PSYOP OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAR

The British might have taken part in at least one rumor [they call them “sibs’] operation. There was a mysterious report of a British helicopter going down in Chile and stories that it was on its way to or from a secret British fighter squadron that had been allowed to prepare an attack base on Chilean soil.  If the Argentineans believed the rumor they would be forced to keep some defensive aircraft to protect the nation from an air attack from the west, leaving less to fight the British in the southeast. It was reported at the time that:

One of the strangest incidents of the war took place involving Chile. About 17 May the Chilean authorities found a burnt out Sea King helicopter near the southern town of Punta Arenas. The crews of three gave themselves up and were returned to the UK to later receive gallantry awards for a number of hazardous missions. Presumably, and as announced by the Ministry of Defense, these include losing their way, ending up 500 miles from the Task Force and destroying their helicopter.

The British quietly gave Chile a number of electronic reconnaissance, fighter and bomber aircraft. In return, the Chilean Army created increased radio traffic along the border to hold the elite Argentine ground forces in place, and the Chilean Navy put to sea under radio silence, a fact sure to make the Argentine Navy very nervous. The British also considered using Chile as a base for commando operations into Argentina and actually planned an Operation Mikado where two C-130 Hercules aircraft would crash land at the Rio Grand Air Base and a SAS squadron would destroy the Super Entendards based there, all the Exocet missiles, and kill all the Argentine pilots.

British Intelligence also got involved in a number of very complicated black operations to insure that Argentina could not rearm itself with additional Exocet missiles. They set up various dummy deals with bankers, front-corporations and arms dealers so that if Argentina tried to buy the weapons, the money might conveniently disappear or the missiles get lost in transit. These operations seem to have been successful.

On the general subject of black operations and rumors, there is an interesting internal rumor that apparently spread among the British sailors of the Falklands fleet. A story went around that the ink on the original propaganda leaflets was specially treated with some kind of pepper solution or irritant. The idea being that if the Argentines decided to use the leaflets as toilet paper to show their disapproval they would get a rather nasty surprise. It was both a prank and something that would ultimately reduce their fighting effectiveness. The individual that mentioned this rumor believes that it is true but it more likely what the Navy likes to call “scuttlebutt.” In reality, the first individual who suffered any kind of medical emergency from using British leaflets would be a propaganda goldmine for the Argentine military who could then warn their troops not to touch the leaflets because they were poisoned by the British. A second rumor that apparently went around the fleet was that the Special Air Service laced the Argentinean water supply with LSD.

The Argentineans were also active. They sent a 3-man team of Marines to Gibraltar to blow up ships of the British fleet. The team of divers was captured by Spanish police (tipped off by British Intelligence) on 17 May 1982 as they were about to attack the tanker British Tamar.

The British Vulcan Bomber

Early in the 1982 Falklands War, the British bombed the airstrip at Port Stanley with Vulcan bombers flying from Britain on marathon, 7,829 mile flights in an operation called "Black Buck." At the time, this was the longest bombing raid in history, using an antique 1960-era bomber that was built to carry atomic bombs to the USSR and had never seen action, with a crew that had never seen combat. In the initial raid the Vulcan dropped a string of bombs with just one actually hitting the runway. The crater was repaired in 24 hours but the effect was a reduction in what aircraft could use the airport. Instead of their best and most modern fighters, the Argentinians could use smaller fighters and still land some cargo aircraft. The better fighters were returned to the mainland to protect airbases just in case the British should decide to come again and bomb their homeland. The mission required 11 fuel tankers. None of the pilots had ever tried to refuel an aircraft in flight, and in fact the machinery had long been dormant. Parts had to be found and rebuilt. There was also a psychological aspect of this impossible bombing raid. It showed the Argentinians that they were vulnerable and could be bombed at any time. It brought the glorious patriotic war home to them. They could die.

After the initial raid, aerial reconnaissance photographs showed numerous craters on the runway, rendering it inoperable. Just as the British had done in WWII to fool the Luftwaffe, the Argentinians had camouflaged the airstrip to make it appear to be cratered, but had continued to use it at night to land cargo aircraft. The British have stated that they were well aware of the deception operation and knew that cargo aircraft were landing at night. Of the five Black Buck raids flown to completion, three were against Stanley Airfield's runway and operational facilities, and the other two were anti-radar missions using Shrike anti-radiation missiles in the Port Stanley area.

The Argentineans were also able to create and use a secret land-based Exocet launch site to attack British ships shelling forces near Stanley. The system was placed on a heavy-duty truck body and powered by a WWII German generator originally designed for searchlights.

Readers who want to know more about these various plots are advised to read The Secret War for the Falklands, Nigel West, Little, Brown and Company, UK, 1997.

LEAFLET OPERATIONS 

The British newspapers and some service members who took part tell of dropping leaflets on the Falkland Islands. There are conflicting reports with other authors and military sites stating that leaflets were not dropped. It seems clear that if there were leaflet missions, that information never reached higher headquarters.

Ian J. Strange wrote of his experiences during the war in The Falkland Islands - Third Edition, David and Charles, London, 1983. He says: 

3 June. Propaganda leaflet raid of Port Stanley. 

On 3 June our diary made special mention that at about 6 a.m. a low-flying aircraft had been heard passing over the back of the town under cover of poor visibility. Later we connected this with the information that propaganda leaflets were being dropped over the Argentine positions. These leaflets, in the form of safe-conduct passes, offered the chance for individual troops to surrender. This was one of the mysteries of the conflict, for we never saw one of these leaflets, and have yet to hear from anyone who did. We wonder if they were dropped in some remote region where they still may be found, or whether instead of dispersing they might have landed in bulk and been quickly destroyed.

Although the British have never confirmed the actual number, we believe that at least four PSYOP leaflets were dropped on the Falklands and have been illustrated in publications. They are entitled "Safe Conduct Pass," "Surrender at South Georgia," "Islands of the Condemned," and "South Atlantic Radio."

The Falling Leaf, The journal of the Psywar Society, says in its autumn 1982 issue:

We understand that all the leaflets were prepared and printed in England and then flown to the Task Force flagship for distribution. Quantities printed, actual dates of dissemination and localities involved as well as which leaflets were dropped are not yet known.

At the time of publication, the Psywar Society researchers had seen four different leaflets. By the winter 1982 issue the Falling Leaf states that there are five such leaflets, but the fifth one is not named. Apparently the five leaflets were exhibited at the British Aerophilatelic Federation’s National Airmail Exhibition held at the Royal Air Force Museum in Hendon, and depicted on a BBC television broadcast entitled “The Best of Collecting Now.”

15th (UK) Psychological Operations Group

The 15th (UK) Psychological Operations Group says on its website:

A limited British PSYOPS campaign was developed during the brief Argentine occupation and subsequent liberation of the Falkland Islands. A radio station was set up on the Ascension Island, known as “Radio Atlantico del Sur” and broadcast to Argentine troops and included music, news and sport. Printed literature including Safe Conduct Passes, were developed but never deployed due to the UK's inability to air-drop leaflets at this time.

The Official History of the Falklands Campaign agrees. It says about leaflets in part:

Another high priority item was the preparation of leaflets for distribution over the Falklands . During the first phase, when there was still uncertainty about the future course of the campaign, three items were produced: a safe conduct pass, a message of inevitable defeat, which took the form of a message from Woodward to General Menendez, and a reassuring letter to the civilian population from the Governor. Later on extra items were produced, announcing the recapture of South Georgia and the opening of Radio Atlantico del Sur. Although 12,000 copies of each leaflet were produced and reached Hermes in time for the landing, unlike the leaflet rounds that could be fired from the big guns of the world wars, a similar capability did not exist for modern field guns so they were never actually distributed.

A British government draft interim assessment for the radio station dating from about 12 May 1982 said in part:

The overall objective of the project for the purpose of this paper is assumed to be purely military. It is defined as: ‘Maximizing the use of radio to persuade Argentinian troops (particularly conscripted troops) currently occupying the Falkland Islands to surrender with minimum resistance at the time when British troops land to re-occupy the islands.’

Several approaches have been rejected as counter-productive: Attempting to diminish or demean Argentinians loyalty to their flag; Trying to convince them that their government is not justified in claiming sovereignty of the Falkland Islands; Attempting to create dissension between officers and other ranks; Excessive reference to hardship caused by inadequate clothing or shelter.

Three particular areas may be selected for positive treatment: The long-standing friendship on a person level between British and Argentinian peoples; The lack of training of Argentinian conscripts by comparison with British troops; The physical isolation of the troops on the Falkland Islands, with particular reference to their friends and families.

CONCLUSIONS: The station must first build up credibility and “audience loyalty.” The advantages of radio’s immediacy will be wasted if either the programming is not ‘live’ or the necessary immediate material cannot be delivered to it. Broadcasts could at least persuade the Argentine conscripts to hesitate for even a fraction of a second before firing on British troops. At best they could, by keeping the hopelessness of their position in the minds of the garrison, persuade an earlier surrender than would otherwise be achieved.

The 2017 Reports adds:

Between 19 May and 15 June 1982 when the project ended, 47 broadcasts were made, three hours each evening between 2300-0200 hours and an hour in the morning between 0830-0930 hours. Argentinian attempts to jam were reported from the second broadcast but monitoring by the Task Force and by the American monitoring station in Paraguay confirmed that these efforts were largely ineffective at stopping broadcasts reaching the Falkland Islands, possibly because the jammers were in the Buenos Aires area.

Bryant Perett says in Weapons of the Falklands Conflict:

A further attempt to undermine the garrison's morale was the printing of leaflets in Spanish urging soldiers to surrender in their own interests and incorporating a safe conduct pass. There is some doubt that they were ever used, for the means of distribution did not exist. The best method of delivery is by means of a shell which bursts above the enemy positions, scattering the leaflets, but this type of ammunition was not available; nor could Harriers be used as a substitute and nor was it worth risking valuable helicopters in the role.

Perett is wrong about the use of artillery for disseminating leaflets. It is not the best method. In fact, it is rather poor. Soldiers tend to keep their head down when being fired upon and are not likely to leave their fighting positions during an artillery attack. It is also difficult to pinpoint the enemy, and the blast of the shell often chars, crinkles and is some case burns the leaflet. Air dissemination is much preferable. More leaflets can be dropped over a much greater area. It is also true that any aircraft that can carry a bomb can carry leaflets, since they can be placed in cluster bomb shells, flare cases, or even specially designed containers.

There are arguments for the dropping of leaflets too. We have the word of a seaman and several British newspapers of the time.

Able Seaman Gunner Kevin Prout of the HMS Hermes said:

I was a Sea Cat director/aimer stationed near the flight deck. The flight crews would often give us the leaflets as souvenirs prior to them being loaded on the Harrier aircraft. I don’t know how they dropped the leaflets at 500 mph but few probably survived considering the conditions ashore. Most of the leaflets were dropped in the early days after the fall of South Georgia. I remember seeing boxes of them but they were gone after a while so I assume that they were all disseminated. I kept a small cache of the souvenir leaflets in my emergency lifejacket bag until I got home.

Authors note: the Sea Cat was the first point-defense missile to enter Naval service.

War in the Falklands mentions the British dropping leaflets on Port Stanley just prior to 11 June in an attempt to avoid further bloodshed:    

For two days Harriers dropped warning leaflets on Stanley, spelling out the reality of the garrison's position.  

The London Daily Mail of 4 June 1982 published a story entitled "Surrender or Suffer Warns Admiral.” It said in part:

Thousands of leaflets urging Argentine troops to surrender were dropped on the besieged garrison of Port Stanley yesterday.

British Harriers flew low over the Argentine trenches scattering the documents - one a letter to the enemy's commander from task force chief Admiral Sandy Woodward and the other a direct appeal to each soldier to lay down his arms.

One of the leaflets includes a safe conduct to allow any Argentine who surrenders through British lines.

The leaflets were dropped in a last ditch attempt to prevent a bloodbath. But the Argentines must move quickly to take up the surrender offer.

The leaflet addressed to the soldiers carried a photograph of the Argentine commander of South Georgia, Lieutenant Commander Alfredo Astiz, signing the surrender document there.

The second leaflet gives the text of a letter sent to the Argentine commander in the Falklands, Brigadier Benjamin Menendez, by Admiral Woodward.

The Daily Star of 4 June had a similar article which said in part;

Harrier jump-jets yesterday plastered the Argentine troops in Port Stanley with thousands of leaflets, urging them to surrender. The leaflets showered down like confetti on the Argentinean positions.

The Falling Leaf adds:

In late May the British Broadcasting Corporation had announced that leaflets had been disseminated by planes of the Task Force over East Falkland. No additional information appeared in the press on the following day so it was believed that this information was not for public information at the time. A phone call to the Ministry of Defense seeking details brought a very evasive and non-committal reply: Yes, we may have dropped leaflets and No, we have no confirmation.

A second newspaper report said that another leaflet mission was carried out over Lafonia in the southern part of East Falkland, which resulted in the immediate surrender of 200 Argentinean soldiers.   

The paperback The Falklands War by the Sunday Times adds:

For two days Harriers dropped warning leaflets on Stanley spelling out the reality of the garrison’s position…

Robert Fox adds in Eyewitness Falklands:

Brigadier Thompson said that leaflets had been drawn up to be dropped over Port Stanley asking the Argentineans to give up honorably as their position was now hopeless…

In Don’t Cry for Me, Sergeant Major, authors Robert McGowan and Jeremy Hands say:

BBC World Service reported that Harriers had been dropping leaflets on Port Stanley…Marines and Paras suggested what should have been written on the leaflets. “Dear Johnny Gaucho. You are done for. Be a good chap and chuck it in, then we can all go home.”

There are so many arguments for and against the dropping of propaganda leaflets during the Falklands War that it would seem impossible to come to a consensus. However, there is at least one report of the leaflet being found on the islands, and this would appear to prove once and for all that some were dropped. Leading Seaman Diver Tony Groom of the Fleet Clearance Diving Team based in the Mine Warfare School in HMS Vernon, Portsmouth, was assigned the task of deactivating bombs, and during his official duties ran across one of the leaflets. He says:

I was serving in the Falklands during the conflict as part of a little known group, the Fleet Clearance Diving Team. Despite our title we did little diving, but a fair bit of bomb disposal. The day after the surrender we were tasked to render a house that was suspected of being booby trapped, safe. In this house I found the "ISLAS DE CONDENADOS," PSYOP leaflet, which I still have. I don't know if it has ever been proven that they were airdropped, but I can assure you this one was. It was found in a house that was still locked up tight due to the fear of booby traps. Besides the leaflet, we also found an Argentine officer’s personal equipment.

Since our original research some further correspondence has surfaced, although it does not really clarify the story. A 9 August 1982 letter from Government House, Port Stanley states in part:

The Civil Commissioner well remembers being involved in the preparation of the leaflets but, oddly enough, we haven't been able to find a single leaflet nor do any of those who were here throughout the occupation remember seeing any.

The Defense Secretariat Division 11 of the Ministry of Defense stated that three leaflets were carried with the Task Force and were available for dropping over the Islands and:

...no leaflets were in fact dropped on the Islands although serious consideration was given to their use and the Task Force Commander had them available. In the event the surrender by the Argentine forces was sufficiently quick for the dropping of leaflets to prove unnecessary.

The Foreign & Commonwealth Office concludes in October 1982:

The Ministry of Defense is rather sensitive about these leaflets because after having been assured by CINCFLEET that they had indeed been dropped, they publicly announced the fact. They later discovered that none had in fact been dropped - the rapidity of the final phases of the campaign made them unnecessary. This in itself would not have bothered them, but in the context of widespread allegations of Ministry of Defense misinformation and generally unsatisfactory relations with the press they have become very touchy about it all.

Since some of the published articles indicate that leaflets 1 and 4 were dropped during the war we will depict them first. We will then show leaflet 2 which was found in a locked house on the Falkland Islands by a Navy bomb disposal expert. Finally, we will depict leaflets 3 and 5 and remind the reader that it is possible that they were not disseminated. At least, no written evidence to support air-dropping has appeared yet.

Safe Conduct Pass
(Image courtesy of Lee Richards)

The safe conduct pass that is reported above to have been dropped on 3 June is printed on blue paper. The leaflet is coded “1” on the front and depicts the Royal Crest of the United Kingdom at the top with the text “SAFE CONDUCT PASS” and the instructions in both English and Spanish within a frame. They are:

 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE BRITISH FORCES 

The soldier who bears this pass has signaled his desire to cease fighting. He is to be treated strictly in accordance with the Geneva Convention and is to be evacuated from the area of operations as soon as possible. He is to be given food and medical treatment if he requires it and then be held in a place of shelter to await repatriation.

 J. F. Woodward
Rear Admiral
Commander British Forces

The back of the leaflet depicts a flag at the top and the following text:

Letter to:
Brigadier General Benjamin Menendez
Commander in Chief of the Argentine forces. 

Undoubtedly you and the readers of this leaflet understand perfectly the serious military situation in which you and the military forces under your command find yourselves at this time. Surely it has not escaped your attention that the British forces under my command have established a dominant presence in the area and that there does not exist even the remotest possibility that your forces can receive aid or be rescued.

It has now reached the point where it has become necessary for you to consider the wisdom and the justification for continuing to resist these overwhelming forces. You must now make a decision about your well-being, that of your troops, and the civil population.

Up until now your behavior has indicated clearly that the preservation of human life is of primary importance to you. I feel certain that this will continue to be a primary consideration for you.

I understand perfectly that before you send me your decision, or before communicating your decision to the forces under your command, you will want to very carefully evaluate your position. Nevertheless, and given the difficulties in internal communications in the islands, I am sending you a copy of the orders given to my forces, which you will find reproduced on the reverse side of this leaflet. 

Rear Admiral John Forster Woodward, Royal Navy.
Commander in Chief of the British forces.

The leaflet ends with the following instructions:

 If you wish to take advantage of the terms offered in this pass you should take the following action:

a.     Lay down your weapon.

b.     Hold this pass in a prominent position

c.      Move forward to the nearest member of the British forces. 

On 29 June 1982, the Daily Telegraph reported that the citizens of Port Stanley were looking to purchase souvenir leaflets asking for the garrison’s surrender, but none had been found. The citizens claimed that they had heard a number of BBC reports of the leaflets being dropped over the town but had never seen any. The article continues: 

One local said he had heard a report that the leaflets were dropped in containers that did not open. He understood Argentine officers simply collected the containers after each drop. 

A ministry of defense or military spokesman was not available to comment yesterday in Port Stanley. There is the possibility that the leaflets were lost in the winds.

 Surrender at South Georgia

The leaflet depicts a photograph of the Argentine commander of South Georgia, Lieutenant Commander Alfredo Astiz, signing the surrender document in the wardroom of HMS Endurance. It is notable that not only did he surrender his army and navy troops, but also the crew of the Argentine submarine Santa Fe. The surrender was photographed and forwarded for world-wide media dissemination. The Ministry of defense then placed it on this leaflet. This leaflet bears the code “4.” The back is all text, depicts the symbol of the H.M.S. Endurance at the top, and says:

SOLDIERS

Your brave companions at arms on the islands of South Georgia have recently returned to their fatherland.  Photographs of them receiving a military welcome with honors and being reunited with their loved ones have appeared in all of the Argentine newspapers (the press).

The Argentine troops recently quartered on these islands surrendered the 24th of April.  Within a short time period they were transferred by sea to the island of Ascencion and later sent by plane to Montevideo.  They arrived in Buenos Aires the 14th of May.

The captain of the frigate, Alfredo Astiz, commander in charge of the forces in South Georgia, becoming aware that the British forces possessed superior armed power, surrendered honorably.  This photo shows him signing the document of surrender.

The British and argentine people are two nations with a traditional bond of friendship encompassing more than 100 years. We do  not want to spill any more blood, but we are determined to do so if there is no other alternative.  More useless loss of life will only create more disconsolate mothers.

Your companions at arms in South Georgia made the right and honorable decision.

You must now do the same.  Think of the danger in which you find yourself.  Your rations and military equipment are in short supply due to the British naval blockade.  Matters will worsen.  Think of your loved ones and your home where they await your happy return.

The Daily Express

The Daily Express of 4 June 1982 depicted the safe conduct pass and Argentine Lieutenant Commander Alfredo Astiz signing the surrender document in an article entitled “Passport to Safety.” Some of the article text is:

On the eve of battle in Port Stanley yesterday the British gave 7,000 Argentinian soldiers a chance to get out and go home. Leaflets showered over the beleaguered garrison by plane told them, “Think of the danger you are in…” The leaflets that floated down from a high-flying Harrier followed a long, two-way bombardment by Royal Navy ships and by artillery supporting the British forces now poised to attack the island capital…

A second leaflet, under the crests of the British ships Endurance and Plymouth, advises the Argentines to think of their “valiant companions in arms” recently on South Georgia who have now returned to their “fatherland.”

In The Battle for the Falklands, Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, Norton, London, 1983, explains why the crew of the Santa Fe was captured. The sub was spotted on 25 April. Three British helicopters attacked it with depth charges, torpedoes and rockets. One missile went through the submarine's conning tower, forcing it to return to land and beach itself near Grytviken.  

The capture of Captain Astiz caused some problems for the British. Hastings and Jenkins explain:

Captain Alfedo Astiz formally surrendered. He was an embarrassing prisoner of war, as he was wanted for questioning by several nations in connection with the disappearance of their citizens while in government custody on the Argentine mainland years earlier. Britain was eventually to return him to Buenos Aires, uninterrogated.

Astiz was suspected to have committed war crimes during his Falklands adventure. Allegedly, he attempted to lure Royal Navy helicopters to land on a helipad he had mined after he had surrendered to British forces. He also is alleged to have encouraged Royal Marines to cross a minefield after he had surrendered. The mines did not detonate as their trigger mechanisms had been frozen solid by the sub-zero weather conditions.

Astiz - The Angel of Death said he killed to save Argentina from left-wing terrorism
Reuters

Note: Decades after I wrote this article, and about 29 years after Captain Astiz was already infamous as a war criminal, he was finally arrested and imprisoned. He was sentenced to life in prison in 2011 for counts of torture, murder and forced disappearance. He was tried again in 2017 and found guilty of involvement in the torture and murder of hundreds of political opponents. Astiz, known as the “angel of death,” has refused to apologize. He said in his defense:

The human rights organizations are groups of vengeance and persecution. I will never ask for forgiveness.

An estimated 30,000 people were killed after a military junta led by General Jorge Rafael Videla seized power in 1976 vowing to rid the country of the threat of communism. During the seven-year campaign of terror, left-wing activists as well as ordinary citizens were illegally detained and killed. Some were killed by firing squad while others were thrown from planes - drugged but still alive - into the Atlantic Ocean.

 Island of the Condemned
(Image courtesy of Lee Richards)

A leaflet not mentioned in the newspaper article is entitled “Island of the Condemned. The front depicts the Falkland Islands surrounded by barbed wire and warships, Harrier jets and helicopters. The image clearly shows that the Argentinean soldiers are trapped and there will be no relief. The leaflet is coded “2.”

The back is all text and reads:

SOLDIERS OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES:

You are completely alone. There is no hope of relief or help from your motherland. You are condemned to the sad fate of defending a remote island. Soon there will fall upon you all the rigors of a cruel and merciless winter and the Argentine Navy is in no any condition to supply you with the reinforcements or provisions that you so desperately need. Your families live with the terrible fear of never seeing you again. You well know that all of this is the honest truth.

WHAT ARE THE REASONS THAT YOU FIND YOURSELVES IN SUCH A CALAMITOUS SITUATION?

Those responsible are the egotists who have named themselves the leaders of Argentina without taking into consideration the wishes of the Argentine people, and who have sent you on a ridiculous adventure, knowing there is no hope of any kind for an end to it. Now, these same leaders look for a way to disguise their stupid incompetence.

SOLDIERS! YOU HAVE DONE ALL YOUR COUNTRY CAN ASK OF YOU!
ONLY THE GENERALS STILL ASK FOR MORE.

IT IS NOT FAIR THAT YOU SHOULD FORFEIT YOUR LIVES TO FULFILL THE
AMBITIONS OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CRAZY ADVENTURE THAT THE WHOLE WORLD SEES AS WRONG.

 

A Message from his Excellency…

The leaflet coded 3 depicts a portrait of the Governor of the Falklands Islands, Mr. Rex Masterman Hunt (Order of St. Michael and St. George). It obviously is meant to raise the morale of the Falklands population and reminds them that the British are on the way and that the ordeal of the occupation will soon be over.

This idea of an exiled leader writing a letter to the occupied subjects is a tried and true method first used by the British in WWII. For instance, after the Germans occupied Norway and Holland, King Haakon VII and Queen Wilhelmina fled to Britain from whence leaflet letters were prepared in their name and dropped over their nations by the Royal Air Force to lift the morale of their people. This letter by the island's governor is an example of the exact same technique. The text on the back is in English:

A Message from His Excellency the Governor Mr. Rex Hunt CMG

The British Task Force is now at hand and has cut the Argentine access to the islands. I am sorry that I cannot be with it in person but am confident that I shall rejoin you shortly.

Your terrible experience under the occupying force will soon be ended. I know that you will continue to be patient and resolute. Do nothing to antagonize the Argentines and stay under cover until the Task Force has liberated you.

My thoughts and feelings are with you all in this final hour of trial before the aggressors are defeated and your freedom is restored.

Best wishes and God bless you.

R. M. Hunt
Governor and Commander-in-Chief
The Falkland Islands and their Dependencies

South Atlantic Radio

The Front of this leaflet is all text: 

Notice to the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands

I have the great pleasure of announcing to them a new radio station.

South Atlantic Radio will transmit news daily from
8:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. on a frequency of 9.71 MHz.

This broadcast will operate like an additional station
to the LRA National Radio of the Falklands.

The back of the leaflet bears the code “5” and the text:

From 8:00 to 11:00 p.m.

R. A. S. (inside a lightning bolt)

9.71 MHz frequency.

The 2017 report offers guidelines for the radio station. We quote in part:

Aim. There is no change to the aim which is the use of radio in support of operational plans, to demoralize Argentine troops occupying the Falklands (particularly conscript troops) so reducing willingness to resist.

Station Characteristics. In order to obtain maximum audience attention Radio Atlantico del Sur is to produce a relaxed modern mixed program appealing to the target audience. Announcers will present themselves as neutral, objective observers of the Falklands situation and other events. But the net effect of the broadcasts must be to increase the sense of isolation felt by the occupying forces.

Every effort is to be made to enhance the credibility of the station. There is to be accurate reporting of world news and sporting events. Broadcasts are to indicate as far as possible an accurate up-to-date knowledge of the Falklands and Argentina. No lies are to be told.

Perrett says in Weapons of the Falklands Conflict: 

During World War II one of the most successful British psywar devices had been a radio station beamed at German troops based in north-western France. Known as Soldatensen der Calais, it was listened to because its news broadcasts were truthful, while those of Dr. Goebbels' radio stations were not.

Having acquired its audience, Soldatensender Calais insidiously set about undermining the confidence of the troops in their leaders and even in their own weapons. Argentina having promptly jammed the BBC's World Service transmissions on the outbreak of hostilities, it was decided to set up a duplicate of Soldatensender Calais, on Ascension Island, beamed specifically at General Menendez' garrison on the Falklands and known as Radio South Atlantic. 

The anti-Argentine Atlantico del Sur propaganda radio operation was not a great success. It first broadcast on 19 May 1982 at 2300 using the Ascension Islands relay Transmitter. The British Broadcasting Corporation issued this press release the same day:

The Ministry of Defense this morning contacted the BBC to make available one of the transmitters at the Atlantic relay station at Ascension Island… The BBC will accordingly make a transmitter available to the Ministry of Defense for its own broadcasting purpose.

This public statement effectively destroyed any chance the British had to claim that the station was a “black” radio operation broadcasting from Argentina or the Falkland Islands. Glenn Hauser recalls the station in the “DX Listening Digest,” 30 September 2002. Some of his comments are:

The station was operated by Defense Ministry personnel. The station had a magazine format and fake record dedications. Music with a PSYOP theme such as “Chariots of Fire” was regularly heard. The station was subject to front page ridicule in the quality British press; they commented that the announcers were not native Spanish speakers, spoke in a Cambridge educated Chilean accent, the music chosen would not appeal to Argentinean forces and that the station was so obviously phony that it would have no effect. The estimated cost of the operation was 10 to 20 thousand pounds a week. Argentina did jam the station but the jamming was ineffective.

This is a bit different from comments made about radio Atlantico del Sur in the 4 August 2001 DX Listening Digest:

The two speakers, a male and female, were Foreign Office employees who had learned Spanish from a Colombian and thus spoke with pronounced Colombian accents, causing much mirth in downtown Buenos Aires, as they were claiming to be Argentinean! The program apparently had quite a big audience amongst Argentineans with a penchant for unintentional comedy. People at BBC World Service were incandescent with rage at this amateurish operation by civil servants, broadcast on a well-known BBC frequency.

Tim Tyler monitored and taped the radio broadcasts during the war and told me:

I monitored Radio Atlantico del Sur as a short wave radio listener and although there were complaints that the radio did not broadcast effective PSYOP, someone was actively jamming the broadcasts, or at least the broadcasts that I heard and recorded. Due to the way shortwave radio works, it is possible that the jammer did not block the broadcasts being heard on the Falkland Islands or Argentina, though if they had shortwave jamming equipment, I would assume they were smart enough to know the proper placement of the jammer to make it effective. I also remember the British Forces Broadcasting Service eventually set up service (also using BBC transmitters on Ascension Island, I believe) to provide news and entertainment to their troops deployed to the Southern Atlantic during the crisis, and I monitored them too. I also monitored the United States Air Force aircraft shuttling Secretary of State George Shultz between Buenos Aires, Washington DC and London as he tried to negotiate a truce.

The Official History of the Falklands Campaign States that the proposal to establish a radio station in the South Atlantic came from the SPG in late April. The operation was code-named MOONSHINE. The station would be aimed at soldiers and their families, with a popular music and news of interest to the Falklands. It would broadcast for four hours each day. Radio Atlantico del Sur was tasked with persuading Argentine troops currently occupying the Falkland Islands to surrender with minimum resistance. It would refer to the long-standing friendship between the British and Argentine Peoples, the lack of training of the conscripts compared with British troops, the physical isolation of the Islands, the lack of medical facilities, the fear of British special forces, and disillusion with the Junta. It would not demean or diminish loyalty to Argentina, or argue against the sovereignty claim, or attempt to create dissension between officers and ranks. The project was approved on 18 May and the first broadcast was made late the next day. The project lasted until 15 June, by which time 47 broadcasts had been made, three hours each evening from 2300-0200 and an hour in the morning from 0830-0930.

Researcher Lee Richards found more data on the British Propaganda radio station and wrote on his website in November 2015:

Radio Atlantico del Sur was a Spanish language radio station operated by the UK Ministry of Defence as part of its psychological operations campaign conducted for Operation Corporate – the recapture of the Falkland Islands following the Argentine invasion in April 1982. The radio station, known as ‘Project Moonshine’ within the Ministry of Defence, was operated by a specially created group called the Media Assessment Team (MAT). The station broadcast from studios in Mayfair, London, via a requisitioned BBC transmitter on Ascension Island. Its first broadcast was on the evening of 19 May 1982 and continued for 47 broadcasts until 15 June.

Chris Greenway wrote an interesting blog about the Falklands radio campaign in a 27 November 2017 article called “No lies are to be told” or...When MOONSHINE became PINOCHIO (sic). He says in part that on 28 April 1982 a document called SPG 20 was the initial proposal by the Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) Special Projects Group (SPG) to set up a radio station to broadcast to Argentine forces in the Falklands. A revised version of SPG 020 was circulated the following day. In an attempt to answer the Foreign Office's objections to the proposed radio station, the SPG issued a further revised document –"Special Projects Group - Paper No 6" – on 3 May. The code-word for the radio operation was “Moonshine.”

In early May, RAdS's civilian manager, Neil ffrench-Blake, wrote the document “Programming - Interim Assessment” containing his suggestions for the station's objectives and methods.

In general it is proposed that “Radio Atlantico del Sur” should present itself as relatively neutral and not too partial. It will not however carry any Argentinian claims for losses of men and equipment unless these have been verified by British sources. It will not be feasible to conceal the station’s British connections (identification of the site of the transmitter alone will give the game away). Nevertheless it is believed that a number of techniques can usefully be employed to build a sense of confidence in the station.

In mid-May, after much argument between the MoD and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), with the BBC totally against another radio station that might besmirch their credibility, a formal proposal to set up Radio Atlantico del Sur was put to the War Cabinet. It said in part:

This project envisages the use of a BBC transmitter on Ascension Island to broadcast to the Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands and, to a lesser extent, on their mainland coastal bases. The aim will be military and designed to maximize the use of radio to demoralize Argentine forces (particularly conscripted troops) currently occupying the Falklands, reinforcing its sense of isolation, and so reducing the willingness of the Argentine garrison to resist any landing.

A seven-point plan was written explaining the philosophy of the radio station:

Propaganda means truth, not lies.

Truth is more powerful than lies.

Disinformation used only under particular circumstances, when no other means are available.

The BBC does not have a monopoly on truth.

The World Service does not have total audience appeal.

Dirty tricks are not part of our language.

Our objectives are military, not political.

On 20 May 1982, a “Media Assessment Team Directive” was written that said in part:

The Media Assessment Team (MAT) is the cover name for the radio station which has been formed under the authority of the Overseas and Defence Committee, South Atlantic…Ministers have agreed to this radio station on the understanding that no lies will be told and that the output should be such that any accusations of "black propaganda" can be refuted.

There was a bit of intrigue to all this infighting. In order to get the station started the name of the project was changed, apparently without telling the opponents of the station so that they would not get to read any of the updates and were very much out of the loop.

To take the pressure off, we removed all opponents to the scheme, including from our circulation list, and changed our code name [from Moonshine] to "Pinoccio" [sic]. This somewhat idiosyncratic spelling of the deceitful Italian puppet was in honor of [Argentine President] General Galtieri's long nose and as a special tribute to the nature of his propaganda.

In another Chris Greenway blog a former “anonymous” member of the radio staff talks about his work:

Some years earlier, when working freelance for the BBC, I had been sent to interview Neil ffrench-Blake about one of his business ventures. I know from my diary that Neil came to my house on the evening of 17 May 1982. He discussed the Falklands War and the radio station he was putting together to broadcast to the Argentinean invaders. I remember he asked me if I was patriotic.

On Wednesday morning, 19th May, at 7 a.m. Neil drove to my house and picked me up. I had no idea where I was going or what I would be doing or even when I would be back. I merely knew it was to do with a Falklands radio station. As we drove into London, Neil explained that he had put a team together to broadcast to the Argentinean soldiers and had “acquired” two Argentinean-Spanish speaking military people to do the broadcasts, as well as a small back-up team. We arrived at the then BFBS (British Forces Broadcasting Service) premises at Kings Buildings in Dean Stanley Street and went to a small suite of offices on the first floor on the left at the top of the stairs. It had “Media Assessment Team” on the door. The story was that we were assessing the various media reports on the war for the Ministry of Defence. While our offices were upstairs at Kings Buildings, I remember the studio as being in the basement.

My role was to write suitable news stories, based on the news of the day, but always upbeat and pro-British, though not excessively so. These were then translated into Spanish and broadcast. Our first broadcast was that evening (19 May) at 11 pm. Neil had chosen a lilting theme tune, the sound track from a film. We were excited when we were able to tune in to the repeater station on Ascension Island and hear the echo of our broadcast, so we knew it was going out. I had a Ministry of Defense pass and may I have gone to the Ministry building in Whitehall a few times for meals. I also had a car pass and commuted from home every day, parking my car on Horse Guards Parade. I worked for probably three quarters of the days of the remainder of the war and remember the last day when news of the cease-fire came through. We felt both elated at, hopefully, having played some small part and at the same time a sense of letdown, or “end of term”. Everything was quickly cleared up and soon there was nothing left to show of our time there.

We had ordered T-shirts and sweat-shirts, with our slogan of “Bringing truth to the front” on them. I remember that mine were sent on to me later since they had not arrived by the time the war ended – I still have them.

Neil ffrench-Blake

Journalist Stewart Purvis, who covered the Falklands conflict in 1982, also interviewed Neil ffrench-Blake who made the motto of the station, "Bringing truth to the front." I have edited the text for brevity and moved a few things around to try and get some order to the comments. He said in part: 

Blake set himself up as a consultant on radio, but this was a cover for a deal he had done with the secret British Intelligence Service MI6. He would travel the world, places like the Middle East and Afghanistan and report back to them on what he had seen. He said “ I consider myself one of the foremost experts in the world on Psychological Warfare because I have actually done it. Few people have.” Our station had great effect on the Argentine soldiers, they were conscripts not professional soldiers. We knew they loved football so we would call up the stadiums in Argentina just as the game was ending and get all the latest scores. The moment the game ended we announced the scores. We had the scores on the air before any Argentine station did. There was even a soap opera called "Two old men," where Pablo and Pancho talked about the world as they saw it. They often mentioned how if they were in the Falklands, they would surrender at the first opportunity to save their lives. Once the British took prisoners, their names were read out on the radio. Purvis was surprised to hear that although the staff was made up of military and civilian amateurs without any radio background, the staff was always called by civilian name, and rank was never used. After 47 days of broadcasts the Argentinians raised a white flag and the station was immediately shut down. Within 24 hours the offices were empty and there was no trace of a radio station ever having been there. The only thanks the staff of the station received was a souvenir T-Shirt and Sweatshirt.

Souvenir Propaganda Radio Station T-Shirt

Purvis was allowed to go through Blake's wartime files. Some were marked "Secret US Eyes Only." I found that odd. It implies the U.S. was more involved than we believed. The documents show that Blake worked for both British Intelligence and the CIA. Spanish language radio scripts were found in the files. One document explained the general plan:

The use of radio as a non-violent weapon and a powerful persuasive medium to support military operations was reckoned to be particularly appropriate in this situation. It was in accordance with the government’s policy of using minimum force and could well result in saving lives. It was proposed that a BBC transmitter should be taken over in Ascension for 4 hours of daily broadcasts. The broadcasts would be prepared in London and transmitted live (via satellite and land links) On 18 May 1982 the project was approved and the first broadcast was made on 19 May 1982.

Another document said:

Propaganda – Truth, not lies. Truth is much more powerful than lies. Disinformation is used only under extraordinary circumstances, when no other methods are available and crucial to save lives.

When the war was over Neil Blake later ran clandestine radio stations for the CIA in Southeast Asia.

Even as the Argentinians were playing propaganda tapes over the Falkland Island radio station, the British were working on a project, they called Operation Moonshine. They needed someone to run the project and MI6 told them that Blake was the man for the job. A list was participants in the program was found by Purvis and he spent the next eight years tracking them all down. Three men were allowed by the British government to talk about the project.

One of the men, Major Terrance Scott was born in Chile and fluent in the South American version of Spanish. Once the radio station started he was given an Argentine-sounding name and announced as Jaime Montero. He would use anything to weaken the Argentine morale, and at one point he talked up the threat of the deadly Gurkhas and their Kukri knives. He reminded their young troops that once a Gurkha drew his knife, it must shed blood. He said in part:

I was at an intelligence course and someone came and said to me, "Pack your bags. You are off to London tonight." I entered an unknown London building and was tested on my Spanish. I asked why I was being tested and was told, "We will tell you at the end of this interview." At the end I was told that the British were going to launch a propaganda Radio station in the Ascension islands that would broadcast in Spanish. We would broadcast grey propaganda, not attributing yourself as anybody, but appearing to be on their side. We used a rumor that the Argentinians were eating the local sheep and were facing an outbreak of blood liver fluke. We went into detail of the awful symptoms of this disease. We wanted them to go on sick call. We were saving British lives. At one point the station offered a prize of a candlelit dinner with Mariana Flores, my cousin, also from Chile, who was acting as a female host on the station.

Jim Warrack was called by Blake personally. He added:

I got a call from Neil and he wanted me to come to London now. Neil was very vague, I thought it was something to do with studios. Blake later told me, "We are going to get the Falklands back and make sure the Argentinians don’t stay there. We will tell them that our boys are coming and they are not going to win."

David Addis got a personal visit from Blake who asked, "Are you patriotic?" He said he was and found himself in London the next day. He said: 

The purpose of the station was to tell the Argentine troops that they were going to lose because they were up against troops with greater knowledge and ability. I pointed out it is a long way from London to Ascension but Blake said  that had been sorted out. We set up a link to Ascension. It was a short-wave link and it was "Rubbish!" We also had a phone link and that was lovely. The first thing I did was switch to the phone line which gave a far better signal. We needed advice on Argentinian music so we called up Tim Rise who wrote "Don’t cry for me Argentina." We never talked about politics. Our priority was to convince the Argentine troops not to fire on the British, and to convince them to surrender. The day the war ended the colonel came in and said, "That’s it boys, we’re off, the BBC wants their transmitter back." 

The British station was located at Dean Stanley Street, SW1, City of Westminster. Surprisingly, everyone was against the propaganda radio station. The Foreign Ministry hated it thinking it would be a competitor to the BBC, and Margaret Thatcher’s own Press Secretary was sure it would not work and cause nothing but trouble for Britain. He even called it "Dirty Propaganda." The politicians had clearly forgotten how devastating the British propaganda radio was to the Germans in WWII. And even in WWII the politicians for the most part had been against it. 

At an 18 May 1882 meeting hosted by Margaret Thatcher the British decided that they would land a force of the Falklands Islands and fight a land war. The next order of business was the controversial radio station and the minutes show that:

The radio station was likely to be disowned by the BBC, but it could have a valuable psychological effect on the [Argentine] garrison and therefore save British lives. Margaret Thatcher looked at it and said, "Do it!" 

Apparently the British Ministry of defense never investigated how effective the radio station was. No Argentinian was asked his opinion of the station. Purvis visited Argentina to question some veterans of the Falklands War. One vet said: 

We liked the music. We were young. And the Beatles, some of us were born when they were around. We all knew it was propaganda and we assumed from Ascension because that was a British Army’s refueling base and we assumed the Americans would let them set up there.

We should also note that at the same time the Argentineans had taken over the Falkland Islands radio broadcasting station, renamed it “Liberty,” and put TV News anchor Silvia Fernandez Barrio known as “Argentine Annie” on the air. This station operated from 2 April to 26 June 1982. The anti-British propaganda broadcasts actually originated on a military base Northwest of Buenos Aires near the Paraguayan border, although it claimed to be based on the Falkland Islands. Argentina established a “National Sovereignty Network” on 8 April to consolidate all Argentine broadcasting during the crisis. The short wave-facilities from Cable & Wireless on the Falklands were used to relay Radio Nacional Malvinas and to carry unscrambled radio telephone traffic to Argentina. Glenn Hauser adds in regard to Liberty:

The opening and closing announcements were broadcast over a lush orchestral version of “Yesterday.” The announcer said, “I am Liberty and I am speaking to you from the heart of our Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich Islands. I am a voice, a spirit, a country. I am now as ever a woman who is proud that the world listens when Argentina speaks.”

Argentine Annie - Silvia Fernandez Barrios

I have listened to some of the Argentine programs and the female Silvia Fernandez Barrios who later worked on the channel 2 of Buenos Aires has a very sexy voice. Some of her radio comments after a rousing Hollywood orchestral version of the entrance of the chariots into the Roman Colosseum from Ben Hur were:

That was a good war tune, but it belongs of course to Roman Empire days. And empires today are not what they were, are they Mrs. Thatcher?

To my dear Susan, your boyfriend is on the Exeter. I am Liberty and I know that he is so far all right. Anxious of course and a little disappointed at all this useless waiting onboard. Our boys [The occupying Argentine Army] are waiting comfortably. Of course, they are on their native land on firm ground; well fed. They aren’t the 600,000 head of sheep that are here on our Malvinas Island, or the property of the Falkland Island Company. I can assure you that since all of this started on the 2nd of April, we have not taken a single piece of land, not even during Easter. And if you don’t believe me, ask Ted in your next letter, and that is if he gets any letters of course.

Although the Argentineans were never able to drop propaganda leaflets on the British during the short conflict, there were some cases where patriotic groups prepared pro-war leaflets for the Argentine public. They were meant to unite the people to defend the islands that they so recently occupied. They are internal consolidation and morale-building leaflets

At least two leaflets were prepared by the Group for the Defense of the Malvinas. Both are printed in the sky-blue color of the Argentine flag on cream-colored paper. In both cases an Argentine postage stamp overprinted “The Malvinas are Argentina” has been placed on the leaflet and cancelled in Buenos Aires with the first day of cancellation date, 22 April 1982.

The attack is against the Argentine people

The first leaflet depicts the islands and a text in regard to the British fleet:

The attack is against the Argentine people. To organize resistance is our duty. They gave their lives for the Malvinas Islands.  

Captain PEDRO GIACHINO
Corporal PATRICIO HUANACS
Soldier MANUEL ALMONACID
Soldier JORGE AGUILA  

We don't want to win more

The second leaflet depicts the Islands and the text:

We don't want to win more. We want to defend what is ours. We trust our armed forces.

At first glance this second message doesn't seem to make sense, but I believe that what they are saying is:

We do not have aggressive aims on any further lands, and we just want to defend our islands.

When I first sat down and wrote this article in 2007, I was aware of eight very colorful cartoon leaflets prepared by the Argentinians for their own people's morale, I depicted them below at that time. In 2022, 15 years later, I discovered that the original set of colorful leaflets were 19 different images distributed in the streets of Buenos Aires city in 1982. It took 40 years for the entire set to become available. They were offered for sale on eBay for $365 and for the patriotic Argentinian that seems a bargain. The owner states:

They are printed by Traditional Offset print of 3/4 solid colors (no halftones) over thin alkaline paper. They measure about 7 x 5.5-inches each.

Not even the gulls

Another anti-British Argentine leaflet depicts an armed British soldier in full dress uniform and a Falkland Islands sea gull. The gull points seawards and says:

Go away. No one wants you on these islands, not even the sea gulls