THE AMERICAN PSYOP
ORGANIZATION DURING
THE KOREAN WAR

SGM HERBERT A. FRIEDMAN (Ret.)

Background

President Truman

Kim Il Sung

Following Japan’s surrender in World War II, Korea was arbitrarily divided into zones of Soviet and American occupation, north and south of the 38th north parallel. By 1948, it was clear that reunification of the two countries was hopeless, in May 1948, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was created in the south, with Dr. Syngman Rhee as president, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was formed in the north. In April of 1948, President Harry S. Truman had stated, "The United States should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that an action taken by any faction in Korea, or by any other power in Korea could be considered a Casus belli (cause for war) for the United States." Kim Il Sung, the dictator of the DPRK, listened closely. He was finely attuned to the intricacies of political rhetoric, and interpreted the President’s comment to mean that the United States would not become involved in any military action on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. withdrew its occupation forces in June 1949.

Possibly, because of this perceived "green light," 93,000 North Korean troops with approximately 100 Russian-made tanks attacked southward early on Sunday morning, 25 June 1950 in an attempt to force reunification. The forces of South Korea were almost pushed into the sea, and communist forces occupied the capital Seoul and much of South Korea.

Mark R. Jacobson mentions how the United States was taken completely by surprise in his PhD thesis, Minds then Hearts: U.S. Political and Psychological Warfare during the Korean War, 2005, Ohio State University:

The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff had just returned from a series of briefings at Far East Command in Tokyo where there had not been a hint of the possibility of a North Korean attack. By the time the armistice was signed three years later, The Korean War had resulted in major shifts in U.S. Defense policy, including a tripling in the size of the armed forces and a doubling of the Pentagon budget.

President Harry S. Truman determined to support the Republic of South Korea militarily and sought United Nations backing. An emergency session of the United Nations Security Council resolved to send troops to Korea. The USSR, having boycotted the session, was unable to veto this resolution. Had they been present, history would be rewritten. North Korean troops pushed the United Nations Forces into a small defensive perimeter at the tip of the Korean peninsula before U.N. troops, largely from the U.S. and Japan and commanded by General Douglas MacArthur, landed at Inchon and launched a counterattack. Initial success brought the U.N. troops to the Chinese border by late November 1950, but on 29 November, China entered the conflict and pushed the U.N. forces southward. Seoul fell again on 4 January 1951. Another U.N. counteroffensive in February and March drove the North Korean and Chinese troops back to the 38th parallel. Despite much bloody fighting, the battle lines remained stable for another two years. As the fighting moved up and down the peninsula, ravaging the land, there were an estimated three million casualties. Armistice talks began in July 1951 but repeatedly failed to reach agreement. A truce was signed on 27 July 1953 establishing a demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel and creating a framework for a permanent settlement of the war. Talks have continued fruitlessly ever since.

The Korean "police action" still confuses scholars today. Various leaders in Washington, the Pentagon, and the front lines were recommending actions as diverse as the simple defense of the South, the total destruction of North Korea, contaminating the Korean-Chinese border with radioactive fallout, and even the invasion of the Peoples Republic of China by the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek.

General Douglas MacArthur refused to concede that the Chinese had entered the war until it was almost too late to halt their advance. It was one of the greatest intelligence lapses in American military history. He was ultimately relieved of duty when President Truman felt that his orders were not being properly and promptly obeyed. The goals of the United Nations were so unclear that Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet answered the question "How will we know when we have won the war?" with the answer, "I don’t know, somebody higher up will have to tell me."

Even worse, early in the war the mention of China or the USSR was forbidden in Allied leaflets because there was a fear that such comments might bring them deeper into the war. Later, they were not mentioned because it was feared that the knowledge that China and the USSR were backing the North Korean armed forces might tend to demoralize South Korean civilians. Eventually they were mentioned in Leaflets, but opportunities had been missed. This problem with producing timely propaganda hampered the Allies all through the war. By the time the leaflets were approved at every level, the news was often old and stale.

Propaganda was used extensively by both sides during the Korean conflict. Aircraft and artillery delivered United Nations leaflets. B-29 bombers dropped strategic propaganda deep behind the enemy’s rear lines. Front-line tactical propaganda was dropped by light bombers and spotter aircraft, or fired from 105mm howitzers. More than 20 million leaflets a week were prepared and disseminated by United Nations Forces at the height of the conflict. Curiously, there seems to be some evidence that the definition of “Tactical leaflets” during the early Korean War was simply “within 40 miles of the front lines.” If the target was more than 40 miles from the front line the leaflet became “strategic.”

General Van Fleet was named commander of the Eighth United States Army in Korea on 14 April 1951. He replaced General Matthew B. Ridgway who moved up to commander of all United Nations forces. Eight days later, on 22 April, Van Fleet was involved in the greatest battle of the war, the Chinese Fifth Offensive. Twenty-one Chinese and nine North Korean divisions attacked southward in human waves. This clash ultimately led to approximately 70,000 Communist casualties, and the capture of 10,000 troops. The enemy was in disarray after this battle, and their morale was low.

The Military Command Structure  

General McArthur	General Ridgway	General Clark	General Van Fleet

Prior to the Korean conflict, General Douglas MacArthur had been Commander in Chief, Far East Command (CINC FECOM), headquartered in Tokyo. Following UN approval of the intervention, MacArthur assumed the additional role of Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC). On 11 April 1951, General MacArthur was relieved of his Korean command by President Harry Truman, following MacArthur’s unauthorized and inflammatory policy statements. Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway replaced MacArthur as U.N. commander. General Mark W. Clark assumed command from Ridgway on 12 May 1952, when Ridgway was appointed Commander of NATO.

The brunt of the UN action was borne by the U.S. Eighth Army (EUSAK — Eighth US Army in Korea). Commanding EUSAK at the beginning of the conflict was Lt. Gen. Walton H Walker. Ridgway succeeded him at EUSAK when Walker was killed in an automobile accident just before Christmas 1950. Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet replaced Ridgway when Ridgway became CINCUNC. Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor followed Van Fleet.

The MacArthur Legend

Some of the early Korean War leaflets depicted General MacArthur in an attempt to boost the morale of the South Koreans and assure them that an almost infallible and undefeatable military leader was coming to their defense.  

Leaflet 1004

Leaflet 1004 depicted a heroic image of General MacArthur and promises good treatment to any captured or surrendering North Korean troops. The text under the photograph is:

Listen each day at 2100 Korean time over 950 kilocycles to truthful news broadcasts from General MacArthur’s headquarters.

The back is all text and says in part:

Personnel of the Armed Forces of North Korea and other persons of North Korea who are taken into custody or fall into the hands of armed forces now under my operational control in connection with hostilities in Korea will be treated in accordance with the humanitarian principals applied by and recognized by civilized nations involved in armed conflict…

   

Leaflet 1002

Leaflet 1002 depicts General MacArthur on one side and President Harry Truman on the other. Some of the MacArthur text is:

…All patriotic Koreans will take heart at the news that general MacArthur himself has flown to Korea to give his personal supervision to this international aid…His vast knowledge of the far East, as well as his world famed military genius, will be of tremendous value in the struggle to defend Korean independence and freedom.

Leaflet 1003

This leaflet first attracted my attention because the back shows a flight of USAF F-180 shooting stars. When I looked at the front I found the portraits of a group of allied military leaders and a message meant to booster the morale of the Korean people. There are photographs of Generals MacArthur, Almond, Willoughby, Wright, and Whitney. Some of the text is:

FREE WORLD AIDS KOREA

Under the brilliant and battle-tested leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, powerful aid is on the way from friendly democratic nations around the world. Britain, Australia, New Zealand, India, the Netherlands, Belgium, and China have pledged their support.

The leaflet goes on to mention MacArthur three times in three short paragraphs. I should also point out that the mention of “China” helping South Korea actually indicates “Formosa” or as we now call it, Taiwan.

General MacArthur appears on or is quoted in many other early Korean War leaflets.For instance, leaflet 1017 is in the form of an official letter dated 20 February 1950 on the stationery of the United Nations Command General Headquarters to the Commander of North Korean forces. The enemy commander is told that U.N. forces will treat North Korean prisoners according to the laws of war and it is expected that the North Koreans will treat the U.N. prisoners the same way. It states that there have been reports of U.N. prisoners murdered and if this continues the North Korean commander and his officers will be held personally responsible. The letter is signed simply “Douglas MacArthur.”

U.S. PSYOP from World War II to the Korean War

At the end of World War II, operational military PSYOP units were disbanded, and official U.S. PSYOP activities were left as the responsibility of the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). Although the military did not relish involvement in PSYOP, some Army personnel were seconded to the CIA, and a very limited PSYOP capability was retained within the military in the form of the very small Tactical Information Department at Fort Riley, Kansas. Prior to the Korean War, the Army had no real PSYOP plans, no doctrine, and almost no trained personnel.

Following the North Korean invasion of the South in 1950, President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) to handle national PSYOP policy. In June 1951, after a year of the Korean War, the United States Army established a special staff agency, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), headed by Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, to supervise its psychological warfare operations. In World War II, McClure had been head of the Psychological Warfare Branch of the Allied Forces Headquarters in North Africa and then the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF in London under Eisenhower. In April 1952, McClure established the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, which has become the Army’s principal training ground for PSYOP personnel. However, during the Korean War, control of PSYOP operations evolved continually and with various lines of responsibility as the Army adopted ad hoc tactics to cope with its lack of preparedness.

General MacArthur’s PSYOP Organization

Meanwhile, in a farsighted decision in 1947, General MacArthur had activated a small Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) in the G-2 division of General Headquarters, Far East Command (GHQ FECOM) in Tokyo. Major General Charles Willoughby, MacArthur’s G-2 (intelligence), appointed a civilian and retired army colonel, J. Woodall Greene, to head the PWB. (During World War II, Willoughby, then a colonel, had been in charge of MacArthur’s G-2.) Greene was active in psychological warfare in the pacific during WWII. Other members of the group included Colonel C.S. Myers who had eight years experience in PSYWAR in the Southwest Pacific and Lieutenant Colonel F.C. Dahlquist who had directed one of the Sino-American peace teams under General Marshall. In 1950 when Truman announced his decision to send U.S. troops to Korea under U.N. command, MacArthur’s people were ready. Within a day, the six-person PWB had designed, printed, and airdropped the first propaganda leaflets over the enemy. The unit had grown to 35 persons by the end of December, and by summer 1951, PWB had grown to 55 people (mostly civilians, with some military personnel on temporary loan from other organizations) and was renamed the Psychological Warfare Section (PWS) and eventually placed under G-3 (operations) Far East Command. Throughout the war, the PWS retained a dominant strategic role in white PSYOP, and served as coordinator of all United Nations PSYOP activities.

A Psychological Warfare Section was formed in the Eighth Army under Lieutenant-Colonel Hatsel L. Harris. After X Corps became operational, it also formed a Psychological Warfare Section with Major Thomas P. Ewing commanding. The Far East Command Printing and Publications Center commanded by Colonel O. B. Powers printed hundreds of million of tactical and strategic leaflets on extremely short notice.

Following his assignment as commander of the U.N. forces in Korea, MacArthur also established a top-secret Joint Services Operation (JSO) to combine U.S., Japanese, and Korean intelligence and counterintelligence activities. This unit was organized and headed by Willoughby. Executive responsibility lay with Major General Holmes E. Dager. The JSO unit probably functioned as a secret group reporting directly to MacArthur, affording MacArthur some personal financial and operational control over PSYOP activities. JSO was assigned a role in psychological warfare and leaflet production, although few details are known.

It is worth noting here that in what must have been an amazing show of complete faith and trust, Korean President Syngman Rhee turned over command of his entire Armed Forces on 14 July 1950 to General MacArthur:

In view of the common military effort of the United Nations on behalf of the Republic of Korea, in which all military forces, land, sea and air, of all the United Nations fighting in or near Korea have been placed under your operational command, and in which you have been designated Supreme Commander United Nations Forces, I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea, and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities, such command to be exercised either by you personally or by such military commander or commanders to whom you may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or in adjacent seas.

Basic white information, including war and morale news, was the province of the State Department’s US Information Service, particularly its USIS Korea group. (In August 1953, the Smith-Mundt Act created the US Information Agency (USIA), which then took over USIS as USIA’s overseas agency.)

By April 1952, three organizations were conducting white PSYOP operations for Korea. Strategic operations were conducted by the Psychological Warfare Section, GHQ, FECOM, operating from Tokyo. The Psychological Warfare Division, G-3, HQ, Eighth Army, eventually located in Seoul conducted tactical operations. Consolidation activities (dissemination of war and morale news in an attempt to bring peace by convincing the civilian population to support their government) were conducted by the State Department’s US Information Service, based in Pusan.

Perhaps one of the most important reference documents in regard to Allied PSYOP in Korea is the declassified secret technical memorandum, US Psywar Operations in the Korean War, written by George S. Pettee under the auspices of the Operations Research Office (ORO) of the Johns Hopkins University. Only 200 copies were printed of the working paper which attempted to assess the past operations and effectiveness of US psychological warfare and possible means for gaining an increased effect. This is an early paper, dated 23 January 1951, so the data covers only the very 205 days of the war that started on 27 June 1950 and would continue until 27 July 1953. Some of the information will be repetitious, and that is because conclusions made at this early stage of the war will be made again later in the “Police Action.”

Pettee gives a background to operations. He says that at the start of the war, US PSYOP in the Far East consisted of seven persons working in the Special Projects Branch of Civil Intelligence, G2, General Headquarters, Far East Command. Three days after the start of the war this small group prepared and dropped several million leaflets on Korea. By 31 October the group consisted of 25 personnel. By 11 January 1951 it had 55 members.

An Early Korean War PSYOP Leaflet

Within twenty-four hours after President Harry S. Truman announced U.S. troops would assist the invaded Republic of South Korea; leaflets were dropped over Korea telling of the decision. Buck Sergeant Rocco Trapani of the USAF deployed to Korea 2 July 1950 from Japan. Upon landing he found the above uncoded leaflet on the ground. Although the leaflet bore no code, we now know that it was leaflet 1001. It appears to be among the earliest of U.N. Propaganda leaflets. The leaflet shows the US seal on front and back, and the same message in English on one side and Korean on the other:

THE UNITED NATIONS has appealed to American forces in Japan to assist the peace-loving citizens of the republic of korea in your struggle against the unprovoked aggression from the north. we shall give you every support. Be steadfast, be calm, be courageous, resist firmly. together we shall drive the aggressor from your territory.

Some of Pettee’s more interesting comments are:

There really was no psywar readiness in the Far East Theatre before 25 June 1950. In the first seven months of the war the leaflet product was about 160,000,000 copies with 105 different kinds of leaflets. Ninety percent of the leaflets were delivered by aircraft, ten percent by the artillery of the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division. The leaflets were addressed to four different audiences; enemy troops, enemy civilians, ROK troops and ROK civilians. Pettee recommends that the US should distribute at least 50 million leaflets a month. At least twenty different tactical leaflets should be prepared each month and loudspeakers should be used at a rate of at least 100 missions per week.

Only two trailer-mounted loudspeakers and two air-borne loudspeakers were available, and they have been hampered by a lack of spare parts. Printing presses should be provided to each Corps, and if possible, to each division.

The provision of trained, experienced and competent psywar personnel from the United States has been far from adequate. The military should establish a roster of qualified psywar personnel. [Note: Similar reports from the Vietnam War about 17 years later make the very same complaint about the lack of trained personnel].

The production of leaflets has been adequate for strategic purposes only. The production of tactical psywar materials in Korea has been very small, either for leaflet or for loudspeaker activities. [Note: Strategic psychological operations advance broad or long-term objectives. Global in nature, they may be directed toward large audiences or at key communicators. Tactical psychological operations are more limited, used by commanders to secure immediate and near-term goals. In this environment, these force-enhancing activities serve as a means to lower the morale and efficiency of enemy forces.].

The dissemination of leaflets has been largely by B-29 bombers based at Yokota, Japan. The aircraft and the leaflet bomb are not satisfactory, but they were all that was available. The B-29 can load 32 M-16-A bombs, each containing about 22,500 leaflets. [Note: The bomb was known s the M16-A1 cluster Adapter of WWII origin. It held 45,000 four-by-five-inch leaflets or 22,500 five-by-eight-inch leaflets. The bomb carried a time delay separation charge. After release at 15,000 to 25,000 feet, the bomb halves separated at 1,000 to 2,000 feet to concentrate the leaflets over a specific target area.]. Pettee says that a more effective alternative should be studied and states that some leaflets have been dropped by the Air Force T-6 Texan, Marine F4U Corsair and C-47 Skytrain loudspeaker aircraft.

The enemy psywar operation differs from the American in many respects, and is far more elaborate and intensive in the aggregate. The enemy has attempted, with his resources, to copy our methods of production and dissemination, He has done so only on a small scale however, and has in general relied upon other methods, especially agitation and internal propaganda, for which his resources are ample and highly developed. Enemy psywar uses posters and other media in great variety and with high skill in areas under enemy control.

Jacobson adds:

On 28 June, just 24 hours after President Truman’s announcement that the United States would oppose aggression in Korea, Far East Command had written, translated, printed and dropped over 12,000,000 leaflets over South Korea…During the first thirty days of the war, Far East Command dropped almost 30 million copies of about nine different leaflets over Korea. By 1951, Far East Command had dropped over 160 million leaflets of over 100 different types…By the end of the war about 2.5 billion leaflets had been distributed by air, artillery, and even by hand…As one historian has put it, the Korean War represented a “peak” of U.S. leaflet psywar in terms of artwork and originality.

The structure of clandestine psychological warfare activities in Korea is complex and confusing. The State Department, the CIA, the army, the air force, and the navy wanted control of PSYOP activities, but only the CIA wanted anything to do with black propaganda. Turf battles resulted in bewildering and changing organizational structures. Here we touch only on points of relevance to propaganda leaflet production.

Colonel Robert L. Gleason implies that the USAF was not ready for the PSYOP war in “Psychological Operations and Air Power: Its Hits and Misses,” Air University Review, March-April 1971:

Although about half a billion leaflets were dropped during the Korean War, postwar surveys indicated that more than one-third of the bundles or leaflet bombs failed to open. Another revealing Korea statistic is that out of 220 different leaflets examined in one postwar analysis, only 22 alluded to or contained themes on air operations or bombardment.This was a far cry from the Japan psywar campaigns of World War II.

In February 1951 the Air Force, becoming painfully aware of its weakness in PSYOP and unconventional warfare, took a giant step in the right direction. It formed three aerial resupply and communications (ARC) wings. These units were equipped with aircraft that included long-range B-29 and SA-16 amphibians. Although their primary mission was the logistical support of friendly guerrilla units, their almost equally important secondary mission was PSYOP.Concurrently, the Air Force initiated a comprehensive program with Georgetown University for training officers in psychological operations. This university instruction was followed by a training period with either the Voice of America or an Army psychological warfare unit. Specialization training was also given ARC wing personnel at a psywar and intelligence school at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho.

The 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group - "The Ganders"

The recruitment of staff for the first PSYOP Group to be deployed to Korea is mentioned in a reunion book entitled Psychological Warfare in Korea - 1952 Life and Times of the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group - 50 years Later, Klein, Herguth and McConaughey, RHP Books, 2002:

"The Army, to find enlisted men for jobs that required a university degree, set up a special classification and assignment unit at Ft. Myer, in Arlington, Virginia. Towards the end of 1950, orders went out to send all draftees with college degrees to Ft. Myer after they finished basic training to be interviewed for possible special assignments. It was through this process that draftees with experience in journalism, radio, advertising and graphic arts found themselves in the 1st RB&L Group."

The unit was formed in Ft. Riley Kansas. It was created by Fifth Army General Order #176, April 1951. The first commander was LTC Homer E. Shields, former Chief of Psywar section of the Sixth Army Group, and later executive officer to General McClure, head of the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). General McClure personally selected Shields for this post.

The Group arrived in Tokyo, Japan, on 6 August 1951. They were headquartered on the 6th floor of Empire House. The enlisted personnel were quartered in the Japanese government Finance Building on B Avenue in the heart of Tokyo. The Officers were billeted in Officer's Clubs around Tokyo.

The group consisted of three companies. Paul Linebarger discusses them in Psychological Warfare, Combat Forces Press, Washington DC, 1954. He says, "The Headquarters and Headquarters Company contained the command, administrative, supervisory and creative personnel necessary for propaganda operations. The 3rd Reproduction Company contained intricate equipment and skilled personnel capable of producing leaflets and newspapers of varying sizes and multiple color. The 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company was designed to replace or augment other means of broadcasting radio propaganda."

The Radio Company had three platoons, each with a complete mobile transmitter that could be attached to more powerful theater elements. In 1953, a Consolidation Company was added to the group when it became clear that there was a need to prepare propaganda specifically aimed at civilians in the rear or in occupied areas under Allied control.

Stephen E Pease says in PSYWAR - Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953, Stackpole Books, Harrisburg PA, 1992, "Its job was to support long-term objectives aimed at both the South and North Korean populaces as well as the Communist Chinese forces and North Korean People's Army.

RADIO OPERATIONS

An Operations research Office report entitled Technical Memorandum Strategic Radio Psywar in FEC by Murray Dyer discusses the Allied propaganda radio in the early stages of the war up until January 1951.

Dyer tells of Major Tom O. Mathews being ordered to produce 30 minutes of radio propaganda against North Korea on 29 June 1950. The Major had no staff, no transmitters, no translators and no news facilities. He was a “can do” officer and at 2100 that evening he broadcast his first program to Korea from a small studio in Radio Tokyo. He was soon broadcasting around the clock from Tokyo. He hired Koreans living in Tokyo as writers and translators. He then found a number of Korean radio technicians who had come under the control of Allied forces on the peninsula. His staff rose to eleven native-borne Koreans. Within a few days of North Korean invasion Mathews had 19 medium and shortwave transmitters of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation sending programs to Korea. It was later learned that many North Koreans found ways of listening to the forbidden broadcasts.

Once Seoul was retaken by U.N. Forces, Mathews augmented the station in the capitol city with a 50-kilowatt medium transmitter and a 10 kilowatt short wave transmitter under the command of the General Headquarters. His translators worked on both leaflet and radio texts and were on the air about six hours a day. The Psychological Warfare Branch installed a 500-kilowatt short wave station to serve Pyongyang.

When the station first went on the air the target was the South Korean civilian population. As the United Nations gained ground, propaganda against North Korea was produced. Later, the programs were combined and the target became Korea as a whole.  The major theme in the early days was the United Nations determination and ultimate victory. The radio broadcasters were lacking target intelligence.  Some of the questions the News people asked are:

What folk songs are known and sung in Korea?
What articles of food do they relish?
What are the winter activities?
What are the summer activities?
What superstitions still hold sway?

It is clear that in the early days the radio personnel did not get the support they needed to produce the kind of texts that might influence a target audience.

At the same time, the Chinese were broadcasting to the Korean people one hour a day and the Russians three and one-half hours a day on as many as 13 frequencies.

When the Chinese first attacked southward in October 1950, the UN forbid broadcasting to them because it had not declared war on the Chinese. However, themes to the Korean people included Chinese aims in Korea, Chinese rejection of ceasefire proposals, the claim that Chinese troops were “volunteers,” and Chinese looting and imperialism. By the end of 1950 there were plans for broadcasting to the Chinese for eight hours a day from 6:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m.

When the 1st RB&L Group arrived in Japan in the summer of 1951, it assumed control over all strategic PSYWAR operations in Korea, although the PSYWAR section continued to provide overall direction. The Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company was a direct descendant of the mobile radio companies of World War II and used some of the same equipment. "

Paul M. A. Linebarger says in Psychological Warfare, Infantry Journal Press, Washington D.C., 1948:

Radio in the Korean conflict was used jointly as a strategic and a consolidation medium. From the beginning of the war, radio was the voice of our military policy. An ambitious network, supervised in 1950-51 directly by PWS and thereafter by the 1st RB&L Group, became known and recognized as the Voice of the United Nations Command. The Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) and the Japan Broadcasting System (JBS) transmitted on a cooperative basis, with the U.S. Government buying air time. The 1st RB&L Group's radio unit furnished programming assistance through key stations in Seoul (KBS), Taegu (KBS), Pusan (KBS) and Tokyo (JBS). In addition, the Group furnished technical assistance to KBS in order to keep as many as twelve network stations on the air.

Alfred H. Paddock Jr., lists the duties in greater detail in U.S. Army Special Warfare, University Press of Kansas, 2002:

The 1st RB&L Group was specifically designed to conduct strategic propaganda in direct support of military operations. Directed at enemy forces, populations, or enemy-occupied areas, strategic propaganda was intended to further long-term aims. The Group supervised a radio station network known as the Voice of the United Nations and often produced more than 200 million leaflets a week disseminated by aircraft or by specially designed artillery shells.

Early in the Korean War the military did not have a dedicated artillery leaflet shell. The 105 mm howitzer smoke shell and the British “25 pounder” smoke shell were most suitable to convert to leaflet shells. With the smoke canister removed each shell could hold about 400 4 x 5-inch leaflets. Artillery can disseminate leaflets with great accuracy and is unaffected by weather conditions. They are best used immediately after an artillery bombardment, preferably at dawn or dusk when the enemy can pick up the leaflets without being seen. During the Korean War artillery was the most accurate means of delivery. Between June 1950 and July 1953 the Eighth U.S. Army delivered over 100 million leaflets by artillery, with over 15,000 shells a month being fired at the enemy during peak periods.

The Printing of leaflets was the responsibility of the 3rd Reproduction Company of the 1st RB&L Group. Leaflets were prepared at the Far East Command Printing and Publication Center outside Yokohama near a railroad station called "Motosumiyoshi." About 250 Americans and 900 Japanese civilian employees worked in the Center. After the leaflets were printed and cut they were rolled and placed inside leaflet bombs by the 3rd Reproduction Company troops. They were then delivered to Tachikawa air base to the planes that dropped them on the Chinese or North Korean troops. From August to September 1951 the Group produced about 13 million leaflets a week. By December 1951 the 50-millionth leaflet was produced. Meanwhile, in Korea, the leaflet missions were planned and organized by the Operations Officer, Kimpo Air Base, Seoul.

The reunion book says about the members of the Group, "The creative psywarriors were all young men, mostly in their early twenties, just starting careers in journalism, advertising and the graphic arts. Their leadership was just slightly older, World War II reservists with only a few years experience in the communications field. Despite their youth, this group produced a cohesive and vital message in the name of the United Nations Command. After leaving the Army, many of these psywarriors went on to successful careers in journalism, TV, advertising, and public relations. A dozen made their mark as university professors."

In regard to the first Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company deployed earlier to Korea, Linebarger says, "The Group's junior partner in the conduct of PsyWar support operations was the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. This unit specifically supported an army in the field with adequate propaganda support...its targets were smaller, lived under unusual circumstances, and presented highly vulnerable, rapidly changing propaganda opportunities..."

      

1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company

From the onset of hostilities in June 1950 until late January 1951, tactical PSYOP operations in the field were confined largely to one man, a lieutenant colonel operating at Eighth Army headquarters as a liaison for FECOM. During this period no operational PSYOP personnel were assigned anywhere within EUSAK. In the fall of 1950, the Army’s small tactical information detachment of about 20 men was sent from Ft. Riley, Kansas, to Korea, arriving on 4 November 1950. The unit was reorganized in January 1951 as the First Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company. The patch of the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company depicted a helmeted eagle with a leaflet in his beak over the symbols "1 L&L." The First Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company was assigned to a newly created Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) operating within G-3 of the Eighth Army in Korea. PWD then assumed control of tactical PSYOP operations from the PWS, which remained headquartered in Tokyo. The First L&L Company prepared leaflets in the field throughout the Korean War, serving until 21 February 1955. In August 1951, the Army’s First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group arrived in Japan from Ft. Riley, Kansas, and was attached to the PWS in Tokyo.

Leaflet # 8721  "All are getting wounded and hurt and we don't have proper medical facilities."

Paul A. Wolfgeher mentions the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in an article entitled "Psychological Warfare" submitted to the Korean War Educator. He says,

The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in Korea earned credit for participating in eight campaigns during the Korean War and was awarded two meritorious unit commendations and a Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation (ROKPUC). The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company served as the Army’s Tactical Psychological Warfare unit until the end of the Korean War. This unit was the first of its kind to serve in a combat zone, with loudspeakers on vehicles and aircraft, and which also disseminated propaganda from the aircraft. Some of the leaflets promised medical treatment for frostbite, undermined faith in their officers, and similarly instilled fear for soldiers’ safety. Another theme told of the mounting enemy dead.

First Lieutenant Marvin R. Warshaw (Ret.), was the wartime commander of the Leaflet Company of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group. He says in part in correspondence with psywar expert Rod Oakland published in issue number 183 of the Falling Leaf:

Fort Riley at the time was headquarters for the Adjutant General’s Publishing and Printing Department. I recruited a staff for my printing company by going to the department, and offering promotions to anyone applying for transfer to my outfit.

As commanding officer of the printing company, I worked with a civilian from a printing press making company; together he and I designed a mobile printing press, sitting on a steel bed that could be jacked up and leveled in the field.

I asked a B-29 squadron leader for permission to modify an empty 500 pound finned bomb casing by cutting the casing in half vertically, and having five shelves welded into half of the casing, so that when the casing was closed and held together by a proximity fuse, the shelves each covered the entire interior diameter of the casing. We used these bombs by inserting what we called “leaflet pies” curled up and held together by a piece of string.

Colonel Jack K. Norris says in his U.S. Army War College Paper entitled “Tactical Psychological Warfare:

On paper, the 1st L&L Company contained about 100 personnel divided into two platoons and a headquarters element. The heart of the 1st L&L was the “hog callers” (loudspeaker teams)…The loudspeaker platoon contained three loud speaker teams on paper but during the Korean War the 1st L&L operated closer to twenty-one teams on the battlefield.

Charles H. Brisco discusses the 1st L&L Company in “1st L&L in Korea, a Photographer’s Record 1952-1953,” Veritas, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2007. He says in part:

The 1st L&L mission was to conduct tactical propaganda for a field army and to provide qualified Psywar specialists as advisors to the army and subordinate corps staffs. Dissemination of tactical propaganda was to be done by leaflet, information sheets and loudspeaker…

The Korean War veterans of the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, Eighth U.S. Army, held their first reunion at Ft. Bragg, N.C., in May 2007. Four psywar veterans who were killed in action in Korea were commemorated when their names were added to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Memorial Wall.

    

"The Speaker" was one of the aircraft used to make loudspeaker broadcasts during the Korean War. Note the mounted loudspeakers in the open side door.

Loudspeaker

What are the duties of a Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company? A Korean War era publication of the Fifth L & L says: "The L & L Company is a combat support weapon. It does it’s job with loudspeakers, set up close to the front line, hurling out messages to the enemy, and with leaflets thrown out by the thousands over enemy troops from airplanes or artillery shells. An L & L Company is also an American propaganda agency. It is the voice of the United States Army addressing the enemy. Its words are as official as the commanding general’s signature. Thus, each broadcast and each written message must be carefully prepared, must be accurate, and must conform to established policy. In a sense, the L & L men are simply the transmitters of messages from a whole people."

What was the Policy Guidance? Early in the war it was quite different than that mentioned above. The very first PWB guidance was as follows:

1. To speak always from a U.N. and not a U.S. viewpoint.

2. To treat the conflict as aggression and not as civil war

3. To attack Communism in terms of its visible effects on everyday life and not in ideological and theoretical terms.

4. To concentrate on simple and concrete subjects, simply expressed, with direct bearing on Korea.

From the very beginning of the campaign, PSYOP had been based on a weekly plan specifying themes to be used in radio, leaflets and other media. The themes changed frequently according to the tactical situation. The one essential ingredient that never changed was truthfulness.

In the first few months of the war before the Chinese entered the fray the major objectives forwarded from the Intelligence and Research Section were:

1. To weaken the effectiveness and resistance of the North Korean Troops.

2. To bring the truth about the war to the people of North Korea.

3. To bolster the morale of the South Korean troops and civilian population.

There followed a constant stream of new guidance. In order not to infuriate the major Communist powers, PWB Guidance 1 reminded the PSYOP troops not to use the term “puppet” of link China or Russia to the North Koreans. By 10 November PWB #17 finally recognized the Chinese entrance into the war and stated:

Factual reporting of Chinese soldiers in Korea is now authorized, under the following conditions only…

Clayton D. Laurie evaluates early American PSYOP in Korea in a section entitled "Psychological Warfare," in The Encyclopedia of the Korean War, ABC-CLIO, 2000. He says:

Leaflets, radio broadcasts, and loudspeakers were credited as a major factor in the heavy increase in prisoners after July 1951, and interrogations of Communist Chinese prisoners of war showed that one in three were influenced to surrender by leaflets. Interrogations of civilians in North and South Korea further revealed that UN radio broadcasts reached a considerable audience and stirred some civilian opposition to the Communist regime. One authority has determined that Chinese enlisted men were found the most amenable to UN psychological warfare messages, while the hardcore North Korean officer corps were least inclined to believe or act on such appeals.

Pettee is not complimentary in regard to the company. He says that they could have provided excellent propaganda if they were combat ready when they reached Korea. The Army was in such a rush to get them to Korea that they were sent without most of what they needed to perform their mission. Some of his criticisms of the unit are:

The Tactical Information Detachment consisting of four officers and twenty enlisted men sailed from Seattle on 15 September 1950. Its one printing press was under repair in Chicago at the time. It was authorized 3 loudspeakers on vehicles, 3 vans and accessory equipment. It needed tractors for its vans, dark-room equipment, water purification equipment, and other items. On 4 November it was designated the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company and authorized eight officers, 99 enlisted men, 3 presses, 12 speakers and 27 vehicles. By 30 November the equipment was still in Yokohama. Two speakers had arrived, only one of which was operable. At last notice the Company had about 55 personnel. So far as known, the operations of this company as an active psywar unit did not begin before 1951.   

In the Volume 1, number 2, issue of Veritas, the Journal of Army Special Operations History, Charles H. Briscoe talks about the successes of the unit later in the war in an article entitled “Volunteering  for Combat: Loudspeaker Psywar in Korea.”

It was April 1951 before the company was combat effective, and nine loudspeaker teams were dispatched to the divisions on line. By the end of June 1951, the company had eleven loudspeaker teams in action.

Briscoe also mentions the recruiting methods of the Company, quoting Private Gerald Rose. Rose is on a Korean troop train when it suddenly came to a stop:

…a soldier entered the darkened railroad car and asked if anyone had training in psychology.

Rose, who had taken a basic psychology course in college, said, “I have.”

…the shanghaied Rose was put on a train to Seoul.

In less than one year Rose completed 253 tactical loudspeaker missions, was awarded a Bronze Star, a Combat Infantryman’s Badge, and two Purple hearts for wounds received while on loudspeaker teams on the front lines.

  

 

Loudspeaker Teams

Stanley Sandler evaluates the Korean War leaflets in "Army Psywarriors - A History of U.S. Army Psychological Operations - Part I - Colonial America to Korea" published in Mindbenders, Vol. 8, No.1, 1995. Some of his comments are:

These tactical psywarriors relied on vehicle and aircraft mounted loudspeakers to get their verbal messages across. But, as in previous U.S. wars, the leaflet was still the major medium.

The most impressive psychological weapon of the U.S. Army in Korea, or at least the one that has left the most evidence, was the leaflet. Probably at no time before or since has the Army fielded such effective printed propaganda.

Korean War Army leaflets used the time-tested themes of the ‘happy POW,’ ‘good soldier-bad leaders,’ ‘surrender and you will be well-treated,’ ‘we can crush you,’ and nostalgia for home, family and women.

In addition, Army psychological warriors cleverly worked on latent Chinese anti-Russian feeling, harping on the brutal Soviet ‘liberation’ of Manchuria in 1945, and proclaiming that ‘Stalin will fight to the last Korean.’

Surveys taken in UN POW camps documented the effectiveness of these leaflets in the field as well as loudspeaker broadcasts. But the most stunning psychological warfare victory for the UN was the refusal of no less than 33,000 enemy prisoners of war to return to their homelands, In contrast, a mere 21 U.S. military personnel refused repatriation.

Paul M. A. Linebarger observed that:

The airborne loudspeaker was the object of experimentation, but the bulk of loudspeaker broadcasts were made from vehicle mounts, such as tanks, and from emplacements. During the static battle situation of 1951-53, most of the broadcasts were of the latter kind. Range of the voice casts was short, something like two thousand yards under ideal conditions. Personnel and equipment were supplied by the 1st L&L Company, and scripts were prepared by PsyWar Division, G3, EUSAK.

The January 1951 memorandum Psychological Warfare Operations gives examples of such operations. For instance:

One C-47 aircraft with loudspeaker was employed on 21 January in two missions over North Korean troops. One mission covered North Korean Army V Corps units in a 60 square-mile area north of Wonju and was made in conjunction with the dissemination of anti-morale leaflets 8011.The second mission covered three areas northeast of Andong with instructions concerning a safe route to be used in surrendering. In conjunction with this mission, safe-conduct passes were disseminated.

Retired USAF Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Childre flew leaflet drops and loudspeaker missions out of airbase K-16, (Seoul City), from January 1952 to Late May 1952.  The majority of the missions were leaflet drops. The leaflet missions had the leaflets in tied bundles with a dynamite squib and a timed fuse to explode them open at about 500 feet. Because of the uneven terrain some obviously would impact on the ground unopened. The voice missions were usually made at night and lasted for up to four hours. The loudspeaker aircraft was rigged with belly mounted speakers and operated by Korean females.  It required that he orbit low and slow in a race track pattern with 2-minute legs at reduced power to complete the messages. He would complete two orbits and then move to the next site if the speakers were still operating. It was one of his least desirable missions since it always drew lots of ground fire. He says that his electronics were usually shot out before the full mission could be completed.  Often the mission was flown near the front lines and Allied troops would often turn on their searchlights, illuminating the aircraft.  This added additional danger. His missions were with 8th Army personnel on board and directed by the 8th Army. 

The 1951 memorandum also mentions loudspeaker tanks:

Tests have been made with a loudspeaker mounted on an M-24 tank. It was determined that a speaker which operates satisfactorily from generating equipment functional to the tank can be welded in place within three hours.

Briscoe mentions the tank loudspeakers in Veritas. He points out the advantage of the tank in allowing the loudspeakers to move far forward, well into that neutral zone between the friendly and enemy lines. However, there were numerous problems. The engine had to be kept running to power the loudspeakers, and that meant that the loudspeakers had to be set on “maximum” to be heard over the engine. Between the engine and the loudspeaker noise, the tank crew, “buttoned up” inside the tank could not hear approaching danger. The loudspeaker team had to communicate with the crew through the outside telephone, but because of all the noise, they could not hear each other. Meanwhile, the loudspeaker tank became a magnet for attack.

The Headquarters of the Eighth United States Army Awarded the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company an Award of Meritorious Commendation on General Orders #243 dated 28 February 1953. The citation read:

By direction of the Secretary of the Army, under the provisions of AR 220-315, the Meritorious Unit Commendation is awarded to the following unit of the United States Army for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service during the period indicated: The 1st LOUDSPEAKER AND LEAFLET COMPANY is cited for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service in support of combat operations in Korea during the period 1 August 1952 to 1 February 1953. The personnel of the 1st LOUDSPEAKER AND LEAFLET COMPANY, the only unit of this kind in the combat zone, performed their duties with determination and aggressiveness. Equipped with bulky public address systems best adapted to vehicular use, the loudspeaker teams hand carried their equipment to isolated peaks on the front in order to render close psychological warfare support to infantry line units. The unit conducted a constant attack by leaflets on the fighting efficiency of the opposing forces. On many occasions the unit operated its presses twenty-four hours daily for extended periods of time in order to satisfy tactical requirements for leaflets. The 1st LOUDSPEAKER AND LEAFLET COMPANY displayed such outstanding devotion to duty in the performance of unusually difficult tasks as to set it apart from and above other units. The devotion to duty, esprit de corps, and loyalty exhibited by the members of this company throughout this period reflect great credit on themselves and the military service of the United States.

Black PSYOP

In 1951, the Eighth Army authorized a unit with the innocuous name "G3 Miscellaneous Division." G3 is the general staff title for operations. G3 Misc. was to be responsible for the planning, training, and support of unconventional operations. On 10 December 1951, the 8240th Army Unit was activated under Eighth Army G3 Misc. The 8240th consisted largely of its "Guerilla Division", which, as the obscurely named chain of command suggests, was largely a maverick operation engaged in a variety of clandestine activities.

Leaflet 1250 

Although this leaflet was not prepared specifically for black operations it depicts a South Korean partisan fighting the communist cadres. Such partisan action behind the lines would be almost by definition, “black.” The leaflet depicts a South Korean patriot aiming a rifle at a terrified Communist. It was produced 8 December 1952 to induce the farmers of Huang Hao-do to protect and defend the partisans. Some of the text is: 

The partisan is fighting for your liberation from Communist aggression. 

Protect the partisan and he will protect you.

Meanwhile, the army and the CIA, bitterly vying for control of behind-the-lines actions in Korea, agreed to form a Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK). This was a cover name for a classified designation, "Covert, Clandestine, and Related Activities – Korea," which was intended to be a joint army and CIA operation with the CIA in overall charge, and with the air force and navy supporting the execution of missions. By January 1952, when CCRAK was activated, actual control ended up with the army’s FECOM-G2. The CIA promptly formed a new unit, JACK, nominally under CCRAK but in reality operating independently. This smoldering distrust continued throughout the Korean War.

In the years following the cease-fire in Korea, PSYOP operations continued occasionally against the North Koreans. In the 1960s, the Seventh Psychological Operations Group, Korea Detachment, headquartered in Okinawa, produced and disseminated leaflets under the code name Operation Jilli (Jilli is Korean for "truth"). Some of these leaflets were printed at Fort Bragg.

LEAFLET OPERATIONS

Within 24 hours after President Truman announced that U.S. troops would be sent to assist South Korea, leaflets were dropped over Korea telling the people that U.S. troops were on the way. Within 48 hours, radio broadcasts were being beamed from Tokyo to Korea. One might make a case that propaganda was the first American weapon of this war.

Most of our information on leaflet operations comes from the United States Army later on in the war. One Air Force Officer, Major Norman D. Vaughn wrote of early operations using balloons and twine in My Life of Adventure, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1995:

Psychological warfare and leafleting were under the same command. We had a mobile printing press that we pulled with a trailer, printing thousand of leaflets right in the field. For a year and a half, I worked with different kinds of balloons. Because of their size and shape, we referred to them as pillow balloons.  We loaded them with leaflets, perhaps a thousand sheets of paper, and then added the helium. The pillow balloons, like all the balloons we used, were open at the bottom. When the balloon reached one thousand feet, the gas would expel from the opening. This helped it drop to a lower altitude. Then it would rip open and dispense its leaflets. The more we helium-filled the balloons and lightened the loads, the further they would go. Our average target was ten to fifteen miles away to reach enemy soldiers on their way to the front and to educate village people everywhere we could …We also dropped loosely tied leaflets from low-flying C-47s, the two-engine cargo planes. These flights were made at night from low altitudes. We tied the leaflets with weak twine, and when the packages flew out of the planes into the slipstream, the twine broke, the packages opened, and leaflets filled the air.

Surrendering enemy soldiers fresh from the battlefield were also used to test Allied leaflets.They were fed, clothed, and told that they were safe and could be completely honest. They were then handed a pointer. On the wall, we had copies of all the leaflets we had sent out within the past few months. Each man pointed to the one which had impressed him most. Eventually, we knew which ones worked best and which ones didn’t work at all.

Public Opinion Quarterly notes:

Of the three major media of Psychological Warfare – leaflets, loudspeakers and radio – the first two have been primarily directed against enemy troops. The larger of these two operations, and thus the more effective, has been the leaflet program, directed by Robert M. Spaulding.

During the first 125 days of the operation more than one hundred million leaflets were disseminated, and 70 different leaflets have been produced, each one designed to support one of the three major objectives of the PSYWAR program.

Paul M. A. Linebarger writes that:

As in World War II, leaflets were delivered primarily by two means: aircraft and artillery. B-29s of the Far East Air Force ferried leaflet bombs on night missions deep into strategic areas. Light bombers and liaison craft in support of EUSAK dropped both leaflet bombs and bundles on tactical targets. The leaflet bundle was a Korean war development. It was wrapped, tied, and fused in such a manner that it would open and release its leaflets in mid-air. The 105mm. howitzer remained the principal artillery piece for placing propaganda-loaded shells on pinpoint targets.

Tremendous quantities of leaflets were printed. The 1st RB&L Group on many occasions averaged better than twenty million pieces of printed propaganda every week. To this, the lst L&L Company in Korea added an average of three and a half million leaflets per week.

Air Delivery of Leaflets

B-29 with bomb bay doors open prepared to disseminate leaflets

The workhorse of air delivery of leaflets in the Korean War was the C-47 Transport Aircraft. Also used was the B-29 Superfortress, which could distribute one million leaflets per flight. Some B-26 gunships were equipped with special pods that held several hundred pounds of leaflets, which could be dribbled out at a slow rate or dumped in bulk in a few seconds. By the end of the war, more than 2.5 billion leaflets had been dropped over enemy positions.

What is the main purpose of the leaflet? Wolfgeher explains: "Leaflets are the work-horse of Psywar. After the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel on 25 June1950, enough leaflets were used in Korea to provide one for every person on earth. Leaflets were dropped by leaflet bombs and timed fused bundles. They were shot across the lines by leaflet shells, and carried and distributed by infantry patrols. The standard size of a leaflet used in Korea was 5 ½ x 8 ½. These leaflets could be retained and passed on from person to person without distortion. The leaflet could be hidden and read later in privacy.

A properly developed and designed message can have a deep and lasting effect on the target audience. The heading of the leaflet is the most important part because it is what your eyes see first. It has to be forceful and short, gain the interest of the target audience, and contain actual facts and details. Color on a leaflet should contrast sharply with the predominant color of the terrain over which the leaflet will be used. It has to stand out so that the individual would want to pick it up. Through intelligence you can learn the favorable colors of the target audience.

Pictures on leaflets showing bombed enemy cities are proof to the soldier that their homeland is subject to air raids. During the Korean War, the leaflet themes centered around the happy POW, good soldiers, bad leaders, surrender, you will be treated well, and nostalgia for home, family, and woman."

The primary means of dispersing leaflets was the leaflet bomb. Fully loaded with 30,000 fliers, a bomb weighed 225 pounds. Before the leaflets were packed into the bomb, a fuse was placed between the two halves of the bomb. The fuse was set to ignite at a predetermined altitude; the fuse detonated the primer cord, which separated the two body sections, detached the fins, and released the leaflets. Wind currents dispersed the leaflets, hopefully over the chosen area.

  

Loading M16A1 Cluster Adaptor Leaflet Bomb

An article entitled "Psychological Warfare in Korea," Public Opinion Quarterly, spring, 1951, adds:

Over friendly territory the leaflets were simply dropped from low flying aircraft in loosely wrapped bundles that came apart in the air. The typical drop was made from altitudes of about 500 to 1,200 feet.

Over hostile territory, the WWII leaflet bomb was replaced by the M-16-A1 cluster adapter, a hollow thin-skinned bomb approximately the size of a standard 500-pound bomb. Each unit carried 22,500 five x eight-inch leaflets, or 45,000 4 x 5 inch leaflets. An airplane normally carried 32 bombs, each of which weighed 170 pounds fully loaded. Thirty-two bombs constitute one aircraft load. Pilots released the bombs at altitudes of 15,000-25,000 feet and the fuse functioned at about 1000 feet to spread the leaflets.

Similar information is found in a declassified 3 January 1951 working paper entitled "Leaflet Dropping in Korea by the Far Eastern Air Force." In that paper William Daugherty interviews flight crews and reviews the dissemination of leaflets up to that date.

Up until 10 December 1950 the Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF) had assigned just two B-29 bombers for two sorties a week for leaflet operations. As of 12 December 1950 the Special Projects Branch had printed and disseminated over 147,000,000 leaflets. 88% of those leaflets were dropped by B-29s of the 98th Bomb Group stationed in Yokota, Japan. The B-29 carried a maximum of 32 of the cluster bombs, each carrying 22,500 leaflets measuring 5 x 8 inches, or 45,000 leaflets measuring 4 x 5 inches.

On 19 December 1950 FEAF agreed to assign one B-29 that could fly a sortie a day. The medium of distribution by the B-29s was the WWII-era M-16 500-pound bomb (cluster adapter) fitted with the M-111-A2 fuse. There were a number of problems with the leaflet bomb. It tended to tumble when released, often losing its tail and thus its accuracy, the casing frequently came apart in the bomb bay, and faulty fuses caused the bombs to split open early, or remain closed all the way to the ground. Because of these faults that became apparent at Aberdeen Proving Grounds and Elgin Air Force Base, two improved bombs were in development. They are the M-105 and the M16A-1.

Daugherty concludes that the M16 bomb is ineffective and inefficient and that if there is a better leaflet bomb in the inventory, then someone needs to motivate the logistics people to get those bombs forward to where they are needed. He also states that the B-29 bomber is a poor medium of dissemination. He recommends other aircraft, artillery dissemination, or troops on the ground be used to distribute propaganda leaflets.

Recommendations for leaflet topics and campaigns are discussed in An Evaluation of Psywar Influence on North Korean Troops, written by the International Public Opinion Research Corporation and subsidized by the Operations Research Office (ORO) of the Johns Hopkins University dated 23 July 1951. This 120-page classified report, with a printing of just 150 copies evaluated the Allied leaflet campaign of the first 205 days of the Korean War after interviewing over 2,000 prisoners of war. It is understood that this is an early survey and as the war continued other recommendations might take priority as the needs and desires of the prisoners was better understood. Some of the recommendations are:

1. Increase the leaflet bombardment of enemy troops. Leaflets have a demonstrable effect in producing surrenders.  However, only half of the respondents in the study had seen them.

2. Coordinate the leaflet bombardment with tactical military operations

3. Emphasize the following themes in leaflets:

a. UN forces treat prisoners well. It is absolutely essential that North Korean troops be convinced that they will not be killed if taken prisoner.

b. The components of good treatment including comfortable sleeping conditions, warm winter clothing and food. There is one other component of good treatment which might be emphasized. This is cigarettes.   The prisoners in camps were crazy for cigarettes and would run out of formations to pick up and hoard cigarette butts. It is possible that a few cigarettes dropped on enemy troops along with the leaflets promising more in POW camps would be extremely effective.

c. Disagreeable aspect of military life avoided such as hard work, marching, and being killed.

d. Being sent home when the war is over. This assurance decreases the fear of being killed when taken prisoner and also operates upon the potent factor of homesickness.

Themes and their codenames are listed in Conrad C. Crane’s Operation Research Office report American Airpower Strategy in Korea 1950-1953:

Checkmate - Your situation is hopeless.
Bulldozer - We have material superiority, we are stronger, and you will lose.
Sweat and Toil – You have put up with winter, digging fox holes, weariness.
Home and mother – You are homesick and resentful of your situation.
Iago – How can you trust you superiors, your allies, the Communists.
Skinsaver – You can still save your life.
Nightingale – We will treat you well when you surrender.
Signpost – It is safe to surrender if you follow instructions.
Desdemona – Our war aims are honorable, we have no wish to harm you.

On the subject of codenames, during the Korean War the United Nations Command took part in a number of specific psychological operations including leaflet drops and radio broadcasts that were given codenames. Jacobson mentions some of them:

Deadline (28 November – 27 December 1951), Hold-up (28 December – July 1952), Deadlock and Concord. Campaigns to portray the UN negotiators as working hard at the Armistice talks to bring peace to the peninsula. As the talks went on without success the leaflet themes changes slightly to cast continued blame on the Communists.

Rupture and Severance. Designed to establish Communist responsibility should the peace negotiations fail.

Blizzard (24 December – 26 December 1951) and Dragon (19 January – 27 January 1952). Blizzard used New Year and the U.N.’s efforts to restore peace as its theme. Dragon used the theme of nostalgia and longing for home during the lunar New Year holiday season.

Sell-out and Swindle (28 January – 23 February 1952). Sell-out claimed that China had made ruinous deals with the USSR. Plan Swindle demonstrated the false promises and hopes offered by the Chinese government.

Patriot (24 February – 15 March 1952). An attempt to intensify Korean patriotic pride,  remind the Koreans of the 1919 Revolt for freedom, and attack the Communists for blocking reunification.

Invader (15 June – 5 July 1952). An attempt to cause resentment against the Communist leaders for prolonging the war against the South.

Fraud – (April - June 1952) Plan Fraud was designed to show that the North Korean regime was corrupt and incompetent.

It is important to note that some of these named operations ran for a month or more, while others were just for a few days. An example of the latter is the holiday season when a campaign might run for all of three days.

Other named psychological operations were:

Strike - The strategic bombing of North Korea.

Fraud - Designed to convince target audience that Soviet Control of Korea is the aim of the North Korean Communist leaders.

Divider - Designed to stimulate longing for normal human relationships and to create dissension against the Communist government which denies them.

Goodfellow – Promises of good treatment from capture to permanent POW camp.

1191/3 – To induce NK civilians to let the war pass them by and help ROK partisans.

Cities – Designed to turn NK college students against the regime.

Captive – To reinforce NK civilians antagonism toward NK for refusal to exchange POWs

Farmer – To induce farmers to check fields for bombs before spring plowing.

Founder – Reminds the Chinese that the communists have rejected Sun Yat Sen’s principles.

Divide – Fosters dissension between the CCF and NKPA.

[Note] Leaflets with * after the code number indicates that they were recommended by the Korean Psywar EUSAK

William E. Daugherty also wrote the secret technical memorandum Evaluation and Analysis of Leaflet program in the Korean Campaign June – December 1950, under the auspices of the Operations research Office of the Johns Hopkins University, dated 23 January 1951. It is important to note that this memorandum only covers the first 205 days of the war. Some of his more pertinent points are:

Through 5 December 1950, slightly more than one-half of all leaflets disseminated by B-29s were directed at either Korean civilians or friend ROK troops; less than one-half were addressed to enemy troops.

Through 28 December, the PWB G-2 had prepared 52 different general-purpose Korean-language leaflets, 19 separate issues of a propaganda series called “Parachute News,” and 14 Chinese language general-purpose leaflets.

Parachute News No. 11

Parachute News No. 11 coded 2011 is all text with the following stories:

United Nations Troops Break Red Offensive, Red Timetables Falter, Red Troops Starving, UN Air Force Bolstered, and Netherlands to send Forces to Korea.

Parachute News No. 18

Parachute News No. 18 coded 2018 depicts a map of Korea on the front showing with white arrows how the United Nations and Republic of Korea forces have surrounded North Korean forces. The title is “NORTH KOREAN FORCES HAVE BEEN CUT OFF AND ARE NOW BEING SURROUNDED BY UN AND ROK Forces.” The news stories on the back include:

Relief funds for Korea, New advances of United Nations and Republic of Korea Armies Continue.

The main story explains:

United Nations and Republic of Korea Troops have moved westward through Kwanju, Chonju and Kusan to Mokpo. After liberating Taejon, United Nations forces marched steadily northward, and were joined at Pyontack by United Nations troops from the Seoul-Inchon area. In the northeast sectors, Republic of Korea units recaptured Chungju, Wonju, Chechon, Hongchon, and Andong and continued on far beyond those cities.

Daugherty criticizes the “Parachute News” leaflet as being inept and inefficient:

Beginning 7 July and continuing for three months, 19 separate issues of the Korean language leaflet series (numbers 2001 to 2019) were issued under the misnomer “Parachute News.” Altogether 14,686,000 copies of leaflets in this series were dropped in Korea by Japan based B-29s. This series was obviously named for a very successful and popular Japanese language newspaper “Rakkasan Jiho” (Parachute News) which was prepared by the Psychological Warfare Branch, Southwest Pacific Area, in World War Two. However, there is to be noted one difference of great importance; the World War II Rakkasan News was a facsimile newspaper, whereas no one could rightfully call any leaflet in the Korean-language “Parachute News” series anything but a simple propaganda throw-away. Furthermore, in the opinion of the writer, the issues in this series did not constitute acceptable propaganda…The series was suspended after 19 issues. The news sheets were not newspapers or news commentaries in any usually accepted sense. They were only poorly constructed and biased news summaries of headline length.

As the war progressed the United States did produce a number of newspaper leaflets of higher quality. We illustrate several below.

Free World Weekly Digest – Issue 68

I selected this 9 June 1952 newspaper leaflet coded 2089 because it depicts U.S. President Harry S. Truman warmly greeting General Dwight D. Eisenhower, candidate for the U.S. presidency in the November 1952 election. It also depicts Greek Army troops arriving in Korea to fight the Communists. The stories cover such subjects as “Canadian replacements arrive in Korea,” “New signs of discontent flair in red satellites,” and “50,000 Seoul citizens protest against forced repatriation of prisoners of war.”

Rehabilitation News – Issue 7

This 16 July 1952 newspaper leaflet coded 2606 is one of a series designed to show North Koreans the progress being made in rehabilitation in the Republic of Korea. Three pictures on the front depict schools being destroyed by Communist invaders, Danish workers distributing books and clothes to boys and girls, and Korean workers using donated United Nations Civil Assistance Command Korea, material to rebuild a high school in Korea.

A memorandum entitled Psychological Warfare Operations; dated 27 January 1951, explains the system for assigning serial numbers to Allied printed propaganda. It gives the series numbers first, then an explanation of the type of PSYOP.

1000: 5x8-inch Korean language leaflets of exceptional appeal with interesting pictures and cartoons (except news sheets).
2000: Korean-language news sheets, in particular "Parachute News."
3000: Korean-language posters.
4000: Reserved for future use.
5000: reserved for future use.
6000: 4x5-inch reduced-size Chinese-language anti-morale leaflets, suitable for artillery dissemination.
7000: 5x8-inch Chinese-language leaflets with miscellaneous subjects, and all after the Allied landing at Inchon.
8000: Leaflets by Eighth Army and subordinate commands.
9000: 4x5-inch reduced-size Korean-language anti-morale leaflets suitable for artillery dissemination.

Types of Leaflets

As in every psychological warfare operation, there were numerous themes used by the United Nations Forces during the Korean War. Pease lists the themes as:

Themes used against North Koreans and Chinese troops

1. Surrender and receive good food, humane treatment, medical care and shelter from the dangers of war.

2. Surrender and you will stay alive to return to your home after the UN forces win the war.

3. UN Forces have superior firepower. You cannot win.

4. A living North Korean patriot is better than a dead one.

Themes used on Civilians for consolidation efforts in recently liberated areas

1. The Chinese and Korean Communists have conspired to make Korea a puppet state to make you a slave.

2. The Communists will exploit all of Korea for their own purposes.

3. The Communists lie when they preach peace and unity and their reactions reveal the truth.

4. All Koreans are brothers. The Communists war immorally pits them against one another.

5. The free nations of the world, through the United Nations, support the Republic of Korea against the Communist aggression.

The official public access web site for the Department of Defense Commemoration of the 50^th Anniversary of the Korean War adds:

Some leaflets promised medical treatment for frostbite, undermined faith in officers, and similarly instilled fear for soldiers’ safety. Other themes for tactical operations told of the mounting enemy dead and the U.N. materiel superiority. Many enemy POWs claimed that the signature of General MacArthur on a surrender pass convinced them that promises of good treatment would be honored.

Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr. believed Korea offered an ‘especial opportunity for highly profitable exploitation’ of psychological warfare, and the secretary advocated ‘quality rather than quantity’ in producing leaflets and radio broadcasts. In spring 1951, strategic plans were under way to double an effort of about 13 million propaganda leaflets a week and to augment thirteen hours of daily radio broadcasts in Korean by adding short-wave broadcasts in Chinese to Chinese troops in Korea and Manchuria. Aircraft by then were flying leaflet missions nearly every day of the week. Leaflets and loudspeakers were credited as a factor in a heavy increase in prisoners as the Korean War moved into its second year. Pace considered psywar as the ‘cheapest form of warfare,’ and Ridgway, when he moved into charge in Tokyo of the Far East command, wanted personnel of ‘integrity and intellectual capacity’ for a psywar planning group.

“Special Needs” Leaflets

In the first six months of the war the Allies produced about 10 leaflets in order to meet special needs or situations. The U.S. military does not call these “tactical” leaflets stating that all early leaflets were strategic in nature, but these are surely tactical leaflets by any definition. They were numbered in the low 8000s. Although the high code number might imply a late war leaflet, remember that the codes designated categories and were not chronological. The 8000s were reserved for leaflets by the Eighth Army and subordinate commands. All but one was printed in Korea on an emergency bases.

Leaflet 8007

Leaflet 8007 depicts a sad Chinese wife at home with her children wondering where her husband is, and if he is alive or dead. Some of the text is:

Chinese Soldiers!

For what are you fighting in Korea?

Do you know you are falling victim to our guns and dying for nothing?

It has been a long time since you parted from your beloved family, wife and children.

Don’t you know how poorly they are situated, verging on starvation and trembling with cold and fear?

Hurry, go back home! Or come over to the U.N. Forces and Republic of Korea Forces. Then you shall be sent home without fear of your life.

Leaflet 8008

Leaflet 8008 depicts North Korean leader Kim Il Sung being fed by a Chinese soldier dressed in the traditional padded jacket while a starving Chinese woman and her four children beg for food. The back is all text:

CHINESE SOLDIERS!

You are good people of China who love peace and independence. Surely you wish to do your best for China.

What are you fighting for in Korea?

Do you respect Mao Tse Tung and Kim Il Sung when they make a scapegoat of you and endanger your life for nothing?

Isn't your family on the verge of starvation, and trembling from cold and fear?

Hurry. Go home to take care of them or come over to the United Nations forces and Republic of Korea forces. Then you will be sent home without fear for your life.

800,000 copies of all-text leaflet 8003 were printed overnight on the order of Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Commander of all the United NationsGround Forces. Some of the text is:

Officers and Men of the Army of the Republic of Korea

Since the first onslaught of the enemy of 25 June, you have been continually in battle. You have met many disappointments and military reversals forced on you by the overwhelming odds of a ruthless foe...It is my belief that the overextended enemy is making his last attack while the forces of the United Nations are becoming stronger each day…Let us tear him apart now so that the road to victory will be that much nearer and quicker.

Leaflet 8002 is all-text and addressed, “Attention Soldiers of North Korea.” Some of the text is:

The odds are against you! Time is running out! You are fighting against superior forces. More and more artillery is arriving every day ready to go into action. More powerful ammunition is arriving every day…Life or death is your choice…Surrender and your life is safe.

800,000 copies of leaflet 8004 asked Korean soldiers to fight harder and civilians to stay loyal to the government. They were printed and dropped on the same day. The title of the leaflet is "Continue the War Effort." The all-text leaflet says in part:

UN Forces have landed in Inchon. Already our troops have severed the enemy’s main communications and transportation lines from the north…The battle must go on until every Communist soldier has surrendered or been killed…Officers and men: Redouble your efforts. Advance. Attack the enemy where you find him and destroy him. Civilians…work hard in support of your Army and you government.

Leaflet 8005 was printed in Tokyo by PWB, G-2, FEC, on special request from the 1st ROK Marines near Wonsan. It is addressed, "To the North Korean Officers and Men.” The leaflet is all-text and says in part:

…The ROK Marine Corps offers you an opportunity to change your mind instead of fighting to a useless death...While you wander through the cold and frosty night of winter, your parents and family are gathered in warm rooms wondering where you are. Do not fail to take advantage of this final offer. Anyone who comes in with this leaflet is assured of protection.

Leaflet 8006

300,000 leaflets coded 8006 were to be printed in Hanhung, Korea, asking Korean civilians to stay off the roads during a U.N. retreat, but they lost power due to the intense fighting and as a result, only 18,000 were printed by a hand press. The leaflet is all-text and says in part:

Return to your homes immediately and stay there for your own safety and protection. Do not approach roads and trails being used by UN forces. Do not obstruct the movement of UN forces. UN forces will not be responsible for the consequences if the above are violated. Any violation of these orders will endanger your life.

The message of Leaflet 8006 sounds good until you realize that thousand of civilians wanted to flee south to avoid the tyranny of the returning Communist forces. Many were probably willing to risk the “consequences” in an attempt to reach the safety of the republic of Korea.

Leaflets 8007 and 8008 were a special request by the ROK Department of Defense urging the Chinese to quit the war. About 500,000 copies of leaflet 8007 were disseminated over the enemy.

Leaflet 8009 was the last of the special need leaflets, produced in late December of 1950 urging Korean civilians not to cross the Han River. This all-text leaflet has the message in both English and Korean. The text is:

Crossing the Han River is prohibited
Troops will fire on anyone attempting to cross

Commanding General
UN Forces

Another early leaflet was prepared by the 24th Infantry Division G-2 by mimeograph machine and allowed the division to make contact with the 19th Infantry Regiment in Chiampo. These leaflets are fairly crude and it is clear that they were produced quickly on an emergency basis. The leaflets produced in Japan were on better paper and far better designed.

A General MacArthur Safe Conduct Pass

The first theme is surrender and receive good food, humane treatment, medical care and shelter from the dangers of war. Safe conduct and surrender passes are always among the most disseminated in every war. General Douglas MacArthur was the Command-in-Chief of all military operations in Korea and his signature appears on many safe conduct passes. Several have the identical front as shown above, but with different messages on the back in either the Korean or Chinese languages. The text on this standard leaflet is, "SAFE CONDUCT PASS. Soldiers of the UN forces: This certificate guarantees good treatment to any enemy soldier desiring to cease fighting. Take this man to your nearest officer and treat him as an honorable prisoner of war. (Signed) Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army, Commander-in-Chief." Notice the choice of words. As in MacArthur’s WWII safe conduct passes to the Japanese, nowhere does this leaflet mention the word "surrender." The communists do not surrender, they simply "cease fighting." A fine point of "face" to the Asian mind.

Surrender passes were dropped all through the war. They were quite effective. Even as the North Koreans advanced in July and August of 1950, many used the passes to come over to the UN side. There was a sharp rise in surrenders when the North Koreans were stalled on the Taegu-Pusan perimeter, and even more after MacArthur’s Inchon landing. The Communist soldiers were threatened with reprisals against their families if they surrendered and reminded that they would be shot by their own troops if seen crossing the lines, but still they came. After one North Korean soldier said that six more of his comrades would surrender but had no leaflets, a sentence was added to subsequent versions stating, “You do not have to have a copy of this certificate to surrender.” Some enemy soldiers stated that the signature of General Douglas MacArthur convinced them that promises of good treatment would be kept.

Another General MacArthur Safe Conduct Pass

Another MacArthur surrender pass bears the United Nations seal at the top. The leaflet is colored in a prominent red and black and should stand out on a snowy Korean hillside. The text in English, Korean and Chinese is:

SAFE CONDUCT PASS

ATTENTION ALL SOLDIERS OF THE UNITED NATION FORCES

This leaflet guarantees humane treatment to any North Korean desiring to cease fighting. Take this man to your nearest commissioned officer at once. Treat him as an honorable prisoner of war.

By command of General MacArthur.

Leaflet 1018

A third General MacArthur safe conduct pass coded 1018 bears the U.N. flag at the top and a certificate insuring safe conduct and signed by MacArthur at the bottom. The leaflet explains to the North Korean soldiers exactly how they are to surrender. It gives them four rules to follow:

1. Leave your unit at night. When daylight comes, move toward the U.N. or Republic of Korea lines.
2. Come in by road or trail if possible. If not, come in across open country.
3. Come in with your hands over your head, so that U.N. soldiers will know that you are surrendering.
4. You do not have to have a copy of this certificate in order to surrender.

 

A General Ridgway Safe Conduct Pass

General Ridgway signed another leaflet similar in appearance to the MacArthur safe conduct pass. This leaflet has the same message in English Chinese and Korean. The text is:

SAFE CONDUCT PASS.

Soldiers of the UN forces: This certificate guarantees good treatment to any enemy soldier desiring to cease fighting. Take this man to your nearest officer and treat him as an honorable prisoner of war.

Matthew B. Ridgway
General, U.S. Army
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.

 

A Second Ridgway Safe Conduct Pass

Another safe conduct pass signed by Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway is coded 7045. The text on the front is in Chinese and Korean. The Chinese text is:

Guaranteed Safety Ticket

The above text in English is the Allied Army Commander Ridgway’s signature. Commander Ridgway ordered the Allied soldiers to welcome and protect you. We ask you to stop fighting immediately and then you will be well treated. The writing to the left is Commander Ridgway’s translation in Korean.

The back depicts three photographs of happy prisoners-of-war. There eyes have been blocked out so they cannot be identified and their families placed in jeopardy. Hiding the faces of prisoners is always a two-edged sword because the enemy can claim that they were not truly Chinese. The Chinese text is:

A Wise Chinese Soldier’s Story

I ran as fast as I could to the Allied army side after I was wounded. The friendly Americans immediately gave me medical aid.

I was then quickly moved to a medical hospital. I got the best treatment and medicines in the hospital. I quickly got well.

My partner and I eat together, wear clean clothes and live in a nice house.

Their eyes were covered because we have to protect their family’s safety.



A General Van Fleet Banknote Safe Conduct Pass (Chinese)

This signed General Van Fleet safe conduct pass was produced in the form of a banknote by the Psychological Warfare Section (PWS) of the Eighth U.S. Army. The note was “To be printed in color (red) to approximate a North Korean 100 won bill. The North Korean soldier will then be able to hide this pass among his North Korean money.” The artwork is a reproduction of engraving used on Korean currency; with the United Nations flag; Eighth Army patch, and official Eighth Army chop. The leaflet was prepared in several different forms, in both the Chinese and Korean language. The square “chop” below the Eighth Army patch reads in Chinese:

Good care guaranteed by the U.S. Eighth Army.




Leaflet 7039

One theme that is not mentioned but that is very interesting is the traditional friendship between the United States and China. During WWII the U. S. supported the Chinese fight for independence against their Japanese occupiers. Leaflet 7039 was prepared by the Military Intelligence Section, Far East Command General headquarters. It targets the Chinese forces in Korea. The leaflet stresses the traditional friendship between America and China. The front of the leaflet has two panels. At the top an American is depicted carrying two sacks and two boxes of food and medical supplies to a flood-stricken Chinese family. The lower panel portrays an American and Chinese soldier, side by side, at an airfield during WWII. The text is:

IN THE TIME OF FLOOD...

....AND DURING WORLD WAR TWO...

....CHINESE AND AMERICANS WORKED SIDE BY SIDE AS BROTHERS.

The back is all text:

When China suffered flood and famine, the American people sent food and medical aid. 

During World War Two Chinese and Americans joined hand in hand to fight aggression.

There has always been true friendship between the Chinese and American people.

The Americans and other peoples of the United Nations forces are friends of China. They have no wish to kill the Chinese people. 

It is only the Chinese political officers who try to deceive you.

HOW LONG WILL YOU LET THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL OFFICERS TURN BROTHER AGAINST BROTHER?



Leaflet # 7126 - Korean family leaflet

The second theme is surrender and you will stay alive to return to your home after the UN forces win the war. Leaflet coded 7126 shows a Korean family waiting and wondering if their son, husband, father will ever return home alive.



"The UN troops treat them good."

This leaflet shows a happy North Korean and depicts the life of a smiling prisoner of war.





Leaflet # 1276 - Inferior Equipment

The third theme is the superior equipment of the UN Command. Leaflet 1276 is entitled "Inferior Equipment" and dated 2 February 1953. It is targeted at the North Korean Army and civilians. The front depicts a 76.2mm divisional gun, M1902/30, labelled "The North Korean Army has this." The second gun is a modern 152mm howitzer M1943, labelled "The Chinese Army has this." The text is, "The North Korean Army weapons are inferior to the Chinese Army weapons." The back has a sketch of Mao eating rice labelled "Korea." The text is, "The Chinese give inferior weapons to the North Korean Army and keeps the best weapons for itself. Why? To keep North Korea weak, so China can swallow Korea like so much rice. North Korean people! Now you know why the Chinese Army gives the North Korean Army its inferior weapons! The Chinese Army is your real enemy!"

  

Leaflet 7079

The black and red leaflet 7079 is targeted at the Chinese Army and the theme is to accentuate the enemy's fear of U.N. artillery. The front depicts a single Chinese soldier in the center of a giant target. The leaflet was disseminated on 24 August 1951. The text is:

DEATH IS COMING!

The back depicts a large hole in the ground caused by an artillery explosion:

Death that comes at you continually. It comes with the sun. It comes with the rain. It seeks you out in the night.

THE SWIFT AND DEADLY ARTILLERY SHELL.

It will soon find you with its purr of death and will kill you as it has killed so many of your comrades. How many artillery shells did you hear yesterday? Will you live to hear them again tomorrow? Death is coming, soldier.

Death is coming - UNLESS YOU COME OVER TO THE UN FORCES WHO ASSURE YOU OF GOOD TREATMENT, GOOD FOOD AND SWIFT MEDICAL ATTENTION.



Leaflet 8202

It wasn’t only death by artillery that the communists feared. Their morale could also be attacked using the theme of death from aircraft. This leaflet depicts a diving U.S. fighter (it looks like the old F-80 “Shooting Star”), but the nose of the aircraft has been changed to that of an attacking hawk. It chases a terrified Communist chicken. The leaflet was printed by the Psychological Warfare Division of EUSAK and coded 8202. It was designed to destroy Communist troop morale by pointing out their lack of air support and that the United Nations Forces ruled the skies. This is very similar to WWII propaganda when the Americans asked the Germans, “Where is the Luftwaffe?” A secondary benefit of such propaganda is that an embarrassed Communist Air Force might take to the skies allowing the Allies to shoot down and destroy more of the enemy. Some of the Korean Language text is:

WHERE IS THE COMMUNIST AIR FORCE?

Day and night United Nations aircraft sweep the skies of North Korea. They search in vain for the Communist Air Force, but find the skies as empty as the promises of your leaders.

The few Communist aircraft that dare to raise their wings flee from the UN challenge as a chicken before a hawk.

The UN Air Force shall continue to dominate the skies, unafraid, challenging, and eager for an opponent.

Curiously, this same leaflet appeared in the April 1952 issue of Air Force Magazine in the “Letters to the Editor” section. A U. S. Air Force Colonel writes in regard to an earlier article in the February issue of Air Force Magazine and says in part:

Recently Eighth Army in Korea produced the only leaflet to date exploiting the psychological impact of air power. This leaflet tells the Reds that despite their leaders’ promise of air support at the front, U. N. aircraft sweep North Korean skies in vain, searching for the Communist Air Force.

This leaflet depicts a “Shooting Star” because that was one of the most modern American fighters early in the Korean War. In fact, the USAF entered the war with WWII prop-driven P-51 Mustangs and Navy F-4U Corsairs. The Communists introduced the MiG-15 Fagot and it was the finest fighter of the war until the introduction of the American F-86 Sabre-Jet. This leaflet was issued again later in the war with an almost an identical image and Chinese text coded 8623.



Leaflet 1206

Another leaflet that used the same theme is coded 1206 and dated 10 July 1952. It depicts an explosion caused by aerial bombing. It was part of the campaign named “Plan Strike.” To the right of the explosion is:

You were warned!

The back is all text except for the top where a pair of hands is depicted manacled between two hammer and sickles. Some of the text is:

COMMUNIST MILITARY TARGETS DESTROYED

The United Nations Command warned you that targets in this area would be destroyed.

Many of them have been destroyed. Others will continue to be destroyed…

Where is the Communist Air Force?

Did the rulers send their airplanes to protect you? Or, is their talk of an air force just “so much wind?”

Here is another warning. Some of the bombs dropped in the raid will not explode immediately. They are set to go off hours and days later.

Do not go near the danger area. You will only risk your life.

As the war went on, more and more leaflets used the theme of Allied air power and the futility of trying to win the war when opposed by UN air supremacy.

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