Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are seldom practiced within the Continental
United States. The military rightfully knows that some citizens see connotations of brain
washing and control in the term "PSYOP." As a result, active duty troops from
Ft. Bragg and reservists from the various PSYOP and Civil Affairs units will deploy only
in the case of a great disaster or emergency. Such was the case when Hurricane Andrew
slammed into the east coast of Florida in August 1992.
A United States Army Southern Command document dated 1 July 1998 justifies the
use of psychological operations in cases like Hurricane Andrew.
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are prohibited by law from targeting U.S.
audiences. The National Command Authority has granted exceptions for specific disaster
situations, such as Hurricane Andrew. PSYOP is used for the preparation and dissemination
of Command Information essential to each phase of the operation. The PSYOP product
approval chain may include one or more Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
officials. PSYOP commanders and personnel must remind civilian agencies and populations
continuously that they are only in a supporting role and solely for purposes of
communication and information dissemination. At the same time, PSYOP personnel and the US
Southern Command staff need to convey the special capabilities PSYOP offers FEMA and other
agencies in support of disaster relief.
However, we note that because of the worry about the term PSYOP, the
psychological operations task force (POTF) was called the Humanitarian Assistance
Information Element and the PSYOP troops were referred to as humanitarian information
support teams.
Infrared Image of Hurricane Andrew
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) preliminary report
of the storm dated 10 December 1993 describes Hurricane Andrew as:
A small and ferocious Cape Verde hurricane that wrought unprecedented
economic devastation along a path through the northwestern Bahamas, the southern Florida
peninsula, and south-central Louisiana. Damage in the United States is estimated to be
near 25 billion, making Andrew the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history. The
tropical cyclone struck southern Dade County, Florida, especially hard, with violent winds
and storm surges characteristic of a category 4 hurricane. In Dade County alone, the
forces of Andrew resulted in 15 deaths and up to one-quarter million people left
temporarily homeless. An additional 25 lives were lost in Dade County from the indirect
effects of Andrew.
The maximum sustained surface wind speed during landfall over
Florida is estimated at about 145 mph, with gusts to about 175 mph. During the morning
hour of 24 August, Andrew generated storm surge along shorelines of southern Florida. On
the southeast Florida coast, peak storm surge arrived near the time of high astronomical
tide. The height of the storm tide ranged from 4 to 6 ft in northern Biscayne Bay
increasing to a maximum value of 16.9 ft at the Burger King International Headquarters,
located on the western shoreline in the center of the bay, and decreasing to 4 to 5 ft in
southern Biscayne Bay. The observed storm tide values on the Florida southwest coast
ranged from 4 to 5 ft near Flamingo to 6 to 7 ft near Goodland.
Anne Newsome gave some additional facts in an article entitled "Are we
Prepared?" in The Special Operations Response Team.
Hurricane Andrew was one of the most destructive storms in US history in
terms of property losses with 25,000 homes destroyed and an additional 37,000 homes left
uninhabitable. Overwhelmed county emergency medical services, limited access to hospital
patient care, and difficulty in procuring supplies exacerbated the already complicated
situation resulting from the storm.
Satellite Radar Image of Hurricane Andrew
NOAA released another report entitled "Hurricane Andrew – 10 Years
Later." This report updated and finalized the extent of the hurricane in cost and
lives:
Hurricane Andrew was the most destructive United States hurricane of
record. It blasted its way across south Florida on August 24, 1992. NOAA's National
Hurricane Center had a peak gust of 164 mph, measured 130 feet above the ground, while a
177 mph gust was measured at a private home. Andrew caused 23 deaths in the United States
and three more in the Bahamas. The hurricane caused $26.5 billion in damage in the United
States, of which $1 billion occurred in Louisiana and the rest in south Florida. The vast
majority of the damage in Florida was due to the winds.
A more recent U. S. Army after-action report gives even higher numbers for the
destruction caused by Hurricane Andrew. It states that the hurricane created 20 million
cubic yards of debris that took six months to remove. It destroyed or damaged
approximately 80,000 homes. It concludes that Hurricane Andrew killed 61 people and caused
damages estimated at $33 billion dollars.
The U.S. Navy mentioned their part in various operations in a paper entitled Joint
Task Force operations since 1983. In regard to Hurricane Andrew they add:
In Florida, military relief operations were centered in Dade County. Over 24,000
U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and Canadian service members deployed to provide
the relief. The major reliefs services provided by the military included: Electrical
generators for emergency power; 100,000 emergency rations (Meals Ready To Eat); the
military served an additional 900,000 meals from 50 mobile kitchen trailers; establishment
of four Life Support Centers offering temporary housing, meals, medical care, childcare,
and sanitation to displaced residents; survey teams that went door-to-door to assess the
damage and inform residents about the available help; and removal of up to 360,000 cubic
yards of debris from streets and other public facilities.
Six Navy ships and nine naval units, mostly construction battalions, took part in
the operation. In addition, six Marine units took part in the rescue and rebuilding. The
report continues:
The military quickly assumed a larger role than that envisioned for it in the
Federal Response Plan. In the Federal Response Plan, the military is the lead agency only
for urban search and rescue missions. During the response to Andrew, the military became
the lead agency for a host of other missions.
Much of the refrigerated food was lifted by helicopter off the ships Sylvania and
Ponce. Some 90 Army CH-47 helicopters were in the area, but they were not qualified to
take off or land on board ship, so all of the ferry duties fell to the Navy CH-46
helicopters. This caused no problems, but it does highlight how service-dependent
logistics operations can become.
The Forces Command Hurricane Andrew Response After Action Report was
released 20 November 1992. It mostly mentions the number of personnel and
supplies assigned to the hurricane recovery. I add it here just to show how
much effort went into the recovery operation:
Hurricane Andrew struck the area of south Miami on the morning of 24 August
1992 and two days later struck Louisiana. The devastation was significant in
Louisiana but not nearly as catastrophic as the densely populated areas that
were hit in southern Dade County, Florida. Both areas were declared federal
disaster areas by President Bush, but many of our efforts and the main
thrust of this report are oriented toward the operation in Florida.
Once alerted, federal forces responded quickly. Assessment of the
catastrophic devastation caused the commitment to soon expand past the
initial logistical task force. Within two weeks there were over 23,000
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, DoD civilians and Canadians involved
under the command of Lieutenant General Sam Ebbesen.
The DOD relief effort was the largest joint and combined engineer effort
ever assembled to assist in the relief, recovery, and reconstitution
efforts. The engineer force consisted of Army, Air Force, and Marine
engineer units, the Navy Seabees, Canadian military engineers, and United
States Army Corps of Engineers (USAGE) employees and contractors. The
military engineer effort grew to a peak of 3,500 military personnel, 600
USAGE employees, and over 4,000 contractor personnel.
Initial life support missions given to the military were to provide
generators, 100,000 emergency rations (Meals Ready to Eat), medical supplies
to civilian Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, and establishment of Life
Support Centers.
The U. S. Army Material Command formed a Logistics Support Group to
establish and operate a depot system. The LSG used a main depot and two
forward depots to receipt, store, and distribute donated and federal goods.
These depots supported military, federal, and civilian organizations. Over
1000 soldiers and DOD civilians and up to 40,000 volunteers worked to unload
trucks, sort donations, pelletize goods, and distribute them.
The Navy played a primary role in food supply. The USS Sylvania (AFS 2)
supplied over 1.9 thousand tons of food supplies to mobile Kitchen trailers
(MKT).
Marine CH-46 helicopters, using external loads, provided fresh products to
22 MKTs daily. Over 120 Army and Marine helicopters flew 5,816 hours hauling
3.5 million pounds of cargo.
The 1st PSYOP Battalion was mentioned in the list of units and this article
is about all the PSYOP that went on to help the people recover from the
hurricane, but curiously, the PSYOP Battalion is never mentioned again.
I have always believed that Hurricane Andrew was one of the major reasons that
President George Bush failed to be reelected. Nightly television news showed American
citizens living among the rubble for days. The television anchors implied that the Federal
Government did very little to ease their suffering. Partisan politics may have been
involved, since the Democratic Governor of Florida apparently hesitated before asking for
federal aid. Three days passed between Andrew's assault and the arrival of federal help.
Kate Hale, the Dade County emergency director, went on live national television on 27
August with tears in her eyes and castigated the federal government. Some of her comments
were:
Enough is enough. Quit playing like a bunch of kids. Where in the Hell is the
cavalry? For God's sakes, where are they? We are going to have more casualties, because we
are going to have more people dehydrated. People without water. People without food.
Babies without formula. If we do not get more food into the south end of Dade County in a
very short period of time, we are going to have more casualties!
We have a catastrophic disaster. We are essentially the walking wounded. We have
appealed through the State to the Federal Government. We've had a lot of people down here
for press conferences, but Dade County is on its own. Dade County is being caught in the
middle of something and we are being victimized. Quit playing like a bunch of kids and get
us aid! Sort out your political games afterward!
We are all about ready to drop, and the reinforcements are not getting in fast
enough. We need better National Guard down here...President Bush was down here. I'd like
him to follow up on the commitments he made.
At the time of the speech, three days after the storm, 250,000 Florida residents were
struggling to survive without foot, water and shelter. The nationwide uproar reached
Washington DC and President Bush immediately ordered 30,000 troops to the disaster area.
Lieutenant General Samuel Ebbeson (a former deputy of General Schwarzkopf during the
Persian Gulf War) was placed in charge of the military relief effort.
On the same day, Miami Herald staff writers Martin Merzer and Tom Fiedler wrote:
The question echoed through the debris Thursday: If we can do it for Bangladesh,
for the Philippines, for the Kurds of northern Iraq, why in God's name can't we deliver
basic necessities of life to the ravaged population of our own Gold Coast?
President George Bush contended that Florida Governor Lawton Chiles hadn't formally
asked for help. Chiles countered that the need for a formal request seemed silly with the
world watching images of 250,000 flattened homes.
Free Hurricane Andrew Emergency Map
An example of the way the nation saw the relief effort can be found in Hurricane! -
The Rage of Hurricane Andrew, Patricia Lantier-Sampon, Gareth Stevens Publishing,
Milwaukee, WI, 1993. Some of the author's comments are:
August 25 - President Bush had flown in for a two-hour visit, but so far there was
no federal relief. Electric power lines were down, food and clean water were in short
supply, and people were sleeping outside with no place to wash up and no way to begin
cleanup.
On Tuesday, September 1, President Bush made a second visit to Dade County, but it
was two weeks after the storm before 22,000 National Guard members finally came to
southern Florida.
The photographs of President Bush depict him walking stiffly and surrounded by military
personnel. Photographs of candidate Clinton show him visiting the homeless without
accompaniment, hugging children, and "feeling their pain."
Whatever the reason, the result was that American citizens were depicted nightly
sitting under the stars by the wrecked remains of their homes while well-fed Haitian boat
people were shown living in clean military tents in the U.S. base at Guantanamo, Cuba.
Since that time, every U.S. President has made a point of personally visiting and being
photographed at a domestic disaster scene.
Hurricane Andrew struck South Dade County, Florida, at about 0435, 24
August 1992. Most of the residents living in the danger zone were asleep when the outer
wall struck. Those that were awake heard the following message:
We interrupt this program to bring you an emergency alert from the National
Broadcast Emergency Center. This is an emergency alert! I repeat. This is an emergency
alert! The outer winds of hurricane Andrew have just reached the Florida coast. Hurricane
Andrew has unexpectedly shifted five degrees south. I repeat. Hurricane Andrew has shifted
five degrees south. Andrew is expected to strike South Dade within minutes. I repeat.
Andrew is expected to strike South Dade within minutes. All South Dade residents should
take immediate cover! I repeat. All South Dade residents should take immediate cover! This
is an emergency alert!
The military suffered too. Homestead Air Force Base was wiped out by Hurricane Andrew.
The three fighter squadrons normally stationed there were moved to bases in South Carolina
and Georgia. During his reelection campaign, President Bush promised to rebuild and reopen
Homestead AFB. After Bill Clinton's victory, the base was closed by Defense Secretary Les
Aspin. The closing caused a total economic loss to the community of 430 million dollars a
year.
Army Relief Efforts included critically needed food and supplies
Within hours after the hurricane struck, the U.S. Army and other organizations were
ordered to the site to help with recovery operations. FM 100-19 Domestic Support
Operations mentions some of the actions:
US military forces responded to Hurricane Andrew in Florida. Army soldiers provided
relief services, prepared meals, cleared and hauled debris, produced and distributed
water, restored power, and constructed life support centers. These missions provided
important lessons in preparedness, leadership, organization, equipment, and safety. The
16th Field Supply Co (FSC), 240th Quartermaster Battalion, was deployed to provide
support. The 16th FSC mission provided laundry, bath, and light textile renovation support
to disaster victims and deployed forces. Overall, the 16th FSC processed 5000 bundles of
laundry and provided showers for more than 22,000 soldiers and civilians. Army chaplains
provided religious support to military personnel who were providing food, water, shelter,
and medical care to civilian victims. They also talked with victims, distributed food,
counseled children, picked up debris alongside other relief workers, and visited the
elderly.
Loudspeaker team member broadcasts a public service anouncement
The United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 1993 discusses
the military operation too:
PSYOP personnel printed more than 500,000 leaflets, posters, wallet-sized
information cards, maps and newsletters and distributed them throughout Dade County. The
PSYOP Task Force developed a local newspaper called Recovery News. PSYOP personnel
published and broadcast in Spanish, Creole, and Kanjobal, a dialect spoken by Guatemalans.
Information Support Teams provided further support with eight loudspeaker teams In
Humvees. The teams broadcast public service announcements to people who stayed with what
was left of their homes and to those whose radios and televisions had been destroyed.
19 year old Private First Class Jason Dobie who deployed with the 18th Airborne Corps
Personnel Automation Group from Ft. Bragg to Homestead AFB describes the relief efforts:
I can still remember stepping off the helicopter at Homestead Air Force Base and
being in awe of the leveled hangars. I worked in the command center and set up the
military's first deployed joint task force database. We set up the database and
started getting all the manifest lists in every format imaginable. They came in Mac, DOS,
text attachments to emails, 5 1/4" floppies, printouts, and some commanders brought
in their laptops. You name it, all from different branches and all in different
formats. We would run queries against it for the command, or sometimes for the press.
The image I still have from that operation is a bikini-clad girl working a hotdog stand in
the middle of a demolished block of buildings and at least 30 soldiers waiting in line.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
FM 90-29, Noncombat Evacuation Operations, Appendix A,
"Psychological Operations" explains the makeup of the PSYOP Task Force.
The PSYOP task force (POTF) is employed on a wide range of small-scale operations
(for example, Hurricane Andrew relief), and commanded by a regional PSYOP battalion
commander. It consists of a task force headquarters, appropriate regional PSYOP battalion
assets, elements of a PSYOP dissemination battalion, and elements of a tactical PSYOP
battalion. The POTF can range in size from 20 to almost 300 personnel, depending on the
mission.
In the case of Andrew, on 18 August 1992, Joint Task Force Miami began deploying
forces from all services to aid disaster-relief operations. Units provided shelter, food,
and water and assisted in relief operations. The commanding general, 2d Continental US
Army, was the Commander of the Joint Task Force.
The success of Joint Task Force Andrew public affairs was also the shared success
of the Total Army public affairs. Volunteers from U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) public affairs
detachments augmented the Joint Task Force Public Affairs Office (PAO), the FEMA Joint
Information Center (JIC), and the broadcasting staff of Radio Recovery. Prior to
integrating the Reserve Components, the early deployment of active duty public affairs
elements was key in keeping the media informed in a crisis situation while obtaining the
logistical support necessary to establish the JIC.
Very little has been written about the psychological operations in support of
Hurricane Andrew humanitarian relief. LTC Paul B. Kappelman and MAJ Robert E. Armstrong
wrote an article entitled "PSYOP Task Force to Joint Task Force Andrew: A Case Study
in PSYOP - Support to Disaster Recovery Operations," in Special Warfare,
July 1993. The article was later reproduced in Perspectives, the Journal of the
Psychological Operations Association, Winter 1994. Since this is one of the only two
written references I have seen on the subject, I will quote liberally from the authors.
They say:
Initially, the only PSYOP troops deployed were loudspeaker teams
accompanying the 82nd Airborne Division. Rapidly the extent of the damage became evident
and the need for additional PSYOP assets became obvious. Within less than a week, the POTF
was established…The Andrew Psychological Operations Task Force was unique because it
included Reserve forces, at every level, from the staff to the loudspeaker teams.
PSYOP soldiers from the Product Development Center discuss the design of some of the
400 products developed to assist Hurricane Andrew Relief
The mission statement of the POTF was:
Provide coordinated information programs in support of the Joint Task Force relief
operations. Supply immediate relief information through radio, loudspeaker, print and
face-to-face contact. Identify key communicators and appropriate language balance to
provide greatest impact. Access the adequacy of recovery communications infrastructure and
effectiveness of relief information. Synchronize emerging information programs oriented at
recovery operations using mass media (radio). Keep information program ahead of events to
inform and prepare the population for restoration of former communication and information
network.
The first priority was to immediately establish radio operations in the
vicinity of Homestead City. The speed of the recovery was believed to be directly tied to
the amount and the accuracy of the information. The troops were reminded that they were
there to assist in the recovery, but they could not cause the recovery to happen in the
same way that they could complete a tactical mission.
The concept of operation was:
• Immediately establish radio operations in the vicinity of Homestead City
and provide for the greatest “footprint” in the affected area.
• Provide immediate survival information from command, public affairs office
and press releases.
• Provide loudspeaker teams to supplement the communication mix and provide
personal, face-to-face contact.
• Stress themes of survival and basic needs.
• As a daily routine is formed, apply PSYOP assets so that information remains
ahead of events to elevate behavior beyond survival to recovery and sustainment.
PSYOP Teams used Humvees with mounted loudspeakers
to assist relief efforts after Hurrican Andrew
Among the recommendations made by the authors for future humanitarian
assistance within the United States:
A PSYOP representative should be deployed immediately to make the
assessment and identify the mission requirements. A POTF can be tailored and deployed
within 18-72 hours. This is better than sending in troops piecemeal. The POTF must be
deployed within the first 24-36 hours. It must be deployed as a unit and should have at
least one dedicated aircraft. Communication equipment must be compatible with the
supported command. Having Reservists mobilize at stations other than Ft. Bragg is time
consuming and presents delays. All PSYOP reservists when called to active duty should
mobilize at Ft. Bragg. Use language familiar to the troops when planning such an
operation. (I assume that they recommend an operation order format). Understand that
civilians may be somewhat confused, but the combat operation language works well for the
military.
The authors point out the Problems:
Under the government's task organization for the Andrew effort, the Joint
Task Force commander reported to a civilian agency, FEMA, which in turn reported to the
Secretary of Transportation. While the POTF's role was solely to provide
information, its product still required approval from those within the chain. The POTF was
assigned to Army forces. When product requests came from Joint Task Force or FEMA, they
were not always viewed as a priority. Having the POTF below the Joint Task Force created a
layered approval chain, slowing down the process and in some cases watering down the final
product. The POTF should work directly for the Joint Task Force. POTF commanders should
work as special staff officers in the Joint Task Force. There must be centralization. Many
critiques of the Andrew effort noted the lack of a central, single authority for
information release. At the outset, the POTF commander should ensure that the
dissemination of information by military forces is centralized and controlled. A Joint
Task Force directive should be issued stating the JTF Commander's policies and guidelines
on information dissemination. With the advent of personal computers, laser printers, and
graphics programs, it is all too easy for a "mini-POTF" to spring up and start
printing its own leaflets. There were a couple of instances of this happening in Florida.
While the efforts were well-intentioned, the products were not in support of the overall
JOINT TASK FORCE mission, nor were they designed by PSYOP trained soldiers.
The second article that mentions PSYOP during the Hurricane Andrew recovery
operations appears in the July 1993 issue of Special Warfare and is entitled
"SOF Support to Hurricane Andrew Recovery," written by SSG Keith Butler.
361st Civil Affairs Brigade
He mentions the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade working to bring normalcy back to
the community. The unit was reinforced with volunteers from around the country. One of the
affected units was the 478th Civil Affairs Battalion, which was stationed directly in the
path of the storm. Butler adds:
The Psychological Operations Task Force, comprised of active-duty soldiers from
the 1st Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group, and Army Reservists from 5th PSYOP Group, plugged the
hole in public-information services left by the hurricane. Telephones, radio stations,
newspapers and television had been wiped away, leaving local citizens with no means of
receiving the word about relief centers and aid available.
Because of the diverse blend of cultures there, the PSYOP team used its
Spanish-speaking ability to get the word out to Hispanic areas. It also broadcast in
Creole for Haitian communities and Kanjobal, a dialect spoken by Guatemalans.
414th Civil Affairs Battalion
CPT John Orillo of the 414th Civil Affairs Battalion is quoted:
Interaction with local authorities is the key. We started marrying up the services
of the police, water authorities, sewage, engineers, Florida Power and Light and building
code officials to people who needed help the most.
Mail carriers were questioned about the damage to property and who was staying
to rebuild and who was leaving. They were in a unique position to know because they walked
their regular routes each day. Civil affairs Units also helped with animal rescue and
combining military and civilian agencies to clear the area of debris. They contacted
insurance companies and brought lawyers into the area to provide free legal service to
residents of the community. Members of the 20th Special Forces Group provided
round-the-clock security to guard against looting.
Army PSYOP Specialists Employed Radio, Loudspeakers and Print
Presses
Specialist Michael Parrish (left) and Private First Class Michael Stork
ensure the POTF broadcasts are going out over the airwaves during the Hurricane Andrew
relief efforts.
Army PSYOP specialists steered victims of Hurricane Andrew to relief centers
throughout southern Dade County with a three-week blitz of public service information -
via print products, radio and loudspeakers. The POTF comprised of active-duty soldiers
from the 1st Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group, and Army Reservists from the 5th PSYOP Group.
They initially broadcast from a 400-watt mobile radio station. Later, they operated from a
1,000-watt transmitter. "Recovery Radio" broadcast seven days a week from 6:00
a.m. to 10:00 p.m. The broadcast content was compiled by the Product Development Center
(PDC). They wrote the scripts, and prepared printed products. SSG Butler says:
Fliers, posters, instructional wallet-sized cards, maps to relief centers and a
newsletter were crafted by teams working around the clock.
PSYOP Press and Radio Operators
PDC developed all the products that were disseminated. We placed a priority on
information that had to go out immediately - then decided how to get it out quickly
through radio, print and loudspeakers. Posters and fliers placed throughout Dade County
gave phone numbers and locations for aid agencies, including food distribution points,
inoculation centers and insurance offices. In all, 400 different products were designed at
the PDC, which also informed citizens about safety precautions, preventive medicine,
debris clearing, schools and church functions. More than 500,000 copies of material were
printed by PSYOP members. The printed public-service information was posted in camps, on
telephone poles and throughout the neighborhoods across Dade County.
Loudspeaker Teams broadcasted public service messages
While PDC soldiers worked at their headquarters, eight loudspeaker teams hit the
streets as a sort of electric town crier, broadcasting public-service news similar to the
radio and print teams, but reaching people whose radios and television were destroyed.
LSS-40 Loudspeaker
The loudspeaker teams used the LSS-40, a 3-by-2-foot box like contraption which
can be mounted on a soldier's back with a battery pack or mounted on a Humvee roof.
One sergeant in the 360th PSYOP Company who took part in the Operation Andrew mission
reminisced about the efforts of the PSYOP units. He said:
We produced a lot of the information that the local government needed to get out to
its citizens, namely general information regarding benefits that were available to the
community through local, county, state and federal agencies. All the soldiers worked their
butts off. There was a lot of work to do though.
Loudspeaker Humvee broadcasts public service announcements in front of
Hurricane Andrew relief tent at left, near crossroads at right. Hurricane Andrew survivors
sometimes called the PSYOP troops the "Town Squires."
We also broadcast tapes which were in the form of public service announcement
messages. They were broadcast in English, Spanish and Creole. One message I recall vividly
was a warning for people not to approach monkeys because they might be rabid. Apparently
the Miami Zoo lost some monkeys during the hurricane and there were fears these monkeys
were diseased. We laughed at that message. We didn't think the monkeys would get down to
Florida City and no normal person would approach a disturbed monkey under any
circumstance.
PSYOP
troop relates emergency information and distributes printed matter to local homeowner.
Units taking part in the humanitarian relief from the 5th POG were 351st from
Brooklyn, NY, (now inactivated), the 360th from Wilmington, DE, (now inactivated), the
303rd from Pittsburgh, PA, and the 312th from Washington DC. Each unit sent a Tactical
PSYOP Team. The 351st members were all Spanish speakers, so we split them up and put one
of their guys in with each non-Spanish speaking team. There was also a command element
from 5th Psychological Operations Group.
The active duty soldiers supported the 82nd Airborne Division to the north of us.
We supported the 10th Mountain Division in Florida City. I worked with and augmented the
1st Brigade of the 10th. Each day we had Briefings to update the commander on progress. A
display of the city was one of the graphics which we updated daily. It showed progress;
trees, trash, destroyed vehicles, and general debris removed. By the end of my stay, all
parts of the city had been cleaned or had at least been contacted and aided by some unit.
I believe that the military was responsible for large items and large jobs. The civilians
or local agencies were left to do the rest.
We did a lot of listening to help comfort those who stayed in their homes during
the hurricane. There were two instances where I personally saw people break down and cry
as they relived their experience. They knew they had come close to death. We gave them as
much comfort as we could, gave them useful information, and hopefully, gave them a smile
and a chuckle or two.
A
Bright Red Poster is placed on Pole to draw Attention
Another newspaper, the Recovery Messenger of 5 September 1992, printed in both English and Spanish, mentioned
the tent cities that were being built by the military:
A relief community is springing up on the corner of Davis and Krome Avenues in Florida
City. Officially called United States Marine Corps Camp Two, the new neighborhood is known
as “Tent City” to most…This camp and another like it, which is located at
Harris Field in Homestead are each capable of housing 1500 residents. Hot meals and
showers are being provided.
Map depicting Food, Water and Medical Locations
The newspaper also contained numerous maps of different sections of the city showing
where food, water and medical help were available.
Dryden’s Actual Map during Operation
Retired U.S. Army Reserve First Sergeant Charles T. Dryden told me that he was
deployed for Hurricane Andrew (August to September 1992) as part of a Hurricane
Relief team from the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion out of Upper
Marlboro, MD (Headquarters: Washington, DC). Dryden was part of
five Humanitarian Information Support Teams (HIST) attached to different elements and
Areas of Operation (AOs) of the 10th Mountain Division out of Fort Drum, NY. He was
billeted along with Division Headquarters at a heavy damaged Holiday Inn and was
tasked out to provide aid and comfort to local migrant worker camps located
out into the Everglades and as far North as Biscayne Blvd. next to the 82nd Airborne's
AO. He recalls:
We made a lot of product like leaflets, posters and tapes. Most of the
handbills were forms to fill out for FEMA assistance, services for abandoned animals
and recovery, shelter and aid. Some handbills were posted on boarded-up store fronts
to inform survivors to be careful where to step due to all the nails in the exposed lumber
and debris. We told them of the need to boil water and the risk of infection due to
dirty water and that tetanus shots were being provided at several local free medical
clinics. The pharmaceuticals, with short or expired dates had been donated by
national drug companies. My team stopped at a Sherman-Williams paint store and the
manager let us have a 5 gallon bucket of wall paper paste and some white-wash brushes on
broom handles for us to apply our product on all those plywood storefronts, like
supermarkets, where the population was inclined gather awaiting information. We were also
able to find a woman in the Dade County Operations Center to write a handout message in
Spanish on yellow office paper for those Spanish-speakers with more immediate needs.
Situation Report (Sitrep) from then SFC Dryden
Notice the many duties that Dryden’s Alpha Team did on this single day. He
distributed leaflets and handbills and pasted them on boarded-up windows. He then took
part in broadcasts on a number of important subjects. Later he was back posting leaflets
and handbills.
Some of our product was meant to control what could be placed out on the curb
for cleanup and collection. We told the people what rubbish could be burned; like
wood, paper, books and clothes, etc. We told them what could be recycled; like metals,
bicycles, lawn furniture, beat up trash cans, window frames, tires and wheels, etc. We
also identified what was garbage that would be dumped and buried in the land fill; items
like spoiled food from the refrigerator and kitchen cabinets, vegetation like house
plants, bushes and grass clippings, etc. We later heard that Dade County had used up their
landfill area for the next 10 years and that's why the county was burning rubbish all
night and inaugurated a major recycling effort.
An article entitled “Humanitarian Assistance, Redleg Style,” by Lieutenant
Colonels James T. Palmer and Charles R. Rash in the October 1993 Field Artillery Tells the
same story. The article shows the make up of the two task forces and we note that each has
a PSYOP Team and a Civil Affairs team. The article discusses the actions of the 1st and
2nd Platoons of the 7th Field Artillery of the 10th Mountain Division in Homestead. The
authors say in part:
We received Special Forces psychological operations teams that gave us a much
needed language capability in both Spanish and Creole…The most serious concern was
the abundance of rotting garbage. It was literally everywhere, strewn throughout Southern
Florida. Refrigeration was non-existent, and the lack of garbage disposal posed a severe
health hazard….By the end of the third week, the soldiers of the 10th Mountain
Division artillery had literally sanitized more than 32 square miles of Dade County.
Dryden continues:
We also recorded tape broadcasts in English, Creole and Spanish that informed
the displaced persons where the medical aid stations were located and that water points
were situated at all Traffic Lights. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
assistance points were marked with yellow helium-filled balloons. This helped the people
find central places where they could fill out forms for loans, etc. The major medical
stations and hospital pickup points where helicopters could land were marked with Red
Balloons. The people were fed by many local churches that were able to provide hot meals
and give the hungry people bags of donated food.
One of our teams joined with the Special Forces and worked
with the local Seminole tribe. Another team was sent to the “Tent City” relief
camp where they dealt with the problems of keeping the single males away from the young
females by organizing work projects like the construction of more tents, handling food
supplies and daily trash collection. We didn't wear any battle gear, just a soft cap
and pistol belt with two canteens. The Florida National Guard wore full gear with weapons.
We shipped our vehicles down and back, a lesson learned for Bosnia. The radios
overheated and our Sergeant Washington solved the problem with a damp towel across the
top. This lesson learned was valuable when the 10th Mountain Division deployed to Somalia.
Palmer and Rash talk about food problems with rather critical civilians:
Some civilians visited the Task Force Commander and complained that the Army was
taking better care of its soldiers than it was the local population. The Commander agreed.
The complaints that the soldiers ate better food and had cleaner water and ice than their
civilian neighbors were entirely true. A Commander’s first priority in a disaster
relief operation must be the security and welfare of his force. One sergeant remarked,
“We are kind of like the missionaries; we have to take care of ourselves if we are to
administer to the civilians for a long time.”
Amazingly, neither task force lost a soldier to disease or injury throughout
Operation Hurricane Andrew relief…
Printed Products
Multilith 1250 Press
Printed products are discussed by Sergeant Keith Butler in an article entitled
“PSYOP assets get the word out,” in Briefback, fall, 1992. He mentions
some of the same information in another article mentioned above. Here he goes into more
detail:
A total of 400 different products were designed by psychological operations task
force members, who additionally informed citizens about safety precautions, preventive
medicine, debris clearing, schools and church functions. The more than 500,000 copies of
materials were printed by PSYOP members on a Multilith (1250) printer and mobile
Risographs. The printed, public-service information was posted at camps, on telephone
poles and throughout neighborhoods across the county in black and white, and blue, red and
green.
Recovery Times
Psychological Operation Troops always want to have a newspaper for their target
audience to read. Here is the Recovery Times, dated 16 September 1992.
Recovery News
There was also a second emergency newspaper called Recovery News. Here is the
issue of 12 September 1992. My favorite story in this issue is the announcement that a
group of healthy escaped monkeys is on the loose and they are tired and hungry (and
probably mad as can be) and the public is warned to stay away from them.
Information Forms
These forms came in various languages. We depict the English and Creole version.
This information was collected and collated and then used to help gather and concentrate
supplies during the humanitarian effort.
Radio Recovery
This large poster (17 x 11-inches) tells the Hurricane victims the Radio Recovery
station number in English, Spanish and Creole.
PSYOP Soldier Reads Radio Script
Applying for Disaster Relief
This handbill told the people of Homestead how to go about applying for relief. The
back of the handbill is identical except printed in Spanish. Because of the size of this
handbill (8.5 x 14-inches) we just show the upper portion.
Notice
As always, conmen and hustlers showed up shortly after the hurricane to try and take
advantage of the homeless Floridians. This handbill points out that they need not pay a
roofer since the Army Corps of Engineers will do the job gratis. The back of this handbill
is in Spanish.
Attention, Attention…
Getting rid of garbage was one of the main healthy concerns. This handbill in
English, Spanish and Creole tells the citizens how the garbage is to be separated and
where it should be placed. The handbill also was printed as a small 8.5 x 3.25 leaflet on
a pink paper.
Attention, Attention…The Pink Leaflet Version
The handbill also was printed as a small 8.5 x 3.25 leaflet on a pink paper.
Copy of loudspeaker announcement written on notebook paper showing
that it should take exactly 20 seconds.
Besides the handbills, the same messages were broadcast. Here is a copy of the
announcement written on notebook paper showing that it should take exactly 20 seconds.
As I write this I am listening to the almost identical public service announcement
broadcast over the radio in alternating English and Spanish language. The short message
is:
Attention - Residents and Volunteers!
The removal of all separated debris, trash, garbage and metal into
piles has begun.
Please place all separated debris, trash, garbage and metal in piles
along the edge of the street to be removed.
Thank you.
Federal/State/Local Coordinating office
This form was printed in order to give the local residents all of the agencies and
phone numbers that might need for any type of emergency that might come up. One side is in
English, the other in Spanish. The 12 agencies include; Disaster Loans to Individuals and
Businesses, Disaster Housing Assistance Program, Disaster Loans to Farmers or Ranchers,
Crisis Counseling, etc. The opening paragraph is:
Disaster assistance programs are made available under Presidential disaster
declarations. Detailed information on the following types of individual assistance
programs is available at the various Federal-State Disaster Application Centers in the
declared counties.
Eye Examinations
There were handbills that directed civilians to medical care. This handbill offers
free eyeglasses to those who lost theirs in the hurricane.
Pet Owners
One of the great tragedies in all natural disasters is that house pets suddenly find
themselves alone in the wreckage with no native ability to feed themselves. This handbill
is English on one side and Spanish on the other.
Electrical Safety Notice
These leaflets were prepared to help the homeowners with information about how to
safely turn on or off their electricity, how to use a generator, and other needed
emergency information.
Rules of Engagement
One does not think that the military might be forced to fire their weapons during a
humanitarian relief operation. Yet, there can be food riots, looters, outside fringe
political parties looking to make headlines or even a dispute caused by a language barrier
that gets out of hand. The military needs to know exactly the rules in such engagements.
Here is the Rules of Engagement (ROE) card issued to troops taking part in the
operation.
Was there really a need for a ROE card? The answer would seem to be "yes."
The Miami Herald of 6 September 1992 reports that members of a South Dade County
armed gang had a confrontation with a patrol of the 82nd Airborne Division. The gang was
armed and spoiling for a fight; the soldiers carried M-16 rifles but had been issued no
ammunition. The confrontation ended peacefully after a discussion (and wouldn’t
you love to know what was said), but Captain Bill Mason of the 82nd was quoted as saying
“One of these times, somebody’s going to call our bluff and somebody will get
shot.” There were other reports of gang members driving by and aiming their weapons
to the troops or pointing them out the window at troops and saying “bang! Bang!”
Curiously, the 6,300 Florida State National Guard and the MPs are all armed, and it is
just the federal active duty soldiers that were not because martial law was not declared
and thus they had no law enforcement jurisdiction.
Specialist 4th Class Mike Rauh was a Ground Surveillance Systems Operator with the
313th Military Intelligence Battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division. He also experienced
the gangs of looters and their threats of bodily harm. He said:
We worked with the Police to catch looters. I was one of many troops that were
repeatedly threatened by the gangs. They would drive by, point their shotguns or pistols
at us and holler “Bang, Bang, Mother Fuc*er!” They had AK-47s, Mac 10s, and even
Uzis. They were better armed than us. They knew we didn't have ammunition and loved to
mess with us. I worked at night with a TAS-6 night vision camera and helped the Police
catch people breaking into stores and houses. They found out about that too and put a
bounty out on us. They offered $1,000 for a Paratrooper's Beret. They used little kids and
people in neighborhoods to spy on us. Many of the gang members were ex-military and a few
of them talked to us and tried to help us out.
He remembered some posters and leaflets during the operation:
I remember troops from Ft. Bragg putting up posters to tell people where to
get food, water, and ice. I also remember some troops handing out flyers telling people
they could come to the Elementary School we shared with the Red Cross to get
free immunizations, emergency food stamp applications, see a doctor or nurse, etc..
In addition to helping people in need, I believe the Army was trying to ease
tensions in the distressed areas. My unit and the Red Cross used an elementary school in
the Naranja Lakes Area. In a further attempt to ease tensions, a few of us got a bunch of
Dr. Seuss & other children's books from the library and read to kids in the
afternoons.
Volunteer Card
One small PSYOP printed product is the volunteer ID card. The card depicts two hands
clasping over a red heart-shaped symbol. The text is “VOLUNTEER. People helping
people. 1992. Hurricane Andrew Relief. ID#_____." The PSYOP-printed
“Volunteer" cards were used to identify civilian volunteers in the Hurricane
Andrew Disaster Assistance Centers.
Conclusion
The Department of Defense prepared an unclassified Working Paper on 31 August 2005.
It listed the various actions taken by the military during the storm. Some of the items
are:
1,014 USAF sorties were flown, plus the use of 120 Department of Defense
helicopters.
35,000 meals a day were served for a total of 850,000 meals.
1,000,000 Meals ready to eat delivered.
80,000 tons of humanitarian supplies were moved by land and sea, another 2,000 tons
by air.
67,000 civilian medical patients were treated.
1,000 tents erected.
6,000,000 cubic yards of debris collected.
30,074 Department of Defense and National Guard personnel were deployed.
There was an interesting comment in the Lessons Learned portion of the
report. We know that there were numerous complaints about the slowness of the aid, and I
cannot help but wonder if this is an attempt at explanation with the claim that the
government might have seemed to be acting slowly but was actually working under civilian
supervision. They also mention military jargon, something I constantly fight with as I
change military comments loaded with acronyms into plain English for my readers:
It is almost a given that some citizens will say that the military response was
too slow, because they have an idea of military capability, they need help immediately,
and they may not know or care about the need for the military to be in a supporting role
to civilian officials. Once arrived, soldiers carrying weapons generate confidence in many
civilians, but fear in others. It’s important to not just assume that all soldiers
need to be carrying weapons. It’s important that soldiers be encouraged to talk to
local civilians – this is America! But remember that civilians don’t use
military acronyms, so speak in plain English.
The Army prepared a Lesson Learned Report that said in part:
The Second Continental U. S. Army had responsibility for coordinating and
controlling response operations in Florida until the establishment of Joint Task Force
(JTF) Andrew on 28 August 1992. The Fifth U. S. Army had responsibility for operations in
Louisiana. Although hard hit by Hurricane Andrew, the damage was not as catastrophic as in
Florida. Because of this, the Fifth U. S. Army received few requests for support. Over
24,000 U. S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Canadian Forces deployed in the
largest peacetime CONUS deployment to provided hurricane relief in Florida and Louisiana.
The Department of Defense relief effort was the largest joint and combined
engineer effort ever assembled to assist in the relief, recovery and reconstitution
efforts. The engineer force consisted of Army, Air Force, and Marine engineer units, the
Navy Seabees, Canadian military engineers, and United States Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) employees and contractors. The military engineer effort grew to a peak of 3,500
military personnel, 600 USACE employees, and over 4,000 contractor personnel. Military
engineers filled the void until contractors, volunteer relief organizations, and local
communities could be mobilized to carry on with disaster recovery.
In 2018, I spoke with Sergeant Rick Schumacher, Product Development Detachment,
345th Tactical PSYOP Company, who told me about his difficulties in later hurricanes:
While Hurricane Katrina was flooding Louisiana, Active PSYOP assets were deployed
from 9th PSYOP Battalion to do civilian communications in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Apparently, there was a difficulty in getting them ramped up and working within the
Incident Command System. From what I understand, when Texas Military Forces (TXNG) saw
this issue, they decided to stand up an IO cell in case they had to coordinate with active
PSYOP. As a former 9th Battalion guy and current Reservist with the 345th TPC out of
Dallas, I was spun up to be the liaison between National Guard/State EOC and PSYOP, if
needed. Otherwise, I was working to identify and access lines of communication to affected
communities on the Texas coast.
When we were transitioning from Katrina to Rita, there where thousands of people
without any communications; cell phones were down, FM and AM transmitters were down,
pretty much everything was down. One thought I had was to develop LEAFLETS and do airborne
leaflet drops into cut-off communities. I was developing messaging while concurrently
trying to determine feasibility of the plan. I had developed messaging in two themes,
shelter-in-place and evacuation. Shelter-in-place communications included things like
“don't wade in the flood waters” (and dangers of doing so), “how to triage
injuries,” and “how to signal for help.” Evacuation messaging included
locations of fuel points, where to shelter, and what to do if you break down. All
messaging included themes of safety and security. Since traditional lines of communication
were so few and far between and the instructions on some of the messaging needed to be
retained, I figured the best method was to print and airdrop leaflets.
In the end, getting authority from the government to drop leaflets was apparently
too difficult. I was an NCO so the decision tree for implementation was way above me.
However, I came up with a long term plan to quickly stand up processes for this type of
communication in future catastrophic events. Unfortunately, I demobilized and don't know
if anything ever came of it or if I was just yelling into the void.
26 years after Hurricane Andrew hit they are still talking about it in Florida.
David Whitley wrote an article in the Orlando Sentinel of 25 August 2018 entitled
“Hurricane Andrew is still impacting Florida 26 years after landfall.” He said
in part:
Weather experts predicted the 1992 hurricane season would be fairly tame. And the
first named storm didn’t even gain hurricane status until August 22. That meant it
got this name: Andrew. Twenty-six years later, Andrew has never really left. Its $47.8
billion worth of devastation no longer ranks it as the most costly natural disaster in
American history. But it is probably the most impactful storm to ever hit the U.S.
Hurricane Andrew at Homestead General Airfield
Photo courtesy of Mark Storrs
When people began crawling out of the debris that morning, they quickly
discovered the government was nowhere near prepared. “Where in the hell is the
cavalry on this one? They keep saying we're going to get supplies. For God's sake, where
are they?” That was the tearful plea of Kathleen Hale, the emergency management
coordinator for Dade County. The confusion, lack of coordination and preparedness on all
levels of government had all but broken her.
Almost 26,000 homes were totally destroyed, and 102,000 more were damaged. The
number of homeless was 160,000, though that didn’t include hundreds of monkeys,
snakes, llamas, birds, cougars and other wildlife that escaped from zoos. Prices for food,
batteries, generators and ice soared since there were no laws against gouging. Looters
descended and property owners armed themselves to protect what was left of their homes.
Governor Lawton Chiles spoke with President George Bush right after the storm and
thought federal troops were on the way. It turned out a formal request was necessary, so
troops didn’t arrive until four days later. The chaos was so bad that Sen. Bob Graham
asked retired General Norman Schwarzkopf, fresh off commanding the Gulf War forces, to run
recovery efforts. He diplomatically declined, saying he wasn’t properly trained to do
the job.
From a disaster management standpoint, Andrew was basically a gargantuan
hard-learned lesson. Florida is much better prepared in 2018 than 1992. It better be. The
population has increased from 13.6 million to 20.6 million. About 98 percent of it lives
in coastal counties. The property values there are about $3.7 trillion. Nearly 3 million
homes are at risk from storm surge flooding. The good news is forecasters think this
hurricane season should be relatively calm. The bad news is that’s what they said in
1992….
The photo on the left shows an 18 foot python caught in Florida.
The photo on the right is of another python pulled out of a plumbing pipe in
Florida
We mention snakes being released into the wild above but they did not know the half
of it at the time. Apparently during the storm a snake breeding facility was blown away by
the hurricane’s wind and hundreds of young Burmese pythons were let loose into the
swamps. Almost 30 years have passed and those pythons have bred and spread almost to the
outskirts of Miami. The pythons have no natural enemy and they are eating everything from
eggs, bird, deer and occasionally the odd alligator. They have become a menace in the
state of Florida and individual are now allowed to obtain licenses to hunt the snakes for
a bounty. A 2012 study by the U.S. Geological Survey found that after Andrew exacerbated
the Burmese python invasion of the Florida Everglades, populations of raccoons and
opossums dropped roughly 99 percent and some species of rabbits and foxes effectively
disappeared. Species that had long flourished here were being decimated by the aggressive
newcomers. By the year 2020, most researchers propose that at least 30,000 and upwards of
300,000 pythons likely occupy southern Florida and that this population will only continue
to grow.
The author would appreciate hearing from anyone who participated in the Hurricane
Andrew recovery efforts. Readers are encouraged to write to him at sgmbert@hotmail.com.
