Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are seldom practiced within the Continental
United States. The military rightfully knows that some citizens see connotations of brain
washing and control in the term "PSYOP." As a result, active duty troops from
Ft. Bragg and reservists from the various PSYOP and Civil Affairs units will deploy only
in the case of a great disaster or emergency. Such was the case when Hurricane Andrew
slammed into the east coast of Florida in August 1992.
A United States Army Southern Command document dated 1 July 1998 justifies the
use of psychological operations in cases like Hurricane Andrew. "Psychological
Operations (PSYOP) are prohibited by law from targeting U.S. audiences. The National
Command Authority has granted exceptions for specific disaster situations, such as
Hurricane Andrew. PSYOP is used for the preparation and dissemination of Command
Information essential to each phase of the operation. The PSYOP product approval chain may
include one or more Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials. PSYOP commanders
and personnel must remind civilian agencies and populations continuously that they are
only in a supporting role and solely for purposes of communication and information
dissemination. At the same time, PSYOP personnel and the US Southern Command staff need to
convey the special capabilities PSYOP offers FEMA and other agencies in support of
disaster relief." However, we note that because of the worry about the term PSYOP,
the psychological operations task force (POTF) was called the Humanitarian Assistance
Information Element and the PSYOP troops were referred to as humanitarian information
support teams.
Infrared Image of Hurricane Andrew
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) preliminary report
of the storm dated 10 December 1993 describes Hurricane Andrew as, "A small and
ferocious Cape Verde hurricane that wrought unprecedented economic devastation along a
path through the northwestern Bahamas, the southern Florida peninsula, and south-central
Louisiana. Damage in the United States is estimated to be near 25 billion, making Andrew
the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history. The tropical cyclone struck southern
Dade County, Florida, especially hard, with violent winds and storm surges characteristic
of a category 4 hurricane. In Dade County alone, the forces of Andrew resulted in 15
deaths and up to one-quarter million people left temporarily homeless. An additional 25
lives were lost in Dade County from the indirect effects of Andrew.
The maximum sustained surface wind speed during landfall over
Florida is estimated at about 145 mph, with gusts to about 175 mph. During the morning
hour of 24 August, Andrew generated storm surge along shorelines of southern Florida. On
the southeast Florida coast, peak storm surge arrived near the time of high astronomical
tide. The height of the storm tide ranged from 4 to 6 ft in northern Biscayne Bay
increasing to a maximum value of 16.9 ft at the Burger King International Headquarters,
located on the western shoreline in the center of the bay, and decreasing to 4 to 5 ft in
southern Biscayne Bay. The observed storm tide values on the Florida southwest coast
ranged from 4 to 5 ft near Flamingo to 6 to 7 ft near Goodland."
Anne Newsome gave some additional facts in an article entitled "Are we
Prepared?" in The Special Operations Response Team. "Hurricane Andrew
was one of the most destructive storms in US history in terms of property losses with
25,000 homes destroyed and an additional 37,000 homes left uninhabitable. Overwhelmed
county emergency medical services, limited access to hospital patient care, and difficulty
in procuring supplies exacerbated the already complicated situation resulting from the
storm.
Satellite Radar Image of Hurricane Andrew
NOAA released another report entitled "Hurricane Andrew – 10 Years
Later." This report updated and finalized the extent of the hurricane in cost and
lives, "Hurricane Andrew was the most destructive United States hurricane of record.
It blasted its way across south Florida on August 24, 1992. NOAA's National Hurricane
Center had a peak gust of 164 mph, measured 130 feet above the ground, while a 177 mph
gust was measured at a private home. Andrew caused 23 deaths in the United States and
three more in the Bahamas. The hurricane caused $26.5 billion in damage in the United
States, of which $1 billion occurred in Louisiana and the rest in south Florida. The vast
majority of the damage in Florida was due to the winds."
I have always believed that Hurricane Andrew was one of the major reasons that
President George Bush failed to be reelected. Nightly television news showed American
citizens living among the rubble for days. The television anchors implied that the Federal
Government did very little to ease their suffering. Partisan politics may have been
involved, since the Democratic Governor of Florida apparently hesitated before asking for
federal aid. Three days passed between Andrew's assault and the arrival of federal help.
Kate Hale, the Dade County emergency director, went on live national television on 27
August with tears in her eyes and castigated the federal government. Some of her comments
were:
Enough is enough. Quit playing like a bunch of kids. Where in the Hell is the
cavalry? For God's sakes, where are they? We are going to have more casualties, because we
are going to have more people dehydrated. People without water. People without food.
Babies without formula. If we do not get more food into the south end of Dade County in a
very short period of time, we are going to have more casualties!
We have a catastrophic disaster. We are essentially the walking wounded. We have
appealed through the State to the Federal Government. We've had a lot of people down here
for press conferences, but Dade County is on its own. Dade County is being caught in the
middle of something and we are being victimized. Quit playing like a bunch of kids and get
us aid! Sort out your political games afterward!
We are all about ready to drop, and the reinforcements are not getting in fast
enough. We need better National Guard down here...President Bush was down here. I'd like
him to follow up on the commitments he made.
At the time of the speech, three days after the storm, 250,000 Florida residents were
struggling to survive without foot, water and shelter. The nationwide uproar reached
Washington DC and President Bush immediately ordered 30,000 troops to the disaster area.
Lieutenant General Samuel Ebbeson (a former deputy of General Schwarzkopf during the
Persian Gulf War) was placed in charge of the military relief effort.
On the same day, Miami Herald staff writers Martin Merzer and Tom Fiedler wrote:
The question echoed through the debris Thursday: If we can do it for Bangladesh,
for the Philippines, for the Kurds of northern Iraq, why in God's name can't we deliver
basic necessities of life to the ravaged population of our own Gold Coast?
President George Bush contended that Florida Governor Lawton Chiles hadn't formally
asked for help. Chiles countered that the need for a formal request seemed silly with the
world watching images of 250,000 flattened homes.
An example of the way the nation saw the relief effort can be found in
Hurricane! - The Rage of Hurricane Andrew, Patricia Lantier-Sampon, Gareth Stevens
Publishing, Milwaukee, WI, 1993. Some of the author's comments are:
August 25 - President Bush had flown in for a two-hour visit, but so far there was
no federal relief. Electric power lines were down, food and clean water were in short
supply, and people were sleeping outside with no place to wash up and no way to begin
cleanup.
On Tuesday, September 1, President Bush made a second visit to Dade County, but it
was two weeks after the storm before 22,000 National Guard members finally came to
southern Florida.
The photographs of President Bush depict him walking stiffly and surrounded by military
personnel. Photographs of candidate Clinton show him visiting the homeless without
accompaniment, hugging children, and "feeling their pain."
Whatever the reason, the result was that American citizens were depicted nightly
sitting under the stars by the wrecked remains of their homes while well-fed Haitian boat
people were shown living in clean military tents in the U.S. base at Guantanamo, Cuba.
Since that time, every U.S. President has made a point of personally visiting and being
photographed at a domestic disaster scene.
Hurricane Andrew struck South Dade County, Florida, at about 0435, 24 August 1992. Most
of the residents living in the danger zone were asleep when the outer wall struck. Those
that were awake heard the following message:
We interrupt this program to bring you an emergency alert from the National
Broadcast Emergency Center. This is an emergency alert! I repeat. This is an emergency
alert! The outer winds of hurricane Andrew have just reached the Florida coast. Hurricane
Andrew has unexpectedly shifted five degrees south. I repeat. Hurricane Andrew has shifted
five degrees south. Andrew is expected to strike South Dade within minutes. I repeat.
Andrew is expected to strike South Dade within minutes. All South Dade residents should
take immediate cover! I repeat. All South Dade residents should take immediate cover! This
is an emergency alert!
The military suffered too. Homestead Air Force Base was wiped out by Hurricane Andrew.
The three fighter squadrons normally stationed there were moved to bases in South Carolina
and Georgia. During his reelection campaign, President Bush promised to rebuild and reopen
Homestead AFB. After Bill Clinton's victory, the base was closed by Defense Secretary Les
Aspin. The closing caused a total economic loss to the community of 430 million dollars a
year.
Army Relief Efforts included critically needed food and supplies
Within hours after the hurricane struck, the U.S. Army and other organizations were
ordered to the site to help with recovery operations. FM 100-19 Domestic Support
Operations mentions some of the actions, "US military forces responded to
Hurricane Andrew in Florida. Army soldiers provided relief services, prepared meals,
cleared and hauled debris, produced and distributed water, restored power, and constructed
life support centers. These missions provided important lessons in preparedness,
leadership, organization, equipment, and safety. The 16th Field Supply Co (FSC), 240th
Quartermaster Battalion, was deployed to provide support. The 16th FSC mission provided
laundry, bath, and light textile renovation support to disaster victims and deployed
forces. Overall, the 16th FSC processed 5000 bundles of laundry and provided showers for
more than 22,000 soldiers and civilians. Army chaplains provided religious support to
military personnel who were providing food, water, shelter, and medical care to civilian
victims. They also talked with victims, distributed food, counseled children, picked up
debris alongside other relief workers, and visited the elderly."
19 year old Private First Class Jason Dobie who deployed with the 18th Airborne Corps
Personnel Automation Group from Ft. Bragg to Homestead AFB describes the relief efforts:
I can still remember stepping off the helicopter
at Homestead Air Force Base and being in awe of the leveled hangars. I worked in the
command center and set up the military's first deployed joint task force database.
We set up the database and started getting all the manifest lists in every format
imaginable. They came in Mac, DOS, text attachments to emails, 5 1/4" floppies,
printouts, and some commanders brought in their laptops. You name it, all from different
branches and all in different formats. We would run queries against it for the
command, or sometimes for the press. The image I still have from that operation is a
bikini-clad girl working a hotdog stand in the middle of a demolished block of buildings
and at least 30 soldiers waiting in line.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
FM 90-29, Noncombat Evacuation Operations, Appendix A,
"Psychological Operations" explains the makeup of the PSYOP Task Force.
"The PSYOP task force (POTF) is employed on a wide range of small-scale
operations (for example, Hurricane Andrew relief), and commanded by a regional PSYOP
battalion commander. It consists of a task force headquarters, appropriate regional PSYOP
battalion assets, elements of a PSYOP dissemination battalion, and elements of a tactical
PSYOP battalion. The POTF can range in size from 20 to almost 300 personnel, depending on
the mission." In the case of Andrew, on 18 August 1992, Joint Task Force Miami began
deploying forces from all services to aid disaster-relief operations. Units provided
shelter, food, and water and assisted in relief operations. The commanding general, 2d
Continental US Army, was the Commander of the Joint Task Force.
The success of Joint Task Force Andrew public affairs was also the shared
success of the Total Army public affairs. Volunteers from U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) public
affairs detachments augmented the Joint Task Force Public Affairs Office (PAO), the FEMA
Joint Information Center (JIC), and the broadcasting staff of Radio Recovery. Prior to
integrating the Reserve Components, the early deployment of active duty public affairs
elements was key in keeping the media informed in a crisis situation while obtaining the
logistical support necessary to establish the JIC."
Very little has been written about the psychological operations in support of
Hurricane Andrew humanitarian relief. LTC Paul B. Kappelman and MAJ Robert E. Armstrong
wrote an article entitled "PSYOP Task Force to Joint Task Force Andrew: A Case Study
in PSYOP - Support to Disaster Recovery Operations," in Special Warfare,
July 1993. The article was later reproduced in Perspectives, the Journal of the
Psychological Operations Association, Winter 1994. Since this is one of the only two
written references I have seen on the subject, I will quote liberally from the authors.
They say:
Initially, the only PSYOP troops deployed were loudspeaker teams
accompanying the 82nd Airborne Division. Rapidly the extent of the damage became evident
and the need for additional PSYOP assets became obvious. Within less than a week, the POTF
was established…The Andrew Psychological Operations Task Force was unique because it
included Reserve forces, at every level, from the staff to the loudspeaker teams.
The mission statement of the POTF was "Provide coordinated information
programs in support of the Joint Task Force relief operations. Supply immediate relief
information through radio, loudspeaker, print and face-to-face contact. Identify key
communicators and appropriate language balance to provide greatest impact. Access the
adequacy of recovery communications infrastructure and effectiveness of relief
information. Synchronize emerging information programs oriented at recovery operations
using mass media (radio). Keep information program ahead of events to inform and prepare
the population for restoration of former communication and information network."
The first priority was to immediately establish radio operations in the
vicinity of Homestead City. The speed of the recovery was believed to be directly tied to
the amount and the accuracy of the information. The troops were reminded that they were
there to assist in the recovery, but they could not cause the recovery to happen in the
same way that they could complete a tactical mission.
Among the recommendations made by the authors for future humanitarian
assistance within the United States:
A PSYOP representative should be deployed immediately to make the
assessment and identify the mission requirements. A POTF can be tailored and deployed
within 18-72 hours. This is better than sending in troops piecemeal. The POTF must be
deployed within the first 24-36 hours. It must be deployed as a unit and should have at
least one dedicated aircraft. Communication equipment must be compatible with the
supported command. Having Reservists mobilize at stations other than Ft. Bragg is time
consuming and presents delays. All PSYOP reservists when called to active duty should
mobilize at Ft. Bragg. Use language familiar to the troops when planning such an
operation. (I assume that they recommend an operation order format). Understand that
civilians may be somewhat confused, but the combat operation language works well for the
military.
The authors point out the Problems:
Under the government's task organization for the Andrew effort, the Joint
Task Force commander reported to a civilian agency, FEMA, which in turn reported to the
Secretary of Transportation. While the POTF's role was solely to provide
information, its product still required approval from those within the chain. The POTF was
assigned to Army forces. When product requests came from Joint Task Force or FEMA, they
were not always viewed as a priority. Having the POTF below the Joint Task Force created a
layered approval chain, slowing down the process and in some cases watering down the final
product. The POTF should work directly for the Joint Task Force. POTF commanders should
work as special staff officers in the Joint Task Force. There must be centralization. Many
critiques of the Andrew effort noted the lack of a central, single authority for
information release. At the outset, the POTF commander should ensure that the
dissemination of information by military forces is centralized and controlled. A Joint
Task Force directive should be issued stating the JTF Commander's policies and guidelines
on information dissemination. With the advent of personal computers, laser printers, and
graphics programs, it is all too easy for a "mini-POTF" to spring up and start
printing its own leaflets. There were a couple of instances of this happening in Florida.
While the efforts were well-intentioned, the products were not in support of the overall
JOINT TASK FORCE mission, nor were they designed by PSYOP trained soldiers.
The second article that mentions PSYOP during the Hurricane Andrew recovery
operations appears in the July 1993 issue of Special Warfare and is entitled
"SOF Support to Hurricane Andrew Recovery," written by SSG Keith Butler.
361st Civil Affairs Brigade
He mentions the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade working to bring normalcy back to
the community. The unit was reinforced with volunteers from around the country. One of the
affected units was the 478th Civil Affairs Battalion, which was stationed directly in the
path of the storm.
414th Civil Affairs Battalion
CPT John Orillo of the 414th Civil Affairs Battalion is quoted,
"Interaction with local authorities is the key. We started marrying up the services
of the police, water authorities, sewage, engineers, Florida Power and Light and building
code officials to people who needed help the most."
Mail carriers were questioned about the damage to property and who was staying
to rebuild and who was leaving. They were in a unique position to know because they walked
their regular routes each day. Civil affairs Units also helped with animal rescue and
combining military and civilian agencies to clear the area of debris. They contacted
insurance companies and brought lawyers into the area to provide free legal service to
residents of the community. Members of the 20th Special Forces Group provided
round-the-clock security to guard against looting.
Volunteer Card
One small PSYOP printed product is the volunteer ID card. The card depicts two hands
clasping over a red heart-shaped symbol. The text is "VOLUNTEER. People helping
people. 1992. Hurricane Andrew Relief. ID#_____." The PSYOP-printed
"Volunteer" cards were used to identify civilian volunteers in the Hurricane
Andrew Disaster Assistance Centers.
Army PSYOP Specialists Employed Radio, Loudspeakers and Print
Presses
"Army PSYOP specialists steered victims of Hurricane Andrew to relief
centers throughout southern Dade County with a three-week blitz of public service
information - via print products, radio and loudspeakers. The POTF comprised of
active-duty soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group, and Army Reservists from the
5th PSYOP Group. They initially broadcast from a 400-watt mobile radio station. Later,
they operated from a 1,000-watt transmitter. "Recovery Radio" broadcast seven
days a week from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. The broadcast content was compiled by the Product
Development Center (PDC). They wrote the scripts, and prepared printed products. SSG
Butler says, "Fliers, posters, instructional wallet-sized cards, maps to relief
centers and a newsletter were crafted by teams working around the clock.
PSYOP Press and Radio Operators
PDC developed all the products that were disseminated. We placed a priority on
information that had to go out immediately - then decided how to get it out quickly
through radio, print and loudspeakers. Posters and fliers placed throughout Dade County
gave phone numbers and locations for aid agencies, including food distribution points,
inoculation centers and insurance offices. In all, 400 different products were designed at
the PDC, which also informed citizens about safety precautions, preventive medicine,
debris clearing, schools and church functions. More than 500,000 copies of material were
printed by PSYOP members. The printed public-service information was posted in camps, on
telephone poles and throughout the neighborhoods across Dade County.
Loudspeaker Team Member
While PDC soldiers worked at their headquarters, eight loudspeaker teams hit
the streets as a sort of electric town crier, broadcasting public-service news similar to
the radio and print teams, but reaching people whose radios and television were
destroyed."
LSS-40 Loudspeaker
The loudspeaker teams used the LSS-40, a 3-by-2-foot box like contraption which
can be mounted on a soldier's back with a battery pack or mounted on a Humvee roof.
One sergeant in the 360th PSYOP Company who took part in the Operation Andrew mission
reminisced about the efforts of the PSYOP units. He said, "We produced a lot of the
information that the local government needed to get out to its citizens, namely general
information regarding benefits that were available to the community through local, county,
state and federal agencies. All the soldiers worked their butts off. There was a lot of
work to do though.
Loudspeaker Humvee broadcasts public service announcements in front of
Hurricane Andrew relief tent at left, near crossroads at right. Hurricane Andrew survivors
sometimes called the PSYOP troops the "Town Squires."
We also broadcast tapes which were in the form of public service announcement messages.
They were broadcast in English, Spanish and Creole. One message I recall vividly was a
warning for people not to approach monkeys because they might be rabid. Apparently the
Miami Zoo lost some monkeys during the hurricane and there were fears these monkeys were
diseased. We laughed at that message. We didn't think the monkeys would get down to
Florida City and no normal person would approach a disturbed monkey under any
circumstance.
PSYOP
troop relates emergency information and distributes printed matter to local homeowner.
Units taking part in the humanitarian relief from the 5th POG were 351st from Brooklyn,
NY, (now inactivated), the 360th from Wilmington, DE, (now inactivated), the 303rd from
Pittsburgh, PA, and the 312th from Washington DC. Each unit sent a Tactical PSYOP Team.
The 351st members were all Spanish speakers, so we split them up and put one of their guys
in with each non-Spanish speaking team. There was also a command element from 5th
Psychological Operations Group.
The active duty soldiers supported the 82nd Airborne Division to the north of us. We
supported the 10th Mountain Division in Florida City. I worked with and augmented the 1st
Brigade of the 10th. Each day we had Briefings to update the commander on progress. A
display of the city was one of the graphics which we updated daily. It showed progress;
trees, trash, destroyed vehicles, and general debris removed. By the end of my stay, all
parts of the city had been cleaned or had at least been contacted and aided by some unit.
I believe that the military was responsible for large items and large jobs. The civilians
or local agencies were left to do the rest.
We did a lot of listening to help comfort those who stayed in their homes during the
hurricane. There were two instances where I personally saw people break down and cry as
they relived their experience. They knew they had come close to death. We gave them as
much comfort as we could, gave them useful information, and hopefully, gave them a smile
and a chuckle or two."
