two holes, vampire-fashion, held the body up by the heels, drained it of blood, and put the corpse back on the trail. When the HUKs returned to look for the missing man and found their bloodless comrade, every member of the patrol believed that the Asuang had go t him and that one of them would be next if they remained on that hill. When daylight came, the whole HUK squadron moved out of the vicinity.

Lansdale was then sent to Saigon by the Central Intelligence Agency to gather intelligence on the Communists and do everything possible to disrupt Ho Chi Minh's organization of the populace of North Vietnam. Lansdale was never a CIA employee, For the Manila assignment, he had been detailed to the Agency from the Air Force; this arrangement was now extended for his service in Vietnam. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen, the Director of Central Intelligence, directly participated in creating the assignment. Their participation resulted in Lansdale's being sent out as chief of a second Station, reporting neither to McCarthy in Saigon nor to the chief of the Far East Division, but directly to Allen Dulles. Tran Do Cam adds:

Colonel Lansdale's organization in Vietnam was called the Saigon Military Mission (Phái Bô Quân Sú Saigon) and it included Infantry Major Lucien Conein, a professional spy who would play a very important role in the political upheavals that characterized the First Republic in South Vietnam.

Just before the North was handed over to the Communists, many Vietnamese civilians were recruited by Colonel Lansdale. Most of them came from the Vietnamese ethnic minority known as the Nùng and some were native to Móng Cái, which is near Hâi Phòng. Others came from areas near the Chinese-Vietnam border, however, they were all sent to Saipan for training in the basics of counterinsurgency.

Lansdale organized rumor campaigns in Hanoi threatening Chinese rule under Ho, and claiming that Chinese soldiers were raping Vietnamese women. He printed fake Viet Minh leaflets which were disseminated in the North and threatened property confiscation, monetary changes and harsh treatment of workers under the Communist regime. He started rumors that "Christ has gone to the South" and "the Virgin Mary has departed from the North." He hinted that the United States might eventually drop atom bombs on the North. He produced leaflets that implied that Vietnamese would be sent into China to work as railroad laborers. Whatever he did, nearly one million North Vietnamese fled southward, many of them Catholics. He contaminated the oil supply of the Hanoi bus company and buried arms to be used by partisans when the uprising against the Communists occurred. Of course, the uprising never happened. This master of black operations is the consultant tasked to advise Barry Zorthian, whom we might consider an "innocent" civilian. What a pair they must have made.

John R, Campbell, a civilian psychological warfare advisor in Vietnam from 1965 to 1967 makes an interesting point about Lansdale in Are we Winning? Are they Winning: A Civilian Advisor’s Reflections on Wartime Vietnam, Author House, 2004. He seems to think that it was just as important to talk the anti-communist indigenous people of Vietnam to head south as the Catholics:

One of the war’s interesting “what ifs” could have been what if U.S. Colonel (later General) Edward Lansdale’s eminently successful operations to stimulate and facilitate the movement of the Catholics of North Vietnam to the South during Vietnam’s partition in 1954 had been replicated with the estimated million strong Nung population in the North. These fierce and efficient anti-Communist fighters, who had served the French so well against the Viet Minh, could have added the equivalent of several divisions to the South’s sorely needy defense. Those relatively few, who apparently succeeded in making the trek on their own initiative, were eventually greatly appreciated well beyond their numbers.

Neil Sheehan says in A Bright and Shining Lie that “ South Vietnam, it can be truly said, was the creation of Edward Lansdale.”

Conclusion

There really is no way to write a conclusion to this article because the war lasted too long and there are too many differing attitudes and opinions. There were programs that worked and programs that didn’t work and they will all be forever argued. What did the Communists think of it all? After they took power, how did they react to the thousands of leaflets, books, posters, radio broadcasts, motion pictures and the like that had been prepared by the American Government and the Government of Vietnam?

Vietnam researcher and University of California (Berkeley) Library Assistant Steve Denney quotes various North Vietnamese leaders and newspapers that show that the Communists were frightened by the propaganda and considered it very dangerous. Some of his comments are:

On the first day of South Vietnam's liberation, May 1, 1975, the Military Management Committee issued a communiqué ordering the temporary suspension of all kinds of books, newspapers, magazines and other printed material owned during the period. In Saigon, in one district only, within less than a week, the people turned in 482,460 copies of depraved literature and 3,000 kilos of reactionary newspapers formerly published by the enemy. One bookstore in Nha Trang surrendered 35,530 "reactionary books." Hanoi Liberation Radio said in a broadcast on June 30, 1975 that the people in the district town of Bac Lieu province "turned over to the revolutionary administration more than 3,000 novels and song books and hundreds of records and tapes which were reactionary in content and poisonous to the youth."

Speaking at a May Day meeting in Ho Chi Minh City, Vo Van Kiet, a high-ranking Communist official, complained of youth songs, which “through spontaneous development, have been made by a number of elements to resemble the youth music of the puppet regime and cater to the extremely egotistic tastes of remnants of the old society who are trying to rear their heads. They entice listeners to shirk obligations, detach themselves from reality, turn their backs on our people's life of labor and combat, regret the past and idolize imperialism.”

So, although it sometimes seemed that American military commanders were not sold on propaganda, the Communists were. Clearly, the first thing they did upon taking power was to send out teams to pick up every piece of printed material, song or motion picture that was sympathetic to the old regime. They had no doubt that American propaganda was poison to their cause.

This article started out as a short commemoration to honor the psychological operations units that served in Vietnam. It had grown by leaps and bounds and any reader with comments, additions, or suggestions is encouraged to send them to the author at sgmbert@hotmail.com.

©   End: 18 January 2006