Over two thousand years ago, the great Chinese Military Strategist Sun-Tzu
(1993) wrote the following: “It is best to keep one’s own army, battalion,
company, or five-man squad intact; to crush the enemy’s army, battalion, company, or
five-man squad is only a second best. So to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles
is not the highest excellence; the highest excellence is to subdue the enemy’s army
without fighting at all” (Sun-Tzu, 1993, p. 111). These writings from one of
history’s greatest military strategists still ring true today. Modern-day warfare is
still concerned with keeping their ranks intact a much as possible. In twentieth century
and modern conflicts such as World War II, The Korean Conflict, the Vietnam War, the
Persian Gulf War, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and various
peacekeeping missions throughout the world, psychological warfare and operations have
played major factors in capturing enemy prisoners and winning over the hearts and minds of
both enemy civilians and combatants.
The Army Dictionary and Desk Reference (1999) defines Psychological
Operations (PSYOP) as “the full range of political, military, economic, and
ideological activities designed to affect the emotions, attitudes, or behavior of friendly
or enemy audiences in support of national objectives.” Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR)
is defined as “the use of propaganda to negatively influence the enemy’s
willingness to fight” (Zurick, 1999, p.187). These definitions are opposite in that
PSYOP is more strategic with broad, long term aims in support of general military
strategies whereas PSYWAR is more tactical, directed towards the enemy with more
immediate, noticeable changes in the enemy’s behavior. Psychological warfare
is only a small element of the broad definition of Psychological Operations. For the
purpose of this writing, these two terms will be used interchangeably due to the fact the
term “psychological operations” was not defined until a later date of some of
the publications and some of the actions.
Learning by Trial and Error
During the Second World War, psychological warfare was regarded as operations
regarding no planning, training or research (Speier, 1948, p. 5). Entrusting mainly men
with experience in disseminating news, opinions, advertisements, and entertainment to home
populations were used during initial psychological warfare campaigns in the first two
world wars which ostensibly was adequate. There was no peacetime agency to plan and/or
research psychological campaigns which led to several weaknesses in both organization and
conduct of psychological warfare. Therefore, weaknesses in psychological warfare derived
form poor coordination of improvised propaganda agencies. There was a lack of adequate
standards in the recruitment of personnel and imperfect coordination of propaganda offices
with authorities established that made political and military decisions (Speier, 1948).
Psychological warfare conducted by the Allied Forces during the Second World War was not
as great as it could have been. Deficiencies in coordination and recruitment allowed
psychological warfare capabilities to not be fully exploited as they were simply not
explored. A major shortcoming of American Propaganda during World War II was that there
was a dearth of political planning beyond the news of the week. Civilian agencies were
designated to disseminate “information and the truth,” (Speier, 1948, p. 7) and
military propaganda units utilized the term “psychological warfare” in
influencing the enemy to cease their resistances. Having civilian agencies and military
units separated created a large gap between what was researched and what was disseminated
on the battlefield.
One PSYWAR campaign that showed effectiveness during the Second World War
occurred shortly after the D-Day invasion at Normandy in June of 1944 (Riley, Cottrell,
1957). Leaflet shells containing surrender leaflets fired from artillery positions brought
forth six German Military personnel carrying the leaflets surrendering to the American
forces. Warning leaflets, warning civilians and opposing forces of a coming attack, were
dropped from aircraft before an attack but the messages were not always well heeded
(Riley, Cottrell, 1957). French civilians, recovered from what used to be their village,
were asked if they saw any leaflets dropped prior to the attack and the message was in the
affirmative. Although the message on the leaflet was comprehendible, the villagers thought
the message was not for them, they thought the wind carried the leaflets from another
battle area. This example went to show PSYWAR units that printed material must be in a
format familiar to the target audience (Department of the Army, 1994, p. J-1) meaning that
to target specific villages or area, these areas had to be specifically addressed on the
product.
When planning for psychological warfare campaigns, there were many different
variables that entered into each operation (Doob, 1949). Committees were created to
pretest products in order to gauge responses of target audiences, making psychological
warfare less artistic and more scientific. However, these sample audiences would either
well represent the target audience or not represent them at all. Pretesting helps make
important decisions about PSYOP materials (Department of the Army, 1994, p. 10-24). A
sample audience is selected through random selection process in order to get a good
example of the population; the sample is large enough to well represent the population.
With the sample selected, the PSYOP Task Force determines the effectiveness of the media
produced. Tactical PSYOP Teams, spread throughout the campaign theater, go out on missions
conducting surveys and showing sample products to the population, information is sent up
the chain of command and a decision is made to whether or not utilize the product or
products tested.
Modern Day PSYOP
From a psychological operations viewpoint, the Korean Conflict was the most
significant war fought between Western Democracy and Communism (Kim, 2003, p. 29). It was
the first war completely fought on the Asian continent and therefore differences in
language, customs, climate, and terrain created risks for soldiers both physically and
psychologically. Once again, the United States suffered many humiliating propaganda
defeats; up to twenty-one American prisoners of war refused to be repatriated allegedly
due to the Communist’s indoctrination programs, estimates between 33% to 70% of
American prisoners of war either cooperated or collaborated with their captors, one United
States infantry officer—over a Communist-controlled radio station in
Seoul—denounced his government (Kim, 2003).
The United States, at the beginning of the Cold War, had many anti-Communist
fears. Fears such as Communism as an ideology may have intrinsic superiority to Western
democracy (Kim, 2003), that the United States was fighting from a handicapped position due
to historical ties with colonialism, fear of the ubiquitous Communist propaganda apparatus
was expressed by top political, military, and communication leaders of the United States,
and fear of an enemy civilian population that may not be able to distinguish between lies
and truth. This final fear was strong due to the number of illiterate people in third
world nations that receive their information through oral propaganda of local agitators
and people influenced by them. Only a few key communicators faithful to the cause would
get the word out and they would spread their propaganda to a larger audience.
Tactics were utilized by United States and United Nations forces during the
Korean Conflict based on what President Truman referred to as “the campaign of
truth” (Kim, 2003, p. 37). Tactical use of loudspeakers and radio broadcasts were
utilized to disseminate information to the masses, but leaflets became the primary means
of winning the hearts and minds of enemy troops and civilians (Kim, 2003, p. 37). Leaflets
were dropped by means of leaflet bombs, containing approximately 30,000 leaflets apiece
(Department of the Army, 1994, p. G-15), from B-29 bomber planes over Communist-held
territories and C-47 cargo planes over United Nations-held territories, 105-mm mortar
shells containing 738 leaflets apiece were utilized to shell the enemy with truth and
information, and ground patrols disseminated leaflets by hand to the local populaces.
These techniques, especially air-dropping leaflets, had a great advantage over Communist
forces as they were not able to control the airspace.
To determine if the use of psychological operations during the Korean Conflict
was effective, research experts were recruited by the Operations Research Office to
develop and carry out PSYOP relevant research evaluations of several aspects of
psychological warfare utilized in Korea on captured prisoners of war (Andrews, Smith,
Kahn, 1954). Nine factors were chosen for the research; a. the degree to which the
individual was in accord with the ideology and aims of the People’s Government before
the war, b. degree and frequency which the individual had experienced fear during battle,
c. degree to which the individual felt poorly treated and physically cared for by his own
forces during the war, d. the amount and intensity of direct battle in which the
individual was involved, e. the amount of U.N. propaganda of any kind received by the
individual, f. the total amount of propaganda per medium during the war: 1. leaflets 2.
loudspeaker 3. radio, g. relative proximity of the propaganda received to action in front
line battle, h. degree of defection or change in accord in the individual, and i. degree
to which the individual was willing to or sought to surrender peacefully as opposed to
forceful capture at the time taken prisoner (Andrews, Smith, Kahn, 1954). These Surveys
were translated to Korean by recruited college students from Korea and Japan (Andrews,
Smith, Kahn, 1954) and then the results were translated back into English. Scales were
designed to measure the stance of the individual on each factor and then each factor was
cross referenced with the other factors to achieve results. Results showed that
psychological warfare did offer some effective influences on enemy [Asian] troops
independent of the lowered morale of the Communist forces (Andrews, Smith, Kahn, 1954).
With the knowledge gleaned from the Korean Conflict, the United States, when
involved in the Vietnam War, created and disseminated PSYOP products similar in a way to
that in Korea. However, the use of loudspeakers was more prominent. Aircraft were not only
used to drop leaflets as they were in Korea, they were also used as loudspeaker platforms.
The United States Air Force’s 14th Special Operations Wing utilized an O-2B twin
engine Cessna aircraft (Rouse) specifically designed for PSYOP related activity. Equipped
with loudspeakers and leaflet dispensers, the O-2B aircraft was used to fly just above the
treetops carrying a pilot and observer to disseminate PSYOP products, no ordnance other
than the truth was dispensed from this aircraft. UH-1H “Huey” helicopters were
also equipped with loudspeakers to broadcast messages to the enemy, as dramatized in a
famous scene from the motion picture Apocalypse Now (1979) where Lieutenant Colonel
Kilgore utilized loudspeakers to play music from helicopters in order to intimidate the
enemy before an attack. However, aircraft mounted loudspeakers are limited to their range
due to difficulties overcoming the sound of the aircraft itself (Department of the Army,
1994, p. I-10). Loudspeakers have a wonderful advantage over leaflets. Leaflets can be
discarded and ignored on the battlefield; an audio message broadcasted over a loudspeaker
cannot be avoided. During a broadcast, the opponent becomes a captive audience, unable to
escape the message (Department of the Army, 1994, p. I-7).
One of the most influential leaflets utilized by the Americans during the
Vietnam War was a modification of a leaflet used in previous conflicts such as World War
II and Korea: the “Safe Conduct Pass” (Whittaker, 1997, p. 175). This specific leaflet guaranteed safe passage of
defectors through American and South Vietnamese force’s lines.
Wordless leaflets were also created to combat the illiteracy of some rural
Vietnamese communities. However, these wordless leaflets were subject to many
misinterpretations. One specific leaflet designed by the Americans showed a “Good
South Vietnamese” trying to help kill harmful insects on one side and the other side
showed the same “Good South Vietnamese” individual being shot down by the
“Bad Viet Cong” (Whittaker, 1997). But, an interview with a defector on the
effectiveness of this leaflet displayed a massive misinterpretation; “On Side 1, they
are showing him how to spray poison on the crops; on Side 2 the VC are killing this
man” (Whittaker, 1997, p. 177).
The next major conflict in United States History, the War in the Persian Gulf
to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, played another major role in the development and
dissemination of PSYOP products. Loudspeaker operations on the air, on the ground and on
dismounted patrols and leaflets were utilized during this operation.
Army Reserve Units from Minnesota, Missouri, Texas, and Arkansas were deployed
to provide tactical PSYOP support for the campaign (Rouse).Loudspeaker operations
conducted from UH-1H aircraft and HMMWV “Humvee” vehicles provided support and
turned the Iraqi forces into a captive audiences.Dismounted ground patrols (soldiers on
foot) had a small PSYOP element carrying a LSS-40C “manpack” loudspeaker on
missions to increase their effective range of their weapons as well.The M16-A2 rifle, the
standard issue weapon of a United States soldier, has a maximum effective range of 800
meters whereas a patrol equipped with a loudspeaker, which has a maximum effective range
of 1,000 to 1,300 meters (Department of the Army, 1994, p. 10-4), is at an advantage
because the loudspeaker message reaches out farther than the patrol’s bullets.
Leaflets were also utilized in the way they have been utilized in previous
conflicts. Warning leaflets of coming attacks, surrender leaflets, even leaflets that
looked like Iraqi currency were handed out by soldiers or dropped from the air. One new
way leaflets were put on the battlefield was by waterborne operations. Approximately
twelve thousand leaflets in sealed bottles depicting a knife-wielding, war ready United
States Marine as a tidal wave overcoming the Iraqi forces were dumped off the Kuwaiti Coast
by a smuggler from the United Arab Emirates (Rouse).
Psychological Warfare in the United States Military changes with technology.
Arial radio broadcasting is a technique employed since after the Persian Gulf War (Rouse).
This technique is employed through an air-mobile broadcasting platform known as
“Commando Solo” (Rouse). A modified EC-130 from the 193rd Special Operations
Wing of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard is able to broadcast radio messages over AM,
FM and Shortwave frequencies and television programs over medium, high, very high and
ultrahigh frequencies (Rouse). The 4th Psychological Operations Group, the only
active-duty component of the United States Army’s Psychological Operations Regiment,
produces radio messages to be approved by the State Department then, upon approval; the
messages are broadcast to target audiences throughout the campaign.These radio broadcasts
are only effective though if the target audience knows when and where to hear the
messages. Therefore, leaflets are dropped after broadcasting commences with times and
stations for the listener to tune in. Before Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, The
Department of Defense deployed Commando Solo to Iraq to broadcast anti-Saddam messages to
the Iraqi population (Rouse). Four days after broadcasting began, approximately half a
million leaflets were dropped with times and radio stations for the Iraqis to tune in.
Conclusion
Modern-day psychological operations and warfare techniques and procedures may
not be well known outside of researchers and personnel directly involved in the production
or dissemination of products, but on the battlefield during combat operations, it is
difficult not to find a civilian or combatant who hasn’t heard a radio broadcast or
seen a leaflet falling from the sky. Some psychological operations are infamous, such as
PSYOP involved in the surrender of General Manuel Noriega by blasting rock music and
United States PSYOP products over loudspeakers (King, 2004). Psychological operations
units have honed their skills through trial and error and the use of modern technology
into a fine science of knowing what to say and how to employ operations. What Sun-Tzu
wrote over two thousand years ago still rings true today; subduing the enemy’s army
without fighting at all is the greatest victory.
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